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Abstract 
After the turmoil of the 1890s shearing contractors eliminated some of the frustration 
from shearers recruitment. At the same time closer settlement concentrated more 
sheep in small flocks in farming regions, replacing the huge leasehold pastoral 
empires which were at the cutting edge of wool expansion in the nineteenth century. 
Meanwhile the AWU succeeded in getting an award for the pastoral industry under 
the new arbitration legislation in 1907. Cultural and administrative influences, 
therefore, eased some of the bitter enmity which had made the annual shearing so 
unstable.  
 
Not all was plain sailing. A pattern of militancy re-emerged during World War I. 
Shearing shed unrest persisted throughout the interwar period and during World War 
II. In the 1930s a rival union with Communist connections, the PWIU, was a major 
disruptive influence. Militancy was a factor in a major shearing strike in 1956, when 
the boom conditions of the early-1950s were beginning to fade. The economic system 
did not have satisfactory mechanisms to cope. Unionised shearers continued to be 
locked in a psyche of confrontation as wool profits eroded further in the 1970s. This 
ultimately led to the wide comb dispute, which occurred as wider pressures changed 
an economic order which had not been seriously challenged since Federation, and 
which the AWU had been instrumental in shaping.  
 
Shearing was always identified with bushworker ‘mateship’, but its larrikinism and 
irreverence to authority also fostered individualism, and an aggressive ‘money-
making’ competitive culture. Early in the century, when old blade shearers resented 
the aggressive pursuit of tallies by fast men engaged by shearing contractors, tensions 
boiled over. While militants in the 1930s steered money-makers into collectivist 
versions of mateship, in the farming regions the culture of self-improvement drew 
others towards the shearing competitions taking root around agricultural show days. 
Others formed their own contracting firms and had no interest in confrontation with 
graziers. Late in the century New Zealanders arrived with combs an inch wider than 
those that had been standard for 70 years. It was the catalyst for the assertion of 
meritocracy over democracy, which had ruled since F
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SECTION I 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Rural Context 
 
 
Chapter 1:  Introduction 
 
Contracting and Arbitration 
 
Sheep shearing is a distinctively ‘Australian’ occupation. Shearers characteristically 
combined elements of fierce egalitarianism with determinedly competitive work 
instincts. Strictly a male domain for most of its history, women were only integrated 
in any meaningful way in the 1970s. Shearing sheds have generated some intriguing 
episodes in labour history, and a colourful folk history adds to the mystique of 
shearers. Their involvement in twentieth century rural life and customs has been 
relatively neglected. Changing patterns of land use affected where they went and what 
they did, but also altered social alignments and attitudes.1 Much of what happened 
was routine, if coloured by the rich and often humorous tales of a life which was 
arduous, but on the whole relished by those who lived it. Inevitably, though, shearers 
were sometimes (or often) in conflict with their employers. Many booms and busts 
shaped society’s overall approaches to reaping the rewards or sharing the burdens 
between profit and wages.2 In the shearing industry stereotyped roles from the past 
regularly clashed with changing reality. Wool was so critical to Australian prosperity 
that these issues are of some general interest.  Consideration of the nature of the work 
and the workplace (the woolshed) with broader themes about the rural societies from 
whence woolgrowers and the shearers mostly came, is worthy of further study. 
 
Organisations representing shearers and woolgrowers played major roles. The 
Australian Workers’ Union (AWU) and the graziers associations were the relevant 
employee and employer collectives.3 Both coveted centralised control over the 
thousands of geographically isolated woolsheds where shearing actually took place 
according to an annual seasonal ritual. Both had origins in the ferocious woolshed 
labour disputes of the late-nineteenth century, which are well-known and extensively 
interpreted. The strikes of the 1890s have often been portrayed as climactic 
                                                
1 See Chapter 2, ‘Land Settlement and the Size and Location of Flocks 1900-1980’. 
2 See Chapter 3, ‘Riding the Sheep’s Back: Wool in Prosperity and Depression’. 
3 The AWU was nationally organised with regional branches. The Queensland Branch, especially, was 
inclined to act independently. Woolgrowers were more fragmented. Grazier associations were State 
based, although coordinated on some matters through the Graziers Federal Council. In addition there 
were State based organisations of mixed (mainly wheat) farmers representing smaller woolgrowers. 
See Chapter 2. 
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confrontations of labour and capital.
4
 The union and woolgrower organisations were 
natural adversaries, suggesting social class was an important motive for regulation, 
but a more subtle understanding may be appropriate.  Shearers and graziers regularly 
interacted in dispersed woolsheds of the outback and agricultural districts. There, 
although they played roles as members of their allotted ‘class’, behaving as ‘squatters’ 
or ‘farmers’ or ‘bush unionists’ or ‘union troublemakers’ or ‘cockie shearers’, as the 
case may be, they also exhibited humanity in its complex diversity. Varying degrees 
of intimacy were possible. Large and small woolsheds generated different 
interactions. Very often the same shearers went to the same sheds, year upon year, or 
worked for the same contractor. There were opportunities get to know each other’s 
virtues, prejudices and foibles.  
 
At the beginning of the twentieth century two notable developments shaped the roles 
of these peak bodies, both also responses to the turmoil of the 1890s. One came from 
the ‘bottom up’, with minimal official encouragement from the pastoralists, and 
certainly none from the AWU. A system of private contracting quickly became the 
dominant means of recruiting shearers and organising shearing. I will argue that 
contracting was enormously adaptable, and belied the stereotype of warring classes.
5
 
The other development could hardly have been more different, and if anything 
reinforced class division. It came from the ‘top-down’ instinct that shearing sheds 
needed codified rules to function peacefully. A system of judicial arbitration created 
the Pastoral Industry Award in 1907 to dictate rates of pay and a long list of very 
strict conditions governing the shearing process. Arbitration was supposed to be 
neutral, although whether it served either woolgrowers or shearers more favourably 
was always subject to various opinions. The contract system determined who was 
hired and where they went, and was quite independent of centralised intervention. 
Arbitration decided what they were paid and what the conditions were. It was a 
curious division of responsibility – the one laissez faire in character, the other almost 
                                                
4 The pacesetter for this point of view is Brian Fitzpatrick, The British Empire in Australia: An 
Economic History 1843-1939, Melbourne University Press, Carlton, Vic., second edition, 1949 (first 
published 1941), pp. 219-28. There have always been, and continue to be, differing interpretations. For 
an  insightful summary, Melissa Bellanta , ‘16 August 1890: The Maritime Strike Begins: On utopia 
and “class war”’, in Martin Crotty & David Andrew Roberts, Turning Points in Australian History, 
UNSW Press, Sydney, 2009, pp. 74-86. 
5 See Section II, ‘The Rise of Contract Shearing’. 
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obsessively interventionist.
6
 The two systems coexisted reasonably successfully, 
although there was spasmodic dysfunction and bitter confrontation. Even at the best 
of times the regular harmony of shearing routine was often qualified by a simmering 
underlying mood of distrust which neither contractors nor the Arbitration Court 
seemed capable of eradicating.7  
 
Contractors did not always follow the terms of arbitration rigorously. The tendency to 
ignore award provisions could ignite the ire of either the AWU or the Graziers 
Association, but quite often eased problems at the woolshed level. Graziers and 
shearing gangs would ignore their organisations if they thought it was ‘common 
sense’ or ‘unavoidable’. The geographically scattered nature of shearing meant that 
strict compliance was difficult to ensure. The underlying larrikin strain in Australian 
culture may have had something to do with this.8 Contractors had an ability to read 
the mood of shearers and graziers, and to broker effective outcomes even if they were 
not entirely amicable. AWU organisers on the spot, too, had this ability.  If they 
departed from the official line it was sometimes ‘common sense’, but it could also 
reflect a combative or militant streak. Departing from the leadership line, however, 
ran a grave risk of a shortened union career.  
 
The story of shearing through the twentieth century is enlivened by individuals and 
groups who, from time to time, disregarded rules. It is quite a varied list. It included 
powerful and independently minded pastoralists who resented their association 
interfering in private decision making. Small farmers tended to want to use family 
members and often had access to local labour which was more loyal to them than to 
the union. Militants, well aware of collective power of the ‘them and us’ mentality of 
shearing teams, were eternally attracted to the idea that ‘direct action’ was more 
effective than arbitration. There were enough mini-victories to sustain the delusion 
that industry-wide strikes could succeed. This was a persistent challenge to the 
                                                
6 The 1907 case required 22 days of evidence and the judgement ran to 45 pages. The extent of 
regulation is demonstrated in the following example: ‘In opening the fleece at the neck and belly the 
machine or both blades of the shears shall be kept under the wool and close to the skin, so as to avoid 
cutting, and the shearer shall not be allowed to run the machine or the shears through the fleece so as to 
break it down the centre or the back, and shall not stand on the fleece.’ CAR, Vol. 1, 1907, p. 65. 
7 See segment in Chapter 7, ‘ “Undercurrents”’. 
8 See extensive discussion below of Russel Ward, The Australian Legend, Oxford University Press, 
Melbourne, paperback edition, 1966, (first published 1958). Also C.W. Bean, On the Wool Track, 
Sirius Books, Sydney, 1963 (first published 1910). 
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AWU’s pro-arbitration policy for the entire interwar period, extending into the 
1950s.9 At the other end of the ideological spectrum, there were shearers not in the 
least rebellious, concerned primarily with making money, and broadly sympathetic 
with the graziers’ point of view. These types, usually ‘gun shearers’ capable of 
shearing large tallies, complained less often about arbitrated rates of pay, but objected 
strenuously to rules which inhibited output.10 Thus early in the century many shearers 
owned their own handpieces despite the union rule against it, and in the 1970s the 
wide comb ban was frequently flouted.11  
 
Arbitration, of course, was a cornerstone of the wider post-Federation economic 
system and governed many workplaces throughout Australian society. Debate about 
its efficacy was, and is, lively.12 The system experienced much legislative fine tuning, 
but attempts to seriously dilute or abolish arbitration never failed to galvanise the 
labour movement’s opposition.13 This is worth noting because radical factions in the 
labour movement often claimed arbitration was a legalistic straightjacket which 
reinforced capital’s hegemony over labour. A well established labour history tradition 
argues likewise. When arbitration was on the line, however, they fought for its 
retention. Employers were less enthusiastic, although in the shearing industry, 
Graziers Association support became as fundamental as the AWU’s.14 Against a 
backdrop of dissent by militant unionists this consensus persisted until the 1970s.  In 
the changing political climate of the 1980s woolgrowers’ faith evaporated as they 
embraced ‘free market economics’, while the AWU’s loyalty to arbitration was 
doggedly reinforced. The result, after a bitter struggle, was that the balance of control 
in shearing sheds shifted in favour of the heretics.
15
      
 
 
 
 
                                                
9 This is intensively examined in Section III, ‘The Arbitration System and its Enemies’. 
10 Introduced in Chapters 2, 4, 5, 8 & 9. 
11 See segments in Chapter 4, ‘Blades or Machines’, and Chapter 10 ‘History of the Wide Comb Ban’. 
12 See, for example, Stuart Macintyre and Richard Mitchell (eds.), Foundations and Effects of State 
Compulsory Arbitration 1890-1914, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1989. 
13 For example, the Bruce Government was swept from office in October 1929. See Chapter 3. 
14 The effectiveness of the Graziers’ Co-operative Shearing Company in the 1922 strike proved 
decisive. See Chapter 6. 
15 See Chapter 10, ‘Mateship’s Last Stand: The Wide Comb Dispute 1970-1990’.  
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Nineteenth Century Background 
 
The wool trade was a vital constituent of the Australian economy for a century and a 
half. The more enterprising spirits who found themselves in NSW in the 1790s were 
eager to enrich themselves, and wool delivered the kind of opportunity they craved.16 
The Australian wool industry dates from the very early 1800s and by the 1830s it was 
a creature of Britain’s nineteenth century industrial transformation. Ever more bales 
were absorbed as factories switched from water to steam power, ships gravitated from 
sail to coal to oil, and cables replaced sea-borne mail.17 The critical factors in 
Australia were unoccupied land (Aborigines were brushed aside), and a capacity to 
mass produce and ship a raw material with a receptive market in the woollen mills of 
northern England. British capital financed pastoral expansion and its sophisticated 
commercial infrastructure. It was not trouble free. Trade cycles and droughts wrecked 
havoc from time to time and fortunes were lost, but wool always bounced back. A 
century later, wool’s imprint was plainly visible in a new nation and modern 
economy. Britain ceased to dominate woollen manufacturing in the twentieth century, 
yet Australian merino wool retained its pre-eminence. Primarily, wool was about 
money, but it was also bound to have profound cultural implications.
18
 
 
The sheep shearers of Australia performed the essential task of harvesting wool. They 
were a highly mobile workforce, travelling from woolshed to woolshed, and they 
occupied a largely male world in which non-deferential and egalitarian attitudes were 
formed. Long before the Australian ascendancy raw wool production had been highly 
commercialised, but European shearing methods bore the stamp of bucolic tradition. 
There was surplus labour, estates were closer to markets and less urgency 
accompanied wool harvesting. Sheep were tied by the legs to prevent them escaping. 
Farm labourers, often women, sat around on stools clipping the staples. Australian 
squatters were not the first to have large flocks but the imperatives of mass 
                                                
16 As early as 1792 John Macarthur said prosperity lay in the ‘export of some raw material which 
would be produced with little labour, be in considerable demand, and be capable of bearing the expense 
of a long sea voyage’. Quoted in Samuel Wadham, R. Kent Wilson & Joyce Wood, Land Utilisation in 
Australia, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, Third Edition 1957 (first published 1939), p. 12. 
17 Geoffrey Blainey, The Tyranny of Distance: How Distance Shaped Australia’s History, Sun Books, 
Melbourne, reprint 1974 (first published 1966), pp. 207-27.  
18 John Merritt, The Making of the AWU, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1986, pp. 3-11. W.K. 
Hancock, Australia, The Jacaranda Press, Brisbane, 1961 (first published 1929), pp. 1-23; Fitzpatrick,  
British Empire in Australia, pp. 33-36, 43-45. 
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production, bulk shipping to faraway places, and scarcity of labour in the colonies, 
meant that these laborious methods would not do. This was the genesis of the 
Australian woolshed and its highly streamlined shearing system, which dates from the 
1840s.
19
 By the 1880s giant sheds with 50 stands, or even 100, were commonplace. 
The woolshed was often compared to a factory, designed as it was to facilitate the 
flow of sheep from mustering yards into the catching pens.20 There was constant 
bustle and movement; everything was coordinated. The process was unique. Although 
rooted in agrarian tradition the ideology of industrialisation drove its evolution.21 
Shearers revelled in this, and tales of shearing in the ‘old country’ never failed to 
arouse considerable mirth in the antipodes.
22
 
 
Shearing was also done for money. Australian rural labourers were recent arrivals as 
were the pastoralists. There was no equivalent of the English field labourers living for 
generations in rural districts, whose unhappy dilemma was to flee to the burgeoning 
industrial cities or to roam the countryside scraping whatever employment modern 
agriculture offered.23 Progress in Australia was more often beset by labour shortage. 
Early pastoralists were assigned convicts but, Aborigines aside, there was insufficient 
labour in the outback for this critical undertaking after transportation ended.
24
 The 
problem was complicated by its seasonality – on the very largest stations shearing 
might last two months, but often less. Permanently employed station hands attached to 
properties could not cope with the mammoth assignment, and a system of itinerant 
shearing labour developed. The shearing process itself was deceptively skilful as well 
as demanding endurance and strength. It took time to become a successful shearer and 
not everyone could. By the 1860s shearers were often struggling farmers hungry for 
money to improve their blocks, and they hated rich landholders into the bargain. If 
                                                
19 Richard Waterhouse, ‘Shearers and the Birth of Mateship’, Chapter 4 in Alan Mayne (ed), Beyond 
the Black Stump, Wakefield Press, Kent Town SA, 2008, p. 116. 
20 Bean, On the Wool Track, p. 54. 
21 Merritt, Making of the AWU, pp. 38-41; Hume Dow (ed), Trollope’s Australia, Thomas Nelson, 
Melbourne & Sydney, 1966, p. 98.  
22 John Martin, ‘Control in the Shearing Shed: the Introduction of Machinery and Changing  Workplace 
Relations in New Zealand’, Labour History, Vol. 69, May 1992, pp. 72-3; The Worker, 30/7/1908, p29; 
A.D. Fraser, This Century of Ours, Dangar, Gedye and Malloch Ltd, Sydney, 1938, pp. 158-62; 
Richard Perry, I went a’Sheperding: Chapters in the Life of a Sheperding Naturalist and His Wife in 
the Western Highlands and Islands, Lindsay Drummond, London, 1944, p. 96.    
23 E.P. Thompson, The Making or the English Working Class, Penguin Books, 1968 (first published 
1963), pp. 233-58. 
24 Why Aborigines were not employed as shearers is an open question beyond the scope of this inquiry.  
There were Aboriginal shearers in Western Australia before World War I, see Chapter 9. 
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squatters wanted sheep shorn shearers had to be enticed out to the woolsheds. They 
developed a strong insider/outsider group mentality and could exert leverage against 
pastoralists.25 If the ‘Captain Swing’ riots in southern England in 1830 are loosely 
comparable with the Australian shearing strikes in the 1890s as examples of angry 
rural uprisings, the point is made.26 Both were put down, but the subsequent success 
of the AWU as a powerful voice for bushworkers had no close parallel in England.  
 
The wool industry’s raw economics did not obviate its romantic appeal in narratives 
of the spread of white settlement. A vibrant folklore grew, and shearing cultural 
traditions have long been linked with the Australian outback. Despite its strict 
division of labour along ‘industrial’ lines, shearing occurred in isolated rural settings 
and was governed in some respects by quintessentially agrarian rhythms. Keen 
anticipation accompanied mustering and preparation of the shed. Shearers arrived and 
swapped yarns. The mood of the shed evolved as early anxieties folded into a daily 
routine. As cut-out neared a more relaxed atmosphere and light-hearted jousting was 
not unusual. Post-shearing rituals surely owed something to old European traditions of 
celebrating the harvest.27  
 
One of the threads of shearing culture was mateship. There is considerable debate 
about what this actually meant, but at its most personal, mateship was the male 
camaraderie which accompanied common experience. A strong sense of ‘them and 
us’ gave mateship a sharper edge. Widened to encompass social class, it has been 
linked to unionism and the solidarity this brought to demands for fair treatment.28 It is 
recognisable in the celebrated ‘fair go’ embedded in Australian attitudes to 
workplaces. Mateship was mostly consistent with money-making, but it had 
poisonous undertones. The mentality of insiders and outsiders could be vicious in its 
denunciation of those who acted independently of group custom. 
 
                                                
25 Waterhouse, ‘Shearers and the Birth of Mateship’, pp. 116, 118. 
26 Fitzpatrick, British Empire in Australia, pp. 22, 225; E.J. Hobsbawm, Captain Swing, 1969. 
27 For example, Myrtle Rose White, Beyond the Western Rivers, Seal Books, Adelaide, 1969 (first 
published 1955), pp. 151-8.   
28 Mark Hearn, ‘Mates and Strangers: The Ethos of the Australian Workers Union’, in David Palmer, 
Ross Shanahan & Martin Shanahan (eds), Australian Labour History Reconsidered, Australian 
Humanities Press, Unley, SA, 1999, pp. 18-37; Roger McDonald, Reflecting Labor: images of myth 
and origin over 100 years, National Library of Australia, Evatt Foundation, Canberra, 1991. 
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Another thread was the renowned competitiveness of shearers. This arose from 
piecework payment and the incentives it created to work fast. Links to yeoman 
farming reinforced this.29 However, the go-getting streak had traction far beyond the 
crude tenets of money-making. It was, indeed, another dimension of mateship. There 
was endless discussion of tallies and records of different kinds, and chiacking over 
victories and defeats.30 Like footballers rivalries were fierce but they also joked about 
them. Competitiveness, though, was closely tied to individual ambition, and had 
considerable potential to clash with mateship in its ‘union solidarity’ form. Shearers 
were often at war with each other, rather than the squatter or shearing contractor. 
 
Historiography of Conflict and Resolution  
 
General histories treat the shearing strikes of the 1890s as key events in a tumultuous 
period which led to the formation of the Labor Party, crystallised Australian 
nationalism, and shaped the post-Federation political economy.
31
 By contrast, shearers 
are seldom mentioned in histories of the twentieth century.32 Regional histories of 
Queensland, where the AWU played a major hand in political affairs, invariably 
mention the 1956 strike as one element of a larger drama, the disintegration of the 
State Labor Government in 1957.33 Overall, though, having been attributed a starring 
role in the opening act of the national story in the 1890s, shearers were not written 
into subsequent episodes. Even during the wool boom of the late-1940s and 1950s, 
coalmining strikes seemed of greater moment.  
 
Twentieth century shearers no longer registered, presumably, because shearing was no 
longer at the cutting edge of labour history as it had been in the 1890s. Urbanisation 
became the driver of mainstream economic and social life. The coal mining strike of 
1948, for example, was a more momentous event than the 1956 shearing strike 
                                                
29 Waterhouse, ‘Shearers and the Birth of Mateship’, p. 118. 
30 Merritt, Making of the AWU, pp. 57, 67. 
31 Bellanta , ‘The Maritime Strike Begins’.  
32 C.M.H. Clark, A History of Australia, Vol.  V, Melbourne University Press, Melbourne, 1981, 
covering the period 1888-1915 contains 11 indexed references to ‘shearers and shearing’. Vol. VI, 
1987, covering 1916-1935 contains none. See also indexes of Stuart Macintyre, A Concise History of 
Australia, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999; and John Rickard, Australia: A Cultural 
History, Longman Cheshire, Melbourne, 1988.  
33 Ross Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland: From 1915 to the 1980s, University of Queensland Press, 
St. Lucia, Qld., 1984, pp. 139-53; Raymond Evans, A History of Queensland, Cambridge University 
Press, Port Melbourne, Vic,, 2007, p. 208. 
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although both involved vital industries.
34
 It is not as if shearers disappeared or failed 
to live up to their reputation as distinctive ‘characters’. Certainly, they were a 
relatively small, declining, and sometimes difficult to define group, but the ongoing 
influence of wool in the economy might have been expected to generate more interest. 
Shearers may have been swept to the margins of social life but their circumstances 
were far from dull. Nor were they, it is argued, irrelevant to our understanding of 
broader social shifts. 
 
Extensive coverage of nineteenth century shearers provides an important starting 
point. John Merritt’s history of the formative period of the AWU contains detailed 
chapters on methods of shearing, woolshed organisation, and shearers’ social 
backgrounds.35 Although a diverse bunch, they emanated largely from the 
smallholdings of rural eastern Australia.  Raymond Markey has also dealt with this is 
some detail.36 Merritt has usefully and succinctly summarised this picture in a recent 
article, highlighting shearing’s links with smallholder ‘opportunism’ and aspirations 
for social advancement.37   
 
If professional historians have written relatively little, references in the popular press, 
in personal and family memoirs, travel writing, and local histories are voluminous. 
Shearers write autobiographies and are willing subjects for oral history whereas 
plumbers and carpenters are rarely troubled to reveal the minutiae of their working 
lives.38 Patsy Adam-Smith’s popular book The Shearers , published in 1982, is a more 
comprehensive and cohesive treatment in this category. The focus is largely on the 
larrikin tradition and anecdotes from the woolshed. It assembles a massive amount of 
material on shearers’ lifestyles, and captures the underdog spirit of shearing culture, 
and also its infectious participatory energy: 
It is an industry where the whole team works to maximum capacity. Many actions appear 
mechanical or set to a rhythm, due to the high intensity of concentration by all taking part; 
                                                
34 The Chiffley Federal Government was defeated in 1949, the Gair Queensland Government in 1957. 
Strikes were not the only, or even the main cause of electoral loss, but industrial unrest contributed to 
overall impressions of economic disorder.  
35 Merritt, Making of the AWU, Chapter 1, ‘The Pastoral Industry, 1860-1911’, Chapter 2, ‘Shearing 
and Shearers in the 1880s’, and Chapter 3, ‘The Shed Floor in the Mid-1880s’. 
36 Raymond Markey, The Making of the Labor Party in New South Wales 1880-1900, University of 
NSW Press, Kensington, NSW, 1988, pp. 57-67. 
37 John Merritt, ‘Shearers, Mountain Stockmen and The Australian Legend’, Journal of Australian 
Colonial History, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008, p. 62. 
38 See bibliography for a list. 
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they can usually anticipate another person’s actions. It is this rhythmic pattern that makes 
watching a shed in action so hypnotic.39 
Despite this, Des Williams, an historian of competition shearing in New Zealand, 
considers it inexplicable that an Australian champion of the 1960s, Kevin Saare, is not 
mentioned at all. By contrast, the treatment of the strikes in the 1890s, is extensive, 
and strikes in 1930 and 1956 each have a chapter devoted to them. One of the 
inspirations for the book was her own grandfather, who was a selector-shearer from 
Victoria.40 Hearn and Knowles’ study of the AWU contains significant sections with 
relevant but fairly generalised material about shearers’ lives and social backgrounds.41  
 
Whereas Merritt, Markey  and others opened the way for shearers to be seen more as 
acquisitive populists than class warriors, sporadic scholarly journal articles and labour 
studies deal primarily with industrial disputes and conflict. The ‘red and black which 
[Brian] Fitzpatrick had splashed about’ has had more enduring appeal.42 Stuart 
Svensen’s study of the 1891 strike in Queensland is meticulously researched and 
engagingly written, but its repeated assertions that conspiratorial and devious 
capitalists orchestrated events, while ruthless acts of violence and arson by unionists 
are forgiven as understandable indiscretions for the cause, tarnish its historical 
value.
43
 Only very recently has a more balanced assessment of what happened in 1891 
appeared.44 
 
Andrew Moore’s article on the communist shearing union of the 1930s, the Pastoral 
Workers’ Industrial Union (PWIU), is widely quoted.45 This useful analysis is also 
handicapped by the author’s doctrinaire Marxist perspective. Graziers are condemned 
as class enemies of the shearers but, if this was ever an adequate representation of 
complex social interaction, it fails to recognise changes in rural society after 
Federation. Moore’s accurate recognition that there were, indeed, shearers willing to 
shear during strikes  is contemptuous in tone, dismissing them as ‘a distinctive labour 
                                                
39 Patsy Adam-Smith, The Shearers, Nelson, Melbourne, 1982, p. 323. 
40 Adam-Smith, Shearers , p. vii. 
41 Mark Hearn and Harry Knowles, One Big Union: A History of the Australian Workers Union 1886-
1994, Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1996, pp. 25-7, 68-70, 150-6, 174-80, 244, 303-4. 
42 Bellanta, ‘The Maritime Strike’, p. 75. 
43 Stuart Svensen, The Shearers' War : The Story of the 1891 Shearers' Strike, University of 
Queensland Press, St Lucia, Qld., 1989. 
44 Peter & Sheila Forrest, Bush Battleground: Barcaldine 1891, Shady Tree, Darwin, 2009. 
45 Andrew Moore, ‘The Pastoral Workers’ Industrial Union 1930-1937’, Labour History, Vol. 49, 
November 1985, pp. 61-74. 
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aristocracy, piece workers whose position inhibited fraternal relations with the more 
plebeian sections of the pastoral working class and who found the mantle of the “gun” 
shearer and “ringer” of the shed more compelling than class solidarity’.46  
  
Less well known, but more useful, is a series of six journal articles by Kosmas 
Tsokhas.
 47
 These, too, place woolshed conflict at the centre of events. Tsokhas deals 
with the period between 1900 and the 1960s in compartmentalised blocks, thus 
covering chronologically much of the period considered by this study. He argues that 
arbitration, as a means of regulating the terms of shearing, was only as successful as 
the underlying balance of social and economic forces in the woolshed permitted. The 
overall assessment that arbitration made the industry workable seems basically sound, 
although he pays no attention at all to the shifting rural social structure or the effect of 
contracting. His analysis of the strikes in Queensland during World War I and 
subsequent destabilisation of woolsheds in NSW in the early 1920s is incomplete. In 
particular the reasons for the creation of a separate Queensland award in 1920, or the 
formation of the Graziers Co-operative Shearing Company (Grazcos) in 1919 are not 
canvassed.48 Tsokhas’s analysis of simmering tensions during World War II is 
illuminating and gives the lie to Moore’s assertion that the PWIU influence was a 
spent force by the late 1930s.49 Without attributing it explicitly to residual PWIU 
acivists, Tsokhas continues to recognise a ‘rank-and-file’ influence putting pressure 
on the AWU in the early-1950s and as such accurately pinpoints some of the longer 
term causes of the 1956 strike.50 This study makes further use of primary sources for 
the period from 1916 to the 1950s to examine conflict in woolsheds.
51
 
 
                                                
46 Moore, ‘Pastoral Workers Industrial Union’, p. 74. 
47 Kosmas Tsokhas, ‘The Shearing Labour Process 1900-1914’, Labour History, 59, November 1990, 
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Journal of the Royal Historical Society of Queensland, XIV, 7, May 1991, pp. 289-304; Kosmas 
Tsokhas, ‘The Shearing Labour Process in the 1960s’, Australian and New Zealand Journal of 
Sociology, 27, 1, March 1990, pp. 34-52. 
48 Tsokhas, ‘Power, law and conflict’, pp. 218-36. 
49 Tsokhas, ‘The Myth of Wartime Harmony’, pp. 217-30. 
50 Tsokhas, ‘ Concessions, Conflicts and Collusion’, pp. 295-7. 
51 See especially segments in Chapter 6, ‘Shearers and the IWW’, Chapter 7, ‘Busworkers’ Propaganda 
Group’, ‘World War II and Communist Influence’, and Chapter 8, ‘Militants after the War’. 
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The wide comb dispute of the 1980s is relatively recent. Tsokhas did not choose to 
produce a seventh article, although it was a fresh issue in the early-1990s when most 
of his work was published. Hearn and Knowles provide a segment titled ‘“Bringing 
Back the Raddle”: the Pastoral Industry 1980-1993’. This portrays the AWU’s side of 
the story, accurately addresses the role of the National Farmers Federation (NFF), and 
identifies the ‘New Right’ dimension.52 The writers, however, are unable to explain 
unionist sentiment. In dismissing motivations of shearers who wanted wide combs, 
they appear to share the adage that perhaps money is not everything,  
It was more ‘logical’ to shear with wide combs. But there was something wrong, something 
changing; many AWU shearers could not put their finger on the precise disturbance.53 
Paul Williams’ study of the breakaway Shearers and Rural Workers Union provides 
some illumination of the anti-wide comb point of view, but is even more partisan and 
fails to address attitudes of other shearers.
54
  
 
A key objective of this study has been to account for the emergence of shearing 
contractors before World War I, and their consolidation by the 1920s. Initially a 
response to industrial unrest in the 1890s, it quickly became the dominant form of 
shearing organisation. Contract shearing has been largely taken for granted although 
there are two exceptions. Merritt’s book on the foundation of the AWU describes the 
first attempt at contracting by J.H. Young and examines prior attempts to centralise 
the recruitment of shearers. His narrative ends around 1911, by which time 
contracting was firmly established. The AWU’s feud with the Machine Shearers and 
Shedhands Union (MSU) early in the twentieth century, for which Merritt is 
effectively a primary source, concerned the joint advance of contracting and machine 
shearing around which there was considerable controversy.55 A little known paper by 
Irwin Young introduces a new form of contracting arising in country towns in the 
1920s.56 Young’s father was a shearing contractor based in Glen Innes during the 
                                                
52 Hearn and Knowles, One Big Union, pp. 304, 309, 313-319. 
53 Hearn and Knowles, One Big Union, p. 341. 
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critical period between 1900 and 1920 when land use patterns and flock sizes were 
being transformed.57 Andrew Moore mentions only ‘the special brand of sycophancy 
practiced by shearing contractors’, a comment which shows no realistic appreciation 
of who contractors were and how they functioned. Contract shearing proved its 
durability despite often expressed antipathy to it from unionists, and a degree of 
scepticism from graziers. 
 
Competing Legends 
 
The Australian Legend by Russel Ward, published in 1958, linked the traits of 
irreverence and egalitarianism to the ‘mateship’ that had grown up amongst 
bushworkers in the nineteenth century.58 The argument was that the very harshness of 
the outback and the ‘nomadic’ work patterns drew men together into a culture of 
mutual sharing. Ward contrasted the collective tendency in Australian society with the 
competitive individualism of the American West founded on homesteader self-
sufficiency.59 The thesis neatly fitted the radical nationalist view of Australian history, 
which emphasised social turmoil in the 1890s as a platform for the emergence of the 
Labor Party as a cohesive political movement and a challenge to British capitalist 
hegemony. Ward wrote during the long years of the Cold War and conservative 
governments led by Sir Robert Menzies, a noted anglophile. In the minds of radical 
nationalists the national narrative had unfinished business.
60
  
 
Ward further argued that the disappearance of nomadic social patterns in favour of 
settled agriculture gave them nostalgic gravitas, contributing to their survival as 
legends or myths. The ‘somewhat belated discovery of the bushman by accredited 
literary men’, he says, became one of two key influences that allowed the bushman to 
become ‘firmly enshrined in both the popular and the literary imagination’.  Thus ‘the 
extinct bushman of Lawson and Furphy became the national culture-hero’.61 Ward is 
                                                
57 Irwin Young, Theodore: His Life and Times, Alpha Books, Sydney, 1971, p. xv. 
58 Ward, Australian Legend. 
59 Ward, Australian Legend, pp. 242-3. 
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claiming here that up-and-coming nationalism needed suitable narratives. Nationalist 
writers in the Bulletin seized on the bush as they found nothing sufficiently 
remarkable in urban society. The Eureka ‘rebellion’ hardly amounted to a satisfactory 
war of independence. Depicting Ned Kelly as a republican hero instead of a violent 
rural bandit helped. Anzac was a godsend because digger virtues were widely 
interpreted as originating in the bush. These connections are all acknowledged in The 
Australian Legend, including mention of a newspaper claim cited in C.E.W. Bean’s 
official war history that ‘by April 1915 there had been enrolled 12,000 shearers and 
station hands, members of the Australian Workers Union, and [only] 1,000 bank 
clerks’.
62
 AWU opposed conscription but this did not inhibit Jack McNeill, arguing 
the AWU’s claim in the 1927 Pastoral Award case, from mentioning it: ‘I may say in 
passing that whilst the war was on 40,000 members of our union enlisted, and they 
included some of the pick of Australian bushmen.’63 Even members of the communist 
PWIU were not immune from these sentiments. A radical shearer who went to the 
Spanish Civil War taunted the fascist captors of his republican battalion in February 
1937, just before they blew his head off: ‘If we had ten thousand Australian bushmen 
here, we'd drive these dogs into the sea.’64 
 
Whether nostalgia alone could sustain a national ethos is arguable, but values 
associated with the ‘legend’ (or at least something deceptively similar) do seem to 
resonate in urban and rural Australia today. Shearers were not only central to the 
legend, they continued to be economically important in the twentieth century.65 Like 
everyone else they had the practical challenge of making a living in the society they 
belonged to. At the same time they were bearers of the nostalgic ideal - in a sense they 
were ‘living legends’ and a lot of shearers’ behaviour reflected it.66 Nonetheless, the 
fact that they travelled out to the shearing sheds belied their categorisation as 
itinerants. More accurately they were settled members of farming communities who 
happened to go out of their local districts for a month or two to make some money 
shearing.67  
                                                
62 Ward, Australian Legend, pp. 54-55, 118, 133, 229-31.   
63 NAA B1958/10 1926/27, Vol 1, Pastoral Award Transcript 1927, p. 356. 
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65 Ward, Australian Legend, pp. 186-193. 213-7. 
66Adam-Smith, The Shearers. 
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In 1978, twenty years after Ward, John Hirst suggested an alternative model for 
understanding ‘Australian’ attitudes, also generated in the bush, but rooted in land 
settlement. The ‘Pioneer Legend’, he proposed, arose from struggles to establish 
grazing runs and farms.68 Pioneers built homesteads and railway stations and schools. 
They were bonded to their districts and not footloose at all. Accumulation of (modest) 
wealth was the embodiment of pioneer values, but they did not entirely ignore 
mateship. Indeed, it was critical to the ethos that neighbours came to one another’s aid 
in times of bushfire and flood, or if children were ill.69 However, the pioneer 
mentality became hostile to trade unions, which Ward had seen as one of mateship’s 
most valuable ongoing legacies. This is a vital distinction. Hirst’s pioneers were not 
immune from notions of disdain for privilege and power, but this followed the 
selector’s desire for land and hostility towards banks and absentee pastoral 
companies. Small farmers were not unsympathetic to the grievances of shearers in the 
1890s but there were limits to the appeal of collectivism.  
 
This observation is not strongly made by Hirst, beyond recognising that the political 
viewpoint of pioneers was ‘conservative’, and suggesting that Ward was over-
reaching the evidence with his assertion of a ‘radical collectivist aspect’.70 It may be 
fair to argue that the legend was ‘classless’ when it was formed in the 1890s as Hirst 
suggests, but acquired anti-labour baggage as time marched on.
71
 Anti-unionism is 
impossible to escape in the behaviour of farmers in the 1930s, who otherwise 
reflected pioneer values. They saw no virtue at all in militant ‘communists’ who 
disrupted coal mines and ports (or for that matter, shearing sheds).
72
 Such 
troublemaking, farmers believed, was imported and not linked to the traditions of the 
Australian bush at all. Indeed, during the 1917 general strike a ‘farmers' army’ from 
the bush assembled at the Sydney Cricket Ground. Volunteers loaded ships and drove 
trains which ‘unpatriotic’ unionists refused to do.73 It is only fair to acknowledge that 
the AWU was also vehemently anti-communist, although The Worker had no love for 
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the farmers' army. There is a ‘town versus country’ dimension to the pioneer 
viewpoint also, which found its strongest expression in the politics of the County 
Party.74 
 
Somehow photographs of shearing scenes look the same regardless of the era. In 
arbitration hearings shearing practices were scrutinised in excruciating detail and 
much the same issues were still being brought up in 1948 and 1978 as in 1907, when 
the first award was made.75 At the end of the twentieth century woolshed routines 
were much as they had been in the late-nineteenth century. The basic layout of yards 
and pens changed little conceptually, although each shearing shed had its own 
particularities and new design ideas crept in. There was evolution in the mechanics of 
shearing equipment and wool presses, of course, and significant innovations in 
shearing techniques. As will be shown, reductions in flock sizes had significant 
cultural implications. But changes inside the shearing shed were not as conspicuous as 
those in the world outside where technological change drove extraordinary social 
transformations.76 Shearers lived in this outside world and it affected how they got to 
the sheds. But the ambiance inside the shed was much was as it had been before 
federation. This was oxygen for romantic legends from the past.  
  
Besides nostalgia, a forward-looking, calculating attitude was often found. In 1917 
W.E. Abbott, a well known pastoralist from the Upper Hunter, implied that money-
making shearers from farming districts were not immune from using unionism to 
force up the price of shearing.  
Thirty or forty years ago shearers were just nomads, who spent their cheques, as soon as they 
were earned, at the nearest pub, and we used to think it was no use to throw good money after 
bad by suing them. That is by no means the case now. I live in a district in which shearers are 
bred. Many of them go out every year to the remote parts of New South Wales and 
Queensland, and put in six month’s shearing at from 30s. to 40s. or 60s. for each working day, 
and almost all of them own property and stock, in some cases worth a good many thousand 
pounds.77 
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During the long and spiteful shearing strike of 1956 Australian parliaments were 
outlets for the frustrations of both sides. A conservative Tasmanian senator resented a 
sermon from the Labor Party about the evils done to shearers by the squatters in 1891 
and 1930. He related a story about a taxi driver boasting that he had been able to earn 
£50 clear a week at shearing, and as a result owned five taxi cabs worth £3000 each. 
Labor interjected , ‘He was taking you for a ride’!78 Stories of big earnings by 
shearers are commonplace, even if some are exaggerated, and others simply 
apocryphal.  
 
Perhaps competing legends simply reflect divisions in rural society. Attitudes to 
unionism, for example, differ between an employer or an employee, a shearer or a 
grazier, a member of the AWU and a Labor voter perhaps, or a supporter of the 
Country Party. There was certainly a pattern of shearing shed tension, but boundaries 
were blurred. Shearers from farming regions were likely to hold pioneering values. 
Bush unionism, at least in part, reflected the populism of land hungry selectors and 
their bitter struggles with drought, governments, and banks. It is significant that both 
Russel Ward and John Hirst felt able to cite the poetry of Henry Lawson and ‘Banjo’ 
Paterson as evidence for their respective legends. Both legends existed sharing some 
things in common. They transmitted nineteenth century images of the outback into 
twentieth century attitudes.79 
 
Legends emphasise virtue, but a lack of scruples was often alluded to. Pastoralists had 
broken strikes in the 1890s with ‘free labour’ (non-unionists) and Whiteley King, 
Secretary of the Pastoralists Union, devised schemes to lock in their loyalty. But a 
letter to the Pastoralists’ Review suggested he was wasting his time. Shearers would 
be ‘free labourers’ on one day and ‘unionists’ on another, it said. ‘The working man’s 
principles are governed by his pockets, and … he will do anything that suits him.’ The 
few that ‘stick to their principles’ were ‘like snow in summer, not often seen’.80 Were 
shearers sufficiently individualistic that neither legend adequately represents them? 
 
 
                                                
78 CPD, Senate, 1956, Vol.9, p. 620. 
79 Common ground is recognised in  Rickard, Australia: A Cultural History, pp. 65, 72. 
80 Quoted by Merritt, Making of the AWU,  p. 213. 
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The ‘AWU Legend’ 
 
It is impossible to ignore the giant shadow of the AWU. Merritt emphasised the 
union’s organisational power rather than what he calls ‘movement’, the spirit of 
collective purpose encapsulated in mateship.81 This is warranted because movement 
without organisation would not have been enough. Apart from disputes with the 
graziers the AWU had to fight breakaway movements on both its Right flank (notably 
the MSU revolt in 1902) and its Left (the PWIU in the 1930s).82 Hearn and Knowles 
analyse the AWU’s institutional history from its founding until about 1990, but they 
also explain that a shearers’ culture defined the mateship ethos of the AWU long after 
it ceased to be primarily a shearers’ union.83 Likewise, the founder’s two published 
works stated the rational argument for the AWU’s existence and philosophy, but also 
claimed ownership of the bushworker spirit.84 In effect, the AWU had written its own 
legend around the experience of the 1890s strikes long before Russel Ward put pen to 
paper. 
 
Scattered occurrences of agitation in woolsheds occurred as early as the 1870s. 
Pastoralists introduced signed shearing agreements in the hope that this would 
facilitate stability, but small regional unions quite quickly led to more ambitious 
schemes to unionise shearers. The Amalgamated Shearers’ Union (ASU) was formed 
in 1886 under the leadership of David Temple, a shearer-activist, and William Guthrie 
Spence, who had already successfully organised mine workers. The time was ripe, 
and enrolments throughout NSW and Victoria were rapid. Parallel initiatives occurred 
in Queensland. The unions aimed to negotiate with pastoralists over the terms of 
shearing agreements, and to confine shearing to unionists. Pastoralists recognised the 
reality of unionism and formed their own organisations (also called ‘unions’ for the 
time being).  Unskilled shed hands were separately unionised (although the leaders 
were the same), but amalgamated into the AWU in 1894. Queensland bush unions 
resisted amalgamation and did not merge with the AWU until 1904. Parochialism 
persisted, especially north of the Tweed, but by the end of the nineteenth century the 
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AWU was spearheading a brand of nationalism within the labour movement which 
resonated well beyond shearing sheds.85 
 
Pastoralists still harboured desires to return to a pre-union past and conferences lacked 
mutual trust. Conservatives were concerned – perhaps paranoiac describes it better - 
at the mobilisation of organised labour in general. The maritime strike of 1890 was 
especially alarming from their point of view. Direct confrontation loomed. The 
shearing unions enjoyed some success through a blockade of wool from Jondaryan 
station in Queensland in 1890, but strikes in 1891 and 1894 ended as bitter defeats. 
These defeats were orchestrated by the squatters in collusion with maritime 
companies and fearful colonial governments, but they were also facilitated by the 
independent streak within the shearing work force. Many colourful incidents of the 
strike period arose from pastoralists attempting to secrete ‘scab’ labour to the 
woolsheds – the burning the Rodney river steamer in 1894 being perhaps the best 
known example. The other side of this coin probably has not had the emphasis it 
deserves. It was relatively easy for Whitely King to recruit shearers in Victoria and 
New Zealand who were prepared to work sheds if they could be protected from union 
pickets. 
 
The genius of the AWU was that defeats inspired recovery and survival. The union 
became a successful participant within the emerging labour arbitration system, for 
which Marxist historians and militant activists have consistently condemned it.86 Not 
everything about the AWU was admirable, and its reputation for ballot-fixing and 
cynical manipulation is largely deserved, but its ideological critics seem unable to 
accept that a radical union could not have survived given the diverse constituency of 
shearers. Unlike Merritt, Russel Ward places most of the emphasis on ‘movement’. 
He argues that ‘the phenomenally rapid growth of [the ASU after 1886] probably 
sprang from the bushmen’s already existing ethos rather than from the organising 
genius and missionary zeal of prominent leaders’. He then quotes Spence:  
                                                
85 Merritt, Making of the AWU, is the main source for this and following paragraphs; see also Stuart 
Svensen, The shearers' war : the story of the 1891 shearers' strike, University of Queensland Press, St 
Lucia (Qld), 1989. 
86 V. Gordon Childe, How Labour Governs: a study of workers’ representation in Australia,  
Melbourne University Press, Parkville, second edition 1964 (first published 1923); Humphrey 
McQueen, A New Britannia : an argument concerning the social origins of Australian radicalism and 
nationalism, Penguin, revised edition 1978; Moore, ‘Pastoral Workers’ Industrial’, p. 62. 
 27 
Unionism came to the Australian bushman as a religion. It came bringing salvation from years 
of tyranny. It had in it that feeling of mateship which he understood already, and which 
always characterised the action of one ‘white man’ to another.87 
The full passage goes on to note the profound importance placed on being ‘true to 
Union rules’ and the irreparable distrust of anyone who ‘ “scabbed” on his fellows’, 
even to the point that ‘at many a country ball the girls refused to dance with them’.
88
 
This is presented as firm evidence of the connection between mateship and unionism. 
The rapid emergence of shearing unionism in the late-1880s was certainly remarkable, 
but it could not have been sustained without robust attention to organisation. At the 
time of Spence’s retrospective interpretation (1909) the union had just weathered a 
serious revolt from its non-militant Right wing. The AWU was embracing arbitration 
and, in practical organisational terms, distancing itself from its more militant past.
89
 
At the same time it was perfecting a style of rhetoric that made it sound more radical 
that it really was. The union maintained a cultivated envy of the grazier class and a 
belief in social redistribution. The Worker frequently reported valuations of deceased 
grazier estates with irony and a racy style which surely mirrored the talk of shearers 
who knew the stations and had shorn at them. The wry humour of the idiom, however, 
was more in fun than hard core class hatred.
90
 While there was undoubtedly a 
groundswell of common feeling in bush unionism, organisation was the AWU’s key 
asset. Shearers with ‘principles’ were ‘like snow in summer’ as the Pastoralists’ 
Review ruefully observed. However, the union worked hard to foster a union spirit 
that appealed beyond blatant self-interest. 
 
While the AWU wallowed in nostalgia to create a mythology of mateship, it was also 
forward looking. The essence of Laborism was to advance the wellbeing of working 
people through ‘progressive’ legislation, enforceable wage awards, and state 
investment in technology, education and health. Figure 1-1 was published in 1910. 
This was the age of the bicycle and long before motor cars were widely used by 
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shearers, let alone aeroplanes.
91
 Travel was fundamentally important to shearers and 
the message of social progress merges with the gospel of unionism. However, the 
illustration is more concerned with justifying union newspaper projects. The old 
Hummer newspaper of the ‘fighting days’ was already obsolete while the Labor Daily 
and a monthly magazine would, it was predicted in the cartoon, soon supplement The 
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Figure 1-1: Worker Illustration 1910 
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Worker. Conference approved an extra levy to finance it. The imagery was impressive 
but not everyone was persuaded. The labour movement believed (with justification) 
that metropolitan newspapers were biased, but the AWU plan to establish a daily 
newspaper was a sore point in some shearing sheds. Both Right wing and Left wing 
factions in the grassroots objected to money being diverted for political purposes. 
Shearers were willing to buy membership tickets but there was resistance to the 
‘Labor Daily levy’.
92
  Moreover, the newspaper venture turned out to be a long and 
very sorry tale of financial mismanagement.93 
 
Ward’s Australian Legend provides a framework within which this idiosyncratic 
union can be understood. However, Ward was hardly born when the union was 
already writing its own remarkably similar legend.94 This was repeated over and over 
at AWU conferences, and especially by union organisers as they went around 
shearing sheds enrolling members and preaching the faith. The AWU legend was 
enjoying one of its most potent periods after the 1956 strike when Ward was writing 
his famous book.95 Ward thought better of mentioning it – perhaps wisely foregoing 
the temptation to comment on current events in a work of history. The posthumous 
rewards were substantial, however, as The Australian Legend now has legendary 
status of its own, although many scholars judge its argument flawed.96 Interestingly, 
there is little evidence that the AWU looked favourably on The Australian Legend 
when it appeared in 1958, or that it noticed its publication at all.
97
 Was this a sign that 
the AWU did not need academic professors (and a radical with past associations with 
communism at that) to tell its own stories?   
 
The national egalitarian ethos was evocatively expressed by Joseph Furphy in Such is 
Life – ‘temper democratic, bias offensively Australian’. AWU’s aggressive 
championship of the underdog captured much the same spirit, but it carried illiberal 
                                                
92 The Worker, 31/8/1910, p. 3; 21/9/1910, p. 3; 4/11/1911, pp. 5, 7. 
93 Clyde Cameron,  ‘When Incompetence and Corruption Merge: the AWU and the World Newspaper’, 
Labour History, No.70, May 1996, pp. 169-81. 
94 Ward was born in 1914. He died in 1996. 
95 See Chapter 8. 
96 An Australian Historical Association Conference at the University of New England in September 
2007 commemorated the fiftieth anniversary of publication of The Australian Legend. SMH, 
29/9/2007, p. 28; Journal of Australian and Colonial History, Vol. 10, No. 2, 2008 is dedicated to 
discussion of Russel Ward’s legacy. 
97 This point was discussed at the Australian Historical Association Conference, which the writer 
attended.  
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undertones. As Peter Coleman put it in 1962, the powerful concept of mateship might 
have arisen out of ‘genuine democratic emotion’, but it had a dark side, ‘the snarl of 
the collectivist bully’.98 
 
The Nature of the Work: ‘Speeding-up’ and Competitiveness 
 
The absence of eye-catching innovation does not mean that woolgrowers were 
technologically unadventurous. Far from it. They readily embraced everything from 
artesian bores to aeroplanes, and if a way had been discovered to streamline shearing, 
graziers would have adopted it. The most obvious modernisation, machine shearing, 
dated from 1888.99 Pastoralists embraced machines because they believed initially 
that it would free them from the tyranny of militant unionists. However, machine 
shearing turned out to be uncannily difficult to master, and full automation proved 
illusive. Militants and cocky shearers delighted in the fact that woolgrowers never 
succeeded in automating the shearing process.
100
 It gave them self-respect, but it was 
also a reminder to all concerned that they were not to be mucked around with. 
 
Two studies, both published in Labour History in the early-1990s, attempted to apply 
sociological work theory to the shearing process.101 One was presented by John 
Martin, a New Zealand labour historian. The other was by the above mentioned 
Kosmas Tsokhas. Both attempted to test the influential Braverman theory that 
mechanisation is a strategy of capitalists to depersonalise or ‘deskill’ work processes 
in order to maximise control and drive down wages.102 While they use different 
sources the conclusions are similar. Martin’s suggestion that ‘mechanisation did not in 
itself greatly change the balance of control and power in the shed’ is, if anything, an 
understatement, as are corresponding sentences in Tsokhas’s paper.103  
 
                                                
98 Peter Coleman, ‘Introduction: The New Australian’ in Peter Coleman (ed), Australian Civilisation: A 
Symposium, Cheshire, Melbourne, 1962, p. 2 (including Furphy quote). 
99 Fraser, This Century of Ours, pp. 191-204. 
100 McIntosh, Beaten by a Blow, p. 71. 
101 Martin, ‘Control in the Shearing Shed’, pp. 72-3; Tsokhas, ‘The Shearing Labour Process’, p. 87. 
102 H. Braverman, Labour and Monopoly Capital: the Degradation of Work in the Twentieth Century, 
Monthly Review Press, New York, 1974.  
103 Martin, ‘Control in the Shearing Shed’, p. 84; Tsokhas, ‘The Shearing Labour Process’, p. 102. 
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In the industrial world at large capitalists intensified their quest for productivity in the 
early 1900s. An American approach known as ‘Taylorism’ (after the expert who 
suggested it) threatened to dehumanise work. A central concern was that the pace of 
work was determined by the machine, reducing worker autonomy. In the stereotyped 
example, cynical plant managers surreptitiously increased the speed of the conveyor 
belt to stretch a little extra output out of the production line. The aforementioned 
general strike in NSW in 1917 was a protest against an attempt to introduce a card 
recording system in the tramway workshops. It seemed to be a text book case of 
Taylorism.104 Radical unionists were hostile to management tactics of this kind. The 
Industrial Workers of the World (IWW), which originated amongst mine workers in 
western United States, was especially contemptuous of what it called ‘speeding up’, 
and introduced the deliberate ‘go-slow’ as a tactic to counter it.105  
 
The IWW was influential in Australian shearing sheds.106 However, in woolsheds 
shearers, rather than the shed manager, dictated the pace of work. Although ‘speeding 
up’ was often presented as a reason for union opposition to shearing contracting in the 
1920s and ‘30s, it was not an objection which carried much weight with the majority 
of shearers.
107
 Successful IWW campaigns were fought over wage rates, not 
piecework. Shearers would contemplate direct action to get higher wages but they 
were more than happy to resume racing each other, and the clock. In other 
occupations piecework payment was considered a form of exploitation, and died out 
as trade unions became influential and society norms less brutal. Not in shearing, 
though. The AWU was sufficiently powerful to end piecework if shearers wanted it, 
but they did not. 
 
Shearing was highly repetitive, yet shearers hated the tedium of urban factories where 
activity had no beginning and no end. Dennis McIntosh explained his reaction to an 
engineering workshop in the 1970s. ‘I felt sick. Every factory department we looked 
into had hundreds of men standing next to their workstations just waiting to die.’108 
Ken Prato spent part of the off-season in 1964 in a lawnmower factory in Melbourne. 
                                                
104 Verity Burgmann, Revolutionary Industrial Socialism: The Industrial Workers of the World in 
Australia, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p 174. 
105 Burgmann, Revolutionary Industrial Socialism, p. 178. 
106 See account of 1916 strike in Chapter 6. 
107 See segment in Chapter 5, ‘The AWU Response’.  
108 Dennis McIntosh, Beaten by a Blow: A Shearer’s Story, Viking, 2008,  p. 24. 
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He was asked to drill holes in grass-catcher components, and with a shearer’s 
mentality found the pace a bit slow. He couldn’t wait to leave. ‘If I found myself 
ahead I would sweep the floor to look busy. I worked five weeks at that place.’109 
Although sometimes the heat and the dust were unbearable and accommodation huts 
were lonely places on Sunday nights, the shearer’s life was unrestrained by normal 
conventions (including the ‘civilising’ influences of women).110 An unmistakable 
conclusion from descriptions of shearing is that participants enjoyed the work. 
Notwithstanding the inconveniences, they were attracted to the lifestyle.  
 
Shearers often kept records, and remembered sheds and seasons with numerical 
precision. They ranked sheds by the quality of the sheep and the run they could expect 
to get. Roy Ryan (1891-1976) kept meticulous diaries throughout his shearing career 
which spanned 1917 to 1971. He recorded daily tallies at every shed for 54 years, plus 
relevant earnings and expenses. Almost nothing else was put to paper apart from 
occasional comments on the weather, and even the trauma of his wife’s death from 
pneumonia in 1934 is barely mentioned. Roy Ryan stayed with shearing for his whole 
working life but indulged an interest in motor cars and aeroplanes as well as well as 
paying boarding fees for his only son after his wife died. Ryan’s obsessive accounting 
is certainly exceptional, but shearers talked constantly about their tallies and their 
income. They observed jealously how their companions fared.111  
 
Ferocious competition was a matter of being respected by other shearers as well as 
money. Ken Prato explained his own attitude to being last on the tally sheet, 
inevitably the predicament of all learners early in their careers. 
Being in front of other shearers by even three or four a day seems to make the job feel so 
much easier than being behind by the same number. ‘On the chain’ – last – is pure hard work. 
The same tally in the same sheep feels infinitely more comfortable from a position further up 
the ranks.112 
Prato had reached 130 a day, but was still ‘on the chain’, when another shearer called 
Frank of about the same level signed on. Ken decided that he had to finish in front. He 
                                                
109 Prato to writer, 20/4/2008. 
110 By the late nineteenth century most shearers were married men ‘who became itinerant workers as a 
means of supporting their families, not escaping them’. Richard Waterhouse, ‘Australian Legends: 
Representations of the Bush, 1813-1913’, Australian Historical Studies, October 2000, Vol. 31, Issue 
115, p. 208. Oral histories and shearers’ memoirs reveal the appeal of escape from domesticity. 
111 NLA MS 9139, Roy Ryan Papers. 
112 Ken Prato, Sheepshit on the Brain: The trials & Tribulations of a Would-be Gun Shearer, self 
published, Ballarat, 2004, p. 4. 
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worked to the limit of his capacity but guile was also required. Saving two of the 
better shearing sheep until last enabled him to jump one in front of Frank and the 
psychological ploy worked. Prato said that he liked to ‘pretend to have the ability to 
go round the other bloke any time he liked with an occasional short sprint’.
113
 
Shearers would employ such tricks to cope with the tedious repetition of the work, but 
it was also about honour. The first ‘hundred’ (in a day) and for those good enough, the 
first ‘two hundred’ were lifetime milestones. As shearers got older they got slower, 
and learning to live with decline was difficult. 
 
Whatever the relevance of the Braverman theory to other occupations and industries, 
it was difficult to apply in shearing sheds. Provided they could be persuaded to shear 
clean as well as fast (not always easy) shearers did not have to be cajoled or bullied 
by the overseer. Everyone else strived to keep up with them. ‘Wool away!’ they 
yelled at the rouseabout, ‘sheep-o!’ at the penner-up. If the overseer barked these 
orders it was only to get in first - it did not pay to upset the shearers’ rush to maximise 
tallies. The grazier was under constant pressure to keep a regular flow of sheep up to 
the shearers. Delays due to tardiness in filling the pens or breakdowns in machinery 
resulted in shearers rebuking the boss. There were sometimes legal suits for 
compensation after extended delays. Remarkably, this applied equally to militant 
unionists and cocky shearers. It was part of a shearer’s cultural DNA. More often than 
not the grazier aimed to slow shearers down rather than speed them up, because 
chasing big tallies compromised the quality of shearing. These nuances are brilliantly 
captured in Henry Lawson’s poem, ‘The Boss’s Boots’. 
The 'rouser' has no soul to save. Condemn the rouseabout! 
And sling 'em in, and rip 'em through, and get the bell-sheep out; 
And skim it by the tips at times, or take it with the roots, 
But 'pink 'em' nice and pretty when you see the Boss's boots.114    
 
The parallel between woolsheds and industrial factories has already been drawn, but 
they differed from most manufacturing plants in one crucial respect. Shearers 
themselves determined the pace of work, not the machines. Dennis McIntosh 
described working in a beer can factory: ‘On a production line the machine is boss. I 
                                                
113 Prato, Sheepshit, pp. 6-7. 
114 Colin Roderick (ed), Henry Lawson Poems, John Ferguson, Sydney, 1979, p. 133. Lawson is 
describing a shearer going flat out, but not being very particular about clean shearing. Later in the 
poem the cheeky rouseabout tricks him by wearing the boss’s boots. Unaware that it is only the lowly 
rouseabout the shearer slows down and shears neatly. 
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spent my day with something that didn’t wait for me.’
115
 Woolsheds were not like 
that. The overseer was required to be a diplomat. More often he wanted to slow 
shearers down to ensure a neat job. Unlike the manufacturing process manager he 
could not set the belt speed a little faster to lift productivity. 
 
Representations of Shearers 
 
Shearing as a spectacle had a mesmerising appeal to casual observers. Travellers were 
often taken to woolsheds and shearing has been widely represented as a model of 
energy, social harmony and good humour. Accounts of shearing in the union 
newspaper also often had this flavour.116 At the same time, astute observers could 
detect attitudes of surly intolerance.117 Both the combative bushworker and the hard-
working pioneer have a place in the ways shearers have been depicted in literature, 
journalism and art. 
 
In the 1890s the Bulletin valorised shearers as feisty unionists who provided, as 
Richard Waterhouse describes it, a ‘catechism for a nation’ They were portrayed by 
nationalist writers as ‘underdog heroes’, a theme which was also common in popular 
theatre. By 1900 there had been a shift and they were more often written about as 
‘pathetic and downtrodden’ and this was undoubtedly what many actually felt.118 
Mateship coalesced around feelings of despondency, and sometimes angry frustration. 
Julian Stuart, a militant unionist of the 1890s, writing in the 1920s, thought shearing 
was a ‘dead end’. Circumstances did not remain hopeless for long, but the sentiment 
remained and can be found consistently in later years.
119
 The inter-war militant 
‘Trucker’ Brown was influenced by his harsh Cobar background.120 Dennis McIntosh 
headed out to the sheds in 1971 as a nineteen year old looking for a pathway out of 
rural poverty, but the old-timers he met quickly disabused him of his naivety. (On the 
                                                
115 McIntosh, Beaten by a Blow, p. 248.  
116 See, E.S. Sorensen, ‘At Wombah Station’, The Worker, 3/1/1903, p 6; ‘A Day in a Woolshed’,  The 
Worker, 10/1/1903, p. 7. 
117 See Chapter 7 for a particularly good example. 
118 Waterhouse, ‘Australian Legends’, pp. 217, 218. 
119 Waterhouse, ‘Shearers and the Birth of Mateship’, p. 122. Julian Stuart is quoted on p. 123. The 
original is Julian Stuart, Part of the Glory:Reminiscences of the Shearers’ Strike Queensland 1891, 
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120 See Chapter 7. 
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other hand they competed against each other tenaciously for their positions in the 
pecking order.)121 Rural depression in Victoria in the 1990s gave rise to the Shearers’ 
and Rural Workers Union dedicated to banishing money-making New Zealanders.122  
Many shearers thrived throughout the twentieth century, as this study shows, but 
others found it a social cul-de-sac, and this fuelled attitudes ranging from the mildly 
disgruntled to fiercely militant. 
 
Charles Bean’s portrayal of shearing published in 1910 bears passable resemblance to 
Adam-Smith’s impressions in 1982, quoted above. He does not mention the strikes, 
although his companion work Dreadnoughts of the Darling recalls battles between 
‘free labourers’ and unionists in a breezy style.123 At one stage Bean characterises the 
woolshed as ‘the republic’ whereas the station or the homestead is ‘the autocracy’. 
The station hands mustering the sheep are under orders from the squatter, but in the 
woolshed democracy rules. The shearers never decide anything without having a 
‘meeting’, an observation that would resonate with many graziers in later decades. He 
criticises the ‘Labour leaders’ – he means the AWU - for their dogmatism which tends 
to undermine ‘the genius of the Australian character’. He hints darkly of ‘the great 
independent undercurrents that flow underneath the surface’ without quite saying 
what they might be. The overall tone of his writing is ‘pioneer’, but it is constantly 
interspersed with ‘bushworker’ threads.124 Bean’s subsequent wartime journalism, and 
later again his official war history, linked Anzacs to the bush. Despite his innate 
conservatism he too had a nose for Australian egalitarianism. Indeed, Ward cites On 
the Wool Track liberally as evidence in The Australian Legend .125 
 
Shearing inspired one of the better known Tom Roberts paintings, ‘Shearing the 
Rams’, completed in 1890. The popular 1975 movie Sunday Too Far Away was also 
set entirely within the shearers’ domain – the woolshed, the shearers’ quarters, the 
shearers’ pub and shearers hurtling along dusty back-country tracks in an FJ Holden. 
Both are artistic creations with licence to interpret, and emphasise different traits. 
Robert’s worked for two painstaking years entailing frequent visits to Brocklesby 
                                                
121 McIntosh, Beaten by a Blow,  pp. 43, 54, 163, 170. 
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Station, near Corowa.
126
 The painting embodies co-operative harmony and a 
Protestant work ethic. The shearers are young and sturdy and keen, not at all 
embittered by years on the tramp or corrupted by gambling and drink. There is no hint 
of the notoriously prickly relationships between shearers and pastoralists, yet, at the 
time woolsheds were on the cusp of violent turmoil of near ‘civil war’ ferocity. The 
painting places shearers firmly within the pioneer myth. Sunday Too Far Away 
focuses on gritty social tensions associated with the 1956 strike, and association with 
Ward’s nomads is readily drawn. The shearers are hard workers and compete as 
shearers do, but they are unionists and relationships with the squatter are tense. They 
are hard drinkers. The great wool industry is a cesspit of distrust.
127
 
 
These examples suggest that depictions of shearing culture are somewhat variable, 
and often reflect the social agendas of those observing and writing. The reality was 
correspondingly complex. They hated the squatters and worked co-operatively with 
them. They resented ‘speeding up’ but bust their guts to beat the other man. They 
were egalitarian but considered themselves a cut above station hands and rouseabouts. 
They were nomads bonded by mateship but also dedicated family providers. They 
were solid unionists but resented the AWU’s dictatorial posturing. They were male 
chauvinists but female shearers became accepted in the sheds.  They were nostalgic 
for the past but looked forward to better days. 
                                                
126 Brocklesby in the Corowa pastoral district was owned by Alexander and Charles Anderson & James 
King. It was not one of the giant stations of the era, with a flock at the low end of the range for smaller 
stations (although certainly larger than a mere ‘selector’ flock). In 1893 it carried 14,170 sheep. In 
1905, when the pastoral industry was beginning to rebuild after the disastrous drought, it carried only 
7,926, plus 32 head of cattle.  
127 John Dingwall, Sunday Too Far Away!, (movie screenplay), Australian Theatre Workshop, 1978. 
  
Chapter 2: Land Settlement, and the Size and Location of Flocks: 1900 to 1980 
 
Graziers and Farmers 
 
Sheep covered most of the eastern third of the continent and, in more scattered 
fashion, the western eighth. Map 2-1 represents the situation on the eve of World War 
II, but the occupation was complete by 1890, Western Australia excepted.1 Both east 
and west had a ‘pastoral’ area of extensive grazing, and an ‘agricultural’ region where 
sheep were more concentrated and kept mostly on cropping farms. This was the realm 
of shearers, the territory in which they moved around - where they haggled with the 
woolgrower, shore their best tallies, endured dust storms, got stranded by floods, 
gambled at poker, and complained about the cook. Pastoral and agricultural zones 
                                                
1 Western Australia is covered in Chapter 9. 
Map 2-1 
 
 
Source is Commonwealth of Australia, Statistical Handbook of the Sheep and Wool Industry: 
Prepared under instruction from the Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics  & Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture, Canberra, 1949, p3 
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differed in organisation and culture, remembering always that shearers were mobile 
and moved seamlessly between regions.  
 
Within regions sheep populations fluctuated, but overall numbers more or less 
doubled from about 90 million early in the century to a peak of 180 million in 1970.2 
For the most part land was not taken from other uses – indeed the opposite happened 
as grazing land was subdivided, primarily to grow wheat. The qualification is that 
some land inside the settlement area was not previously cleared for grazing or 
agriculture. Brigalow in Queensland and mallee in Victoria were cleared for 
occupation. Parts of Western Australia and the Macquarie Marshes were in this 
category.3 Vast regions of western-NSW and Queensland which had been egregiously 
overstocked, and virtually abandoned to rabbits or prickly pear, were resettled. Land 
policies encouraged tenures for family settlers, although with mixed results. Patterns 
of farming and grazing generally became more intensive, and social structures 
evolved accordingly. Dry-land farming techniques adopted in the agricultural zone 
combined sheep with cropping.4 Sheep numbers progressed least in the drier specialist 
pastoral country where wheat growing was not considered viable. They multiplied 
fastest, albeit in fits and starts, in the blackened patches on the map. The shift from 
pastoralism to agriculture is well documented.5 
 
The family farm was the social goal of ‘closer settlement’ legislation throughout 
                                                
2 Sheep numbers peaked at 106 million in 1892, and fell by half to 54 million in 1903. They recovered 
steadily, passing 90 million in 1910. There were further setbacks due to drought and they did not again 
reach 100 million until 1926 and this growth period ended at 125 million in 1942. Since the peak in 
1970 the population has fallen consistently and in 2005 dipped below 100 million for the first time 
since the 1944-1945 drought. Sources for statistics: Wray Vamplew (ed), Australians: Historical 
Statistics, Fairfax, Syme & Weldon Associates, Broadway NSW, 1987, p. 81; N.G. Butlin, 
‘Distribution of the Sheep Population: Preliminary Statistical Picture’, in Alan Barnard (ed), The 
Simple Fleece: Studies in the Australian Wool Industry, Melbourne University Press in association with 
The Australian National University, Malbourne, 1962, pp. 281-387; updates from Australian Bureau of 
Statistics.  
3 The Land, 17/1/1930, p 1; David Cameron, ‘Closer Settlement in Queensland: The Rise and Decline 
of the Agrarian Dream, 1860s-1960s’, in Graeme Davison & Marc Brodie (eds.), Struggle Country: 
The Rural Ideal in Twentieth Century Australia, Monash University ePress, Clayton Vic, 2005, p. 
06.15. Ross Fitzgerald, A History of Queensland From 1915 to the 1980s, University of Queensland 
Press, St Lucia Qld, 1984, pp. 411-4. 
4 Bruce R. Davidson, European Farming in Australia: An Economic History of Australian Farming, 
Elsevier Scientific Publishing Company, Amsterdam, 1981, pp. 274-82; Wadham et al, Land 
Utilisation, pp. 109-14.  
5 Butlin, ‘Distribution of the Sheep Population’, pp. 281-387; Wadham et al, Land Utilisation, Chapter 
V, ‘Land Utilisation in the Wool Industry’. 
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Australia between 1895 and 1914.
6
 In the 1920s this folded into ‘soldier settlement’. 
Soldier settlement has commonly been judged a total social disaster. It is an overly 
harsh assessment, although the whole history of rural settlement is characterised by a 
tendency to push production beyond the capacity of land and climate.
7
 Soldier 
settlement was supplemented by ambitious programs to attract suitable British 
immigrants. Nevertheless, while land development schemes sometimes left small 
farmers swinging in the breeze without working capital on blocks that were too small, 
agriculture progressed. Livestock numbers in western-NSW never recovered from the 
Federation drought, and persistent droughts in Queensland in the 1920s limited 
expansion. Agricultural areas recorded long term gains. Wheat, however, shaped local 
politics and social custom in these areas. By contrast, wool remained the dominant 
source of income on pastoral stations.8  Moreover, the absence for the most part of 
compulsory resumption in land policy, meant that large holdings continued to exist, 
even in areas suited to agriculture.9 Pastoral companies and wealthy grazing families 
persisted, and indeed thrived. On the other hand, land legislation had some success 
breaking up estates in Queensland and western-NSW. Social engineers wanted to 
break up vast grazing estates into suitably sized single family blocks on which a 
‘gazing farmer’ (sometimes called the ‘grazing selector’) could achieve modest 
prosperity. By European norms these were vast leases – perhaps up to 100,000 acres 
each. However, at stocking rates of five acres or more to the sheep – flocks of up to 
10,000  sheep were not excessive. The small grazier was a variant of the closer 
settlement ideal creating specialist woolgrowers with small flocks. 
 
Social distinctions within the evolving settlement pattern had a peculiarly Australian 
flavour – settlers were either ‘graziers’ or ‘farmers’, stereotypes loosely based on 
class.10 They were signposted by wool and wheat. Graziers of the pastoral zone were 
‘pure merinos’ who were wealthy and snobbish, although this was muddied by 
socially unrefined and fiscally fragile grazing selectors. Prosperous graziers were 
                                                
6 Richard Waterhouse, The Vision Splendid: A Social and Cultural History of Rural Australia, Curtin 
University Books, Fremantle WA, 2005, pp. 30-1.  
7 Stephen Garton, The Cost of War: Australians Return, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1996, 
Ch.4, ‘Soldier Settlement’, pp118-142; Richard Waterhouse, ‘Agrarian Ideals and Pastoral Realities: 
The Use and Misuse of Land in Rural Australia’, Ch. 4 of  Martin Crotty & David Andrew Roberts 
(eds.), The Great Mistakes of Australian History,  UNSW Press, Sydney, 2006, pp. 71-3, 77-8. 
8 Income from cattle was significant in some regions. 
9 Large acreages were allocated to wheat on some grazing properties.  
10 Colin Clark, Australian Hopes and Fears, Hollis & Carter, London, 1958, p. 73. 
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comfortable in the city and their weddings graced the society pages of the Sydney 
Morning Herald or The Age. Often they lived in Sydney or Melbourne, and anyway 
limited their involvement in local rural affairs.11 Farmers were down to earth, spoke 
with an Australian twang, hated Sydney and were more likely to watch district 
football. Land had been a marker of social distinction since the early colonial period, 
but ‘squatters’ and ‘selectors’ gave it sharper focus in the 1860s.  
 
Post-Federation closer settlement created new issues to divide the wool grazier and 
wheat farmer, although they also developed interests in common. Production 
possibilities roughly corresponded to rainfall configurations but advancing technology 
continually redefined what they actually were. Inherited wealth and privilege, the core 
of grazier-farmer division, was undeniably a factor. Land was basically a fixed 
resource after 1890, but not impossible for new entrants to purchase. Vast acres were 
held on Crown leases, the terms of which could and did vary. Resumption of large 
holdings for closer settlement entailed ticklish issues of compensation. In NSW 
legislation drew back from compulsion despite enthusiasm for it from some quarters. 
On the other hand, many pastoralists voluntarily subdivided portions of their estates, 
because they judged it a sensible commercial option. Australian land settlement had 
its rigidities, but social and geographical mobility was a more powerful force. Banks 
were forced in the 1920s to focus on the needs of country towns such as Dubbo, 
Orange and Tamworth. Previously, they had been driven primarily by the capital 
needs of pastoralists. This was vital in the 1930s when wheat prices hit the floor and 
storekeepers were shackled by their unpaid accounts. Banks often carried both.12  
Farm size and the mix of enterprises were dictated by a range of economic and social 
influences. Like many stereotypes there was some basis to the grazier-farmer social 
barrier, but it was also an oversimplification. Land use since 1900 constantly changed, 
and in the early twenty-first century patterns are still in flux.  
 
Increasing sheep concentration meant smaller flocks, smaller woolsheds and smaller 
shearing gangs. More frequent changes of location did not require moving as far from 
home to find sufficient shearing. The social climate of smaller sheds was also 
                                                
11 In 1920 the Prince of Wales stayed three days at Wingadee in the Coonamble district. Joan 
McKenzie, Wingadee: A Great Australian Station, Clyde Agriculture Ltd, Sydney, 2003, pp. 36-9. 
12 Geoffrey Blainey, Gold and Paper: A History of the National Bank of Australasia Limited, Georgian 
House, Melbourne, 1958, pp. 308, 328. 
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different. Temperamentally, shearers identified with farmers more easily than 
graziers, although this was not straightforward either. Farmers could be even more 
fiercely anti-Labor than graziers, and successful shearers sometimes looked down on 
struggling selectors. Donald Macdonell, General Secretary of the AWU, got a laugh 
all round, including from the graziers present, when he cracked a joke about dairy 
farming in the Arbitration Court in 1907.13                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                         
 
Wool legends gripped imaginations more than mundane accounts of ‘cocky’ sheds, 
where most of the sheep actually were, or the wheat harvest.14 By the 1930s legendary 
giant woolsheds along the Darling were often unused or stripped of their corrugated 
iron, but hung on in memory as icons of bush unionism and wool folklore.15 Strikes in 
Queensland in 1891 and 1894 left a huge mythological footprint. The ‘tree of 
knowledge’ at Barcaldine, where striking shearers reputedly camped is held to be the 
‘birthplace’ of the Australian Labor Party. The tree was poisoned in 2006 by an 
unknown vandal (presumably not a Labor supporter) and plans are afoot to spend $5 
million to erect a memorial on the spot.16 Equally, stories of mateship and droving, of 
surviving fire and flood, and also the social grandeur of the grazier lifestyle, survived 
closer settlement. Purely grazing districts held a mortgage on the cultural imagination 
although by the 1920s they carried only a quarter of the sheep. The poems of ‘Banjo’ 
Paterson and Henry Lawson were widely known. On the whole, everyday reality in 
‘cocky shearing’ districts was not quite the same as in Longreach or Bourke. Reality 
and legend were not always on the same track. 
 
Accommodating Land Hunger 
 
The great success of wool did not quell the belief that land could be put to better use. 
Land tenure polarised rural Australia for most of the nineteenth century. Sheep 
stocking rates quoted in acres to the sheep rather than sheep to the acre did not gel 
with European notions of agricultural improvement, although wool from Australia 
had become an important raw material for industrial Britain. Sensitivities regarding 
                                                
13 The Worker, 20/6/1907, p. 22.  
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Harris, Outback in Australia, Garden City Press, 1913, pp. 152-3. 
15 Michelle Grattan, Back on the Wool Track, Vintage, Milsons Point (NSW), 2004, p. 68.  
16 Brisbane Courier, 19/3/2008, p. 10; 22/3/2008, p. 3; 8/5/2008, p. 24.  
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land access were heightened by the mid-century gold rushes when prospecting waned 
as a sensible quest for the population bubble of independent fortune-hunters. Some 
went on to New Zealand where gold discoveries livened up austere pioneering 
settlements in Otago and the West Coast, for a while at least. Most were of a mind to 
put down roots in Australia where they had ended up. Industrialisation was making 
Britons mobile but Australia was even less hidebound by custom and tradition, less 
deferential to privilege. Democracy was adopted with remarkably little resistance.
17
 
For a ‘new’ society it was sophisticated in its commercial and financial organisation – 
thanks largely to wool. For all that there was not much ‘industry’ for mass 
employment. Moreover, migrants saw themselves escaping industrial squalor. A self-
supporting, wheat-farming yeomanry was enormously alluring and there seemed to be 
plenty of land – albeit the centre of the continent was desert and the tropical north 
considered unsuitable for white people. The perceived problem was that the best of it 
was ‘locked up’ by a handful of wool barons. In the minds of land reformers the main 
virtue of the ‘squatters’ was not pioneering fortitude, but their luck in getting in first.  
 
This shaped ‘squatter versus selector’ politics between 1860 and 1890. ‘Selectors’ – 
another Australianism – were the intended beneficiaries of ‘selection acts’ passed in 
the 1860s.18 The failure to create an agriculture which satisfied these sensitivities is 
well enough known. Land Acts in the mid-1880s refashioned the rules, and although 
problems remained, key elements of what became the rural structure of the twentieth 
century took root. A viable form of agriculture, as opposed to grazing, made 
remarkable strides in the first decade of the 1900s, fortuitously graced by a run of 
favourable seasons – in stark contrast to the drought which went before.
19
 There was 
more to it than luck. Amidst the social maelstrom of the 1890s, the political 
organisation of selectors tends to be neglected. The Farmers and Settlers Association 
of NSW was formed at Cootamundra in 1893, instilling cohesion into the lobby for 
closer settlement. Farming in South Australia and Victoria was already well 
established, but in NSW the squatters’ plight was the selectors’ opportunity. 
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19 ABL E256/1653, C.J. King, ‘The Early Years of the Department of Agriculture in New South Wales, 
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 43 
Parliamentarians felt compelled to act and legislation regulating land tenure was a 
dominant preoccupation as Federation transformed Colonial into State Governments. 
Land policy remained a State responsibility.  
 
Closer settlement legislation was not the only factor. Agricultural science and public 
investment in railways facilitated farming ambitions. There was also a favourable turn 
in world wheat prices around the turn of the century.
20
 These factors were, arguably, 
more profound. Railways were certainly crucial. During the closer settlement era 
railway construction filled gaps in the network with branch lines where wheat farms 
were being established. It is a moot point whether wheat followed the railways or 
railways followed wheat. Because they were public investments using (usually 
borrowed) government money, intensive enquires preceded each extension. Wheat 
growing prospects were vital to these decisions. Between 1902 and 1925 the veins of 
the NSW railway network reached towns in the central-west and the Riverina.21 
Edgars Dunsdorfs designated the period from 1896 to 1930 ‘the period of rapid 
expansion’ for wheat.22 Growth was particularly spectacular in NSW. Movement into 
the drier areas was certainly risky, but more successful than might have been 
imagined when they were purely extensive grazing regions. The NSW Department of 
Agriculture was established in 1890. Early in the twentieth century a network of 
government farms was established. William Farrer’s famed wheat breeding activities, 
originally begun as a private obsession, were extremely significant. The decade of 
grace with the weather came to an abrupt halt in 1914 and 1915 when drought again 
struck. By then the world was at war, and with it great trauma and further social 
transformation. Nonetheless, farming had graduated from being an irritation to sheep 
stations, to a force of some substance.   
 
Drought had a habit of catching administrators by surprise. By the late-1920s major 
grain and fibre markets suffered from oversupply and prices sagged. In the 1930s, in 
the demand vortex of the Great Depression, they collapsed. Through all of this, 
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 44 
including the disastrous days between 1929 and 1934, the underlying presumption 
that wool was fundamental to Australian prosperity was never seriously challenged.23 
The perception was that graziers provided the money on which capital expansion 
depended.  To a degree the yeoman ideal did eventuate, but the outcome was more 
complex and punctuated with setbacks. There was recovery of sorts by the late-1930s, 
but it was not until after World War II that product prices improved decisively. By 
then official attitudes to land and agriculture had been turned upside down – hillbilly 
selectors were giving way to agri-business entrepreneurs. The adage of upper limits 
on the acreage a settler could occupy under closer settlement gave way to the opposite 
notion. ‘Get big or get out’ became the secret of farming success. This was the lesson 
of the 1920s struggle with debt, poor prices, and recurring droughts. Furthermore, it 
was the old staple of wool which came to the rescue rather than wheat. Wheat 
growing became more deeply dependent on production quotas to support prices.24 
 
Settlers themselves needed no convincing on the need for larger holdings. Farmers 
had always expanded as they succeeded, recognising that long term security was not 
guaranteed by the upper limits imposed on their initial investments. They always saw 
settlement blocks as the minimum for survival, whereas official policy regarded them 
as the maximum. A 1971 government report claimed that the median size of farm had 
been increasing since 1938.25 Local and family histories suggest that most successful 
settlers were finding ways to increase their holdings from the time they first occupied 
them. At the same time large grazing estates tended to shrink in size as blocks were 
carved off for closer settlement. But they did not disappear. 
 
Shearers and the Land 
 
The rambunctious egalitarianism of the gold rush population rubbed off on 
bushworkers.26 Wages were relatively high when there was work, but it was an 
insecure basis for domestication. Drovers, bullock drivers – and of course shearers – 
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might have been unreliable gamblers and social misfits in some cases, but they were 
opportunistic rather than servile in their attitudes. Lack of domestication and 
larrikinism often disguised it, but many were ambitious to improve their lot.27 
Shearers came from the jumble of selector families sprinkled around NSW and 
Victoria as a result of the selection acts.28 Their skills were in high demand seasonally 
but getting to a higher level of independent land ownership was impeded. They were 
well positioned to observe land use with its mixture of squatters and selectors. Rural 
populism coloured their outlook, complete with distrust of the banks.29 Unionism in 
the 1890s was given some of its militant edge by frustrated land hunger.  
 
A speech given by the union leader W.G. Spence to a large audience in Bourke in 
April 1893, in the midst of the shearing trouble, had the topic ‘Land for the People’ - 
also an identifying slogan for the Farmers and Settlers Association.30 Spence’s words 
would not have been out of place at a farmers’ rally, despite the socialist undertone. 
There is a need for change. Australia is becoming a land of syndicates and monopolists. We 
have often heard of the term ‘wool-kings’ as applied to the squatters, but I ask, how many of 
them are not in the hands of the Banks? To remedy this drift I support the idea of village 
communal settlements, to be aided by the State. We have here on the banks of the River 
Darling a very great advantage. If the State assists us to get on the land, we have plenty of 
water at hand for irrigation purposes, and if we go into this on a co-operative basis it will be 
better for all concerned.31  
Rural Labor hoped small farmers would become part of its natural constituency, 
although by the 1920s the opportunity had closed. Farmer and grazier organisations 
circled their wagons around the Country Party built on anti-Labor foundations. As far 
back as the 1880s shearing unionists such as John Toomey of the Young Branch of 
the ASU, had exploited selectors’ anti-squatter attitudes in the cause of bush 
unionism.32 Some stalwarts of the Farmers and Settlers movement were Labor men – 
notably John Treflé, later a minister in Labor Governments. Anti-squatter feelings 
were not enough, however. Three issues sealed Labor’s fate – leasehold tenure, land 
tax, and unionisation of farm labour. This came to a head in 1910 when Labor 
Governments took office with genuine majorities for the first time in the 
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Commonwealth and NSW. Federal Labor introduced a land tax designed to break up 
large estates but farmers feared it was aimed at them. The NSW Government moved 
to repeal legislation entitling leaseholders to freehold their farms (the ‘Conversion 
Act’). It led to a crisis in which two rural Labor members resigned in protest – the 
policy was reversed but the political damage was enduring. In 1912 the Rural 
Workers Union attempted to establish an award for farm workers in  NSW. This was 
the last straw. In truth, the farmers had already chosen an anti-Labor path. Treflé’s 
radical land resolutions were unceremoniously spurned at the 1905 Farmers and 
Settlers Conference. Indeed, this persuaded him to enter parliament on the Labor side 
in 1906 although he remained active in farmer politics. 
 
Land policy was a perennial interest of the AWU. In the 1920s an organiser in 
Queensland was confronted with questions about the fate of Stony Creek and Gordon 
Downs, properties listed for resumption. ‘What is to be done with the Gordon Downs 
country? Is the land hungry intending selector going to get a chance for some of it, or 
is the station going to get it back after a time?’ 33 The Worker periodically whetted the 
appetites of its agrarian base by publishing pioneering stories, supplementing its usual 
diet of class warfare, Labor politics, woolshed disputes, and squatter bastardry. This 
was designed to sing the praises of the Queensland Labor Government, but plainly 
recognised the pioneer streak in its rank-and-file. Sometimes selectors had started out 
as shearers, but always upward mobility and the benefits of thrift and hard work were 
emphasised, given some help from the Government. The paper said less about pioneer 
attitudes to the AWU, as once bushworkers owned sheep their tolerance of shearers 
faded.
34
 Queensland Labor’s agrarian credentials helped it to govern almost 
uninterrupted from 1915 to 1957, although graziers small as well as large gravitated to 
the United Graziers Association of Queensland (UGA) and the Country Party.35  
 
As the twentieth century advanced there was a blurring of the distinctions between the 
grazier, the farmer and the bushworker. Rank-and-file shearers did not necessarily 
think of themselves as implacable enemies of the grazier class. Many were shearing 
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because it was a way of accumulating the deposit for the purchase of their own farm 
or grazing selection. 
 
Pioneering Narratives  
 
Glimpses of land settlement narratives appear in the transcripts of evidence given to 
public enquiries, land records, and in local and family histories. Pioneering attitudes 
highlight progress from humble beginnings, without electricity and tractors, to modest 
prosperity and community respectability. This is fused with contradictory images of 
population decline and nostalgia for simpler days. Farmers, wealthy grazing families, 
and grazing selectors made arrangements for getting the sheep shorn in a variety of 
ways, and this reflected their social attitudes. Anecdotes are risky sources of social 
generalisation, but human interaction is not easily understood from statistics of land 
settlement.  
 
(a) Farmers 
 
Arthur Cosh settled in northern-NSW in the 1920s.
36
 He was born in Willunga, South 
Australia – wheat country - in 1891. His grandfather had been a gold seeker turned to 
farming, clearing and developing 11,000 acres of Mallee scrub. Cosh’s father 
continued the farming tradition, but as Arthur and his three brothers approached 
school-leaving age land was too pricey and they looked further afield. There was talk 
of a move to Western Australia, but Cosh senior spotted a notice that Bannockburn 
station at Inverell was being subdivided. They bought 3,000 acres which they called 
‘The Wattles’ plus 600 acres for Arthur’s uncle. By 1908 they had cleared and sown 
700 acres for wheat and 300 acres for maize, and sown lucerne for grazing. They went 
to a sheep sale at Wigewa station near Denman and spent more than £4,000 – a 
substantial outlay – on 3,000 sheep, some for the brother’s 600 acres. It was quite an 
exercise to get them back to Inverell. Drovers were hired and they spent five weeks on 
the road. Clearly the family had access to cash, but it was imperative that the risks 
paid off. 
 
                                                
36 Material on Cosh comes from Arthur Ernest  Phillipps Cosh, David Jumping Kangaroos : the life of 
an Australian pioneer settler's son, Devill Publicity, 1978. 
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The bigger picture was that the railway extension from Moree to Inverell had been 
completed in 1902. Under Closer Settlement Acts several large properties were listed 
for subdivision – Bannockburn, Myall Creek, Arrawatta, Byron and Auburn Vale. In 
1906 when settlers began to arrive little of this country had previously been 
cultivated. New selectors with small holdings were under financial pressure to make 
quick returns. Many bought cows and established a co-operative butter factory. 
However, they gradually changed to agriculture. The butter factory closed and was 
eventually superseded by a flour mill. After World War I there were further 
subdivisions for soldier settlement, Inverell and Newstead North stations being cut up 
for this purpose.
37
  
 
By the 1920s Arthur Cosh was running The Wattles in his own right. Between 1915 
and 1920 the family had explored further options to take up land.38 They bought their 
first tractor in 1920, although kept the 8-horse team. Cosh remembers a mice plague 
in 1914. He notes the contamination caused by prickly pear and pays tribute to the 
scientists who eventually devised a solution. He recalls that for farmers the 
Depression really set in during the 1920s along with drought, but he was well enough 
established to survive it. He became a pillar of the local Farmers and Settlers 
Association branch, and remembered with particular pride his role in lobbying to have 
grain silos built in the 1930s. Cosh never states his political allegiance but it is safe to 
assume that he was solid Country Party. With some satisfaction he recalled ‘standing 
up to Evatt’ while giving evidence in defence of an AWU application for a Rural 
Workers’ Award.39 The Farmers and Settlers position was to oppose any award ‘until 
the farmers got a fixed price for their products’.  
 
The 700 sheep on Cosh’s grandfather’s selection in South Australia were usually 
shorn by the family. Arthur Cosh had learnt to shear with blades by the time he was 
12, and he also wrestled with the old style wool press. He did not turn to shearing to 
make some money, although many like him did. Having learnt with blades the best he 
could manage with machines was 50 a day. In later years when he had his own 
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woolshed he marvelled that the best of the shearers could do 170. The Wattles was the 
first farm in the district to install machines in a 5-stand shed, and neighbours brought 
their sheep to be shorn. This was a common arrangement between the wars. The 
Wattles itself stocked less than 1,000 sheep but there were usually 13,000 shorn there, 
making it a significant shed for a contractor or a shearer (2,600 per man as the 
shearers looked at it). Arthur Cosh was certainly no friend of the Labor Party or the 
AWU, but his relationships with shearers were largely amicable. There is no reason to 
believe that he did not get on reasonably well with local AWU organisers. Politically 
he supported wheat pooling, and it is likely that he favoured wool market 
intervention. Conspicuously he was a ‘farmer’ or a ‘selector’ – albeit a successful one 
- rather than a grazier. He would not have agreed with Graziers Association policy on 
wool marketing, but there is no obvious evidence that he harboured a serious animus 
against ‘squatters’ or big land owners.  
 
******** 
 
A Royal Commission in 1917 heard evidence of similar shearing arrangements in the 
Narrabri region. Tarriaro station was a medium-sized grazing operation owned by the 
Buchanans whose overall holdings were substantial. The woolshed was handily 
located 10 miles from a rail head. Buchanan let the shed to a neighbouring selector 
called McGregor who only had 700 sheep himself, but did shearing for others at 7½  
pence per sheep. Ralph Terrbutt, a small owner with 1,000 sheep had his shearing 
done there. Buchanan did the same with the shed at Killarney station. Killarney ran 
from 6,000 sheep to 12,000 depending on drought conditions.  The station had been 
cut up and had a larger shed than was now needed. It was rented out to Mr. Warren, a 
contractor,  who organised shearing for 40,000 sheep from the surrounding district. In 
this way closer settlement did not necessarily always lead to smaller shearing sheds, 
although when selectors prospered they increasingly built their own. Killarney 
management had nothing to do with shearing at the shed, although it had priority over 
others when its own sheep were ready.
40
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(b) Graziers 
 
Sir Norman Kater was born into wealth and opportunity in 1875. His grandfather 
Henry Kater arrived in Australia in 1839, a young man from a Bristol mercantile 
family which had prospered in the sugar trade. It was a sign of the wool trade’s mid- 
nineteenth century standing that the Empire’s merchant class sent their sons to 
Australia to establish new fortunes. Henry’s well equipped and funded enterprise was 
badly timed. He paid top money for an estate near Parramatta just in time to be wiped 
out by the 1841 wool slump. He shifted to Caleula near Bathurst where he established 
a flour mill, and later ran a cloth factory at Orange. It is not known whether his 
indulgent father coughed up more precious capital, but it is likely he borrowed to get 
started again in what were undoubtedly uncertain ventures. The exact nature of the 
‘cloth factory’ is difficult to imagine. According to the family history circumstances 
gradually improved, and the Katers grafted their way to economic security.41 
 
Great wealth had not materialised by the 1870s. It was, in fact, Henry’s sons – the 
father and uncle of Norman - who rode the wool boom of the 1870s and 80s, getting 
started in 1863 on 16,000 acres and 4,000 sheep on difficult country on the 
Castlereagh River. Like Arthur Cosh’s grandfather Norman Kater’s father was shaped 
by the gold rush period, but in a different way. The struggling flour mill could not 
finance sheep stations, and he began his working life as a bank clerk in Mudgee. 
There he gained an understanding of pastoralism. By the 1880s the brothers had a 
sizable holding in the Warren area.42 Despite their wealthy Bristol origins, it was still 
possible to see this history in Australia as a pioneer narrative of hard work and 
upward mobility. In 1893 Mumblebone station ran 41,450 sheep and 500 cattle.43 
 
The Katers survived the 1890s relatively intact. The region north of Coonamble had 
not been subject to the same speculative madness which gripped the west Darling in 
the 1880s. The 1884 Land Act had brought in a few selectors but it was considered 
borderline country for wheat, and the Katers had not been forced to freehold their 
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leases. The Coonamble railway was not opened until 1903, and this helped keep 
selectors away.44 In 1905 Mumblebone was carrying only 16,800 sheep, an indication 
of how severe the drought had been. Tellingly, though, they had added Egelabra, a 
small station of about 10,000 acres.
45
 It ran only 4,613 sheep but was turned into a 
prize merino breeding stud. Probably the Katers acquired it at a ‘good price’.  
 
The Katers were certainly not ‘selectors’, being stout opponents of the Robertson 
Land Acts. As time went on their opposition to closer settlement softened, but never 
disappeared. Perhaps governed by the collective family memory of the 1841 collapse, 
Norman’s father developed clear headed principles for station management taking 
into account the need to survive droughts while remaining faithful to the mercantile 
tradition of growth and improvement. He developed a strong interest in Darwin’s 
theory of evolution. This led to stud merino breeding. He selected sheep which not 
only had fine wool and a body type strong enough to carry a heavy fleece, but could 
survive in tough conditions. Kater senior had a saying: ‘A  fleece, however good, is of 
poor value if picked up on the plains from a heap of bones.’46 
 
Young Norman spent the 1890s studying medicine at the University of Sydney, and 
looked set for a career as a surgeon when the untimely death of his older brother in 
1902 drew him back to the pastoral enterprises.47 He lived an essentially rural, if 
privileged life on a property at Molong until the war intervened. But from 1920 he 
resided in Sydney, often spending weekends at a property near Berrima, which the 
family had long owned. The extensive pastoral holdings in northern-NSW were run in 
this way.
48
  By 1923 the Eenawena stud at Nevertire had been added. The overall 
stockholding was over 35,000 sheep, and in 1931 it exceeded 50,000. The Katers had 
been well enough established and sufficiently astute investors to survive many 
droughts and depressions. Of course, they prospered hugely in the 1950s.  
 
In 1915 shearing on the Kater estates was done by contract although about half the 
sheds in the Warren district still retained ‘station’ arrangements. Mumblebone was 
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scheduled to start on 23 July, requiring 16 shearers for 16,000 sheep. Eenaweena 
nearby – also 16,000 but only 10 shearers – was listed for 2 August. Small by 
nineteenth century standards, they were very typical of grazier sheds in the twentieth 
century. It would not have been feasible for Norman Kater, much as he disliked the 
Labor Party and trade unions, to even contemplate shearing ‘non-union’ as 
pastoralists in the Warren district had in the 1890s. This was the antithesis of ‘cocky 
shearing’, such as the Cosh’s of New England practiced. Almost certainly the same 
contractor was engaged for all his sheds and the dates would have been set for his 
convenience. It was a tight schedule. Averaging 100 a day shearers might have made 
the second shed on time, just - but not if there were delays. However, the contractor 
could easily delay Eenaweena with the station manager’s co-operation. From a 
shearer’s point of view Mumblebone, was only1,000 per man but the two sheds 
together averaged 2,600, a good professional proposition. Six shearers would miss out 
on the second shed, relying on the contractor to place them elsewhere. Warren was an 
early shearing district with some early-July sheds.
49
  
 
Kater was a founding director of the Graziers Co-operative Shearing Company  in 
1919, and thereafter Mumblebone, Egelabra and Eenaweena were amongst its loyal 
sheds.50 He served continuously on the  board until his death in 1965, and was closely 
involved on the graziers’ side of every strike, of their complex dealings with the 
AWU and their focussed antagonism to the interwar communist shearing union.
51
 To 
most shearers Kater would have been a remote figure, and to some a hated one. 
Despite his association with the Shearing Company, it is unlikely that he was directly 
involved with shearing arrangements on his properties. As a squatter’s son he was 
probably capable of shearing an occasional sheep, but unlikely that he ever had much 
reason to pick up a handpiece. 
 
******** 
 
The New Zealand and Australian Land Company consolidated after the drought and 
then expanded. In 1893 the company had owned four major stations controlling 
720,000 sheep - Wellshot was then its only Queensland holding, and by far its largest 
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(360,000 sheep). By 1905 it had extended its holdings by adding five more stations, 
although most of its original holdings had endured massive losses, and its overall 
sheep flock was only marginally higher (800,000 sheep). Wellshot now carried only 
176,000 sheep.
52
 The company had invested to compensate for the loss of some of its 
leases for a marginal increase in its overall wool production, although its cattle herds 
had more than doubled to about 100,000. No doubt acquisitions reflected depression 
property values. Between 1905 and 1913 – all round good seasons for woolgrowers – 
the company engaged in an expansion spree. In 1913 it controlled 14 stations in NSW 
and 10 in Queensland, with a combined flock of 1.3 million sheep and comfortably in 
excess of 100,000 cattle. Drought did not reappear until 1914 and 1915, and shearer 
militancy made an unwelcome re-appearance in 1916.53 To make matters worse a 
State Labor Government swept to power in 1915. Nevertheless, guaranteed wool 
prices during the war ensured a strong income flow into the 1920s. In 1923 the New 
Zealand and Australian Land Company’s 1913 empire was largely intact, although 
closer settlement eroded its overall carrying capacity to just over 1 million sheep and 
about 100,000 cattle. Wellshot, subject to further resumptions in 1917, now ran 
146,000 sheep. It was still a substantial flock, but only 40 per cent of its 1893 size. In 
1904 the shearing agreement specified 60-80,000 sheep at Coombe Martin, shorn by 
machines for the first time.54 It was resumed for closer settlement in 1916, and the 
absence of later listings in the directories suggests that it disappeared as a separate 
entity. Shearing in the Land Company sheds was contract after about 1904.
55
  
 
Graziers and Closer Settlement 
 
Despite the advance of agriculture and the dogged rural pragmatism of New England 
farmers like Arthur Cosh, class warfare in shearing sheds did not die on pastoral 
estates. However, there is a danger of exaggerating this. In 1891, the newly formed 
Pastoralists’ Union of NSW had only 618 members covering 24 million sheep (about 
                                                
52 The station was listed as shearing 230,000 in 1911 in The Worker, and the 1913 Pastoral Directory 
listing gave it 186,000. These were both reasonably good production seasons, implying that Wellshot 
lost had lost a large proportion of its acreage to grazing selection.    
53 See Chapter 6. 
54 This was the cause of a dispute, discussed in Chapter 4. 
55 For the experience of the AMLFC pastoral company in the 1920s see J.D. Bailey, A Hundred Years 
of Pastoral Banking: A History of the Australian Mercantile Land & Finance Company, Clarendon 
Press, Oxford, 1966, pp. 216-33. 
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40% of all sheep in the then colony). After 1900 the expanding population of wheat 
growers (who were also sheep owners) mostly joined the Farmers and Settlers 
Association, and became the dominant constituency of the Country Party in the 1920s. 
However, the population of specialist graziers also grew, with the corollary that flock 
sizes also shrank. The politics of graziers associations in all States reflected this. 
Table 2-1 summarises the total number of sheep controlled by members of the 
Graziers Association of NSW. The renaming of the Pastoralists’ Union as the 
Graziers Association in 1916 was, indeed, one of the signs of social change.56 
Members’ sheep roughly doubled during each 14 year stretch, 1900 to 1914, and 1914 
to 1928, while membership of the Association quadrupled during each stage. In other 
words flock sizes fell by two-thirds, and then by another half. By the mid-1920s the 
Graziers Association now spoke for almost two-thirds of the sheep in NSW, while the 
average flock size had shrunk below 4,000 sheep. Pastoralists rebuilt their flocks after 
the drought and some bought additional stations, but in the longer term graziers were 
doing much the same as the farmers.
57
 Through pasture improvement and changes in 
sheep husbandry they were running more sheep to the acre (fewer acres for each 
sheep). The difference between a ‘grazier’ and a ‘farmer’ narrowed, despite 
differences in political outlook and social standing between members of the Graziers 
Association and the Farmers and Settlers Association.58 
 
A table prepared by the Graziers Association in 1928 showed that 86% of its members 
held flocks of less than 5,000, but these only accounted for 50% of their sheep.  There 
were a lot of graziers with flocks that were modest compared with the old days. The 
counterpart  - that only 14% of members carried 50% of the sheep – is also 
noteworthy. Half the wool came from wealthy grazier families and pastoral company 
properties. The Association’s leadership continued to be dominated by patrician types 
- men such as Sir Norman Kater, Sir Graham Waddell and O.E. Friend. They were 
resolutely conservative and highly suspicious of meddling governments especially if 
they were Labor. Increasingly, however, the Association had to be responsive to the 
                                                
56 SMH, 6/7/1916, p. 10. 
57 B.D. Graham, ‘Graziers in Politics, 1917-1929’, in Alan Barnard (ed.), The Simple Fleece, p. 595. 
58 Tom Connors, To Speak With One Voice: The Quest by Australian Farmers for Federal Unity, 
National Farmers Federation, Barton ACT, 1996, pp. 132-44. 
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small and medium graziers. District committees were established and Annual 
Conferences determined policy.59  
 
Table 2-1: Changing Flock Sizes and Membership of Graziers Association of 
NSW 
   Sheep Numbers 
 Members 
 
 
(number) 
Flock 
Size 
 
(average) 
Graziers 
Association 
 
(million) 
Total NSW 
 
 
(million) 
Graziers 
Association 
Proportion 
(per cent) 
 
1891 618 38,843 24.0 60.0 40% 
1900 275 24,984 6.9 36.2 19% 
1914 1,901 8,321 15.8 43.6 36% 
1928 8,247 3,777 31.1 50.5 62% 
Source: Adapted from table in Graham, ‘Graziers in Politics’, p. 595. 
 
The Kidman Phenomenon 
 
The rabbit invasion of the Darling River stations led to a drastic reduction in sheep 
numbers by 1902. After a Royal Commission, the Western Lands Board sought to 
establish grazing selectors. The Queensland State Government grappled with 
comparable climatic and ecological constraints in its huge pastoral zone.60 The aim 
was subdivision of large estates into blocks big enough for a family to survive, but not 
become squatters. In western-NSW conditions were so dire that the problem of 
dispossessing squatters hardly arose – many were happy to get out.61 In Queensland 
the pastoral companies were in better shape and it remained a sanctuary of large 
stations well into the twentieth century.
62
 
 
                                                
59 ABL E256/1647, ‘Recollections of Mr. J.W. Allen, Former Secretary of the Pastoralists’ Union of 
NSW and the Graziers’ Association of NSW’, circa 1950, p 12; Graham, ‘Graziers in Politics’, p. 596. 
60 Ross Fitzgerald, History of Queensland From 1915, p. 195. 
61 Bailey, Hundred Years of Pastoral Banking, pp. 177-8.  
62 H.M. Boot, ‘Debts, Drought and Foreclosure: Wool producers in Queensland and New South Wales 
1870-1905’, Australian Economic History Review, Vol. XXVIII, No. 2, Sept. 1988, pp.33-52. 
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The extraordinary career of Sidney Kidman (1857-1935) had a major influence.
63
 
Kidman was not, at heart, a pastoralist but a canny trader, although he eventually 
became the largest landowner in Australia, and arguably the world.64 His activities in 
the Western Division were a relatively minor part of a huge cattle trading empire 
based on a ‘chain of supply’ concept which exploited flood plains to hold stock in 
good condition while vast areas withered through lack of rain.65 Kidman’s genius was 
that he combined an understanding of the ecological effects of drought with market 
arbitrage – the value of having livestock in the right place in the right condition at the 
right time. He developed his stock trading skills and his knowledge of pastoral 
country knocking around western-NSW in the 1870s and 1880s. A typical enterprise 
was a butchering business in Cobar with a population of copper miners, where the 
value of cattle bought from western squatters was readily multiplied.66 Kidman’s time 
as a wanderer in the west coincided with the great flock expansion along the Darling. 
He did not have the capital to become a squatter himself, but even as he began to 
accumulate wealth he continued to concentrate on arbitrage rather than station 
acquisition. Only after the turn of the century, when stations were cheap because of 
the Federation drought, did he engage in a ‘non-stop buying spree’.67 Even then he did 
not become a squatter in the accepted sense. He moved flocks and herds around 
selectively to exploit highly variable grazing conditions. Kidman’s ownership of stock 
was fluid and he always maintained that he did not know himself how many he had 
apart from those being moved from place to place by drovers.  He favoured cattle 
rather than sheep – they were less labour intensive, and the markets were more 
predictable. Also they did not cut up natural pasture as much as sheep did, allowing it 
to recover from drought and overgrazing. Nonetheless, there were about 250,000 
Kidman sheep to shear in the Western Division during the 1920s, and some in south-
western Queensland. This was the nucleus of a run for a Broken Hill shearing 
contractor.
68
 
                                                
63 Jill Bowen, Kidman: The Forgotten King: The true story of the greatest pastoral landholder in 
modern history, Angus and Robertson, North Ryde NSW, 1987. This is a carefully researched account 
of Kidman’s life and pastoral career. The better known biography is less reliable. Ion Idriess, The 
Cattle King: The Story of Sir Sidney Kidman, Angus and Robertson, Sydney, 1936. See Bowen’s 
introduction, p. x. 
64 The double page map published before p. 1 of Bowen’s book shows scale of Kidman’s interests. 
65 Bowen, Kidman, pp. 72-87. 
66 Bowen, Kidman, pp. 31-8. 
67 Bowen, Kidman, pp. 104, 118, 125-140. 
68 Bowen, Kidman, pp. 371, 427-8, 429.  See Chapter 5 for the shearing career of Charlie Flavel. 
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Kidman was a controversial figure. While he was enormously wealthy he had the 
personal style of a bushman who was most comfortable yarning to his drovers and 
station managers. He mingled with city slickers in Melbourne and Adelaide, but 
seemed less at home. On the other hand there was debate about whether he was mean, 
or just thrifty. Kidman’s attitude to surviving harsh conditions was that nothing 
should be wasted. He bought stations ‘cheap’ and invariably stripped the buildings of 
iron and anything else that had value. Only skeleton staffs of station hands were 
retained, accelerating depopulation of the Western Division, the opposite of what land 
reformers envisaged. It was a common view that he destroyed rural communities, but 
any formula for closer settlement was likely to exceed the landscape’s capacity to 
withstand human exploitation.69     
 
Under the Western Lands Act small blocks were made available for selectors – 
‘small’ meaning runs of up to 100,000 acres able to carry perhaps 10,000 sheep.
70
 
Droughts impacted heavily again in 1914 and 1915, in the early 1920s and in 1927. 
The combination of Kidman’s attitude to stocking sheep and the travails of the 
grazing selectors meant that the sheep population never recovered from its disastrous 
collapse in the 1890s. Bourke had been a thriving Darling River wool port and was 
also the terminus of the railway from Sydney. Some shearers had lived there, at the 
mining town of Cobar, and at Broken Hill. While Broken Hill continued to grow the 
overall region fell into decline. Shearers and miners drifted away, but the region 
retained a nucleus of shearers who tended to be more downtrodden and militant than 
those further east.
71
  
 
The Land  newspaper complained in 1924 that there was ‘eager’ demand from settlers 
which could not be met.
72
 However, there was a more sober analysis in the Sydney 
Morning Herald in the midst of the Depression crisis in 1930. The articles provided a 
comprehensive summary of the history since 1902. Gritty courage of the settlers could 
not hide a message that was brutal and frank. Run holders big and small had been 
                                                
69 Bowen, Kidman, pp. 417-39. 
70 Carrying capacities were 10 to 20 acres per sheep. The bare minimum sized flock for a viable 
enterprise was regarded as about 5,000 sheep.  
71 See Chapter 7 for ‘Trucker’ Brown, who came from Cobar. 
72 The Land, 28/11/1924, p. 23. 
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seriously affected by the combination of drought and poor wool prices since 1927, 
and some had been ‘forced to leave their homes penniless’. The Western Lands 
Commission had foolishly caved into the pressure from settlers and the early 
confidence which built before World War I was ‘crudely shattered’. Was it cheaper to 
let sheep die or to go to the expense of keeping them alive?73 Kidman usually had 
another station in his continent-wide network to which he could transport them before 
their condition deteriorated, but droughts generated a cruel dilemma for small run 
holders. 
 
Kidman died in 1935. The grazing empire was divided amongst descendants, but a 
large chunk continued intact under the guidance of his son-in-law Sid Reid.74 After 
World War II many of the Kidman properties were split up for soldier settlement. 
Yancannia station, for example, was divided into 17 lots of about 100,000 acres each, 
capable of carrying about 5,000 sheep plus the progeny. Laurie Walsh, a Broken Hill 
shearing contractor in the 1950s explained that this ‘worked out pretty right’, but only 
because the Western Lands Act was not rigidly administered. With blocks of this size 
selectors were inclined to overstock and abuse the country. With a run of dry years 
carrying capacity could fall as low as 1,000 sheep. However, in Walsh’s observation 
the act came to be administered ‘more flexibly’ enabling leaseholders to control 
bigger areas. Somehow ex-Kidman managers seemed to get preference when blocks 
were balloted. Walsh expressed the view that the Kidman pattern of land occupation 
would eventually re-assert itself in some form. It was possible for a leaseholder with 
four or five sons to gradually accumulate a holding of up to a million acres.75  
 
The World of Shearers 
 
The world of shearers (Map 2-1) may usefully be viewed in regional sub-groups 
based on flock sizes.76 As small flocks were frequently combined for shearing, flock 
                                                
73 SMH, 2/7/1930, p12; 3/7/1930, p. 19; 4/7/1930, p. 12; 5/7/1930, p. 14; 7/7/1930, p. 10. 
74 Bowen, Kidman, p. 412-5. 
75 SLV MS 557-558, Patsy Adam-Smith interview with Laurie Walsh, 1980. 
76 Available statistics are canvassed in Butlin, ‘Distribution of the Sheep Population’, pp. 296-9. 
Butlin’s estimates (pp. 300-7) detailed regional shifts between 1860 and 1957, but do not address flock 
sizes.Estimates in Tables 2-2 to 2-4 are derived from data published regularly in official Year Books of 
NSW, Queensland and Victoria, anchored to the Butlin figures. For manageable discussion, they were  
amalgamated into broader regions, corresponding as closely as possible to Butlin’s zones. 
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size statistics are a limited but useful guide to changing woolshed patterns.  Tables for 
Victoria and the Riverina are not presented, but both regions exhibited rough 
similarities to northern and central-NSW (Table 2-2).77  
 
The overall number of sheep in the sheep-wheat country surrounding Moree, 
Coonamble and Dubbo expanded at least until the 1930s, after which it flattened out. 
Numbers roughly doubled from about 10 million early in the century to nearly 20 
million at the time of the 1950s wool boom. Wheat was harder to grow in the more 
western parts. Moree was already established as selector country in the 1880s but 
Coonamble, with less reliable rain, was not settled by selectors until early maturing 
wheat varieties became available. Still, in 1900 there were almost three million sheep 
in flocks of less than 5,000.78 Grey shaded rows represent flock sizes for which sheep 
numbers were rising. Rows bordered in heavy black identify declining sheep 
numbers. It is clear at once that smaller properties were gaining a larger share of the 
total sheep in the first half of the twentieth century. In 1900 (admittedly drought 
affected) there had been slightly more than two million sheep in flocks of 1-5,000 
sheep. By 1912 there were over 5½ million, almost nine million by 1929, and 11 
                                                
77 The accumulation corresponds as closely as possible to NSW statistical districts III and IV (‘Middle 
and North Central Divisions’) , Butlin, ‘Distribution of the Sheep Population’, Figure 1, p. 282. 
78 NSWPP, 1913, Vol. 3, Pt. 2, Parliamentary Standing Committee on Public Works, Report on 
Proposed Railway, Warren to Quambone, Minutes of Evidence,  p. 1050. 
Table 2-2: CHANGES IN RURAL SOCIETY 
Sheep to be Shorn, by Flock Size 
(thousand sheep) 
 
North & Central NSW 
     
Flock Size 1900 1912 1929 1950 
     
Below 500 248 637 721 788 
500 to 1,000 430 988 1,537 2,209 
1 to 2,000 978 2,141 3,125 4,223 
2 to 5,000 1,325 3,513 5,830 6,667 
5 to 10,000 1,426 2,245 3,574 2,975 
10 to 20,000 1,431 1,986 2,625 1,594 
20 to 50,000 2,248 2,023 1,555 876 
Over 50,000 1,895 974 607 64 
     
Total 9,983 14,505 19,572 19,396 
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million by 1950.  By contrast, over four million sheep on properties with more than 
20,000 sheep in 1900 had withered to less than one million by 1950.79 Medium sized 
flocks (5 to 20,000 sheep) initially showed some growth – roughly three million sheep 
in 1900, more than six million by 1929 – but this is deceptive because as larger 
stations lost acreage in the 1920s some slipped into this category. This ceased to 
matter by the 1930s. Between 1929 and 1950 this category shrank by 25 per cent from 
6.2 million to 4.6. In 1900 55 percent of the wool came from big sheds (more than 
10,000 sheep), and by 1929 it was only 11 percent.  
 
For shearers it represented dramatic change. Before World War I most of them made 
their money in big sheds accompanied by up to 30 shearers. Graziers were socially 
and culturally aloof and easy to hate. By 1950 most of them worked in sheds where 
the owners were from social backgrounds much like their own. Maybe six or eight 
shearers were present, in some cases as few as three or four. The actual mechanics of 
shearing and woolshed practice changed little, but the social climate in small sheds 
was more intimate. Nevertheless, there were enough larger sheds in the interwar 
period for industrial conflict. Both Midkin and Wingadee were in this region.80 
 
Victoria was on the whole comprehensively closely settled well before 1914 although 
the Western District carried a distinctive pastoral pattern and ‘old money’ character 
into the interwar period.
81
 Irrigation along the Murrumbidgee gave the Riverina a 
closely settled look, but large stations maintained a presence. There was always a 
marked difference in settlement patterns north of the Murray River and the 
unambiguously farming districts of northern-Victoria on its southern banks. The 
Riverina retained its reputations for merino stud stations, as the famous statue of a 
ram near Deniliquin bears witness. Towards the north, as the country on the Hay 
Plains and along the Lachlan River merges with the arid Darling River regions of 
western-NSW, extensive grazing was never superseded.  
                                                
79 This figure was certainly diminished by the drought – in the ‘normal’ years before 1895 these 
stations carried 5 to 7 million sheep. 
80 For Midkin and Wingadee see Chapters 7, 8. 
81 Monica Keneley’s articles on land settlement in the Western District - ‘Closer Settlement in the 
Western District of Victoria’; ‘Land of Hope: Soldier Settlement in the Western District of Victoria 
1918-1930’, The Electronic Journal of Australian and New Zealand History, 
www.jcu.edu.au/aff/history/articles/keneley2.htm , 2000; ‘The Impact of Agricultural Intensification on 
the Pastoral Economy of the Western District of Victoria, 1890-1930’, Electronic Journal of Australian 
and New Zealand History, 1999.    
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The Western Division – Kidman country  – was a hub of pastoralist expansion in the 
1880s, but by 1900 it was devastated (see Table 2-3).82 In 1893 the region carried 19 
million sheep, and was the home of some of the biggest flocks in Australia. It never 
rose above seven million in the next fifty years. Grazing selector properties (2 to 
10,000 sheep) grew erratically, hosting about a million sheep in 1900 and almost five 
million by 1950.83 Opportunities for shearers who lived in Broken Hill or Bourke 
stagnated as the emphasis shifted towards these smaller properties. The 4½ million 
sheep in large flocks in 1900 was a quarter of what it had been before the drought, and 
after World War I shrank even further. These were the stations Charles Bean 
mentioned in On the Wool Track. In the early 1890s Samuel McCaughey’s Dunlop 
and Toorale stations accounted for half a million sheep and an acreage comparable to 
Belgium. Dunlop was the first station to attempt a complete shearing with Wolseley’s 
patented machines. Henry Lawson briefly worked as a rouseabout at Toorale in 1892. 
Although he hated every minute of it he was still writing poetry about it a decade 
later, and helped create what Russel Ward identified as the ‘Australian Legend’. 
While the Darling River continued to shape the national mythology of shearing, by 
                                                
82 NSW Statistical districts V and VI (‘East of Darling’ and ‘West of Darling’), Butlin, ‘Distribution of 
the Sheep Population’, p. 282. 
83 Useful statistics are also presented in J. Rutherford, et al, New Viewpoints in Economic Geography: 
Case Studies from Australia, New Zealand, Malaysia, North America, Martindale Press, Sydney, 1966, 
Chapter 9, ‘Woolgrowing in the Western Division of NSW’, p. 175. 
Table 2-3: CHANGES IN RURAL SOCIETY 
Sheep to be Shorn, by Flock Size 
(thousand sheep) 
 
Western Division, NSW 
     
Flock Size 1900 1912 1929 1950 
     
Below 500 52 26 25 18 
500 to 1,000 121 59 104 57 
1 to 2,000 241 237 414 353 
2 to 5,000 426 597 1,002 2,890 
5 to 10,000 684 817 783 1,639 
10 to 20,000 1,068 1,204 1,004 883 
20 to 50,000 2,359 2,683 1,364 779 
Over 50,000 1,362 1,287 625 178 
     
Total 6,375 6,910 5,361 6,799 
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1950 few shearers had much incentive to go out there. A scattering of grazing 
selectors and Kidman holdings stripped of assets were almost the only ones left.   
 
Queensland has similarities, but is less bleak (see Table 2-4).84 Sheep numbers fell 
heavily in the 1890s but recovered quite quickly to 12.5 million by 1905. By 1914 
they passed 23.1 million, exceeding the pre-drought peak. Thereafter, the wool 
industry struggled and there was little further growth until the 1950s. Land policies 
encouraged a shift to smaller flocks, but unlike closer settlement in NSW, this did not 
result in an increase in the overall population of sheep. The country was more like that 
around Broken Hill and Bourke than Moree and Armidale. Wool production was vital 
to the Queensland economy and there was persistent angst over the lack of growth.85 
Problems in the Western Division of NSW could be viewed as a social issue, because 
there was plenty of wheat and wool grown elsewhere. In Queensland the difficulties 
of smaller woolgrowers impeded the overall economy. 
 
 
                                                
84 There would have been some point in separating the western  Mitchell, Maranoa and Warrego 
districts on Butlin’s map from the more closely settled Darling Downs. As 80 percent of Queensland 
sheep were in pastoral regions the State is represented as a whole to avoid clouding the discussion.  
85 Ross Fitzgerald, History of Queensland From 1915, pp. 195-8. 
Table 2-4: CHANGES IN RURAL SOCIETY 
Sheep to be Shorn, by Flock Size 
(thousand sheep) 
 
Queensland 
     
Flock Size 1905 1914 1924 1934 
     
Below 500 111* 187 186 195 
500 to 1,000 220* 295 262 392 
1 to 2,000 601 685 1,056 
2 to 5,000 
1,246 
1,922 2,435 4,714 
5 to 10,000 2,551 3,385 5,343 
10 to 20,000 
2,903 
3,893 3,146 4,182 
20 to 50,000 5,881 4,996 3,742 
50 to 100,000 4,606 2,944 1,883 
Over 100,000 
8,054 
3,194 990 121 
     
Total 12,535 23,129 19,028 21,574 
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In 1914 small flocks (less than 10,000) accounted for slightly more than five million 
sheep. This was 11½ million by the mid-1930s, indicating a huge shift in emphasis 
towards small flocks, as there was little overall growth. Big stations (more than 
20,000) dropped from 13½ million to under six million over the same period. Unlike 
western-NSW large stations had not disappeared, but they ceased to dominate. There 
was only one flock left with more than 100,000 sheep. With 20 million sheep 
Queensland remained an attractive hunting ground for shearers. Its appeal was 
underlined by the spread of shearing throughout the year. Queensland proved popular 
with fast shearers and shearing contractors  for this reason, but this also meant local 
shearers had to compete against ‘southerners’ for the most lucrative stands, and there 
was unemployment in pastoral towns. 
 
Another way of examining patterns is to compare Victoria with Queensland (see 
Figure 2-1).86 Victoria’s usually reliable rain had already made it a wheat farming 
region with small flocks by the 1880s, although pastoralists still dominated the 
Western District. Queensland’s sheep population was roughly the same, but spread 
over the western plains on large stations and grazing selections. Victoria’s sheep 
                                                
86 Figure 2-1 is a redrafting of Butlin’s, Fig. 2, p. 283. Data has been smoothed into 5-year moving 
averages to focus on longer term movements, and is not drawn to a logarithmic scale. 
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numbers expanded steadily with minor fluctuations, while in Queensland they 
stagnated in the inter-war period and declined from the 1940s.87  After World War II 
there was more shearing in farming districts of Victoria than Queensland, where 
shearing legends had been created.  
 
NSW is also shown in Figure 2-1 for comparative purposes, but it is it is more 
usefully spit into its grazing and farming components and compared with Queensland 
(see Figure 2-2).88 The role of Queensland as a magnet for shearers from northern-
NSW underlines this grouping of districts. The Darling River region (also with 
autumn shearing) stagnated and lost its appeal. Within NSW the focus of opportunity 
shifted decisively from the romantic far-west to the wheat-sheep regions and to 
Queensland, although the latter was affected by droughts in 1914 and 1915, in the 
1920s, and again in the 1940s. Still, there were almost always more sheep to shear in 
Queensland than either of the two major regions of northern NSW. Moreover, after 
1920 the wages in Queensland were better.
89
    
 
Many of the great old sheds fell into disrepair, although some gradually acquired 
heritage value. Some continued to be used, although usually the number of stands was 
cut back.90 Medium sized sheds were built when they needed replacement. A new 
woolshed was a big investment for heavily mortgaged selectors and in the 1920s 
many growers postponed it. In the more affluent 1950s many built woolsheds for the 
first time.91 The hiring of woolsheds to neighbours or contractors was common 
between the wars.92 Another development was ‘depot shearing’. A suitable building in 
a country town was set up with yards and shearing machinery, and farmers brought 
sheep from the surrounding district. Shearing depots were often combined with wool 
scouring. The use of portable ‘2-stand shearing plants’ was another common practice. 
These were mounted on a truck or a trailer for mobility, and were particularly suitable 
                                                
87 A burst of growth during the 1950s was less marked than in either NSW or Victoria. 
88 5-year moving averages of Butlin figures. The corresponding data is graphed by Butlin in Fig. 3, 6 
on pp. 286, 292.  
89 See Chapter 6.  
90 The 51-stand woolshed at Tupra station, near Hay, was built in the late-nineteenth century and was 
still being used in 2003. However, only 8-stands were in operation. Witnessed by writer. See also, 
McKenzie, Wingadee, pp. 42, 49, 54. 
91 Kosmas Tsokhas, ‘Concessions, Conflicts and Collusion’, p. 290.    
92 See Chapter 4. 
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for handling flocks of 1,000 sheep or less, but their use was not confined to this.93 
During severe droughts, there was a chance sheep could be saved if the shearing plant 
was set up in the paddock.94 
   
Bicycles and horses gave way to motor cycles (briefly) and then cars (although this 
was more gradual). Trains had taken shearers out to Bourke since 1882, but as the rail 
network thickened it improved as a means of reaching shearing sheds. In the interwar 
period rural garages ran taxis which could be loaded up with shearers’ gear, to take 
them to the shed from the nearest railway town for a shilling a mile.95 Sometimes 
shearers were taken to sheds on the tray of a truck, although only in Western Australia 
was this widespread.
96
 In the pastoral age shearers were engaged by letter, or almost 
as often by turning up at the roll call and taking their chances. Life on the road was 
complicated by unscheduled delays due to weather or breakdowns, and predicting 
exactly when a shed would cut out was impossible. Early in the century the telegraph 
was of more immediate use to employers and the union than individual shearers, but 
                                                
93 I.C. Heazlewood, Old Sheep for New Pastures: A Story of British Sheep in the Hands of Colonial 
Shepherds, Australian Society of Breeders of British Sheep, Tasmanian Branch, Launceston Tas., 
1992, pp. 25-6. 
94ABL Z278, Shearing Company Minutes, 9/7/1929.  
95 NAA B1958/10 Box 2, Pastoral Award Transcript 1926, p. 80. 
96 See Chapter 9. 
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gradually improving telephone services helped to improve the flexibility of 
arrangements. These factors changed the ways shearers met and reacted with each 
other, and also with graziers and employers. The emergence of shearing contractors as 
the dominant method of engagement was intertwined with these social and 
technological elements, and is taken up in detail in Section II .    
 
Shearers mainly lived in the areas where farm development was concentrating the 
sheep population – in Victoria, the central-west of NSW and New England, but 
mainly because farming supported an expanding rural population on selector blocks 
and rural towns. Shearing was a logical occupation for young rural men, but for most 
it was not year-round employment and they often lived where the other opportunities 
were. If they were farmers or engaged mainly in agricultural work, naturally they 
lived in farming areas. If the alternative employment was mining, or road and railway 
construction this dictated the choice. There is strong evidence that about a quarter of 
all shearers before World War II lived in either Sydney or Melbourne, where there 
was seasonal employment in abattoirs, flour mills and on the waterfront.97 The 
proportion living in the metropolis gradually declined. During the pastoral age, when 
there were many more sheep inhabiting the Darling, shearers made their homes in 
Bourke or Wilcannia and some lived in mining centres such as Cobar or Broken Hill. 
Even so many shearers came out from selector districts further east.98 The decline of 
the big stations (and many of the mines) led to population drifting away but the 
proportions of local to incoming shearers may not have changed. 
                                                
97 NAA B1958/10 Box 2, Pastoral Award Transcript 1927. 
98 Merritt, Making of the AWU, p. 38. 
Chapter 3. Riding the Sheep’s Back: Wool in Prosperity and Depression 
 
Burden of Dominance 
 
It was often said that Australia rode on the sheep’s back. The cartoon in Figure 3-1 
was originally published in the Pastoral Review in 1892. It was prescient because 
over the next decade shearing strikes, rabbits, bank crashes, low wool prices and 
finally drought closed out the ‘long boom’ of the nineteenth century and economic 
depression was settling in. When the Review reprinted it in September 1930 the Great 
Depression of the 1930s had already arrived. The debt swamp which the pastoralist 
waded through in 1892 was largely of his own making, but in 1930 most of the 
national debt had been created by others. After Federation the economy was rigged to 
favour non-wool sectors and this inflated the cost of producing wool. Pastoralists 
were natural ‘free-traders’ in a society of ‘protectionists’. The ideology of ‘the new 
protection’ was most associated with Alfred Deakin, a Victorian politician who served 
three times as Prime Minister during the first decade of Federation, but it was a 
haphazard consensus more than a grand plan. To urban protectionists and the labour 
movement, the political constituencies which counted, it combined sound economics 
and social justice. Its components were tariffs to protect industry, arbitration to ensure 
‘fair’ wages, British immigration, state enterprise rather than rapacious capitalism, 
and, last but not least, government borrowing.
1
 Probably closer settlement legislation 
should be added to the list, although it is not often referred to in the context of the 
‘Deakinite settlement’.2  So pivotal was the wool economy that it encouraged a view 
that it was the only non-subsidised commodity Australia was capable of producing, 
and graziers succumbed to delusions of grandeur at times. Their backs, rather than the 
sheep’s bore the burdens.  
 
Despite its problems in the 1890s, wool re-emerged in the early 1900s as an economic 
colossus. For more than a century it had outmanoeuvred foreign competitors to 
                                                
1 P. Kelly, The End of Certainty : Power, Politics and Business in Australia, Allen & Unwin, St. 
Leonards,  NSW, Revised edition, 1994, pp. 1-16. Kelly coined the term ‘the Australian Settlement’, or 
alternatively ‘the Deakinite Settlement’.     
2 Deakin was an enthusiastic supporter of state funded irrigation schemes, a clear indication that closer 
settlement was consistent with his overall vision. 
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Figure 3-1: Pastoralists’ Burden 
 
 
This cartoon, originally published in the Pastoral Review in 1892, was 
reproduced in the issue of September 1930, p 868 
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dominate world trade in merino wool.3 Sheep stations monopolised the outback. 
Sophisticated commercial tentacles reached far and wide, internationally and through 
much of Australian society.  Wharf labourers, broking house clerks, rural publicans, 
country golf clubs, and perhaps even Kings Cross brothels rode the wool economy. 
Social divisions and alliances arose from its inter-dependencies. On the whole, wool 
growing was highly profitable, but risky. Prices were volatile and stock perished 
during droughts. Growers experienced a disconcerting variability in their income. Size 
mattered, and adequately capitalised pastoralists were better at withstanding these 
shocks. Yet large sheep stations led to class envy, as already observed. The Australian 
polity was ambivalent about wool, mythologising it into the national culture and 
exploiting its riches, but also contriving to limit its influence.  
 
Dominance of land use and the wool trade were of less moment than wool’s 
dominance of exports (see Figure 3-2). Australia needed to import capital and 
manufactured consumer goods. An export staple was essential to pay interest on the 
foreign loans which built railways and other infrastructure considered vital for 
                                                
3 Alan Barnard, The Australian Wool Market 1840-1900, Melbourne University Press on behalf of The 
Australian National University, Melbourne, 1958, pp. 19-44. 
Figure 3-2: Wool exports (percent of total) 
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Raw data from Vamplew, Historical Statistics. 
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economic progress. The burden - or was it a privilege? – was carried by wool, because 
it was by far the most successful export commodity. Wool as a proportion of overall 
exports fluctuated around 40 percent between 1900 and the mid-1960s, rising to over 
60 percent in 1951. Then it went into a sustained slide and no longer dominates 
economic events. For most of the twentieth century, however, the trappings of modern 
society were leveraged to the foreign currency earned by wool. Major fluctuations in 
wool income triggered crises (notably in the 1930s) and booms (as in the 1950s). 
Minor variations were scrutinised for their effects on the rest of society. Menzies 
Governments rode the post-War boom from 1949 to 1972, but came close to losing 
general elections in 1954 and 1961, when minor wool downturns forced it to apply the 
monetary and fiscal brakes to restore ‘balance’ to the economy.4 The ultimate decline 
of wool as an export staple once the 1950s boom had run its course was not as 
damaging as the history of wool dependence implies, because by then exports of 
minerals were eclipsing it.5 However, for a century and a half cycles of depression 
and prosperity were largely dictated by the ebb and flow of the wool trade.  
 
The planks of the Federation architecture were not laid all at once. The Immigration 
Restriction Act of 1901 was one of the first initiatives of the new Commonwealth 
Parliament. The Arbitration and Conciliation Act was passed in 1904, but it was 1907 
before it had much impact. The ‘Harvester judgement’ of Justice H.B. Higgins created 
a ‘basic wage’ of 42s per week, and paved the way for a wage fixing bureaucracy at 
the centre of economic affairs. Over time, wages in specific industries were linked to 
the basic wage.6 Comprehensive import tariff schedules were not completed until 
1908.
7
 The policies were not quite a grand plan, but were inter-dependant. They 
shaped a social order not directly exposed to wool shocks. The problem for 
woolgrowers was that their costs were determined in one world, sheltered from 
competition, and their prices in another, the unforgiving external marketplace. The 
conjunction of the major export sector being exposed to risk while key employment 
                                                
4 Sir Robert Menzies retired in 1966, but the Liberal-Country Coalition remained in office until 1972. 
5 Barrie Dyster and David Meredith, Australia in the International Economy in the Twentieth Century, 
Cambridge University Press, Melbourne, 1990, p. 244. 
6 The Pastoral Industry Award of 1907 (July) pre-dated ‘Harvester’ (November). See Chapter 6.  
7 For overviews of tariff policy see David Pope, ‘Protection and Australian Manufacturers’ 
International Competitiveness: 1901-1930’, Australian Economic History Review, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, 
March 1986, pp.22-9; Peter Lloyd, ‘100 Years of Tariff Protection in Australia’, Australian Economic 
History Review, Vol. 48, No. 2, July 2008, pp. 99-145.   
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sectors were protected from it created enduring tensions.  
 
The monetary dimension of wool dependence needs some emphasis. ‘In an open 
economy with a fixed exchange rate’, according to economic theory, ‘an externally 
transmitted disturbance will be amplified’.8 Wool was sold at auctions in Australia but 
paid for with foreign money. Although wool was not the only source of foreign 
reserves, another being the sometimes profligate borrowing by State governments, it 
facilitated foreign borrowing to boost sectors that had nothing to do with getting wool 
off the sheep’s back. Credit-driven development was sheltered by the tariff wall.  
 
The Harvester judgement was typical of the mechanisms insulating citizens from 
external events. Higgins has enjoyed heroic status in labour historiography, although 
the case has been made by an economic historian that the basic wage was a factor in 
persistent unemployment in the 1920s.9  Higgins used the phrase ‘frugal comfort’ to 
describe the basic wage.
10
 This brilliantly expressed the social decency of fixing 
wages to internal prices. It was progressive, humane – it tempered the cut-throat 
nature of raw capitalism. However, prices for household goods were formed in a 
monetary oasis largely created by wool income, while wool prices were generated 
outside.  It was an excellent compromise in many ways, but had dangerous 
ramifications. The system was divorced from market reality, exposed to the whims of 
politics and social prejudice, and risked compromising prudent limits. The crisis of 
the 1930s was a particularly acute demonstration of these flaws, but there was a 
persistent tendency towards over-consumption, just as likely when wool prices were 
high. ‘Civilised capitalism’ exhibited a brand of egalitarianism that survived most of 
the twentieth century.11 By the end of the century, though, it was unravelling.   
 
Graziers had access to corridors of power, although the extent to which this translated 
into hidden and sometimes sinister backroom political manipulation has been greatly 
exaggerated. The AWU could also get its foot inside ministerial doors, as did urban 
                                                
8 A.M.C. Waterman, Economic Fluctuations in Australia, 1948 to 1964, Australian National University 
Press, Canberra, 1972, p. 40. 
9 Hearn and Knowles, One Big Union, pp. 92-3; Colin Forster, ‘An Economic Consequence of Mr. 
Justice Higgins’, Australian Economic History Review, Vol. XXV, No. 2, Sept. 1985, p. 111. 
10 John Rickard, H.B. Higgins: The Rebel as Judge, George Allen & Unwin, Sydney, 1984, p. 261. 
11 N.B. Nairn, Civilising Capitalism: The Labor Movement in New South Wales, 1870-1900, Australian 
National University Press, Canberra, 1973.  
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manufacturers. Wool interests could not be ignored, but a cool examination of the 
Australian political economy suggests that big graziers seldom got what they 
wanted.12 In particular, protection of manufacturing was embedded. There was one 
further nagging qualification to wool’s economic supremacy. From the 1920s on, 
mass produced synthetic fibres ate away at its market share, and eroded its terms of 
trade.13 When society did finally move to a more free trade position late in the 
twentieth century, wool was too weakened to really benefit. The AWU was 
preoccupied with graziers crying poor, and slow to appreciate the difficulties of the 
industry in the 1970s. 
 
Arbitration during the Depression 
 
Shearers were amongst keenest observers of wool’s fluctuating fortunes. They were 
often battlers who knew that the wealth did not automatically trickle down from 
powerful pastoralists. Crude notions of class division do not adequately represent their 
place in the social structure or their attitudes, but shearers built a great union, the 
AWU, committed to extracting its pound of flesh from the graziers.14 Woolshed strife 
in the 1890s had two noteworthy legacies. Independently of the union, a system of 
employment by contractors proved a very robust system of organising shearing runs.15 
The other was industrial arbitration.16 From 1907 working conditions were fixed by 
the Commonwealth Arbitration Court, and much of the subsequent history of grazier-
shearer relations was shaped by its cumbersome but enduring bureaucratic 
machinery.17 Together, they achieved a measure of symbiosis. Contractors were more 
in tune with woolshed reality, but they probably could not have kept the peace as 
effectively without the anchor of the Court’s pedantic rule-making. As it was, strikes 
did occasionally occur and minor disputes were commonplace.18 Shearing was a hard 
life, but the AWU successfully institutionalised high wages for white men. The union 
                                                
12 Hart, Philip ‘The Piper Calls the Tune’, in Cameron Hazlehurst (ed.), Australian Conservatism: 
Essays in Twentieth Century Political History, ANU Press, Canberra, 1979, p. 137. 
13 Commonwealth of Australia, Statistical Handbook of the Sheep and Wool Industry: Prepared under 
instruction from the Minister of Commerce and Agriculture, Bureau of Agricultural Economics  & 
Ministry of Commerce and Agriculture, Canberra, 1949, pp. 93-98. 
14 John Merritt, Making of the AWU; Hearn and Knowles, One Big Union. 
15 Contract shearing is discussed in Section II. 
16 Section III deals with arbitration and woolshed conflict. See especially Chapter 6 for Graziers’ Co-
operative Shearing Company and Graziers’ Association tactics during the 1922 strike. 
17  John Merritt, Making of the AWU, p. 354; Hearn and Knowles, One Big Union, p. 106.  
18 Tsokhas, ‘Shifting the Burden’, p. 51.  
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was a trenchant supporter of ‘White Australia’, and vehemently opposed women 
working in shearing sheds. Through the AWU, shearers epitomised a typically 
‘Australian’ approach to dividing the spoils between profits and wages.  
 
According to J.W. Allen, Higgins was ‘hated very cordially’ by the graziers, while 
‘the Union liked him’.19 In 1911 Thomas Waddell, a former Premier and well known 
pastoralist, was speaking in the NSW Legislative Assembly on an Industrial Disputes 
Amendment Act. This had nothing to do with Higgins, but the Federal Pastoral Award 
hearing of that year was underway with Justice Higgins presiding, and Waddell could 
not resist a blistering attack under parliamentary privilege. 
I would not like to trust the matter to this sentimental humbug, the present judge [Higgins], 
this man who is a disgrace to his position as a member of the bench, in showing himself to be 
a violent partisan. I say, no man has ever disgraced his position more. God help the farmers of 
this state, and of Australia, if they have to suffer restrictions that a man of that sort would 
place upon them.20  
He was not mincing words but Higgins over-reacted. The first three pages of the 
written award responded in kind. While Waddell’s words were personally ‘hurtful’, 
he was speaking out only for the public good and with ‘salutary judicial restraint’. 
Nevertheless he managed to accuse Waddell of cowardice and to get in a few jousts of 
his own about his ‘wild and whirling words of reckless and irresponsible ill-temper’.21  
It was enough to force Waddell into a ‘personal explanation’ in the NSW Parliament, 
but it was the kind of apology that indicated he was not very repentant.22 W.E. Abbott 
(1844-1924), another well-known, straight-talking pastoralist warrior attacked 
Higgins over the 1917 award, which lifted shearing rates from 24s per 100 to 30s and 
for the first time regulated wages and conditions for station hands. He could not resist 
a swipe at protected farmers while he was at it.23  
The wool grower has taken a lot of killing because he grew up strong and sturdy without 
coddling or protection, but now I think the politicians, with the help of Judge Higgins and the 
AWU, have got him down and will give him the 'coup de gras' (sic) before long. Then 
Australia will have to look to the coddled and protected irrigationists of Yanco and Victoria to 
pay the interest on her debts with their exports of produce.24 
 
                                                
19 ABL, E256/1647, ‘Recollections’, p. 5. 
20 NSW PD, Vol. 41, 1911, p1144; The Worker, 6/7/1911, p. 4. 
21 CAR, Vol. 5, 1911, pp. 62-4. 
22 NSW PD, Vol. 41, 1911, pp 1811-1813. See also, Rickard, Higgins, pp. 188-190. J.W. Allen also 
remembered the incident, see ABL, E256/1647, ‘Recollections’, p. 5. 
23 Stuart Piggin, 'Abbott, William Edward (1844 - 1924)', Australian Dictionary of Biography, Volume 
7, Melbourne University Press, 1979, pp 3-4; John Merritt, That Voluminous Squatter : W.E. Abbott, 
Wingen, Turalla Press, Bungendore, N.S.W., 1999. 
24 Brisbane Courier, 11/8/1917, p. 6. 
 74 
Higgins died long ago in 1929 but New Right commentators in the present day still 
single him out for calculated scorn.25 This goes to the heart of a continuing debate 
about economic regulation.26 Practice has shifted sharply away from the Higgins 
philosophy since the mid-1980s. In the early twentieth century grazier protest was 
futile as ‘the workingman’s paradise’ took shape.27 The image of the woolgrower as 
the ‘squatter’ is an enduring one and it was customary to assume that they could 
afford to endure the costs they complained about. However, although there were 
graziers who were wealthy, grazing selectors battled droughts and struggled.28 
 
In 1930, the graziers did get their way in the Arbitration Court, but the circumstances 
were extraordinary. Abbott was no longer alive although Waddell, now aged 76, was 
still in the NSW Legislative Council.29 The shearing award set in 1927 was due to run 
until the end of 1931, but the collapse of wool prices in 1929 persuaded the graziers to 
approach the Court in May 1930 for an unscheduled and drastic  variation. Justice 
Dethridge was presiding.  Wool prices were a mere third of their mid-1920s level.
30
 
Dethridge explained that the Court had been in the habit of linking shearing rates to 
the ‘Harvester basic wage’, and that the employers had always acknowledged they 
could afford to pay whatever the Court decided. On this occasion, however, he had 
‘the distasteful duty of adjusting wages in accordance with the present economic 
realities’.31  
It is manifest therefore that whatever the court may do, the market prices of a product of an 
industry must, in the long run, be the main factor governing the share of wage earners, as well 
as those of capital and management, in the return from an industry.32 
                                                
25 SMH, 18/12/2007, p. 11. 
26 The defeat of the conservative Howard Government in the 2007 Federal Election has been widely 
attributed to its ‘Work Choices’ policy. 
27 The phrase was used with irony by William Lane in his 1892 polemical novel about the shearing 
strikes. As with Donald Horne’s phrase ‘the lucky country’ of the 1960s, the irony was largely lost. 
Historians of the Left were inclined to straight denial rather than irony. W. Lane, The Workingman's 
Paradise: An Australian Novel by 'John Miller' (With an Introduction by Michael Wilding), University 
of Sydney Press, Sydney, 1980 (first published 1892); Donald Horne, The Lucky Country : Australia in 
the Sixties, 2nd rev. ed.; Penguin, Harmondsworth, 1968 (first published 1964); K.D. Buckley & 
E.L.Wheelwright, No Paradise for Workers : Capitalism and the Common People in Australia 1788-
1914, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1988; K.D. Buckley & E.L.Wheelwright, False Paradise: 
Australian Capitalism Revisited, 1915-1955, Oxford University Press, Melbourne, 1998. 
28 Graham, ‘Graziers in Politics’, p. 595. See also Chapter 2. 
29 He died in 1940. A. R. Buck, 'Waddell, Thomas (1854? - 1940)', Australian Dictionary of 
Biography, Volume 12, Melbourne University Press, 1990, pp. 337-8. 
30 This was 9.5 pence in February 1930. In world ‘gold’ terms they dropped to 4 pence in 1931, but 
devaluations of Sterling and the Australian pound ‘rescued’ the situation. See also below. 
31 CAR, Vol. 29, 1930, p. 263. 
32 CAR, Vol. 29, 1930, p. 265. 
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The Judge thought that ‘in some industries’ it was open to ‘subsidize a market price 
by artificial means’. But for wool ‘there is no power in Australia that can control 
prices’. He concluded that ‘if the wool industry is crippled, all other industries will be 
more or less lamed’. It was ‘the main staple industry of the country, not a parasite that 
Australia can afford to allow to wither’.33 ‘Crippled’, ‘parasite’, ‘wither’ were all 
strong words. It was a brutal analysis, but essentially accurate.34  
 
The Worker disagreed. It reminded readers that for 15 years, ‘squatters opposed tooth 
and nail every proposal that they should base wages on what the industry could afford 
to pay’.  The 40 percent slump in wool prices was all very well, but ‘Let it not be 
forgotten that in 1922 when there was a slight setback in wool prices, the graziers let 
loose a flood of propaganda that the days of high wool prices were gone forever.’ 
Judge Powers made his damaging award (to graziers it was enlightened common 
sense).35 ‘But what happened!’, The Worker fumed. The subsequent recovery in wool 
prices and wool revenue between 1921/22 and 1928/29 was then laid out in clear 
detail.36 There was an element of understandable hyperbole in this indignation, but 
statements of this genre accompanied every pastoral award hearing that was ever held, 
in good times and in bad. Grazier advocates knew the history just as thoroughly and 
returned every AWU barb with interest. The Pastoral Review’s slant on the Dethridge 
ruling was that ‘shearers and station hands are not fools’, and understood the reasons 
for the award even if the AWU did not.
37
 Dethridge chastised the AWU for not co-
operating in the hearing, but the union had serious problems trying to calm its militant 
wing and could not afford to be seen co-operating with the squatters.38  
 
Higgins retired from the Bench in 1923 and died in 1929. It will never be known what 
he would have thought of his successor’s interpretation. His legend as a Labor hero 
was safe from the ravages of the Depression. The possibility that his reputation as the 
bête nior of conservatives might be redeemed was forever lost. When Dethridge died 
                                                
33 CAR, Vol. 29, 1930, p. 265. 
34 For a different interpretation of the judgement, Moore, ‘Pastoral Workers Industrial Union’. 
35 This was the trigger for a major strike, discussed in Chapter 6. 
36 The Worker, 16/4/1930, p. 7. 
37 Pastoral Review, Aug 1930, p. 732. 
38 Moore asserts the Court had a grazier bias, Moore, ‘Pastoral Workers Industrial Union’, p. 61; 
Tsokhas is more measured, Tsokhas, ‘Shifting the Burden’, p. 41. 
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in 1939 The Worker was as respectful as it felt it needed to be towards a judge of the 
institution it revered, but there were no weasel words. 
Many of the awards handed down by him fell short of what the Unions reckoned was ‘a 
square deal’, and his opposition to any shortening of working hours was bitterly resented by 
the working masses.39 
This was a contrast to the fulsome eulogy for Higgins, the ‘famous judge’, published a 
year or so before the 1930 crisis struck. The same issue, written as wool was on the 
eve of its worst crisis, presented a list of recent deceased grazier estates under the 
headline ‘They Died Rich’.
40
  
 
The problem of reconciling external prices and internal costs was an enduring 
preoccupation of woolgrowers. A 1939 Queensland inquiry expressed it as follows: 
The Australian Wool Industry is thus entirely unsheltered and dependent on overseas trade. It 
is exposed to any economic blizzard that blows in any wool-consuming country of the world, 
and to the political exigencies of customer countries. It has to accept world parity for its 
product, and this fluctuates according to the ability of the customer countries to pay, as well as 
their desire, or their disinclination, to buy. While its income is determined by the purchasing 
power parity of low wage countries overseas, all its costs of production are inflated by the 
high living standards of Australia.41 
Again the language was graphic – ‘blizzards’. It added that wool could not be 
supported ‘by stimulating purchases overseas’.
42
 It therefore required ‘sympathetic 
consideration from within’. 
Anything that [is] done in Queensland and Australia to help the industry function efficiently, 
and to reduce its costs, should ungrudgingly be done in order to advance not only its interests 
but the interests of the whole community.43  
The AWU was apt to look at decisions of the arbitration court the other way around.
44
 
Emphatically, the union did not, as the report implored, ‘ungrudgingly’ accept the 
need to reduce ‘inflated … high living standards’. Hatred of ‘cheap foreign labour’ 
was in its bones. Its raison dêtre was to inflate living standards as much as it possibly 
could, and it poured scorn on realism of this kind. Not even during the extreme crisis 
of 1930 did it shrink from this view.  
 
                                                
39 The Worker, 4/1/1939, p. 13. 
40 The Worker, 16/1/1929, pp. 15, 17. For class envy see also The Worker, 1/8/1928, p. 20.  
41 Report of the Wool Advisory Commission appointed to Inquire into the Economic Condition of the 
Wool Industry in Queensland, 1939, QPP, 1939, Vol. 2, pp 629-745. See pp. 11, 31 of report. 
42 This clumsy phrase meant that woolgrowers could not influence overseas prices. Advocates of 
pooled marketing disputed the proposition. 
43 Report of the Wool Advisory Commission, p. 31 of report. Emphasis added. 
44 The Chairman of the Commission was W.L. Payne, President of the Land Board. Payne had also 
chaired the inquiry in 1927. 
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Shearing cheques had to go around in the grocery stores, petrol stations and doctors’ 
surgeries of the society shearers lived in – perhaps also on the racecourses and in the 
pubs. Shearers were reluctant to accept arguments from the graziers that shearing 
rates might sensibly be linked to the price of wool. In arbitration cases the AWU only 
drew attention to wool prices when they were rising, and the graziers only mentioned 
them when they were going south! The Pastoral Review, however, was not 
completely astray when it claimed that shearers ‘understood’ the reasons for the 
award cut in 1930.45 Cuts in shearing rates at the height of the Depression were, with 
hindsight, not especially draconian. Woolgrowers also sent their children to schools in 
Australia (often not the same ones shearers’ families attended), and had to buy cars 
and farm machinery over the top of tariff barriers. They did not have the luxury of a 
privileged market for wool, and knew better than shearers that wool prices did not 
track the retail prices index. The mechanism for adjusting shearing rates was 
cumbersome, and hampered by the class rhetoric of the 1930s, which both sides had 
fashioned in the 1890s. 
 
Evolution of Economic Ideas 
 
Cost-price disparities drove economic debate in the twentieth century. It divided town 
and country and contributed to Australia’s idiosyncratic class war.46 Social engineers 
and economic boffins took a back seat, as politicians’ searched for a formula to marry 
‘sound economics’ with treasured social philosophies. Wool affairs could not avoid 
the attentions of grand theorists, political visionaries, and assorted crackpots. Wool 
was a proven wealth generator but its commercial scaffolding did not spread it around 
as desired. Nineteenth century anxieties focussed on land reform, but in the twentieth 
wool was increasingly entangled in unfathomable money and banking questions - 
inflation and deflation, rates of currency exchange, the basic wage, and tariff policy. It 
was drawn into the twentieth century obsession with macroeconomics.47  
                                                
45 See Jack Munday’s response, described in Chapter 9. 
46 The Federation-era division between ‘protectionists’ and ‘free-traders’, the inter-war policies of S.M. 
Bruce culminating in the 1929 election which was essentially about the future of arbitration, the 
swirling policy controversies of the Great Depression, and the debates between ‘Keynesians’ and 
‘monetarists’ in the 1970s, may all be seen as examples. 
47 One colourful contributions from the 1930s was Joseph Hamlet, Australia Joyriding to Bankruptcy: 
Tariff Mad - Work Shy: A Drastic, Trenchant and Virile Criticism of Australia's Economics,  Mortons 
Ltd, Sydney, 1930. The book was published on the defeat of the Bruce Government in 1929, and is 
indicative of the prevailing mood of crisis. Hamlet, who is credited with both a BA and B Ecs, had 
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The voice of rural labour, the AWU, was a passionate supporter of the post-
Federation consensus. So much so that it often claimed to be its main inventor.48 The 
union’s enthusiasm for arbitration arose out of the devastating failure of strikes in the 
1890s. It differed from urban unions who saw arbitration as compensation for 
manufacturing protection. The first comprehensive arbitration legislation appeared in 
New Zealand and it was adopted in Australia in the early-1900s. This was a uniquely 
antipodean approach to labour relations. Radical labour was strongly opposed to 
arbitration, regarding it as a product of parliaments dominated by bosses and a supine 
labour movement, but this only reinforced the moderate view that it was sacrosanct.
49
  
Ted Grayndler, AWU General Secretary, returned from a study tour of the United 
States in 1927 convinced that Australia had little to learn from a society where brutal 
confrontation accompanied collective bargaining without regulation.50 Henry Boote 
expressed it most colourfully. 
[S]trikes and lockouts rage beneath the Stars and Stripes with a virulence unknown in this 
country – with bloody battles between the strikers and the bosses’ gunmen; with assassination, 
incendiarism, roundings-up and big stick beatings. The Capitalist and the Communist enjoy 
themselves thoroughly in America! There is no arbitration system to get in their way.51 
Despite virulent antipathy from old timers like Waddell and Abbott, the Graziers 
Association came to exactly the same view as the AWU on arbitration. There was no 
natural love of a system so linked to protection and inflating costs, but graziers 
concluded that it was the best way to fix problems in shearing sheds.
52
 
 
On ‘White Australia’ the AWU was rock solid, to the extent of boycotting rural hotels 
employing Chinese cooks.
53
 State enterprise was also much to its liking. AWU 
                                                                                                                                       
something to say on a wide range of subjects: fiscal matters, secondary industry, geographic isolation, 
‘scientific money v the gold standard’, the jury system, arbitration awards, the future of democracy 
and, of course, the wool industry.  By the 1930s there was a small but cohesive network of genuine 
professional economists who wielded significant influence. See P. Kenyon, Does Australia's past have 
a useful economics?, Murdoch University. Economics Programme,2nd draft. ed.; Murdoch University, 
Murdoch, W.A., 1992; Donald J. Markwell, ‘Keynes and Australia’, A paper presented at the Reserve 
Bank of Australia on 18 September 1985, Research Discussion Paper 2000-04, Research Department, 
Reserve Bank of Australia, and New College, Oxford, June 2000. 
48 The Worker, 15/8/1928, p. 7.  
49 See Chapter 6. 
50 The Worker, 25/5/1927, p. 4. AWU leaders in some ways resembled Samuel Gompers, the American 
union leader who died in 1924, in their dislike of socialists. But Gompers ‘pure and simple unionism’ 
scorned political action. AWU officials sought seats in Parliament and careers in labour tribunals.  
51 The Worker, 4/1/1928, p. 3. 
52 See Chapter 6 for the graziers’ conversion to the value of awards for shearing. 
53 The Worker, 13/5/1915, p. 19; 2/1/1924, p. 7.  
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support for tariffs is harder to understand, and it was rarely explained.
54
 In 
Queensland the focus on agrarian development made the AWU lukewarm about urban 
industry. However, it was paradoxical that the AWU denigrated sheep grazing in 
favour of wheat farming, given that its grassroots made a living from shearing sheep. 
Moreover, agrarianism led to smaller shearing sheds and these were hard to unionise. 
In 1952 Queensland conservatives mischievously speculated that the AWU did not 
support Labor Government land resumptions because this would reduce the number 
of sheep. In conditions of booming wool prices there may have been some truth to the 
jibe.55  
 
Before 1945 wool prices fluctuated between lows of eight pence per lb and highs of 
about 25. A rough benchmark for wool over the long term was 10 pence.56 Above this 
graziers were doing well unless they were in a drought. Below it they were in trouble. 
In December 1916 the Imperial Government agreed to pay 15½ pence for all 
Australian wool for the rest of the war (plus a half share of the profits on resale!). This 
was an outstandingly good deal, but massive unsold stocks risked destabilising the 
market after the war ended.57 There was a rocky period in 1921 and 1922, but by 1924 
wool, at 25 pence or more, was again buoyant. Prices softened in the late 1920s then 
collapsed between 1928 and 1931. The Court set shearing rates by retail prices and 
was not required to adjust them for these fluctuations, but in practice the profitability 
of woolgrowers was considered. On two notable occasions – the Powers Award of 
1922 and the Dethridge Award of 1930 - the Court cut shearing rates because, it was 
argued, the country could not afford to maintain the cost of living formula.58 Overall, 
arbitration managed to create a reasonable correlation between the value of wool and 
the payment of shearers, though that was not its central purpose (Figure 3-3). 
                                                
54 The usual justification for protection was that an industrial base supported a larger population. A 
visiting British Labour MP in 1926 asked why Australia should worry about secondary industry when 
perfectly good products were produced by British workers. ‘When the population is 106 million – 
maybe!’ sneered the AWU. The Worker, 6/10/1926, p. 15. It was also claimed that tariffs on farm 
machinery reduced its cost, presumably through economies of scale. The Worker, 26/1/1927, p. 5. 
55 QPD, 1952, p. 1435. 
56 The data in Graph 1 have been adjusted to a 1912 general price level. There was little sustained 
inflation during this period so the figures approximate nominal prices for wool in Australian currency. 
57 Commonwealth of Australia, prepared under instruction from the Hon. The Minister for Commerce 
and Agriculture, Statistical Handbook of the Sheep and Wool Industry, Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics & Department of Commerce and Agriculture, Canberra, ACT, 1949, p. 73. 
58 CAR, Vol. 16, p. 375; Vol. 29, p. 261. 
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The pre-1930 economy was not ‘managed’ in the way that became the norm after the 
Depression, and especially after World War II. There was no central monetary 
authority. Credit conditions were shaped primarily by the actions of private banks. 
When wool prices fell banking reserves shrank, and banks tended to restrict lending 
without being compelled by the government to do so. This meant that the ‘balance of 
payments’ – consistently an economic ‘problem’ after World War II – tended to be 
self correcting. Likewise, short bursts of inflation were nullified amazingly quickly, 
compared with later experience. The corollary – although it was not fully recognised 
until after the Depression – was that employment took the brunt of  cyclical economic 
forces.59  Before John Maynard Keynes there was no consistent acceptance that the 
employment cycle could be controlled, or that an economy could exist for extended 
periods at less than ‘full employment’.
60
 The Deakinite economy was insulated from 
                                                
59 Jenny Lee and Charles Fahey, ‘A Boom for Whom?: Some Developments in the Australian labour 
market 1970-1891’, Labour History, No. 50, May 1986, pp. 1-27; Charles Fahey, ‘ “Abusing the horses 
and exploiting the labourer”: the Victorian agricultural and pastoral labourer, 1871- 1911’, Labour 
History, No.65, Nov 1993, pp. 96-114 . 
60 Roy Harrod, The Life of John Maynard Keynes, W.W. Norton, New York, 1951, pp. 535-6. 
Figure 3-3: Wool Price and Shearing Rates 1900-1946 
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Calculated from raw data on wool and retail prices published in Vamplew, Historical Statistics. Data 
on shearing rates from table published in The Worker, 26/6/1947 p. 14, and CAR Volumes. Note 
slumps in wool in early-1920s and in 1930s. Shearers were well paid in late-1930s and ‘40s. 
 81 
‘any economic blizzard that blows in any wool-consuming country of the world’,
61
 
but it was directly exposed to sharp fluctuations in monetary conditions. 
 
The Depression crisis hastened the idea that it was possible, and desirable, to fine-
tune demand to stabilise economic fluctuations. The visit of Sir Otto Niemeyer from 
the Bank of England in 1930, the acrimonious debate over ‘The Premiers’ Plan’, and 
conservative anxieties over J.T. Lang’s threatened default on overseas debt, were 
indications of how novel the notion of macroeconomic management was in the 1930s. 
The dismissal of Lang from office by the Governor of NSW in May 1932 epitomises 
a confused and troubled period. The Scullin Commonwealth Labor Government was 
elected in a landslide amidst unprecedented (until then) euphoria, but the Government 
collapsed through internal division after barely two years of its term.62 In 1937 a 
journalist who witnessed events in Canberra first hand wrote a lively memoir which 
probably captures the mood of the time better than many later histories of the 
Depression period. The battle of wills between the ultra-conservative Chairman of the 
Commonwealth Bank, Sir Robert Gibson, and Ted Theodore, the Labor Treasurer 
who was politically damaged by the Mungana mine scandal, is a case in point. 
Theodore wanted to attempt a brave but untried monetary reflation, but was hostage to 
conservative orthodoxy as well as his political enemies on the Labor side, including 
Lang to his Left and J.A. Lyons to his Right. 
There is much to be said on both sides; and when the full history of this period comes to be 
written, a long chapter could be devoted to the contests between the Government and the Bank 
Board, for they involved many problems affecting the nature of parliamentary and democratic 
government which were not then settled, but merely pushed to one side by the ebb and flow of 
day-to-day events.63 
 
‘Long chapters’ have since been written, but not brought the resolution Denning 
expected.64 Gibson is mostly painted as a died-in-the-wool reactionary while 
Theodore is a social progressive who had read the new Keynesian economics. There 
                                                
61 Report of the 1939 Wool Advisory Commission, quoted above. 
62 The Worker, 23/10/1929, p. 3; 2/12/1931, p. 10. For a graphic insider’s account suggesting cabinet 
paranoia and confusion, Frank Anstey, ‘Memoirs of the Scullin Government, 1929-1932’, Historical 
Studies, Vol. 18, 1979, pp. 368-92.  
63 Warren Denning, Caucus Crisis: The Rise and Fall of the Scullin Government, Cumberland Argus, 
Parramatta (NSW), 1937, p. 75. 
64 The literature is large. Probably the most authoritative analysis is C. B. Schedvin, Australia and The 
Great Depression :A Study of Economic Development and Policy in the 1920s and 1930s, Sydney 
University Press in association with Oxford University Press, Sydney, 1970; other useful papers are 
Markwell, ‘Keynes and Australia’; and Alex Milmow, ‘Niemeyer, Scullin and the Australian 
Economists, Australian Economic History Review, Vol. 44, No. 2, July 2004, pp. 142-60. 
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is some truth to this, but reflation was wildly experimental. Moreover, Lang’s enmity 
with Theodore was just as damaging. The Treasurer might at least have expected 
some support for a progressive approach from his own side of politics, but Lang had 
his own agenda. The ‘Lang was right’ version of events continues to have currency 
amongst historians.65 Conservatives, including most of the prominent graziers, 
fingered Lang as a dangerous demagogue. Many in the Labor Party thought so too, 
and the split in NSW lasted until the 1940s.  As a result of the 1930s shambles, 
though, a new economic orthodoxy emerged in which it was axiomatic that 
Governments could control events.  
 
The Depression did not lead to any weakening of the Deakinite settlement. Rather, 
protection was dramatically increased. The Bruce Government had commissioned a 
comprehensive review of economic policy in 1927. This foreshadowed a 
rationalisation of tariff policy, and had it been implemented there would have been 
reductions. But the Brigden Report was not received until 1929.
66
 Bruce was defeated 
and the Scullin Government was not interested in tariff reductions. Denning is again 
worth quoting. 
Canberra became a happy hunting ground for tariff ‘touts’, an unpleasant name bestowed on a 
group of importunate people whose purpose it was to impress on the government and the party 
the dire importance of Australian-made silk stockings, or razor blades, or toilet paper, 
receiving the whole of the Australian market; and whenever two or three people were gathered 
together in a quiet place, it was an easy wager that one of them was a Labor member, and the 
others high tariff advocates. The doormat at the entrance to the Customs department was worn 
thin by their feet.67    
 
The defeat of Scullin in 1931 did not mean that tariff policy was reversed. The 
political vortex catapulted J.A. Lyons into the Prime Ministership as a conservative. 
He had been one of Scullin’s senior economic ministers and perhaps it was not 
surprising that he had no taste for cutting tariffs. Tariff policy was modified to exempt 
some items of farm machinery not manufactured in Australia in 1934, but only 
because Lyons needed to appease Country Party sensitivities.68 Sir Norman Kater on 
                                                
65 Frank Cain, Jack Lang and the Great Depression, Australian Scholarly Publishing, Melbourne, 
2005. 
66 Clark, Australian Hopes and Fears, p. 157. 
67Denning, Caucus Crisis, p. 62. See also, Clark, Australian Hopes and Fears, p. 159. 
68 Earle Page, Truant Surgeon: The Inside Story of Forty Years of Australian Political Life, Angus & 
Robertson, Sydney, 1963, Ch 25, ‘The Lyons Tariff Controversy’. 
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one occasion sought an audience with Lyons to apprise him of woolgrowers’ views.
69
 
Tariffs were reviewed and the rates were fiddled on a regular basis, but the underlying 
philosophy of protection did not change significantly. 
 
Arbitration, too, survived the Depression intact. Like tariffs, there was frequent 
fiddling with the empowering Acts, but the need was less often questioned. 
Frustration with industrial unrest in the 1920s led conservatives to question whether it 
was worth the trouble.  In Prime Minister Bruce’s view the parallel State 
Commonwealth courts were destabilising. If unions did not get what they wanted in 
one jurisdiction they found ways of getting disputes heard in the other. This certainly 
happened in the shearing industry when a Queensland Award was established in 
1920.70 There was also a NSW shearing award from 1926.71 Shearing sheds, though, 
were not central to Bruce’s attempted Commonwealth takeover of the arbitration 
system via referendum in 1926. As usual it was coalmining and the docks. The 
referendum was lost and the Prime Minister changed tack, calling the 1929 election 
on abolition of the Commonwealth system, handing the unholy mess, as he saw it, to 
the States to sort out.72   It was seen by Labor as a return to the pre-arbitration 
capitalist jungle.
73
 Until 2007 Bruce was the only Prime Minister to lose his seat in a 
general election.74 Given the political disaster that followed for Labor, the 
Whitlemesque euphoria accompanying Scullin’s landslide in October 1929 is largely 
forgotten. ‘It Will Never Again be Threatened’ roared Henry Boote’s editorial.
75
 
 
The labour movement was angered by Arbitration Court reductions in the basic wage 
during the Depression, but remained wedded to the principle. Whether Bruce, through 
the Brigden tariff review and emasculation of arbitration, was inching towards 
wholesale abandonment of the Deakinite economy is unanswerable. He did not really 
understand the labour movement and was in coalition with the Country Party who 
                                                
69 Hart, ‘The Piper Calls the Tune’, p. 117.  See Chapter 2 for Kater’s background. 
70 See Chapter 6. 
71 The Worker, 22/9/1926, p. 20; 13/10/1926, p. 18. This was to encourage unionisation of cocky sheds. 
Farmers could avoid paying award wages if shearers were not in the AWU. The NSW award was even 
more generous than Queensland and was a source of instability. 
72 A.B. Wildavsky, D. Carboch, D. The 1926 Referendum &The Fall of the Bruce-Page Government, 
Cheshire, Melbourne, 1958. 
73 The Worker,  29/5/1929, p. 18. 
74 The 2007 election, in which Prime Minister John Howard lost his seat, was also fought with 
industrial relations as a central issue. 
75 The Worker, 23/10/1929, p. 3. 
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complained about tariffs on farm machinery, but expected and received government 
support for farmers. He was essentially conservative rather than a radical reformer. As 
with tariffs, Lyons Governments of the later-1930s did not contemplate another wild 
experiment with the arbitration system. The growing fear of communism dissuaded 
them from any further Bruce-type political adventures.   
 
The Ottawa Agreement of 1932 reinforced the principle of ‘Empire preference’ in 
trade, the core idea being that the Empire should buy Dominion food and raw 
materials for British machinery and consumer goods. No group was more loyal to the 
Empire than graziers, but they were at heart laissez faire liberals and this was not an 
ideal arrangement for them. The market for wool had shifted away from Britain and it 
was not in their interests to irritate German and Japanese industrialists. This 
underscored what came to be seen as ‘appeasement’ of totalitarian powers in the late-
1930s.76 Marketing issues were again temporarily sidelined during the war, when 
wool was purchased by the British Government (as in World War I on very 
favourable terms) to prevent enemies getting hold of it.77   
 
The Exchange Rate 
 
Before 1925 the exchange rate was not used to mediate internal and external 
imbalance. The British Government, in a perhaps foolish attempt to reassert its 
previous status in the international economy, decided to return to the pre-World War I 
gold standard. It amounted to a revaluation of Sterling against America and the 
European Continent of about 10 per cent. For Britain it proved to be a wrong choice, 
but that is incidental to this narrative.78 It led to the first conscious exchange rate 
decision in Australian history. It was actually a ‘non-decision’ because Australia 
retained its parity to Sterling, but the advantages and disadvantages had to be weighed 
for the first time. Had exports still been dominated by British markets it would have 
                                                
76 Robert Menzies earned the tag he wore for life, ‘Pig Iron Bob’, confronting unions trying to block 
iron shipments to Japan. 
77 Commonwealth of Australia, prepared under instruction from the Hon. The Minister for Commerce 
and Agriculture, Statistical Handbook of the Sheep and Wool Industry, Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics & Department of Commerce and Agriculture, Canberra, ACT, 1949, p. 73. 
78 Britain’s decision to rejoin the gold standard in 1925 was to be an important destabilising factor 
leading to world depression, but Australia was not able to affect this or even predict they might happen. 
Roy Harrod, The Life of John Maynard Keynes, W.W. Norton, New York, 1951, p. 358. 
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made little difference, but this was not the case. Over 60 per cent of wool was now 
sold in Europe, and some in Japan and the United States. The flow of Australian 
pounds from these sales was reduced by 10 per cent. Wool prices were strong at the 
time and this masked the effect of overvaluation for a year or two. Apart from the 
direct effect on exporters’ incomes, it had a moderating effect on domestic prices (and 
perhaps inhibited the Arbitration Court when adjusting shearing rates). It also meant 
that the hefty interest payments on Australia’s large overseas debt were, in the 
meantime, slightly less burdensome.  
 
The first significant devaluation of Australian currency occurred in January 1931 as 
the Depression deepened.79 This time there was much more at stake. It was effectively 
an acknowledgement of the inability of banks to counter speculation. It did not in any 
way solve woolgrowers’ problems because the circumstances were so extreme and it 
had the disadvantage of increasing interest payments on overseas loans.80 Another 
effect was to transfer income within Australia from sheltered (internal) sectors to 
exposed (exporting) ones. This was pointless if the arbitration court simply passed it 
into wages, as Norman Kater pointed out. Wool prices between 1906 and 1916 
averaged 9½d in gold, he said, and from 1920 to 1930 - 17½d. After the fall it was 
9½d/lb in ‘Australian currency’ and 7½d in Sterling - but only 4¾d in gold.81  There 
was no magic solution to the predicament of the wool producers who received prices 
determined externally and paid internal costs. It was the first glimpse of a long and 
tortuous debate about how the exchange rate should be managed.82 
 
Although Keynesian economics had introduced the idea that Governments could 
control the employment cycle, it took until 1946 for a co-ordinated international 
response to the Depression to be formalised. The Bretton Woods agreement set rules 
for fixing exchange rates, while fresh concepts of demand management were 
employed internally to steer a course between inflation and deflation. A speech in 
                                                
79 Dyster and Meredith, Australia in the International Economy, p. 134. 
80 Debt was a politically volatile issue. In 1932 the NSW Premier Jack Lang was sacked by the State 
Governor as a consequence of  ‘repudiation’ of foreign debt. 
81 Daily Telegraph, 29/1/1935, p. 6. For a graph of export prices between 1929 and 1933 showing the 
impact of currency realignments, Charles P.  Kindleberger, The World in Depression 1929-1939, 
Penguin Books, Middlesex, 1987, p. 86. 
82 Keynes’ own views about exchange rates at the time largely concerned international stability. He had 
little to say about the problems of small trade dependent economies. Harrod, Life, pp. 526-7. 
 86 
1944 by Dr. H.C. Coombs, then Director-General of the Ministry of Post-War 
Reconstruction, was an indicator of the new thinking.83 With hindsight it was over-
confidently  paraded as a recipe to guarantee full employment. This was the real 
beginning of the ‘Keynesian revolution’, which Australia enthusiastically embraced. 
Keynesian philosophies ‘worked’ for two decades in a way that the pre-War shambles 
palpably had not. In principle, however, not all that much had changed in Australia. 
The Deakinite ingredients were retained. Keynes, in fact, disapproved of protection, 
although he was not a doctrinaire ‘free trader’. He was ambivalent about arbitration.84 
Protection was frowned on by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the 
international bank which policed Bretton Woods arrangements.  
 
The Bretton Woods formula for managing international payments was based on fixed 
exchange rates. The rules, however, allowed countries to change the exchange rate to 
get out of balance of payments trouble, but only if internal problems were addressed. 
This was designed to avoid Depression-era trade wars in which tariffs and exchange 
rate devaluations were the chosen weapons of economic nationalism, while 
underlying structural issues were ignored.85 Stripped of jargon, IMF rules usually 
meant something nasty to quell inflation, including curbs on wages and cuts in 
government spending.86 This kind of thing had made Justice Dethridge, Sir Otto 
Niemeyer, and Sir Robert Gibson very unpopular in 1930. Now the medicine of 
economic puritans was being written into the conventions of international trade, albeit 
with some honey to sweeten the taste. It was all aimed at avoiding the instability of 
the Depression. The AWU, however, was no happier getting the message from the 
IMF, than from the arbitration bench. The exchange rate, if used wisely, could 
facilitate desirable structural shifts. Niemeyer’s approach was more brutal, and less 
likely to do so.87 
 
                                                
83 Coombs, H.C. Problems of a High Employment Economy, The Joseph Fisher Lecture in Commerce 
given in Adelaide on 29 June 1944, The University of Adelaide, 1944.  
84 Harrod, Life, pp. 446, 469; Clark, Australian Hopes and Fears, p. 134. 
85 Harrod, Life, pp. 526-7. 
86 For the ‘IMF system’ and the ‘gold standard’, Victor Argy, The Postwar International Money Crisis: 
An Analysis, George Allen & Unwin, London, 1981, pp. 1-30. The system had broken down and the era 
of floating exchange rates had arrived, although Australia did not float until March 1983. 
87 For a discussion on Keynesian economic ideas and Australian policy in the post-war period, Selwyn 
Cornish, ‘The Keynesian Revolution in Australia: Fact or Fiction?’, Australian Economic History 
Review, Volume 33, No. 2, 1993, pp. 42-68. 
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1950s Wool Boom 
 
The first major test was not the risk of another depression, but handling the boom 
following World War II. This was a novel experience. The average wool price for 
1950/51 was 175 pence per lb, fuelled by exceptional demand to equip the United 
States army fighting in Korea (see Figure 3-4). The effect on an industry used to 
living off 10 to 15 pence was profound. The previous all time peak was about 25 
pence.88 Prices retreated but remained high historically. This was partly illusory 
because inflation lifted costs. Figure 3-5 zooms in on the wool price spike and the 
retail price index. The sharp jump in retail prices (with a bit of a lag) is now 
understood to be a monetary effect rather than a direct effect of woolgrowers 
accelerated spending.  Adjustments in the ‘basic wage’ via the Arbitration Court had 
levelled out by 1953, but the damage was done. Wool prices were now falling and 
income had shifted from woolgrowers to sheltered activities. Periodic ‘credit 
squeezes’ became the key instruments of ‘stop-go’ economic management.89 On 26 
September 1951, wool prices having slumped since 1950, the government brought 
down what was called the ‘Horror Budget’. It was ‘the first time in Australian history’ 
                                                
88 Selected lines sold for more than 240 pence per lb, giving rise to the slogan ‘a pound per pound’, by 
which the Korean War boom in wool prices is often recalled.  
89 This is the popular name given to the use of government budget contractions and controls on lending, 
to reduce aggregate demand in the economy.  Short tern ‘recessions’ came close to causing the defeat 
of the Menzies Government in 1954 and 1961. 
Figure 3-4: Wool Prices 1901-1979 
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
70
80
90
100
110
1901 1907 1913 1919 1925 1931 1937 1943 1949 1955 1961 1967 1973 1979
p
e
n
c
e
 /
lb
0
20
40
60
80
100
120
140
160
180
p
e
n
c
e
/l
b
 (
1
9
1
2
)Real Wool Prices
Nominal Wool Prices
 
 88 
that the budget had been used for ‘anti-cyclical purposes’.90 The 1950s are thought of 
as a ‘low inflation’ period but economists were concerned that latent inflation could 
easily get out of control. 
 
The squeeze on woolgrowers’ incomes was not recognised as a national problem until 
the mid-1960s. Australia was riding its good fortune without appreciating signs that 
the good times were ending. Simmering tension in the shearing industry was 
indicative of general wage pressure. Shearers wages were linked to the retail price 
index, and Figure 3-5 makes the grazier side of the 1956 shearing strike more 
explicable.
91
 
 
The economist Colin Clark was critical of the failure of the Menzies Government to 
revalue Australian currency in the early-1950s. This had potential to ease inflationary 
pressures, and dampen wages movements.92 Clark was voicing views that were 
already orthodox, and government advisers did recommend revaluation in 1951.93 
Clark claimed that a majority of the Cabinet favoured the move but Menzies over-
                                                
90 Waterman, Economic Fluctuations, p. 86. 
91 The 1956 strike is discussed in Chapter 8. 
92 Under a fixed exchange rate regime revaluation would not have caused a contraction of reserve 
money. Australian price levels would be lower, however, and economists reasoned that this moderated 
the wage-price spiral. Clark, Australian Hopes and Fears, pp. 261-3. 
93 Tim Rowse, Nugget Coombes: A Reforming Life, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2002, p. 
208. 
Figure 3-5: Wool Prices & Retail Price Level 1944-61 
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ruled them. It would have been unpopular ‘in certain quarters’, Clarke wrote in 
1958.94 This was not quite accurate. Menzies, largely an innocent in matters economic 
and an Anglophile, was probably happy to restore parity with Sterling, severed during 
the crisis in 1931. It was John McEwen, the Country Party leader who strenuously 
vetoed it because it would have trimmed the incomes of his rural constituents.95 Clark 
explained that the opportunity had probably been lost by the time wool prices hit their 
peak in 1951. An enormous flow of imports meant there was now a balance of 
payments problem as well as inflation, and revaluation was no longer a viable  
course.96  
 
For a nation ‘growing on the sheep’s back’, the 1950s wool boom was an 
extraordinary event. In the interests of running a stable economy there were strong 
grounds for smoothing out the highs and the lows of external income, but this was 
difficult politically. Woolgrowers were highly suspicious of currency trickery 
(although in later years they were more forgiving of devaluations which lifted 
incomes when prices slumped). The AWU was even harder to convince that 
compromises for the general good were sensible. The cost of living was rising and 
wool prices remained upwards of 60 pence a lb. Complex economic theory carried 
little weight in the woolshed. Social prejudices forged in the cauldron of the union’s 
historical fight with the squatters, not monetary theory, fashioned reactions.97  
 
‘McEwenism’ 
 
John McEwen was a soldier settler from Victoria. He had come up the hard way. He 
got his start as a dairy farmer and was shrewd enough to  get a bigger farm and 
change to sheep. He was one of those who came out of soldier settlement better off 
than he went in. A gruff and often ruthless man, he could in later years be moved to 
tears when reminded of those who had to walk away.98 A natural leader, McEwen 
                                                
94 Clark, Australian Hopes and Fears, p. 232. 
95 Peter Golding, Black Jack McEwen: Political Gladiator, Melbourne University Press, Carlton South, 
1996, pp. 148-9. 
96 Clark, Australian Hopes and Fears, p. 232. 
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became prominent in the rancorous forums of Victorian rural politics. The Victorian 
Country Party had two wings: ‘people who had graduated into farming from being 
miners, from being share farmers or from being people employed on farms99 – people 
whose natural affiliation would have been with membership of the Labor party’, and 
‘the stable and more well-off farmers’.100 McEwen gravitated to the conservative 
wing of the movement. He entered Federal Parliament in 1934, and became a minister 
in the Lyons Government in 1937. He held influential posts continuously from 1949 
to 1971. From the late-1950s until the end of his political career he was the key 
architect of economic policy and was arguably more powerful than Menzies himself.  
 
McEwen’s enthusiasm for protection outweighed the narrower rural interest. 
Underlying this was a belief in the importance of immigration to build up population, 
and the supposition that it was not possible to provide employment without 
intervention by the government. The rationale for this was not purely ‘economic’, but 
McEwen was not an inward looking economic nationalist. As Minister of Trade he 
fought vigorously to promote exports, and expected protected manufacturers to strive 
for overseas sales. One of his most significant initiatives was a trade agreement with 
Japan in 1957. Memories of Japanese concentration camps were still fresh and this 
was not politically popular, but it was far-sighted, and it opened the way for a flood 
tide of mineral exports to an emerging economic superpower. This largely underwrote 
the ‘long boom’ of the 1960s. So comprehensive was McEwen’s influence that the 
philosophy of the period has been widely designated ‘McEwenism’. This is not by 
any means an mark of admiration and a later generation of ‘economic rationalists’ 
expressly condemned it. They considered him second only to Justice Higgins as a 
malign influence on Australian progress. They devoted their careers to bringing it to 
an end. They eventually succeeded, but not until the 1980s. 
 
In his maiden speech in 1934 McEwen wondered aloud how or why the 
Commonwealth Bank fixed the exchange rate, and if anyone in the government could 
influence it. He noted that labour had the arbitration system (which he approved of) 
and manufacturers had the Tariff Board (which, at that time he may not have), ‘but 
unfortunately those engaged in essential primary industries have no tribunal to which 
                                                
99 Some would have been shearers. 
100 From John McEwen His Story, as quoted by Golding, Black Jack, p. 68   
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they can appeal in order to secure a reasonable return for their labour.’
101
 Although 
revealing deeply interventionist instincts, it also indicates a capacity for lateral 
analysis. McEwen wanted equivalent certainty for his farmers as manufacturers 
enjoyed.  
 
The ideas behind ‘McEwenism’ were not new. They had been expressed by Earle 
Page, Country Party leader of the interwar period, at a Farmers and Selectors 
Association function in 1927. Page was right behind the White Australia Policy, 
which ‘stood for protection of all sections of the community against inferior standards 
of wages and living’. However, he said, it should apply to ‘everyone in Australia’. 
Primary industries should be ‘maintained on a White Australia basis’! This could 
almost have been from the transcript of an AWU conference. He spent a little time 
decrying urban protectionism, but seemed to accept that it was a political reality. The 
only alternative for country people, therefore, was to stake a claim for their share.102 
The result was that wheat growers, sugar producers and dairy farmers had benefited 
from guaranteed prices and subsidies since the 1920s. Only woolgrowers were left out 
of the loop.  
 
The 1960s saw continuing consumer prosperity. Inflation was sufficiently contained 
to prevent a further crisis arising from disparities between internal and external price 
levels. Already, however, graziers were thinking about broader issues than awards for 
shearers and station hands. Ted Cole, industrial officer for the Graziers Association 
wrote in 1965 that he spent almost as much time in the Arbitration Court making 
submissions regarding Metal Trades Awards and basic wages cases as he did on 
Pastoral Award matters. The graziers recognised that ‘major increases in costs were 
coming from outside the boundary fence’ and that ‘something had to be done to 
protect the pastoral employer and the rural industries caught in the resultant cost 
squeeze’.103 There was some pressure for a devaluation in 1967 but Australia 
managed to avoid it. British Sterling was devalued in November 1967. Australia’s 
export competitiveness was already under pressure, and it was a question of whether 
the British move should be followed. McEwen was strongly in favour of a devaluation 
                                                
101 Golding, Black Jack, p. 63. 
102 SMH, 8/8/1927, p 11. 
103 Muster, Graziers Anniversary Supplement, 7/6/1965, p12. Clipping in ABL E256/1641.  
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to assist the farmers, but was far away in Geneva conducting trade negotiations. Had 
he been in Canberra he may well have persuaded Cabinet to devalue.104 The incident 
was, however, a precursor of difficulties throughout the 1970s   
 
The Keynesian revolution of the 1950s folded into an insipient but ultimately 
crippling addiction to inflation in the 1970s, known as ‘stagflation’. In a nutshell the 
problem for wool was that inflation in Australia averaged 11.5 percent while export 
prices rose 9 per cent.105 Wool prices were hinged to a lower world inflation rate, but 
competition from synthetic fibres was further eroding wool’s value.  
 
In 1927, only two years before the worst slump in prices hitherto experienced, a 
Queensland report was arrogant enough to assert: ‘The state has no need to explore 
for new markets [for wool], as manufacturers come here from other countries anxious 
to buy.’106 Already, however, acute observers were worried that the advantage 
enjoyed by nylon and rayon through economies of scale was a serious threat. 
Synthetics might have been cheap and nasty compared to the natural feel and quality 
of woollen textiles, but consumer mass markets could be seduced by price at the 
expense of quality. Australian grazing interests lobbied hard for a high price for 
compulsory purchase during World War II, but the negotiators feared that the 
substitution of manufactured synthetics would accelerate. The danger was obscured 
during the wool boom of the 1950s, although few doubted in the 1960s that synthetic 
competition was hurting wool. High wages for shearers and the burden of Australian 
protectionism were bound to be more seriously questioned in these circumstances. 
 
There was a related and frenetic debate over wool marketing. Pastoralists built close 
relationships with woolbrokers in the nineteenth century. Farmers, on the other hand, 
deeply distrusted ‘middlemen’. They complained about ‘lot splitting’ -  buyers 
colluding at auction then ‘splitting the lot’ amongst themselves. Compulsory purchase 
of both wool and wheat during World War I was a watershed, because it suggested 
collective marketing worked well and the British Australian Wool Realisation 
                                                
104 Golding, Black Jack, p. 267.   
105 Calculated from Australian Bureau of Statistics figures. 
106 QPP, 1927, Vol 2, pp 121ff, Report of the Land Settlement Advisory Board appointed to Inquire 
into Certain Matters Relating to Land Settlement, , p 2 of report. By 1939 Queensland experts were 
deeply concerned about markets. See 1939 report quoted above. 
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Association (BAWRA) disposed of the surplus in an orderly manner. Large graziers 
blocked plans to make BAWRA permanent. Norman Kater argued in 1923 it would 
be ‘overstepping the bounds of commercial morality’.107 Farmers and Selectors 
Association meetings and the rural press did not agree, but in the meantime grazier 
rugged individualism carried the day. BAWRA was not formally wound up until 
1931, and there was a move to resurrect it during the crisis of 1930, but the graziers 
again prevailed.
108
 It was all more or less repeated after World War II, but the farmers 
had little hope of changing the status quo when wool prices were booming. By 1971 
the resistance of graziers was broken and market intervention to smooth the extremes 
of price fluctuation was introduced. 
 
From Stagflation to Economic Rationalism 
 
During the 1970s governments tried to redress internal/external imbalance by more 
frequent exchange rate adjustment. This alleviated cost pressure on woolgrowers for 
short periods, but a circuit-breaker was needed. The ‘crawling peg’, by which the 
Reserve Bank was given authority to reset the exchange rate at regular intervals based 
on an automatic formula, was not a solution. It paralleled the Arbitration Court fixing 
wages. The whole economy, including now the exposed export sector, was controlled 
by regulations for fixing wages, prices and the currency. Economic management was 
treating symptoms but not the disease. 
 
This was the background to an economic debate with revolutionary implications. 
Australia was a small fish in a very big pond, and had to participate in international 
trade by rules not of its making. The Bretton Woods system had ceased to work 
properly in the 1960s, and effectively ended in 1971 when the $US severed the link to 
the gold price and became a floating currency. For a time the crawling peg 
perpetuated the fiction that Australia could decide its own exchange rate. The 
eventual ‘cure’ was the floating of the currency in 1983, but this required a radical 
deregulation of financial flows, and a mechanism to reduce real wages should this be 
                                                
107Macmillan, Kater Family, p. 84. 
108 Pastoral Review, July 1930, p. 629. 
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necessary.
109
 Ultimately this meant that the automatic linking of awards to the cost of 
living had to be broken. It gave an old conservative fear of ‘union power’ additional 
piquancy.  
 
Formation of the National Farmers Federation (NFF) out of the rag bag of State and 
product-based organisations in 1978 introduced fresh cohesion to rural politics. The 
NFF Secretariat was an enclave of neo-liberal economics, or the ‘New Right’. The 
philosophy was far from universally welcomed by its farming grassroots, spoon fed 
by generations of Country Party interventionism and special pleading.110 In a 
circulated Industrial Newsletter Paul Houlihan, who became the NFF’s Industrial 
Officer in 1981, lamented the ‘dumping’ of the Minister for Industrial Relations Ian 
Viner from the Fraser Government. Viner’s replacement, Ian McPhee, was viewed by 
the inner circle at the NFF as an economic ‘wet’. He had been Executive Director of 
the Victoria Chamber of Commerce, ‘probably the most rabid protectionists in the 
country’, with close links to the Confederation of Australian Industry and the 
Australian Council of Trade Unions (ACTU)!111 Houlihan was alluding to the 
‘industrial relations club’ which, radical economists believed, was a cosy political 
alliance of protected industries and unions who colluded to link wages and prices at 
the expense of healthy competition. Even the graziers, the only wing of rural politics 
with laissez faire instincts, had been solidly behind labour arbitration since 1922. 
Flirtation with ‘free market’ economics risked alienating much of the NFF 
membership, but ‘flexible labour markets’ could easily be packaged as an anti-union 
message. That was always popular amongst farmers.  
 
Ian McLachlan, from a wealthy South Australian grazing family, was convinced 
‘McEwenism’ had to be abandoned.112 He became chairman of the important 
Industrial Relations Committee of the NFF while the former unionist Houlihan was 
                                                
109 An important caveat of neo-liberals was that the system permitted an increase in real wages if it is 
possible. Whether it does so according to egalitarian sensibilities is another matter. Keynesian thinking, 
however, required reductions in real wages to ensure full employment.  
110 ABL NFF records. These abound with papers on macroeconomics, presenting Friedmanite or 
‘monetarist’ views. See also Connors, To Speak With One Voice, p. 218. 
111 ABL N143/7, Circular No. 111, 4/8/1980; N143/8; N143/9; N143/201; The Land, 1/2/1979, p.32; 
4/4/1980, p. 15; 1/2/1979, p.3.  
112 A publicity document called Farm Focus was officially launched in early-1981 after intensive 
preparation. This distanced farming organisations from ‘McEwenism’. ABL N143/327; The Land, 
14/8/1980, p. 9; The Australian, 19/1/1982, pp 1, 32; 23-24/1/1982, p.  4. 
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his ‘go to’ man in the secretariat.
113
 Press reports of a ‘strike fund’ to fight industrial 
disputes appeared during 1980. A detailed proposal was indeed discussed internally 
on 18 June. $100,000 would be raised ‘to encourage member organisations and their 
members to offer resistance in industrial matters which have national implications’. 
Bans on the export of live sheep had been occupying most of the Industrial 
Committee’s time, as well as constant shearing wage applications. The live sheep 
campaign helped to galvanise membership support, and the fresh-faced Canberra team 
was keen to exploit other labour issues.114 A peculiar controversy over the legality of 
wide combs for shearing was ready made for the purpose.115 
 
The AWU’s dominance of shearing sheds was a small matter in the overall reshaping 
of the economic system which radical economists advocated, but it exemplified the 
wider problems they identified. This is the background to the ‘wide comb dispute’. 
The dispute itself was extremely contentious amongst shearers and in rural districts, 
and is of considerable cultural interest. It was not especially pivotal in reforming the 
economy because wool was no longer a leading industry. But shearing traditions 
symbolised deeply imbedded values about what was ‘fair’ which had been operating 
for almost a century and these were under attack. Opponents of ‘economic 
rationalism’ repudiated the values implicit in the reforms of the 1980s, but the 
experience of shearers showed some surprising insights into who were winners and 
losers.
 
 
 
This was the third economic ‘revolution’ to confront Australia’s export dependent 
society since Federation. The Keynesian consensus had emerged from the ashes of the 
Depression, although under McEwenism the protectionist Deakinite consensus 
remained intact. In the 1980s the exchange rate was floated, industrial protection was 
largely dismantled, the labour market ‘deregulated’ (but only partially), and public 
enterprise was ‘privatised’. This radical transformation occurred after decades of 
frenetic controversy amongst economists. It is outside the scope of this overview of 
wool’s wild ride to address the reasons for the NFF’s embrace of ‘monetarism’ and 
‘free market economics’, or its full consequences, not all of which are yet clear. 
                                                
113 For Houlihan’s career and background, Helen Trinca and Anne Davies, Waterfront: The Battle that 
Changed Australia, Doubleday, 2000, pp. 100-101.  
114 ABL N143/7, N143/8, N143/9; The Land, 1/2/1979, p. 3; 24/4/1980, p. 15. 
115 See Chapter 10. 
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Nevertheless, it laid the foundation for the third ‘long boom’ in Australian economic 
history. Unlike the previous two, this boom had nothing to do with wool!  Somewhat 
surprisingly shearers, whose union was entrenched in Deakinite thinking, proved 
better equipped to cope with the pressures of the deregulated world than anyone 
would have thought.116  
 
The most revolutionary aspect of the new model was that it forced entrepreneurs to 
focus on markets rather than seeking favours from governments. Warren Denning’s 
image of  Canberra as ‘a happy hunting ground for tariff “touts”’ comes to mind. In 
John McEwen’s day, too, the success of an industry depended more on getting the ear 
of the Minister or ‘the department’ than it did on market research or entrepreneurial 
risk taking. For a simple, if brutal, exposition of how the floating currency 
transformed the way the economy worked it is hard to go past the words of Hugh 
Morgan, a mining magnate rather than a grazier, but four square with the NFF 
philosophy. In 1988 he delivered the Alfred Deakin Lecture at the University of 
Melbourne. The irony of a tradition honouring one of the great protectionists could 
hardly be avoided, but Morgan was suitably deferential to the memory of a giant of 
Federation. Recent economic history since the float in 1983 had witnessed a collapse 
of the Australian dollar over 1985 and 1986. The then Treasurer, Paul Keating had 
made a famous comment on radio about Australia becoming a ‘banana republic’ – it 
was an oblique message to the trade unions that if they pegged wage demands to the 
cost of living rather than what they produced, the currency would keep falling. By the 
time Morgan made his speech a fortuitous rise in foreign commodity prices had 
occurred and (assisted by the fact that wages had been restrained) the floated currency 
rose in value. In Morgan’s view the market was ‘rewarding’ the sensible behaviour of 
the manufacturers now that the door to the Treasurer’s office had been closed. 
As commodity prices rise, so does the Australian dollar and economic pressure is transferred 
from commodity producers to those manufacturers who, whilst protected in some measure 
against imports, cannot now merely solve their difficulties by obtaining an increase in the 
tariff.117 
 
                                                
116 This study deals with the period from 1900 to 1990.  As these words were finalised global financial 
markets were experiencing the most serious banking crisis since the 1930s. It seems safe to assert that 
the long boom which stated in 1993 is coming to a shuddering halt during 2009. It is at least a warning 
against ‘end of history’ interpretations of the 1980s economic reforms.  
117 H. Morgan, Political Vision and Economic Reality; 22nd Alfred Deakin Lecture, 29 November 1988, 
Alfred Deakin Lecture Trust, Melbourne, 1988, p 15. 
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There was no need to add, because it was only rubbing it in, that the manufacturers 
could no longer cave in to every demand for higher wages just to reward employees 
for honouring factories with their presence. Hugh Morgan’s brand of plain speaking 
was not everyone’s cup of tea, but it must be acknowledged that, as Managing 
Director of Western Mining Corporation, he was adversely affected by a rising 
exchange rate. He did recognise a bigger picture. When they vetoed revaluation in 
1950, they only saw the government depriving them of a ‘pound a pound’ for wool. 
Of course in 1950 the manufacturers could get redress from their difficulties by 
running to the Tariff Board. Moreover, John McEwen, the warrior of the Country 
Party, encouraged them to do it! 
 
Throughout the twentieth century ‘competition’ had been seen as incompatible with 
Australian egalitarian values. Interest groups were encouraged to co-operate in 
building the economic nation. Manufacturers had tariffs. Labour had awards. The 
States invested in railways. Even farmers were compensated for the costs they 
endured. John McEwen bragged that ‘devaluation compensation’ was the best lurk he 
had ever discovered!118 Only when neo-liberalism asserted itself in the 1980s did 
‘competition’ became politically correct. Although not acknowledged by Left-wing 
critics, a major reason for the political success of neo-liberalism was that it portrayed 
competition as the friend of egalitarianism rather than its enemy.119 The egalitarian 
myth became ‘the customer is always right’. In his inimitable style, Hugh Morgan 
reserved his sharpest barbs for Justice Higgins, the ‘famous judge’ of long ago. 
Higgins’ influence has been so profound and so pervasively harmful, that we are entitled to 
speculate upon the causes of so much disdain for economic reality. Higgins’ vision was of a 
nation for whom commodity prices never fell, and where mediaeval doctrines of just prices 
could be applied without disturbance from an outside world.120 
Even W.E. Abbott and Thomas Waddell might have considered this a bit harsh on the 
worthy judge. Nonetheless, after ninety years of pretending otherwise, Australia was 
coming around to their point of view. 
 
                                                
118 Farmers were granted subsidies in lieu of currency devaluation. 
119 Consider as a specific example the recurring controversy over whether big oil companies rig petrol 
prices. The ‘solution’ to this in the 2000s is invariably referred to the Australian Competition and 
Consumer Council (ACCC). In the 1930s some form of price control would have been pursued. 
Arguably, neither approach has been particularly successful, but that is beside the point.  
120 Morgan, Political Vision, p. 15. 
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The Rise of Contract Shearing 
 
 
Chapter 4: J.H. Young and the Pioneer Contractors 1895-1920 
 
The ‘Station’ Shearing System 
 
In the nineteenth century sheep stations organised their own shearing. Dates were 
advertised inviting written applications with a £1 deposit.1 Alternatively, shearers 
simply turned up at the roll call. At big sheds they camped for days in advance. If 
hired they moved into the accommodation and others drifted away. Large numbers 
moved around at shearing time and men did not always know each other well, or at 
all, but roadside camps had a cheery conviviality. Mates travelled in twos and threes 
but yarning and information swapping fostered mateship on a grander scale.2 Henry 
Lawson poems, based on a relatively brief excursion to western-New South Wales in 
1892 when the system was at its peak, helped to mythologise the life.3 In 1909 when 
the system was in sharp decline, Charles Bean wrote of the migration to Darling River 
stations: ‘At that time of year there began – as there still begins – a great movement, 
away back in the heart of Australia. Far out there the back country was mobilizing.’4 
 
‘Station’ shearing was a haphazard means of recruitment. Travel was a serious 
challenge. Better-off shearers rode horses but many tramped by foot until bicycles 
arrived. Trains were also used but vast areas of the outback were hundreds of miles 
from the few railway lines.
5
 Motorcycles became popular after about 1913, but use of 
cars remained limited in the inter-war period.6 Engagement at the end of an energy 
sapping journey was far from guaranteed, and gaps between sheds meant weeks of 
unemployment.
7
 Demand for shearers was intense for relatively short periods while 
for most of the year little shearing was available. Working conditions and 
                                                
1 The Worker, 2/7/1913, p. 1. Forfeited deposit money was usually donated to charity. Telephones and 
cars eventually rendered them obsolete.  
2 The Lone Hand, October 1907, pp. 613-4; The Worker, 14/7/1909, pp. 4, 5; Brisbane Courier, 
21/7/1923, p. 18. 
3 Robyn Burrows and Alan Barton, Henry Lawson : A Stranger on the Darling, Angus and Robertson, 
Harper Collins, Sydney, N.S.W., New York, 1996, pp. 8-9. 
4 Bean, On the Wool Track, p. 81. 
5 Henry Lawson went to Bourke by train. Toorale station, and Hungerford on the Queensland border 
were reached on foot. Burrows et al, Stranger on the Darling, p. 8. For rail and bicycle, and travelling 
in groups, The Worker, 14/7/1909, p. 4; The Lone Hand, October 1907, p.  613.  
6 For motorcycles The Worker 12/2/1913, p. 3. 
7 See Chapter 5 for Tom Bartle’s experiences 1912-1915. 
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accommodation were often shabby. Bush unionism and the legendary contempt for 
‘the squatters’ fed on these privations. 
 
Not all pastoralists were tyrants, and station shearing was not ideal for them either. 
Overloaded with correspondence, coping with the unpredictability of a roving 
workforce was never easy. Station managers could never be sure even on the eve of 
shearing whether chaos or order would rule. All sorts tramped the outback and it was 
difficult to gauge their merits. Codes of mateship operated in ways that pastoralists 
could not easily fathom, let alone control. Name-swapping, although a harmless 
enough subterfuge, often made it difficult to be sure who was who. E.L. Barnes 
related an amusing instance, during his trip to New Zealand in 1904. He arrived for 
shearing using the name of a comrade who had been offered a stand but did not want 
to take it up. Barnes generally got on well with overseers. He did well at the shed, and 
at the cut out – forgetting for the moment that he had not been employed under his 
own name - asked for a reference. The overseer readily agreed to provide one, but 
looked at him wryly. ‘Which name will I put it in?’8  Stands were kept for regulars, 
and shearers often left their deposit at a station after the cut-out to book the shed for 
next year.
9
 Both squatters and shearers had a vested interest in building mutual 
understanding, but arrangements could easily fall apart. 
 
Neither the union nor the pastoralists had much success solving the logistical 
nightmare of co-ordinating 50,000 pastoral workers at thousands of sheds covering a 
third of the continent. In the troubled 1890s both saw merit in centralisation. A 
reasonably successful system was operated by the Pastoralists Union of Victoria and 
Southern Riverina (PUV) from the mid-1890s until the early-1920s. In 1899 7,000 
shearers were registered and 936 shearers were sent to 52 sheds.10 In NSW Whitely 
King worked hard to foster ‘office engagement’. The motivation was partly political, 
aiming to subvert unionism, but it was also an attempt to streamline arrangements 
amid indications that it could become popular amongst shearers.11 W.G. Spence of the 
ASU, later the AWU, also saw mutual benefits in centralised recruitment, but 
                                                
8 SLV H17273, Box 125/1, E.L. Barnes, Shirtsleeves to Shirtsleeves, unpublished , 1949, p. 290. 
9 Randell, Teamwork, p. 22. 
10 ibid.  
11 Merritt, Making of the AWU, pp. 211, 295. 
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envisaged the union being in control.
12
 Each side distrusted the other’s motives 
(probably with sound reason). Union rules prohibited members from registering at 
pastoralist offices (although many did anyway). Graziers were advised against 
recruiting from the union office (but some did when they badly needed shearers).
13
 
Lukewarm class solidarity on both sides was, in fact, a ray of hope if someone 
reasonably neutral could cut through the ingrained distrust. 
 
J.H. Young & Co. 
 
John Henry Young was not exactly neutral, but had the right idea. He had been a clerk 
in the employment office of the Pastoralists’ Union, and knew enough shearers to 
calculate that he could put a team together. In 1895 he approached a few carefully 
selected stations with a proposition. Young would supply the machines, employ the 
shearers and shed labour, hire the cook, provide the rations and bale the wool for a 
fixed price per sheep. The pastoralist needed only to muster the sheep and load the 
bales onto wagons when it was all over. It was a bold idea. How he financed it or set 
the price is not clear, but Young was a capable entrepreneur. The experiment occurred 
in three sheds in the Walgett area. It was a limited exercise involving about 50,000 
sheep in total, but evidently proved the point. At a calculated guess, Young had 
employed perhaps 10 shearers continuously over the three sheds, engaging a similar 
number of shed hands, a presser, a wool classer, and a cook. Each shearer would have 
pocketed a cheque for about 5,000 sheep. Young had astutely observed that providing 
a good run of sheds was the key to being able to retain the best shearers. Before 
contracting, many shearers did only three sheds for 6-7,000 in a whole season.
14
 
Young soon had a thriving business and almost immediately other firms started up.15 
 
John Young was surprisingly frank about his trade secrets at the inaugural Pastoral 
Award hearing in 1907. Fast shearers were essential for profitable contracting. Wool 
had to come off fast enough to keep the wool handlers (mostly paid by the week) fully 
occupied. ‘If a man could not shear 100 sheep a day under fair conditions with the 
                                                
12 Merritt, Making of the AWU, pp. 131-2. From about 1910 until the late-1930s The Worker newspaper 
regularly published a listing of starting dates and other details.   
13 Possibly union leaders pulled strings for Henry Lawson to get a position as a rouseabout at Toorale. 
Burrows et al, Stranger on the Darling, p.113.   
14 The Worker, 20/6/1907, p. 22; 23/7/1907, p. 3. 
15 Merritt, Making of the AWU, p. 259. 
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machine he [is] of no use.’ 
16
 He acknowledged that this applied amongst the lighter 
sheep of the Western Division, and tallies in the Central Division and the Riverina 
were lower, but they were exacting judgements. His views on shearers were based on 
their general attitudes as well as overall speed and competence. ‘The South Australian 
shearers are a wretched bad lot. If we had these shearers again we would give up 
contracting.’17 He meant they were slow and clumsy, but probably also that they had 
been a bit too assertive for his liking. Alternatively, Queenslanders were superlative 
shearers: ‘They are the finest shearers in the world. They are the only shearers in 
Australia.’18 
 
Counsel for the pastoralists – a friendly inquisitor - asked him to elaborate, and he 
provided an overview of the shearing workforce. 
In Queensland they shear from January to December, and are professional shearers. There 
[are] certain months of the year when there [is] a slight difficulty in getting shearers in 
Queensland. The difficulty [begins] about August and September. These [are] busy months 
over the whole of the States. There [are] over 40,000 shearers required in Australia during 
these months, but there [are] really only 20,000 men who follow it up regularly, while there 
[are] 10,000 who [do] casual shearing as ‘cockies’ on the bosses’ station.19 
It irked the AWU that any employer, but Young in particular, would be so 
opinionated. At one point the senior counsel asked in cross-examination whether 
Young had shorn sheep himself. This became a standard practice by the AWU in the 
Arbitration Court – if you did not shear you were not entitled to have opinions about 
it. He had not, he admitted, ‘but the business [has] been under [my] observation’.
20
 It 
certainly had - at squatter headquarters - but his understanding of the logistics and 
psychology of shearing was hard to fault.   
 
Young stressed the importance of keeping pressers fully occupied, and he usually had 
                                                
16 The Worker, 11/7/1907, p. 19. 
17 ibid. 
18 ibid. 
19 ibid. 
20 ibid. AWU counsel was Hon. George Houston Reid, former Premier of NSW, recent Prime Minister 
of Australia, renowned free trader, and (supposedly) anti-Labor. In 1909 Deakin’s Protectionists and 
Reid’s party (Reid was not then closely involved) combined in a liberal-conservative ‘fusion’ to oust 
Labor from office. Reid plied his trade as a lawyer and saw no conflict accepting this brief, nor the 
AWU in engaging him. He joked about his better known political role when the graziers tabled an issue 
of The Worker, purporting to demonstrate and discredit AWU political activity, The Worker, 
20/6/1907, p. 22. Only four months earlier The Worker had run a very unflattering cartoon of Reid and 
an article ridiculing his declared intention to ‘smash socialism’, The Worker, 14/2/1907, p. 9. He had 
also represented the AWU at the Royal Commission into the MSU in 1904 (see below). 
Correspondence with Nick Dyrenfurth of Monash University on this matter is acknowledged. 
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the same ones ‘year after year’. If a presser did 20 bales a day he was less than fully 
occupied. ‘The wool pressers [have] to be going all the time to make a fair thing out 
of it.’ They could make up to £8 per week. With 10 shearers, a presser might bring in 
his son to help keep up, but for 15 shearers, Young said he could afford to hire 
another man. The profit for the contractor was 3 pence per sheep up to 20 shearers, 
but above that it would be 4 pence! A manager ought to be able to make £1 per day. 
Of course, a great deal [depends] upon the quality of the shearers employed. Twenty good 
shearers would turn out between 40 and 50 bales. Twenty bad shearers might turn out only 20 
bales.21 
Contracting was not aimed at reducing wages, but equally, Young was only prepared 
to pay big money to workers good enough to earn it. Provided men were fast enough 
Young was not particularly concerned about the rate per 100. If they were not fast 
enough they were not wanted at any price. The profit came from having the presser 
fully occupied. He would not employ an extra presser if the wool was not coming off 
the board fast enough, preferring instead to persuade the presser to ‘bring in his son’ 
(and presumably not pay him). Such arrangements were possible in rural society 
without being condemned as exploitation, but were anathema to the AWU view that 
everyone had to get the union rate. Shearing and pressing were skilled and physically 
demanding, and he could not expect to find the qualities needed in every swagman 
wandering the outback. He cultivated men who had what it took, but was not much 
interested in anyone else. The regime was popular with some shearers, but clearly did 
not please everybody. Charles Bean’s woolsheds were ‘republics’. AWU mateship 
and ‘meetings’ made them democratic, but J.H. Young’s republic was a meritocracy 
where meetings were considered a waste of valuable time. 22  
 
Other Early Contracting Companies 
 
According to the Pastoralists Review, in 1896, the very next season, ‘quite a 
proportion’ of the larger stations had shorn contract, and contractors had started up in 
south-west Queensland. Within a decade J.H. Young & Co was operating in all the 
eastern States shearing over six million sheep annually, employing approximately 
2,000 shearers. The NSW Sands Directory for 1910 listed five sheep-shearing 
contractors with offices in Sydney including J.H. Young. The others were the Federal 
                                                
21 The Worker, 11/7/1907, p. 19. 
22 Bean, On the Wool Track, p. 85. 
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Sheep Shearing Company, Great Pastoral Co-operative Sheep Shearing & Wool 
Scouring Company, Merriwa Contract Shearing Company, and Paroo Shearing 
Company.23  
 
Federal’s Queensland manager, James Meredith Yates (a former Young’s manager), 
also enlightened the 1907 hearing. Company headquarters was in Sydney. It operated 
in NSW and Victoria, but its most rapid growth was in Queensland. Queensland 
operations began in about 1903 with four sheds. Only four years later it had 50 spread 
across the grazing districts: Tambo, Blackall, Adavale, Hughenden, Richmond, Eulo, 
Darling Downs and St George. The company operated amongst large flocks averaging 
about 40,000 sheep with one or two as high as 140-150,000. The clientele, this 
suggests, were graziers on pastoral leases and pastoral companies with chains of 
sheep stations, plus a smattering of ‘grazing selectors’.24 By 1910, over all States, 
Federal was doing about 200 sheds, all over 10,000 sheep each, and was probably 
close to matching Young’s six million sheep.
25
 In some cases the company entered 
into 3-year contracts with stations. ‘Wherever [we can we take] the shearers from one 
shed to another’, Yates explained to Reid. 
We occasionally succeed in making arrangements in connection with dates to suit the 
pastoralists and the company, but we have to be ready for all emergencies. The shearers apply 
to us, and we try to give local men the preference, and at the present time we are filling up our 
sheds as the shearers send in their applications. I employ from 200 to 250 men, and the head 
office sends us some from New South Wales. It all depends on the number of sheep we have 
to shear.26 
Management of shed hands during wet weather was a particular headache. Under the 
weekly pay formula, the old ‘station agreements’ were entitled to ask idle shed hands 
to ‘do some work, such as chopping wood’, but this was less practicable under 
contracting. Yates said the company had always paid union rates in the pre-arbitration 
period.  
 
It was never easy ‘arranging our sheds in the office’. There was never a ‘rush of 
shearers’ and ‘now and then [we cannot] fill the sheds and the pastoralists [have] to 
wait for some time before a start [is] made.’ Yates said this had little to do with a lack 
of machine shearers but a ‘want of shearers of any kind’. The difficulty did not arise 
                                                
23 Sands Directory for NSW, 1910, p. 1680.  
24 The Worker, 4/7/1907, p. 19. 
25 The Worker, 18/10/1910, p. 4. 
26 The Worker, 4/7/1907, p. 21. 
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in May-June-July, ‘but up to the latter part of October, we have the greatest 
difficulty’. This was when most properties wanted to shear, and other work was 
available. Justice O’Connor wanted to know why the shortage persisted, noting that 
shearers could make a lot more money than unskilled labourers, but no convincing 
answer was forthcoming apart from the fact that harvesting on the Darling Downs 
coincided with shearing. The contractors’ ambition to cultivate a small workforce of 
highly skilled elite year-round shearers was frustrated by the fact that many shearers 
were tied to farming and unavailable at busy periods of the cropping calendar. Some 
shearers preferred shearing, and would wait several weeks to get a shed if they had to, 
but the less skilled shed hands were more difficult to procure.
27
 
 
Many pastoralists were not willing to be flexible when fixing starting dates. A 
contractor could seldom predict exactly which day a shed would finish, and needed a 
degree of tolerance. Many graziers cooperated, but some adopted haughty attitudes to 
fixing dates and expected the contractor to somehow make everything fall into place. 
William John Young (no relation to John Young the contractor), general manager of 
the Australian Pastoral Company, was in charge of stations throughout Australia, 
including nine in the St. George district of Queensland. He was seized of the 
advantages of contracting (it ‘[provides] all the labour – everything’) - two properties 
had just switched and others were to follow. However, he refused to recognise that 
careful scheduling of start times was necessary to ease labour shortages. ‘I must have 
my shearing done about the same time. It must be got over in six weeks. I could not 
do with less than 200 men.’ On one occasion he had four sheds shearing 
simultaneously.
28
  
 
Contractors could at times seem dismissive of shearers, but they were faced with 
practical problems and came to understand how to get the best out of pastoral 
workers. Old style pastoralists like William Young were less understanding. He 
replied to the stock question that he could shear sheep by hand but added, with 
obvious intolerance, ‘I have had a lot of experience supervising shearers’. He 
expected that somehow about 200 of them would materialise when it was convenient 
for him. Yet he did not know, and did not seem to care, where they came from or 
                                                
27 ibid. 
28 ibid. 
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where they went to after they left his stations. Shearers, he said, came from ‘no place 
in particular’ but added vaguely, ‘a good many come from New England’. Shed hands 
were mostly ‘local men’.29  
 
James Yates told the court honestly enough that he could shear but had never 
followed it for a living’. He had worked in the sheds since 1880, starting with shed 
work and within a year or two took on wool classing. Later, he managed woolsheds 
for J.H. Young & Co before taking up the position with Federal Shearing.30  John 
Young the contractor had given an answer not unlike William Young the pastoralist, 
but at least it was backed by considerable knowledge of shearers’ capabilities and 
habits. 
 
While these contracting enterprises enjoyed great success in the early-1900s it was not 
always plain sailing. The National Shearing Company ran into financial difficulties 
and was eventually bankrupted.
31
 Fresh issues arose about where legal obligations 
rested. When the AWU attempted to collect lost wages from the stations the courts 
ruled that they were not the legal employers.32 In 1910 it was rumoured that the 
Federal Company was short of cash. It was accused of offering the piece pickers tins 
of tobacco to work during smoko, and trouble arose at Tupra station over its refusal to 
provide ‘vegetables, butter, sauce and jam’. Frank Lundie of the Adelaide Branch 
claimed that Federal Shearing ‘absolutely refuse[s]’ to return deposits, hinting that 
shearers’ cash was being used as working capital.33 
 
Contract shearing originated in NSW but its most rapid growth was in Queensland, 
where grazing selections intermingled with huge pastoral empires. Stations with more 
than 100,000 sheep each still dominated, but the number of small graziers was 
expanding due to the 1910 Land Act. Woolscouring plants were located at Longreach, 
Ilfracombe, Barcaldine, Winton and Blackall, and these were also set up with shearing 
stands, where ‘hundreds of thousands of sheep [were] put through the hands of the 
shearers’. These were almost all sheep from the smaller properties. The Longreach-
                                                
29 ibid. 
30 The Worker, 4/7/1907, p. 19. 
31 The Worker, 22/8/, 1915, p. 19; 28/10/1915, p. 23; 6/4/1916, p. 21; 18/1/1917, p. 19. 
32 The Worker, 20/4/1916, p. 20; 18/1/1917, p. 19 
33 The Worker, 17/8/1910, p. 12; 31/8/1910, p. 5; 21/9/1910, p. 6; 28/9/1910, p. 8; 5/10/1910, p. 3. 
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Ilfracombe scour owned by Edkins, Marsh & Co shore 777,000 sheep in 1913, a huge 
throughput for a single location. Barcaldine had more than one establishment. 
Westbourne’s scour had 16 shearing stands and was able to handle about 2,000 sheep 
per day (average of 125 per shearer). During the season they used about 40 shearers, 
so few stayed for the full season. McLaughlin & Co’s scour was equipped with 23 
stands with a capability of about 3,000 per day, doing 100-120,000 sheep a year. At 
Blackall the Western Queensland Meat Company provided 20 stands and the turnover 
of shearers was comparable, 40 or 50 different shearers filling the stands during the 
season.34 These were all prime employment sites for money-makers. The comments 
of Justice H.B. Higgins, presiding over the 1911 arbitration case, removes all doubt 
about the rapid uptake of contract shearing in Queensland.  
The principal cause of the higher average tallies in Queensland, and of the higher average 
earnings of the Queensland shearers, is to be found, in my opinion, in the fact that the shearers 
in Queensland are faster workers. In the other States the shearing usually takes place in the 
latter part of the year, but in Queensland there is shearing all the year round, in all the months; 
and there has arisen a special class of professional shearers, men attracted by the early season 
and the prospect of many sheds, men who come to live in the various centres of Queensland, 
and who, by frequent shearing, acquire exceptional dexterity and speed. In Queensland there 
are also, perhaps as the result of the same causes, partly also because the stations are generally 
larger, far more sheds than elsewhere in which shearing contractors are employed. Of the 
shearing fixtures for this year in Queensland, I gather about 70 per cent, or more, are contract 
sheds. In New South Wales, I am told, not one-fifth of the sheep are shorn contract, and the 
proportion of contract sheds is still smaller. The contractors have the pick of the sheds and the 
pick of the shearers, and attract them by the steady run and rapid sequence of sheds. In 
Queensland there are also many co-operative parties of shearers, who go from station to 
station, bringing engines and other plant with them; and the tendency of such parties to 'speed 
up' is apparent as in the case of butty-gangs. The effect of contract shearing on the tallies is 
very marked in certain instances where it has been introduced after the station has been doing 
its own shearing.35 
No wonder John Young thought Queensland shearers were ‘the best in the world’. 
 
John Young came from the pastoralists’ side of the fence and this affected the union’s 
willingness to come to terms with contracting. He was correspondingly reluctant to 
concede that the AWU, for all its extravagant myth-making, was a voice for the 
legitimate grievances of a disparate and sometimes unruly workforce. His thriving 
business was less than seven years old when he was embroiled in grazier intrigues 
aimed at undermining the AWU and accordingly the union never expressed any 
gratitude for the valuable service he rendered money-making shearers (see below). 
                                                
34 The Queensland Government Intelligence and Tourist Bureau, Central Queensland: Its Marvellous 
Pastoral and Mineral Resources, Its Unbounded Agricultural Possibilities, and Its Scenic Beauties, G 
and N Ingleton, 1914 (digital edition published by Archive CD Books, Adelaide, 2007), pp. 52-54. 
35 CAR, Vol. 5, 1911, p. 87. 
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Events seemed to reinforce the union’s view that the prime purpose of contract 
shearing was to do the squatters’ dirty work. In fact, under the nose of the union, and 
to a lesser extent the graziers, contractors had eased such problems. The Pastoral 
Award arrived more than a decade after Young’s successful venture at Walgett. 
Young sold the business in 1913 and the name changed to Long and Hill, but his role 
as a pioneer of shearing organisation was not yet finished.36 His hard headed realism 
was disturbing to old shearers who could not keep up the pace of 100 a day or better 
and they favoured rules which would slow gun shearers down. This was given a 
sharper edge by the transition from blade shearing to machines. 
 
Blades or Machines 
 
At the turn of the century the transition to machines was far from complete. Smaller 
stations with flocks of less than 10,000 and the proliferating farming properties with 
as few as 1,000 mostly shore with blades. However, machines were relentlessly 
closing the gap as prosperity began to return after the end of the drought. Machine 
shearing skills were quite different to blade techniques and older shearers found them 
difficult to master. Contract shearing rapidly advanced the uptake of machines and 
Young’s aggressive management style stirred up growing resentment. In 1923 T.J. 
Lonsdale, a former shearer and AWU organiser at Bourke before the war, recalled ‘a 
feud between the followers of the two systems’, and ‘hatred engendered in the hearts 
of the old blade men towards the machine men’.37 Some owners were as reluctant to 
adopt machines as the old blade shearers, although the hard-headed case for them was 
overwhelming. It sped up the shearing, reduced its average cost, and resulted in a 
cleaner cut that enhanced the value of wool. Young men were shearing with machines 
and blade specialists were a diminishing breed. Heavier fleeces, too, advanced new 
methods of shearing.
38
 
 
Mateship and money-making clashed over ‘carrying machines’.39  As far as the union 
was concerned the onus was on the grazier or contractor to provide the equipment. 
For battlers it was bad enough paying for fresh combs and cutters. AWU rules 
                                                
36 The Worker, 2/7/1913, p. 1; See Chapter 6 on the Graziers’ Cooperative Shearing Company. 
37 Brisbane Courier, 14/7/1923, p. 18.  
38 The Worker, 20/6/1907, p. 1; 4/7/1907, p. 19; 27/6/1907, p. 19. 
39 To ‘carry a machine’ meant a shearer owning his own handpiece. 
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prohibited members from carrying machines, but not all handpieces were the same. 
Money-makers who had mastered machine shearing did not seriously object to buying 
their own. The unreliability of station handpieces was a key factor. Gun shearers 
gravitating to the new contracting gangs were especially attracted to owning their own 
gear.40  In Queensland, perhaps half of all shearers owned handpieces in 1907.41  
 
Carrying machines quickly became a form of ‘scabbing’. As Lonsdale explained, 
‘strange things happened’ to private machines. ‘The lagoon at Toulby station is the 
resting place of at least a score of shearing machines which disappeared off the stands 
at the shed’, he wrote.
42
 In 1905 at Warraweena station, near Bourke, there was ‘some 
trouble over some of the men hanging their own machines’. To appease quarrelling 
amongst the shearers ‘the boss is said to have bought them’. There was a limit to what 
this boss would put up with, though. A dispute over wet sheep arose and the ‘rep’ 
‘was made the target of the boss’s spleen and his shearing suddenly found to be 
unsatisfactory’. That is, he was sacked! The significant conflict at this shed, however, 
was between machine carrying shearers and sticklers for union protocol, and the 
squatter was primarily an observer.43   
 
The rule against private machines was emphasised strongly in the union’s 1904 policy 
statement. ‘Members are not permitted to provide machines, and must not use any 
other than those provided by the employer.’
44
 However, in Queensland serious 
thought was being given to abandoning the rule. Matters came to a head at the AWU 
Conference in 1905, a year after Queensland amalgamated with the AWU. While 
conference favoured retaining the ban, delegates knew it would be difficult to enforce. 
E. Bowman feared that failure to keep it might be the ‘thin edge of the wedge’. 
Squatters and contractors would simply stop supplying handpieces altogether and 
before long shearers would be compelled to buy their own if they wanted work. Even 
worse – shearers would be obliged to pay ‘the experts to do them up, find their own 
oil, and even perhaps pay rent on the top gear and engine driver.’ This was deliberate 
hyperbole, surely, but it did make the point that the union had to decide whether it 
                                                
40 The Worker, 20/6/1907, pp. 19, 23, 24. 
41 The Worker, 28/2/1907, p. 13; 27/6/1907, p. 19. 
42 Brisbane Courier, 4/8/1923, p. 18. 
43 The Worker, 28/9/1905, p. 6. Warraweena was a large machine shed with over 46,000 sheep. The 
Australian Pastoral Directory, 1905, p. 14.  
44 The Worker, 9/4/1904, p. 5. 
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should accommodate the protest, or side with money-makers who preferred their own 
handpieces to poorly maintained station machines.  
 
The Secretary General Donald Macdonell typically tried to appease both sides. 
[I think] they should have had a rule years ago allowing men to find their own machines, 
provided they were paid something extra by the sheepowner for so doing. The best men [are] 
now penalized for their loyalty in sticking to the rule: while the disloyal not only [earn] more 
by having superior machines, but - what [is] more galling to many men - they [are] unable to 
compete on even terms with other shearers carrying machines whom they [know] they could 
beat on their merits. Of course, if men were allowed to carry their machines all would soon be 
compelled to do it, and that would amount to a reduction in price; but if the sheepowner paid 
extra rates there would be no reduction, and their claim to the Arbitration Court could not be 
prejudiced. [I think] such a proposal would best meet the case.45 
The ‘disloyal’ ones he was referring to were deserting the AWU for a rival union. 
During its short life from 1902 to about 1906 the Machine Shearers and Shed 
Employees Union (MSU) threatened to undermine the very survival of the AWU. At 
the time of the conference debate, though, the battle to destroy the MSU was almost 
won and Macdonell was more interested in wooing its followers back into the fold. 
Rather than condemning them as ‘scabs’, he wanted to find a way of letting them 
carry machines. Fining them and encouraging the angry mob to throw handpieces into 
lagoons was not helping. In a typical AWU fudge, the carrying machines ban 
remained and union rhetoric condemned the practice. But it was a rule more honoured 
in the breach than the observance. It was quietly left out of the 1905 policy 
statement.46 
 
As the original machines installed in the 1890s began to wear out after 15 or 20 years 
of use, machine shearers were often in conflict with employers over poorly 
maintained or faulty machinery.
47
 This contributed to shearing unrest during World 
War I.48 In a case involving Talavera station near Roma in 1908, shearers were 
eventually exonerated on appeal, having walked off the job after an extended 
machinery breakdown. This was regarded by the AWU as a watershed.
49
 The legal 
precedent that employers were bound to provide efficiently working machinery and 
handpieces reinforced the argument that shearers with private handpieces were 
                                                
45 The Worker, 13/5/1905, p. 7. 
46 ibid.. 
47 The Worker, 9/1/1913, p. 20; 17/9/1913, p. 4; 24/9/1913, p. 4. 
48 See Chapter 6. 
49 The Worker, 12/3/1908, p. 29; 19/3/1908, pp. 21, 29; 25/6/1908, p. 29. 
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encouraging squatters to ignore their obligations and ‘scabbing’ on their mates.
50
 
Nonetheless, the practice did not die out. For a time ‘cocky’ sheds were a form of 
reprieve for the remaining blade men – although this was a very different social 
environment from the old giant sheds, and it was a little demeaning.
51
 Before long the 
farmers ‘began to get small plants of two machines and up to four and six’, so 
eventually these were no longer blade sheds either. Older men drifted to opal digging 
at Lightening Ridge, and some saw out their working days as shed hands.
52
 This 
reduction in status was not necessarily a source of continuing conflict with the 
younger men, because their yarns and attitudes from the ‘old days’ found their way 
into twentieth century shearing culture. Gradually their number dwindled and by the 
end of World War I the issue had lost its sting. For a time, though, it split the union. 
 
The MSU and the 1902 Strike
53
 
 
Seasons from 1895 to 1899 were extremely difficult for the AWU. Shearers were 
disillusioned as sheep numbers declined steadily due to drought. The union bled 
members but its leaders were determined to hold it together. They negotiated to the 
extent they could with pastoralist organisations to set terms for shearing. This bound 
its members to ‘union rates and conditions’, but the solidarity of shearers could not be 
counted on. Pastoralists were not in much better shape. Rabbits were running wild and 
many were in financial trouble. From their perspective the union remained belligerent 
and disruptive. Pastoralists were turning to contracting, but some remained obsessed 
with being in control of their own woolsheds.54 Victoria’s labour registration system 
was working reasonably well, and the PUV was ambivalent about contractors, 
instructing its office not to engage shearers for them.55 Conferences between the 
AWU and pastoralists’ unions were hampered by distrust, and both sides had 
difficulties in getting their own members to abide by the set rates.  
 
                                                
50 Brisbane Courier, 4./8/1923, p. 18. 
51 The Bulletin, 22/12/1910, p. 44. 
52 Brisbane Courier, 14/7/1923, p. 18. 
53 This segment relies heavily on Merritt, Making of the AWU, pp. 260-357, and Hearn and Knowles, 
One Big Union, pp. 95-9.    
54 Merritt, Making of the AWU, pp. 260-71, 304. 
55 Randell, Teamwork, pp. 17-31. 
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In 1900 and 1901 the drought was getting worse but the bargaining position of 
shearers improved. Sheep numbers were still declining but many shearers were lured 
to the Western Australian goldfields and a good number went to New Zealand.56 As 
the oversupply of shearers narrowed they became more assertive and most sheds 
shore at 20/- a hundred in 1901, above 18/6 set as the limit by the NSW pastoralists. 
This was as much due to the mood of men in the sheds as to AWU policy, as non-
union sheds also shore at 20/-. More ominously from the pastoralist viewpoint, there 
were dramatic increases in AWU membership in both 1900 and 1901. Its leaders grew 
more confident. The 1901 season witnessed a number of wildcat strikes at individual 
sheds and, in Merritt’s judgement, the overall season was a clear win for the AWU. 
The Pastoralists’ Union, which had also been bleeding members, likewise saw a rise 
in subscriptions. When they were in trouble squatters were more inclined to 
appreciate the advantages of group solidarity.57 
 
Despite these encouraging signs for the AWU its leaders sought succour in political 
rather than industrial agitation. Labor representation in parliament and the prospect of 
compulsory arbitration legislation would be more effective in the long run than direct 
action at woolsheds. Already, many of its leaders had served terms in parliament and 
many more had stood for office. Arthur Rae was one of 35 members elected in 1891 
to the New South Wales parliament – Labor’s first flush of real electoral promise.58 
W.G. Spence had represented Cobar from 1898, switching after Federation to the 
Commonwealth seat of Darling. Cobar was inherited by Donald Macdonell, whose 
day job from 1900 was Secretary General of the AWU. Political activity required 
funds and an increase in membership dues was rammed through at the 1901 
Conference over rank-and-file reservations. The Wade Government in NSW, having 
closely examined the New Zealand Arbitration and Conciliation Act of 1892, passed 
legislation in 1902. Pastoralists viewed arbitration with trepidation, but knew they had 
to learn to live with it.59 
 
                                                
56 Arnold, ‘Yeomen and Nomads’; Rollo Arnold , ‘The Dynamics and Quality of Trans-Tasman 
Migration, 1885-1910’ Australian Economic History Review, Vol. XXVI, No. 1, 1986, pp. 1-20. 
57 Merritt, Making of the AWU, pp. 284-92. 
58 Rae reappears briefly in Chapter 5, and is prominent in Chapters 6 and 7. 
59 Merritt, Making of the AWU, pp. 192, 271-7, 292-4. 
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In 1902 the drought deepened alarmingly and despite the renewed strength of the 
union a very difficult season beckoned. As a letter writer to The Worker put it: 
The stations around Ivanhoe are not likely to have much of a shearing this season. Some sold most 
of their sheep before the worst of the drought. It will be a hard job to save the remainder from 
perishing.60 
Graziers were desperate, and faced the diabolical problem of getting the wool off to at 
least salvage something before stock perished. Their plight gave shearers leverage 
despite dramatically depleted sheep numbers, although strikes at such a time hardened 
anti-AWU prejudice. The AWU was confidant enough to announce at the Annual 
Conference in January that union rates for 1902 would be 25/- a hundred. Pastoralists 
saw it as a gambit for the likely claim in the NSW Court, not necessarily what the 
AWU expected to get. Nevertheless, it was a 25 per cent rise – more in Victoria where 
ruling rates were lower. It was bold to the point of being provocative.61 
 
An unexpected bombshell dramatically changed the equation. A new union (the 
MSU) had been registered at the NSW Court, and announced that its rates for 1902 
would be 20/- a hundred. In commercial terms it was an aggressive act of price 
competition. In trade union terms it was unmitigated ‘scabbery’. The shearing 
agreement offered to squatters was in many respects similar to the AWU’s, but with 
telling differences. The MSU permitted shearers to engage through contractors and (as 
the name suggested) to own machines. Overall, it was shrewdly judged. For desperate 
times 20/- was a good rate. Many sheds had shorn for less in recent years and very 
few, possibly none, for more. Some drought stricken squatters were desperate enough 
to pay 25/- to get the wool off before sheep perished, and shearers worth their salt 
would have been happy to hold out for the AWU’s 25/- if they could get it. Most 
knew, though, it was unrealistic. The MSU was splitting shearers into two sharply 
defined camps, and was likely to cause major defections from the AWU.62 
 
It quickly got worse for the AWU. The pastoralists accepted the MSU’s request for a 
conference, and after some spirited haggling came to terms with the rebel union at 
20/-. They agreed to dispense with ‘Clause 8’ of the agreement, which had been there 
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61 Merritt, Making of the AWU, pp. 294-7. 
62 Merritt, Making of the AWU, pp. 297-301. 
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since 1894, and was a sore point with the AWU.
63
 To add insult to injury the AWU’s 
request for a conference was met with a polite return letter enclosing a copy of the 
Pastoralist’s agreement – it was a way of telling the AWU that there was nothing 
further to discuss! The over-confident claim for 25/- had been comprehensively 
upstaged. To suddenly revise ‘union rates’ to 20/- would have been extremely 
embarrassing and the subsequent gloating in the Pastoralists’ Review unbearable. To 
fight for anything higher was doomed to failure. The AWU was boxed into a corner.
64
 
 
The key architects of the MSU were J.H. Young shearers, notably John Leahy who 
was appointed Secretary. Leahy had shorn ‘non-union’ in 1894 although he joined the 
AWU in 1895 and 1896. Jack Meehan, an AWU stalwart, met Leahy in 1901 at a 
contract shed and they had long (seemingly constructive) conversations about 
unionism and ‘law and order’ in the sheds. George Maiden of Goldsborough Mort & 
Co. said that the MSU shearers were ‘a great boon to the pastoral interests’ and ‘they 
get along pleasantly together without bother or trouble’.
65
 The emphasis on attitudes 
tempered a discussion within the MSU about the merits of establishing grower 
subsidised shearing training. It was said the industry needed ‘young men who will act 
fairly in time of any unpleasantness in the sheds’, and a ‘class of men [from] … 
temperate non-contentious families [to avoid] the nauseous problem of how to deal 
with crowds of warlike bushmen’.66 MSU shearers were not, however, immune from 
a touch of bush legend swagger, as this dismissive view of formal training hints.  
‘Technical schools’ is a term which sounds magnificent; but the man who wants to learn 
machine shearing, will do so much quicker in a woolshed….. In a shed can be seen all the 
latest styles – long blow, three-quarter blow, and the blow which is a mixture of both; also the 
‘bogus’ organiser’s blow, which, like the shears, will soon be a thing of the past.67  
The correspondent could not resist turning the tables on the AWU, cheekily deeming 
it ‘the “bogus” organiser’.  
 
The turf war between blades and machines was a factor in the MSU’s creation. It 
attracted top line contract shearers who viewed the AWU’s anti-squatter viewpoint 
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64 Merritt, Making of the AWU, pp. 301-6. 
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with contempt. The ‘undercurrents’ referred to by Charles Bean referred to nit-picking 
agitation over woolshed conditions which interrupted proceedings and caused delays. 
MSU shearers eschewed the idea that squatters were class enemies. J.H. Young’s 
testimony at the arbitration hearing some years later showed that contractors were 
prepared to pay shearers top rates if sheds hummed with efficiency and speed. The 
increase in AWU fees and its political activities were singled out for ridicule by MSU 
leaders.
68
 References to The Worker newspaper as The Loafer underscored 
contracting money-makers’ disdain for the AWU’s mateship ethos.69  
 
Whether the MSU was a squatters’ front remains unclear. The AWU certainly thought 
so, but Merritt gives it the benefit of the doubt. Perhaps there were no explicit links to 
pastoralists, although the contractor Young was suspiciously proactive. Young and 
Leahy preferred to be fined than to appear before a Royal Commission in 1904. This 
might have produced some historical clarification, but it was certainly ammunition for 
AWU accusations that there was something to hide. During 1902 and 1903 Young 
was negotiating with Burgon & Ball of Sheffield, shearing machinery manufacturers, 
to float his business. A private letter to Young at the end of 1902 contained the 
following intriguing comment. 
You refer in your letter to the ‘Blowing out of the old Union’, having received many 
congratulations: well you know Jack, I have congratulated you, and again wish to do so, for I 
am sure you are responsible for the great success the new Union seems to have obtained, and 
if I were you, I should most certainly clear the way to some quiet corner in that beautiful 
harbour of yours and paint pictures. 70 
This is not quite the smoking gun which proves Young’s financial and organisational 
involvement, but it is awfully close.71 It certainly indicates that as 1902 drew to a 
close, pastoralists thought they had the AWU on the run.  
 
Macdonell’s response to the crisis was two-pronged. Firstly, the MSU’s legal right to 
registration had to be undermined – its long term survival would be difficult 
otherwise. Secondly, he prepared to fight for ‘union rates’. This was not a preferred 
strategy because of recent bitter experience, but to do nothing would see desperate 
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shearers rush the sheds and boost the credibility of the rebel union. Moreover, if 
contract shearers won most of the sheds at 20/- a hundred, most others would be out 
of work. It could be painted as a victory of a greedy few against true mateship. The 
moral basis of solidarity could be reinforced.     
 
The deregistration ploy backfired horribly. The AWU tried to argue that the MSU was 
an employers’ organisation rather than one of workers, but MSU lawyers succeeded 
in exposing union rules not compatible with MSU members’ needs. These included 
AWU political funds, and (unsurprisingly) rules against private machines and 
contracting. Macdonell decided that the offending clauses would have to be jettisoned 
and hastily convened a meeting of the Executive Council. Unfortunately this was 
ruled out of order when the court agreed with the MSU that the amendments required 
a plebiscite of AWU members. Thus after an unsuccessful court challenge, an 
unsuccessful appeal, and a defence of the MSU’s cheeky counter application to 
deregister the AWU (all at considerable legal expense), the ‘bogus outfit’ was still a 
registered workers’ union in NSW at the end of 1902.72  
 
Meanwhile the strike was also a fiasco, although it is hard to discern this from 
contemporary accounts of it in The Worker. Knowing the weakness of its position the 
Executive Council hastily revised ‘policy’ rates from 25/- to 22/6 before the campaign 
had even started. As with all shearers strikes hard facts are vague and the AWU seems 
to have enjoyed some early success. Strike camps were formed and there were 
colourful reports of incidents involving intimidation and kidnapping at Wingadee and 
other stations in the Coonamble region, some written by ‘Banjo’ Paterson for the 
Sydney Morning Herald.73 These imbued the 1902 strike with some of the myth-
making aura of the 1890s strikes, but a pattern quickly emerged of shearing at the 
MSU rate. This was hardly surprising and by September the strike was abandoned.
74
   
 
The twin debacle explains Young’s optimism at the end of the season, but Macdonell 
persisted with a quasi-legal assault in 1903. If  his day-job was Secretary General of 
the AWU, his night-job as the Member for Cobar now showed its true worth. At 3am 
                                                
72 Merritt, Making of the AWU, pp. 298-9, 307. 
73 Hearn and Knowles, One Big Union, pp. 96-7. ‘Wingadee’ is misspelt as ‘Wingalee’. 
74 Merritt, Making of the AWU, pp. 312-5. 
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on the 3
rd
 of September1903 when the House was almost empty, he moved that a 
select committee investigate the MSU. By 5am the motion was passed, and even 
better, Macdonell was ensconced as chairman of the investigation. When the ambush 
was discovered the next day there was an uproar, but the upshot of it was the setting 
up of a Royal Commission a day or two later to examine aspects of the MSU’s origins 
and purpose. The legitimacy of the Commission was challenged by the pastoralists – 
this was the basis on which several key figures including Leahy and Young refused to 
testify – and it became something of a legal quagmire.75 However, it was enough for 
AWU propaganda purposes that the final report questioned the motives of MSU 
supporters, and the idea that it was a squatter conspiracy stuck.
76
 In 1903 and 1904 the 
seasons improved and pastoralists swung back to hiring local men in preference to 
MSU shearers from outside their districts. Basically the MSU was unable to maintain 
its early momentum in the face of persistent and superior AWU organisation. Equally, 
Macdonell had a field day exploiting the conspiracy theory. With the MSU on the 
back foot the AWU energetically pursued a Commonwealth award.
77
 
 
The union was, in fact, positioning itself to accommodate MSU deserters. But it 
needed militants also. The 1902 strike was not best forgotten but became another 
heroic myth, created out of what was, at the time, an unmitigated disaster.78 For years 
afterwards, when organisers gave rousing pep talks while going round the sheds, or 
when an old unionist died and was being eulogised, phrases such as ‘he was with us in 
the fight of 1902’ were often repeated. The AWU leaders of the 1930s had been 
young unionists in 1902 and this legitimised their status. Delegates to the Annual 
Convention in 1949 took time off to make another of their ‘pilgrimages’ to the graves 
of Ted Grayndler, John Barnes and Jack McNeill in the Melbourne General Cemetery. 
The current President, W.H. Nicol, presented what was described as a ‘stirring 
address’ mentioning as well two other ‘great warriors’ buried elsewhere, Arthur Watts 
and Frank Lundie. These ‘five great men’ had graduated to influential positions, 
including Cabinet rank, but had begun as ordinary shearers. The story was told of the 
time Barnes, McNeill and Lundie had been travelling in the Riverina looking for 
work, but ‘there was a strike on, and they would not go into the shearing sheds’. They 
                                                
75 Hearn and Knowles, One Big Union, pp. 97-9. 
76 Merritt, Making of the AWU, pp. 323-5, 330-2. 
77 Hearn and Knowles, One Big Union, p. 99. 
78 Merritt, Making of the AWU , pp. 344-54, 362. 
 118 
spotted the fire of a strike camp on the opposite bank of the Murrumbidgee. Rather 
than cross to join the camp they pitched their tent for the night, joining the strikers 
after breakfast the following morning. They had, of course, been spotted. The strikers 
wondered rather indignantly whether they were spies. If they were union men why 
hadn’t they come straight into the camp? Barnes replied that they did not want to 
place extra demands on their depleted food supplies, even though he knew they would 
willingly offer it!
79
 The story may, or may not be true, but it exemplifies the 
intriguing way that the union’s mateship code was able to claim heroic radicalism 
from its past, and weld it onto its adopted pragmatic scheming and deal making. The 
AWU made an art form out of such ideological gymnastics. 
 
Shearing at ‘Coombe Martin’ and ‘Wellshot’, 1904
80 
 
Ilfracombe lies between Barcaldine and Longreach in the heart of Queensland’s 
pastoral country. By 1904 the rains had returned, wool prices were improving, and 
stock numbers recovering. The rapid advance of machine shearing and contracting 
was a talking point whenever sheep men gathered. There was already a significant 
scattering of ‘grazing farms’ throughout central-western Queensland in 1893, and 
these had since been added to.81 One response to the 1902 drought, however, had been 
to extend expiring pastoral leases on favourable terms, so that pastoral companies 
could recover financially before they had to relinquish them. This remained an 
ongoing cause of resentment in Labor circles for years to come. The New Zealand and 
Australian Land Company, owners of Wellshot and Coombe Martin stations, was one 
pastoral company expanding its activities against the trend to closer settlement.
82
   
 
Coombe Martin had switched to machine shearing about a decade previously. 
Wellshot had just changed the previous season and was now going a step further, 
engaging J.H. Young and Co. for the first time. At least a few of the 60 or so shearers 
who scored stands at these two sheds in 1904, and maybe some of the shed hands, 
would have imagined how much better life would be if only they could get a few quid 
together. Perhaps they might even end up with an acreage carved out of one of these 
                                                
79 The Worker, 9/2/1949, p. 6. 
80 Details were reported in The Shearer, Vol. 1, No. 8, 17/9/1904, p. 2. 
81
 Australian Pastoral Directory, 1893, 1905. 
82 See Chapter 2 for New Zealand and Australian Land Company expansion during this period. 
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vast estates and make a go of it on their own, running 5-6,000 sheep and fattening a 
few steers. Shearing big tallies was a way of getting the capital together to get started, 
provided the government did its bit to encourage the small man onto the land. Such 
men appreciated union efforts to bargain shearing rates up, but had little time for 
radicals. They resented the wealthy squatter to an extent, and had no particular love 
for the New Zealand and Australian Land Company. Although 1894 was a relatively 
fresh memory, few were still brooding over it. 
 
The drought and the failure of the strikes had nevertheless left their mark, and not all 
shearers felt this hopeful. The hardships of shearing bred disillusionment, and many 
were resigned to lives as wage workers. The bleak view of the outback portrayed by 
Henry Lawson resonated. Perhaps their ageing bones might last for another year or 
two. They wanted shearing rates high enough to make a living without having to race 
the clock. Younger ones might have heard radical talk circulating in mines and cane 
fields, and the railway yards in Brisbane, and been excited by it. William Lane’s 
Workingmen’s Paradise, perhaps, encouraged hostility to the ‘squatter’, and to the 
world at large.83  
 
Shearing at Coombe Martin did not go according to plan. The manager got 60 replies 
for his advertised 40 stands, so on the face of it there was little to worry about. But 
when shearing actually started on 3 August only 25 signed on. To make it worse most 
of these were grossly incompetent. In the overseer’s view only eight were any good 
and the rest were hopeless. They were unacceptably slow with very poor technique, 
hacking the wool and ‘butchering’ the sheep.  The management put up with it for 
three days, hoping there might be some improvement as they acclimatised to the 
work, but then decided to cut their losses and call it all off. They sacked the whole 
board, including the eight shearing to an acceptable standard. Putting a whole new 
team together at very short notice when there was a shortage of good shearers was 
risky to say the least. However, the manager had the luxury of knowing the larger 
flock at Wellshot was being shorn extremely efficiently under the contract 
arrangements. The sheep were driven over to Wellshot where Young’s shearers easily 
                                                
83 Both had been ‘scab’ sheds in 1891 and 1894. At Coombe Martin in 1894 a unionist – one of a group 
who had turned up to harass the ‘free labour’ - was shot in the thigh by a stray bullet. Another unionist 
named Prior was jailed, possibly on false evidence. Svensen, Shearers’ War, pp 204-5; Merritt, Making 
of the AWU, pp. 242, 244. 
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coped with an extra 60,000 or so sheep - roughly another 1000 per man, perhaps six 
or seven days extra for gun shearers, and a welcome fattening of cut-out cheques. 
 
There was a subsequent court case because the minimum quota specified in the 
Coombe Martin agreement had not been reached. All but one of the shearers accepted 
their fate, but James Simple stood on his dignity and sued for wrongful dismissal. The 
historical interest lies mainly in the insights into shearing culture embedded in the 
evidence.84 Simple was 32 years old. He had, he said, shorn with blades in 1886 
(which means he would have been 14) and with machines since 1892 (aged 20). It had 
taken him about a week on the machines to get to about 60 a day and his best tally 
was over 100. However, it transpired that he had shorn at only two sheds in 1892 and 
had not done any machine shearing since. He had recently shorn at Wellshot when it 
was still a blade shed (he would not have had a show of getting a pen there in 1904 
with Young’s running the shearing). When pressed he acknowledged that he had 
‘been away from it two or three years at a time’. He had a ‘learner’s reference’ from 
one of the sheds he had shorn at in 1892 and a ‘first-class reference’ from the other, 
but unfortunately these papers had been ‘destroyed in the fire at Emerald’. Reading 
between the lines, he was not a regular shearer and had talked up his ability in order to 
get the stand. The ‘60 a day’ and a best tally of 100 suggests he had the makings of 
being a good shearer, but he was badly out of practice and there is a strong possibility 
that the claims were fabrications. During the abbreviated 3-day shearing at Coombe 
Martin he had averaged 43 a day, with a lowest tally of 35 and a highest of 56. He 
maintained that his tallies were acceptable for a competent shearer during the first 
week. It was widely accepted by shearers that it took a week or more to get their hand 
in at a new shed. He claimed the sheep were exceptionally wrinkled and had dense 
wool, and all the shearers were complaining about them. He said that he did not know 
what tallies other shearers were getting (which seems implausible) or that one shearer, 
Harry Darnley, had shorn 114 on 8 August (the same day that Simple got his best tally 
of 56). 
 
Harry Darnley was one of the eight shearers management had regarded as acceptable. 
He did not openly contradict Simple’s version, perhaps out of a sense of worker 
                                                
84 James Simple v R.A. Hopkins, Small Debts Court, Longreach, Friday, 2 September 1904.   
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solidarity, or perhaps due to an understandable reaction to the sacking, which in his 
case was certainly unfair. He was also the shed ‘rep’, and probably therefore a ‘union 
man’ and not inclined to back the pastoralist’s version. When shearing was called off 
he had taken the settlement, but was not re-employed at Wellshot and had not been 
able to get replacement work85. His usual tallies among good sheep were in the range 
of 100 to 140, but the sheep at Coombe Martin were, he said, ‘rough’. Nonetheless, 
his tallies over the three full days were 67, 78 and 114, which suggests that he was 
getting used to them pretty quickly. Simple was a ‘fair shearer’, in Darnley’s opinion. 
He confirmed that shearers who were ‘out of practice’ could expect to improve their 
tallies by ‘about a third’ after a couple of weeks. Darnley had been shearing for 
‘thirteen or fourteen years’, so he may have been only a year or two older than Simple 
but the evidence suggested that he was more experienced.  
 
Hugh Gill was considerably older than either, and had been shearing for 35 years (i.e. 
since about 1869). He had not shorn with machines since 1898 (six years previously). 
Gill drew a clear distinction between the skills of blade and machine shearing. It took 
a full season for a good hand shearer to come to grips with the demands of machines. 
On the other hand an ‘out of practice’ machine shearer would require ‘from three or 
four days up to a fortnight to get his hand in’. Moreover, ‘it would take him fully a 
fortnight to get up to his usual average’ but ‘he could do passable work in the 
meantime’. A man ‘with his hand in’ should have been able to do 85 a day of the 
Coombe Martin sheep. Asked about a shearer who had not touched a handpiece for 12 
years, but had followed hand shearing (as Simple had claimed) Gill still thought ‘it 
would take him ten or twelve days to become competent’. Perhaps a sense of 
solidarity also coloured Gill’s evidence to the court. Gill’s assessment of his own 
proficiency was later flatly contradicted by Richard Hopkins, the station manager. 
Gill had no idea how to shear with machines, chopping the wool and he ‘did not know 
how to handle the sheep and work the sheep to the machine’.  
 
 Joseph Webb was another older shearer who had been in the sheds since 1875 (nearly 
30 years – suggesting he was around 50 years old, possibly more). He, too, spoke of 
the difference between machine and blade shearing and found the transition 
                                                
85 Shearers of Darnley’s ability were in short supply, but it was very late in the year for shearing in 
Queensland. He probably needed to travel down to NSW, or even Victoria, to get a shed. 
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problematic. Tallies with the blades averaging 130 fell to around 100 with machines 
(but he claimed once to have done 135 with machines in a day and 700 in a week). 
Even though machines had been around for at least half of Webb’s shearing career, 
hand shearing was still quite common in 1904.  Webb’s testimony confirmed the 
general view that it took about 10 days for a shearer to build up to his usual daily 
tally. At Coombe Martin he had done only ‘39 or 40’ on the first day and this had 
built up to 63 on the last full day before the shearing was called off.  It was hard for 
older shearers to adjust to machines, and  Webb was one of those who had not 
successfully made the transition. 
 
The shearers maintained that the sheep were exceptionally difficult to shear. Simple 
was the only one who refused to accept the settlement offered and took the station to 
court. Had he been sacked for incompetence there would have been no case, but 
because the whole shearing had been halted he claimed that he was owed 
compensation because the station had broken its agreement.  The management’s 
account of the Coombe Martin shearing was, understandably, quite different. Hopkins 
said that if 20 or 25 of the shearers had been of a similar standard to the top eight (e.g. 
like Darnley), it would have been worth persisting. However, not only were the tallies 
low (which meant that wages for shed hands and pressers were spread over fewer 
sheep and added to average costs) but there were too many like Simple and Webb 
who were making a mess of it. Managers were prepared to allow some leeway on the 
basis that shearers improved with practice. However, they were getting messages 
about the wondrous deeds of the contractors at Wellshot and tolerance quickly 
evaporated.  
 
The court was concerned with Coombe Martin and there is no comparable evidence of 
events at Wellshot.
86
 However, the ill feeling between the two shearing gangs got an 
airing. The Wellshot contract shearers had benefited at the others’ expense, and the 
temptation to brag was too much to take. Mateship wore a little thin. Darnley, 
especially, resented the taunts about clumsy shearing. He wailed that the employers 
were ruthless and greedy. The contract shearers were self-serving and duplicitous. 
John Leahy’s retort was correspondingly sarcastic.    
                                                
86 See Thomas Kerr, Chapter  5, for a contract shearer thriving at this time. 
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I am fully aware of the Coombe-Martin dispute and am prepared to fill that shed in 1905 and 
will guarantee that the men I engage will double the average tally of the ‘competent’ shearers 
who shore there this year. You can’t ring your mulgas on me. I know the Central Division of 
Q as well as you. 
and: 
You don’t know what you are talking about. The sheep at the station mentioned are ‘good’ 
sheep from a shearer’s point of view. I know because I shore there and cut 173 wethers in less 
than eight hours. The boss is a good sort and has always been reckoned one of the ‘whitest’ 
men in the West.87 
     
It is no accident that the case was extensively reported in The Shearer, the newspaper 
of the MSU. Its ethos was to get stuck in and get the job done. As the disappearance 
of blades accelerated, older shearers were still finding it hard to adjust to machines. 
Even competent shearers such as Harry Darnley could find it difficult to accept the 
implications of a more competitive environment, although he was a good enough 
shearer to get sheds with a contractor. The prospects for older men such as Hugh Gill 
and Joseph Webb were unlikely to improve. Young James Simple would need to work 
on his shearing technique and do less complaining if he wanted to be taken seriously. 
The managers would have been apprehensive about the engagement of J.H. Young & 
Co. for the Wellshot shearing – 200,000 sheep meant there was a lot at stake – but it 
can hardly be doubted that the contractors would be invited back in 1905 and be 
offered Coombe Martin as well. 
 
Machines and contracting had changed the nature of shearing on the big pastoral 
stations by the end of World War I. Lonsdale’s use of the terms ‘feud’ and ‘hatred’ 
are corroborated by this incident, although over time a more nostalgic and respectful 
attitude to old timers crept in. Sentimental tributes to shearers when they died 
reflected this.88 Nonetheless, the collectivist notions of mateship underscoring the 
AWU ethos sat uncomfortably with the cult of competitive meritocracy imbedded in 
piecework payment. Yet, mateship was a very elastic concept that could 
accommodate staunch unionism as well as the renowned rivalry between shearers and 
the gut busting ambition to shear big tallies. Already, contracting was adapting to 
closer settlement. New forms of it were finding ways to take machine shearing into 
the regions where most shearers actually lived, where wheat was grown and the flocks 
were becoming much smaller.  
                                                
87 The Shearer, Vol. 1, No. 8, 17/9/1904, p. 4. 
88 The Worker, 12/2/1913, p. 4; 12/3/1913, p. 3; 9/3/1916, p. 21. 
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Shearers’ Perspective 
 
The murky MSU affair failed to impose a more compliant form of unionism but 
contracting continued to advance. Sheep stations decided one by one, but as more of 
them switched it was harder to get shearers the traditional way. The transition in 
Queensland was especially rapid whereas in NSW ‘station’ and ‘contract’ co-existed 
into the 1920s. Station shearing shrank as graziers were converted to its benefits, but 
the ultimate triumph would not have been possible if shearers themselves had not 
voted with their feet. Not all shearers were as enthusiastic as John Leahy’s men, but 
union debates exaggerated the virulence of opposition. Narratives of union loyalists 
and sceptics bear this out.    
 
The MSU was still alive when Tom Bartle was doing station work in the Riverina; he 
took up shearing a bit later. 1 When he appeared at the 1917 Pastoral Award hearing as 
an AWU witness he had recently been working as a union organiser, and his attitudes 
were coloured by this. The Court was being fed with concrete evidence about ‘lost 
time’ between sheds so that the award would generously compensate. Justice Higgins 
presided, and unfortunately for the social historian, tired of extraneous detail when 
Bartle’s narrative had just entered 1914, cutting the witness short. However, more 
emerged in cross-examination, and the transcript provides valuable insights into the 
shearing life on the eve of World War I. 
 
Bartle came from Sydney. He arranged his first shearing engagement each season by 
writing to stations in the time honoured manner. By 1915 he had discovered shearing 
contractors and this measurably reduced his down time. Although this was his best 
season to date he abandoned the sheds for a mining job in Cobar at the end of the 
year. Probably in his late-twenties he rationalised being single. ‘I cannot save enough 
money or get enough to keep a [wife] on’, but he seemed to be still something of a 
free spirit. Certainly other shearers were more conscientious about finding 
replacement sheds. He alluded to grazier antipathy to unionists. ‘I know that for being 
                                                
1 NAA Box 206/126 Vol. 1, pp. 113ff. Pastoral Award Transcript 1917. The narrative is supplemented 
from other sources.  
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outspoken in certain sheds I have been practically victimised’
2
. Higgins had already 
noticed his confident and somewhat cheeky tendency: ‘I have no doubt about your 
being outspoken’, the judge quipped, departing from his usual meticulous 
impartiality, ‘but I will not take that statement about victimisation without something 
more definite.’ There are few clues to Bartle’s family background. He was in the age-
group for enlistment, although it is futile to even guess why he had not gone to the 
war. 
 
He originally left Sydney around 1905 or 1906 and found a job as a jackaroo at Illawa 
Station in the Riverina.
3
 He took jobs as a station hand and gravitated to shearing 
sheds as a rouseabout. Taking opportunities at ‘barrowing’4 he started as a full time 
shearer in 1910. He describes himself as a good shearer, claiming to be the ‘ringer’ in 
at least one shed in 1913, but gave no definite evidence of his tallies5. When unable to 
find shearing he worked at anything he could find, and seems to have abandoned the 
sheds altogether after the 1915 season for the mining job at Cobar.
6
 ‘There was 
absolutely nothing in the game so I turned it up’, was the way he put it. The relative 
security of a salaried career with the AWU beckoned, although a position as a  
temporary shed organiser was the best he had managed. 
 
Bartle's first shed in 1912 was Bindara in NSW. Shearing began on 31 July and he 
was engaged for about nine weeks. Following a gap of 10 days after the cut out, he 
shore at Umetbee from 10 October to the 23rd.7 Then he went to New Zealand but 
Higgins’ tidy mind was not interested in that. The full NSW season stretched from 
mid-June to late-October, provided a shearer was prepared to travel, and there was 
potentially enough shearing in Queensland and Victoria to occupy some shearers for 
                                                
2 Bartle’s ‘outspokenness’ had been on display at the end of 1916 during his stint as an AWU 
organiser. He was ordered off a property in the Coonabarabran district while attempting to organise 
wheat harvesters. He later persuaded them to demand ‘log rates’. The owner conceded but there was a 
disagreement over the terms. To Bartle it was a case of ‘victimising the prominent unionists’ but with a 
little more tact the dispute might have been avoided. The Worker, 4/1/1917, p. 19.  
3 Probably this was ‘Uillawa’, in the Hay district, a large station running 680 cattle and 46,438 sheep. 
Australian Pastoral Directory 1913, p. 67. It was not unusual for court stenographers to misspell the 
names of people and places.  
4 The practice of young station hands or rouseabouts shearing during ‘smoko’.  
5 Shearers invariably described themselves as ‘a bit above average’. From a strictly statistical 
perspective, some must have been ‘a bit below’. It was part of the culture of competitive mateship to 
talk their ability up. ‘Shearing in the bar’ was a popular song, recognising this. 
6 Mining at Cobar was also insecure. See Chapter 7.  
7 These properties could not be found in the 1913 Pastoral Directory.  
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almost 12 months of the year. Yet Bartle had managed to find only two sheds for 11 
weeks work before he went to New Zealand. 
 
In 1913 he got started much earlier with a pen at Boorara, a Kidman property with 
35,000 sheep near Hungerford on the NSW-Queensland  border.8 Roll call was on 12 
March. The most direct route was by train to Bourke then across country – the only 
firm details are that it took four days and included a bicycle ride of 170 miles.
9
 There 
is independent evidence of some trouble at Boorara - no details are provided but it 
possibly concerned delays due to faulty machinery.10 All Bartle said was that shearing 
did not actually start until the 14
th
. Boroora cut out on 12 April and he did not find 
another shed until early August, when the main NSW shearing was in full swing.  
 
This was at Ingar Station11 at Nevertire, where he shore from 4 August to 5 
September. It did not form part of Bartle’s evidence, but a report by the shed ‘rep’ 
printed in The Worker gave a sense of very miserable conditions at this shed in 1913. 
The accommodation was ‘disgraceful, the weather boards having shrunk to leave gaps 
of ½ to 1 inch’. All hands had colds and there was not enough room for everyone to 
sit at the mess table. In the now politically incorrect phrases of AWU-speak, ‘some 
had to do the blackfellow act on the woodheap’.12 Finally, Bartle managed to find a 
regular run of sheds. After a 3 day gap he began at Eurabba, Grenfell on 9th 
September until the cut out on 3rd October - another three week's shearing. He was, in 
fact, a day late as shearing at Eurabba began on the 8th. The fact that the pen was kept 
for him is probably a sign that he was known. Then, after a 5 day gap Bartle started at 
Emutdee on 9th October and cut out on 29th November, a decent stint of about 7 
weeks.13  
 
So after barely a month of shearing in March/April he had drifted around for 4 months 
‘looking for any class of work’. He picked up ‘three or four weeks in a mine’ at 
                                                
8 Australian Pastoral Directory, 1913, p. 165. Kidman actually bought the station in 1913. Bowen, 
Kidman, p. 242. 
9  Henry Lawson tramped the same route from Bourke to Hungerford in 1892. 
10 The Worker, 14/5/1913, p. 1. Sidney Kidman was notorious for keeping costs down.  
11 A modest station with 5,868 sheep. Australian Pastoral Directory, 1913, p. 22. 
12 The Worker, 17/9/1913, p. 1. 
13 The directory lists Eurabba amongst the holding of Steele Calwell. The total shearing was probably 
about 15,000 sheep. Australian Pastoral Directory, 1913, p 132. No listing for Emutdee found. 
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Cobar. Perhaps the pay was good, because when he abandoned shearing at the end of 
1915, he ended up in Cobar. Once the main shearing season started he fared better – 
three sheds for perhaps 14 weeks of paid work, but living conditions were rough. It is 
not mentioned whether or not he went to New Zealand again in 1913. He may have 
been discouraged by the violent industrial unrest disrupting wharves and transport 
services in the Dominion. This was widely reported in Australia. Early in 1913 The 
Worker had published a ‘Keep Away From New Zealand’ indicating that the New 
Zealand union was in a ‘fight to the death’ with the sheepowners.14 
 
He began the 1914 season at Goolring, Bourke, from 4 May to 27th, and then after a 
three day gap started at the famous Weilmoringle.15 It was at this point that Justice 
Higgins interrupted, although the grazier's advocate extracted further sketchy details 
of his activity in 1915. In that year he shore in 7 sheds for the Paroo Shearing 
Company, starting at Thurloo Downs on 23rd April. He shore a further two sheds for 
the Southern Contract Shearing Company based in Goulburn, cutting out for the year 
at Myalla, Cooma on 1 December 1915.16 This was the only season in which he had 
worked entirely for contractors, and it was by far the fullest. He shore continuously 
from the end of April through to the beginning of December – about 7 months, 
without the unproductive gaps of 1913. He started well in 1914, getting stands at two 
really big sheds in the north-west. Weilmoringle alone would have kept him busy 
almost to the end of August. There is every reason to believe he then found sheds 
further south, as he had in other seasons.  
 
The nature of his decision to go with the Paroo contracting company in 1915 was not 
explored, but it is possible to speculate. Weilmoringle was one of a handful of bigger 
sheds deluded into persisting with old methods of recruitment. These large stations 
had junior bookkeepers to handle voluminous correspondence and the station manager 
himself did little other than supervision. Keeping control was one thing, but wiser 
                                                
14 The New Zealand shearing dispute was settled within a fortnight. The Worker, 2/7/1913, p. 1; 
16/7/1913, p. 3; For reports of general labour unrest see The Worker, 6/11/1913, pp. 1, 3, 5; SMH most 
issues during October-December, 1913. 
15 Goolring was owned by Goldsborough Mort Pastoral Company, 7,841 sheep. Weilmoringle in 1913 
was owned by Magill Bros & Mackay, and carried 55,000 sheep. Australian Pastoral Directory, 1913, 
pp. 16, 19. Weilmoringle was still ‘station’ shearing in 1915.  
16 Another Goldsborough Mort holding, 31,253 sheep, Australian Pastoral Directory,1913, p. 122. 
Thurloo Downs was a ‘contract’ shed in 1915. Myalla ran 11,817 sheep.  
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graziers understood that contractors could handle detail more efficiently. More to the 
point, if there was a strike a contractor stood a fair chance of putting together a fresh 
team at short notice. Militants explicitly targeted large ‘station’ sheds because they 
were vulnerable. Smaller stations without the baggage of office staff embraced 
contractors more enthusiastically. Nonetheless, by 1915 it was relatively rare to find 
big sheds still shearing ‘station’.  
 
From a shearer’s perspective, a regular spot at such a shed was gold. If this could be 
done without the medium of a contractor, well and good, but it was hard to secure 
these prized stands. Even a well regarded shearer known to the management could 
easily miss out – they required 36 shearers and if your letter was the 37th in line, too 
bad. Alternative large sheds were now rare. The advantage of going with a contractor 
was that if you missed out on a shed the contractor was likely to find another stand 
reasonably quickly. Returning to Weilmoringle in 1915 would presumably have been 
a good option for Bartle, but he signed up with Paroo.     
 
While graziers such as W.E. Abbott complained about the generosity of shearing 
awards, to shearers it was a mirage. Starting with the best of intentions in April 1913, 
Bartle had managed only 4 sheds and barely 20 weeks of shearing by October. With 
contractors in 1915 he had 7 sheds in the north and a further two (probably small 
ones) in the Tablelands by the time he cut out in early December. The option of 
Tasmania or New Zealand would have employed him beyond New Year if he felt 
inclined. Given this success it is surprising that Bartle went mining, but it was a year 
of very severe drought and sheep were dying and in poor condition. An acute shearer 
shortage due to the war was fuelling militant unionism, and though he saw himself as 
‘outspoken’ he may not have seen eye to eye with IWW firebrands.17 Bartle did not 
have a regular pattern from season to season, and in this respect was not typical. 
Whatever the reason, his attitude to contractors remained ambivalent. He admitted 
they provided the best basis for continuity of work, but he insisted that station owners 
treated shearers better. There was an element of rose-tinted nostalgia in this – shearers 
had not entertained much fondness for squatters in 1894. The AWU's antipathy to 
contractors may also have influenced his opinion. 
                                                
17 See Chapter 6. 
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Another problem for shearers under ‘station’ arrangements was predicting how long 
they would be engaged. It had become standard practice for agreements to specify the 
number of sheep as an aid to planning shearing runs. Graziers were legally required to 
compensate shearers if they did not provide the minimum number. It also worked the 
other way. If the grazier kept on supplying sheep after the maximum had been 
reached, shearers were under no obligation to shear them. However, the minima and 
maxima tended to be unrealistically wide.18 Consider the dilemma of Frank Lysaught, 
shearing at Noondoo in 1917.19 The agreement specified 25,000 to 50,000 sheep.  If 
the shed cut out, say after 26,000, the grazier would have fulfilled his side of the 
agreement, but shearers might have three weeks idle if they had counted on more. 
Alternatively, if they wrongly assumed an early cut out, shearers would miss roll call 
at the next shed. Walking out early risked prosecution. 
 
Contractors took start times out of shearers’ hands. Yet Lysaught protested that this 
was not ‘fair’. He complained, no doubt with justification, that contractors only 
favoured faster shearers with follow-on work. If a shearer was ‘dropped’ by a 
contractor he was doomed to wandering around on his luck, as Tom Bartle had done 
in 1912. Lysaught held this view very strongly, even though he was a more than 
competent shearer averaging around 130 a day. Ever reasonable, Justice Higgins 
baulked at Lysaught’s assertion that it was somehow unfair for contractors to favour 
the best shearers. If he needed a doctor would he not try to find the best one available? 
Lysaught doggedly refused to acknowledge that the grazier or the shearing contractor 
had a comparable right to hire the best shearers. The question was posed to him a 
number of different ways by counsel for the graziers, and by Higgins, but he 
tenaciously stuck to this point of view. ‘The slow man has to live as well as the fast 
man’, he said. He refused to agree with the exasperated grazier advocate who asked 
him, ‘Supposing you were going to get anyone to do anything for you, you would get 
                                                
18 This was a persistent issue in award cases. The graziers argued that, especially in drought years, it 
was impossible to know how many live sheep they would be able to muster. 
19 Noondoo was one of many holdings of Australian Pastoral Company, listed as 27,689 sheep in 1913. 
It ran a large herd of 2,564 cattle. Dirranbandi in southern  Queensland was very drought-prone and 
sheep numbers varied widely. The cattle-sheep ratio reflected markets and grazing availability.  
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the best men you could, wouldn't you?’ Lysaught stubbornly insisted, ‘I do not think I 
would; I believe in giving a fair deal.’20  
 
This was the AWU mateship ethos, contradictions and all, in a nutshell. The fuss over 
‘carrying machines’ and the ‘broad gauge comb’ rule were other examples.21 Both 
Bartle and Lysaught clearly benefited from the sequencing of sheds that contractors 
offered. Contractors paid award rates and the ‘lost time’ problem was resolved. 
Contract shearing succeeded, firstly, because it simplified the grazier’s burden, but 
there were crucial advantages for shearers.  Despite what they said about a more 
kindly attitude from the stations, it is doubtful whether Tom Bartle engaged in 
friendly chat with the station overseer at Weilmoringle any more than with the Paroo 
Company’s shed manager. As employers contractors were often hard to please, and 
their reputation for meanness was partially deserved. Equally, though, they had an 
interest in ‘looking after’ shearers with reputations of ‘reliability’.  
 
There is a glimpse of the kind of judgments made by contractors in the following 
letter to a shearer applying for a pen, unwisely committed to paper and subsequently 
leaked in The Worker:  
Yes, I will handle the team at ‘Crower’ this year, but in picking the men have to be quite 
satisfied that they are out to work and not lie in the hut because of two or three points of rain. I 
remember you and your shearing, but don't remember if you are what we call a wet sheep 
shearer or not. If you will guarantee that you will vote right and not make one to hang up the 
job, I shall be pleased to receive your £1 deposit and put your name on the list. ‘Crower’ starts 
November 1; about 2000 per man.22 
‘Wet sheep shearers’ were sure of getting stands in follow-up sheds. Those who were 
getting a little older, those with a reputation for drunkenness or gambling, and most of 
all, agitators likely to stir up trouble by ostentatiously proclaiming the sheep wet, 
were not wanted. Contractors did not always have enough stands available to 
accommodate every shearer’s desire for a follow-up shed, and they were not always 
ethical in the way they dealt with this, leading to distrust.23 Complaints about the 
iniquities of shearing contractors could still be heard in the late 1930s, but by then it 
was immovable as the principal means of carrying out shearing.24 Bartle and Lysaught 
                                                
20 NAA Box 206/126 Vol. 1, Pastoral Award Transcript 1917, pp 172-3. Emphasis added. 
21 See Chapter 10. 
22 The Worker, 9/9/1915, p 20. 
23 McIntosh, Beaten by a Blow, p. 66. 
24 The Worker, 3/11/1937, p. 20. 
  131 
were also money-makers when it all boiled down, despite the mask of mateship. Still, 
if contractors wanted ‘wet sheep shearers’, they were not going to sink that low. On 
the other hand, there were many who despised whingers who wanted to ‘lie in the hut 
because of two or three points of rain’. Contracting survived all this, but the ritual of 
complaining about it was equally persistent. It was part of the underdog spirit that 
kept shearers going. The acid test was that despite everything they elected to work for 
them. 
 
Shearers Taking the Initiative 
 
A small passage in On the Wool Track touches on another trend.  
Of late the shearers themselves have taken it into their heads to get those profits for 
themselves, and have started a co-operative contract company of their own, which divides the 
contractors profit amongst the men. I heard the golden opinions of their work. It is perhaps the 
most hopeful development in the wool industry.25 
Justice Higgins made a similar observation in 1911.26 In 1908 the AWU was told:  
On the Murrumbidgee last year there was a party of four shearers with a little plant of their 
own, who were a co-operative company, doing the whole of their own work, and taking 
contracts with farmers in the district.27 
This new practice of ‘co-operative group shearing’ was already common enough to be 
noticed but sufficiently unusual to be discussed. It was but one reflection of the ways 
in which rural change was already spawning new solutions to shearing organisation.  
 
Diversification of flocks introduced new priorities although the squatter prerogative 
did not disappear. Contractors such as J.H. Young & Co, the Merriwa Shearing Co. 
and Federal Shearing had been flourishing for about a decade. They were centralised 
from Sydney, and in effect contracting refined the ‘station’ system. As Young’s 
involvement with the MSU showed, pastoralist perspectives persisted. Contracting 
enterprises springing up in rural towns, where both the sheep and the shearers were 
concentrated, were an adjunct of closer settlement. There was less need to circulate 
the supply and demand for shearers through a Sydney office. It was common for 
shearers to start up these enterprises. In farmers’ woolsheds traditional antagonisms 
lost some of their bite.  
                                                
25 Bean, On the Wool Track, p. 99. 
26 CAR, Vol. 5, 1911, p. 87. 
27 The Worker, 12/3/1908, p. 29. 
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Corroborating evidence is tucked away in the transcripts of arbitration cases and 
inquiries into the wool industry. Private contractors in rural districts did not 
completely displace the pioneer contractors but co-existed with them.28 By the 1920s 
there was considerable diversity in the style and size of shearing contractors, as 
befitted diversity in flocks and farming systems. The attitude of shearers was mixed. 
Some relished the opportunities, some were ambivalent, and there was an 
undercurrent of hostility that was never quite extinguished. Between the wars shearing 
contractors became embedded as the dominant employers of shearers and they 
continued to evolve as the wool industry itself evolved. 
 
********** 
 
In 1909 Arthur Rae encountered something a little different from group shearing. He 
was visiting sheds as a ‘general organiser’ for the AWU, and on his travels he came to 
Eremeran station, a large shed in the vast open spaces between Hillston and Cobar, 
with 40 stands and about 40,000 sheep.29 Rae commented on ‘the peculiar manner’ in 
which the shearers had been engaged. Recruitment had been delegated to a shearer 
named Joe Coves from Goulburn, a man who had regularly shorn there in previous 
years. Applications had simply been handed over to him to sort out. A stand was 
being kept for him, so he was still earning income by shearing. As he was not actually 
present Rae was unable to interrogate him, but perplexed though he was, found 
nothing the AWU could seriously object to. There was no evidence of ‘personal 
favouritism’, or even worse, that Coves might have taken money for his services. Pens 
had simply been allocated in the order of the dates on the letters, but Rae was in no 
doubt that such arrangements were open to abuse ‘and must be nipped in the bud’.30 
Coves was perhaps one step away from becoming a contractor in his own right, 
although whether this happened is unknown. W.H. Lambert visited the same shed in 
1910, keen to test rumours that Joe Coves was acting as a ‘labour agent’, but could 
only infer guilt, stating that ‘he thought it expedient to stay away!’.31 Coves was still 
working as a shearer in 1911 when he was one of six who narrowly out-voted five 
                                                
28 Some of the original batch of contractors were still in business in the 1920s and 1930s. Grazier co-
operatives formed after 1919 also continued the tradition. See Chapter 6. 
29 Rae was an activist for the original ASU and involved in radical unionism in the 1920s and 1930s. 
For more on Rae see Chapter 7. 
30 The Worker, 14/7/1909, pp. 4, 5. 
31 The Worker, 20/7/1910, p. 7. 
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others demanding the return of deposit money. One of his companions was denigrated 
as a ‘Sunday sheep-shearer’.32 Whatever Coves actually did, he was a money-maker 
not too concerned with mateship sensitivities. By 1913 Eremeran had been purchased 
by A.B. Triggs who controlled a string of stations in NSW with an aggregate of more 
than a million sheep. The Worker described him as ‘Australia’s sheep king’, and as 
such he was a squatter worth cultivating by a budding contractor. 
 
********** 
 
In 1906 Thomas Kerr had, with a partner, bought a shearing plant and established the 
contracting firm Sinclair and Kerr. They engaged 60 shearers during the season and 
shore 280,000 sheep in sheds covering quite a wide area of central Queensland - 
Barcaldine, Isisford, Blackall, Longreach. Already they had contracts for more sheep 
in 1907. He gave evidence at the 1907 award case about his earlier shearing career.33 
Kerr had been shearing for ‘15 or 16 years’, which means he had entered the sheds 
around 1890 when unionism was buoyant. Kerr decided when he was about 25 to 
make full use of the year-round shearing pattern in Queensland to make some money, 
and carefully accumulated savings from shearing to invest in the business. In 
consecutive years from 1902 to 1905 he banked £191, £190, £239, and £278 
(including £40 from a repaid debt). ‘[I] began shearing in January, and had not 
finished sometimes in December, when the shearing was carried on until next year. [I] 
was able to go from one shed to another.’ At £1 per 100 he needed to shear 10,000 
sheep to gather £100 in gross income, so these were large sums, and he must have 
been shearing 20-30,000 sheep per annum (or 2-3000 a month).
34
 
 
Justice O’Connor was impressed: ‘You do not waste time, then?’ ‘Not in the years 
mentioned’, Kerr replied. He had begun as a hand shearer and converted to machines. 
He was a better shearer than average without being outstanding. Perseverance and 
thrift were his outstanding qualities. He was, he claimed, ‘above average’ with the 
blades – ‘over a hundred a day’. Kerr thought hand shearing was physically more 
                                                
32 The Worker, 22/3/1911, p. 4; 2/8/1911, p. 3; Pastoral Directory 1913, p. 69. 
33 All details on Kerr are from the account of the case in The Worker, 4/7/1907, p. 21.  
34 ibid. 
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demanding than machine shearing, although the vibrating ‘tube’
35
 caused problems 
and some men used ‘blocks and pulleys’ to keep them steady. Machine shearers 
averaged 25 sheep more in a day.36 In 1904, two years before the contracting 
partnership was established, Kerr had been at ‘Corona’ and ‘Westlands’, sheds in the 
Longreach district, each shearing about 80,000 sheep. Corona started on 17 August 
and finished on 4 October. Kerr’s yield had been 5,592 (averaging 135 per day – the 
shed average was 91), compared to the highest tally of 5,860. Westlands had started 
on 6 October and cut out on 2 December. Kerr averaged 123 for each working day 
(including some part days interrupted by rain), for 4,500 sheep. This is concrete 
evidence of just over 10,000 sheep over 4½ months, with only two days between 
sheds. If he was as well organised for the rest of the year he may well have shorn 
25,000 sheep (for a gross income of about £250). In that year, Kerr ‘banked’ £239.  
 
While shearing may well have contributed most of his capital, it seems likely that he 
had additional income. In reply to another O’Connor question he explained that he 
had been ‘shearing selectors’ sheep on the Flinders … with [a] Ladbury’s shearing 
plant’, although he also said he was paid £1 per 100, which was the going rate for 
shearing, not a ‘per sheep’ contractor’s charge. Probably, however, he was able to ‘go 
from shed to shed’ in selector districts beyond the scrutiny of the AWU (which 
strenuously opposed this sort of enterprise). Possibly the selectors provided shed 
labour and paid rental for the machines. Whatever the precise arrangements, he was 
banking about £200 each season over and above his living expenses, and it would be 
hard to do this by shearing alone. Most likely 1906 signified the formation of his 
formal partnership with Sinclair, but he had been operating on a self-employed basis 
several years beforehand. He must have been in his late-30s when he made the jump 
from shearer to boss. 
 
********** 
 
                                                
35 This refers to the cable connecting the overhead mechanism to the handpiece. Until they were 
superseded by a more robust system of gears and rotating metal rods, ‘tubes’ caused problems.   
36 This evidence is quite different to that given by the older blade shearers Webb and Gill in 1904 (see 
Chapter 4), and goes to the cultural rift between blade and machine shearers early in the century.  
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Another Queenslander had gone shearing just before World War I, when he was 
twenty.37 Around 1917 or 1918 he set up as a shearing contractor, making enough 
money to achieve his ultimate ambition of becoming a grazing selector in 1925. In 
1926 Queensland was gripped by a serious drought and he told the land inquiry in 
1927: 
When I was a shearing contractor I thought I only had to go into the land business and I would 
be a millionaire in no time. If you tell the others the position today they will tell you that you 
twist it around, and that you are with the boss.38 
He had taken a lease on 20,000 acres, enough to carry 8000 sheep and make a 
reasonable income – or so he thought. But the drought still had not broken and the 
property was carrying only 3,500. His dilemma had been to sell sheep and lose wool 
revenue or to hold them by buying fodder. Whatever he did meant a loss and already 
his debt was up to £11,000. He anticipated that the drought would end, but it would 
still be several years before he would be better off than he had been when he gave up 
shearing contracting in anticipation of financial independence. He looked back 
wistfully on his years of accumulating capital in the shearing game. 
When I was shearing I could always earn £300 to £400 and go away for two or three months, 
possibly to New Zealand in the hot weather. 
And, 
A shearing contractor has no worries. He knows what he is getting for his sheep, so long as he 
has a good team of shearers. I have had men with me earning £500.39 
The ‘with the boss’ remark showed an awareness of talk amongst shearers that they 
did all the work while ‘squatters’ made all the money. Now he saw the world from the 
point of view of a grazing selector rather than a shearer. Importantly, though, the 
account highlights the attractions of shearing and contracting as vehicles for money-
making. 
  
********** 
 
Another very successful contracting business which began before the war was 
McInnes Brothers of Queanbeyan. As with many others it became an inter-
generational concern, and McInnes grandsons were still running it in the 1950s. 
Andrew McInnes, one of the founders, was also active in the formation of the 
                                                
37 QPP, 1927, Vol. 2, pp121ff , Report of the Land Settlement Advisory Board appointed  to Inquire 
into Certain matters Relating to Land Settlement, 1927,  
38 ibid.  
39 ibid. 
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Shearing Contractors Association of NSW in 1927. Few details are known of the 
origins of this business, except that the brothers were shearers. By the mid-1920s they 
had a run of 25 sheds shearing about 500,000 sheep, employing 150 to 200 men – 
which probably meant they were running five or six teams simultaneously.  In the 
early days the McInnes brothers supervised most of the sheds personally (and perhaps 
also continued to shear) but as the business succeeded they were increasingly office 
bound. By the late-1920s they had opened an office in Anderson Street, Belmore, in 
western Sydney. Presumably this was dictated by the need to find shearers.40   
 
********** 
 
Often contractors benefited from the patronage of grazing interests. At the very least, 
repeat business at one or two large sheds was needed to provide the nucleus of a 
viable concern. The Kidman properties in western-New South Wales were Charlie 
Flavel’s opportunity in the 1920s. Born around 1896, Flavel was a rough diamond 
who grew up in Broken Hill and by the end of World War I was a shearer. Kidman 
was primarily a cattle man, but his Darling properties carried sheep. Numbers varied 
widely, but there could be 200,000 sheep in good seasons scattered over the Kidman 
holdings which needed to be shorn. It was the basis of a shearing business. In 1926 
Flavel bought a truck to transport the shearers and he was in business. Contracting for 
Kidman, renowned for penny-pinching, was not for the faint hearted. Machinery was 
seldom properly maintained and station budgets were too lean to carry spare parts. 
Flavel always fixed them to keep the shearing going and this was seldom charged to 
the stations. As Clyde Cameron wryly remarked, ‘That’s why he was able to hold the 
contracts!’.41 It followed that Flavel also ran a tight ship. Shearers from Broken Hill 
were a tough lot, and often militant. Flavel needed to be able to handle them if he was 
to keep the Kidman sheds. Cameron was an AWU organiser in the 1940s and Broken 
Hill was part of his beat. They often sparred on industrial matters but Cameron had a 
grudging empathy with this character from the west.42 Perhaps there is an echo of 
Russel Ward’s thesis that the harsh environment helped to breed mateship, although 
not in this case linked to union solidarity. Flavel built up a run of 450,000 sheep – all 
                                                
40 NAA1958 Box 206/126 Vol. 1, Pastoral Award Transcript 1917, pp. 242-8, 250-1. 
41 Bowen, Kidman, p. 429. 
42 Bowen, Kidman, pp. 427-9. Mick Young worked for Flavel during his shearing career. 
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of it in the ‘corner country’ - and was rumoured to be ‘very wealthy’ by the 1950s 
with investments in mining shares and ownership of a drive-in movie theatre. After 
World War II most of these far-western stations were broken up into soldier 
settlement grazing blocks. Charlie Flavel slid into retirement as new contractors 
moved in, but he was still telling shearing yarns to anyone who would listen in the 
1980s.43        
 
********** 
 
Jack Dwyer was born in 1908 into a farming family in Victoria. He had solid but 
limited schooling before venturing into the Riverina in the 1920s. Handicapped by the 
effects of poliomyelitis, shearing was not a suitable occupation. Dwyer, a quick 
learner, found a clerical position in the office of the stock and station agents, W.J. 
Quirke & Co in Narrandera. Working the accounts of merino stud breeders along the 
Murrumbidgee indicated that there was ‘money in wool’. Shearing contracting 
beckoned as a means tapping into the flow of wealth. However, it was the 1930s and a 
bit of luck was needed to get established. A prominent grazier William Brown of 
Memagong station in the Young district took a liking to him and helped him 
considerably.44 Dwyer decided to try his hand in Queensland, and got his break at 
Northampton Downs, one of the biggest sheds in the Blackall district. Brown lent him 
money to buy a small property at Dalby and (probably using Brown’s influence to 
attract clients) became a full time shearing contractor while running some stock on the 
small property. By the end of World War II he was affluent enough to repay his debt 
to Brown and buy a larger property at Roma. He thus became a grazier in his own 
right, subsequently prospering during the 1950s wool boom.45  
 
********** 
 
                                                
43SLV MS 557-7, Patsy Adam-Smith interview with Laurie Walsh, 1978, Walsh uses the name 
‘Blakeley’ when talking about the shearing contractor, but all the facts suggest he means Flavel. Arthur 
Blakeley was a prominent AWU official in the 1920s and ‘30s. He had once been an organiser around 
Broken Hill and it is possible the names were confused. 
44 An element of notoriety is associated with Brown as the father-in-law of Eric Campbell, leader of the 
paramilitary organisation, the New Guard, during the Depression.  
45 Information provided by Jack Dwyer’s son, Don Dwyer. 
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Ray Stibbard was born in 1896 and grew up around Dundee and Glen Innes in New 
England, districts being transformed to wheat-sheep farms under closer settlement.46 
He did various forms of rural work but shearing was in the family. His older brothers 
went ‘out west’ every year, and his uncle ran Chappell’s Woolscour at Dundee.
47
 He 
learnt to shear in ‘cocky sheds’ when still a teenager, but began to venture further 
afield to bigger sheds such as Angledool to the west and others near the Queensland 
border. In 1918 he did wool pressing for the Merriwa Company at C.J. Campbell’s 
Ranger’s Valley Station. It was the tail end of the war, and shearers were still in short 
supply. However, 12 of them were clipping wool faster than a young novice could 
jam it into bales. He was pressing from 6am to 11pm to keep up. Sometimes the 
shearers helped at night. Whether they were in the AWU or not, this was the antithesis 
of a union culture. Wartime labour shortages were the spark for increased militancy in 
Queensland, but this was not the way in New England.48 It was not as if Campbell 
was a mere selector. He was a wealthy grazier with partnership interests in perhaps 
100,000 sheep. Stibbard’s lesson from this, though, was not of being exploited, but 
that dedication earned regular contracts at Ranger’s Valley. 49 
 
With companions from the Glen Innes district Stibbard went on his first big shearing 
trip to Queensland in 1920.50 The contractor did not honour an undertaking to pay 
extra if the sheep were well shorn. ‘It was there and in other western areas’, he wrote 
in his retirement, ‘that I began to realise that life as a shearer would not be all milk 
and honey’.  He returned to Glen Innes taking jobs in the Bulldog Boot Factory for a 
while, and then on the construction of the Tenterfield railway. But he was not happy, 
realising ‘that with all its drawbacks, wool was my life’.
51
 He returned to shearing. 
Just how the transition was accomplished is not described, but by the late-1920s 
Stibbard was established as a contractor. Forty years later it was handed over to his 
sons. He lists 39 sheds which were the core of his activity, which built quite quickly 
to a run of about 350,000 sheep per annum. This was dominated by holdings of the 
Campbells, for whom Stibbard had sweated long hours in 1918. Apart from one or 
                                                
46 Stibbard, Not a Dream. Similarities with the background and outlook of New England farmer Arthur 
Cosh are worth noting. See Chapter 2. 
47 Stibbard, Not a Dream, pp. 26, 31. 
48 See Chapter 6 for Queensland unrest. 
49 Stibbard, Not a Dream, p. 39; details of Campbell interest from Pastoral Directories 
50 See below for the targeting of Queensland sheds by NSW contractors in the 1920s.  
51 Stibbard, Not a Dream , pp. 42, 44. 
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two other large properties, much of Stibbard’s run consisted of smaller sheds of 
between 2 and 9,000 sheep each, which he returned to year after year.52 Stibbard’s 
origins were sufficiently knockabout to entertain some empathy with unionism, but he 
was wary of the AWU’s growing power. He preferred one to one relationships to 
regulations: ‘I attribute my success as a shearer and contractor to the fact that I have 
always treated my men as equals.’53    
 
********** 
 
Henry Salter was born in the vicinity of Kerang in Northern Victoria in 1907. His 
father was a farmer. The original 280 acres occupied in 1876 had been expanded by 
almost 1000 acres. They were not dirt poor, but it was a robust existence. Henry’s 
father died in 1923. His older brothers were able to buy dairy farms, and in 1927 a 
new house was built on the home farm.54 After working in shearing sheds as a 
rouseabout Henry had learnt enough to land his first shearing stand in 1924. Graziers 
could be tough customers, but they were also conscious of the shortage of quality 
shearers. Henry was still struggling to master the art when the boss sacked a man who 
seemed unwilling to improve and Henry feared for the consequences when his own 
inexperienced efforts faced scrutiny. ‘How long have you been shearing?’ was the 
question. ‘About six weeks’, was the reply. His tactic was to refer only to the period 
he had been full time, to create an impression he was learning quickly. The response 
was encouraging, ‘Well, keep at it.’ Salter was short and stocky and diligent, and did 
improve quickly. Within a year he had shorn a 100 in a day, the mark of reasonable 
proficiency.
55
   
 
Salter seemed to be able to find plenty of farm work to occupy the year, but he 
quickly saw shearing as his vocation. The season in Northern Victoria was short, but 
across the Murray the expansive Riverina beckoned. Fly-blow was becoming 
prevalent and this meant that crutching was available throughout the year. In 1926 – 
he was still only 19 – he bought a ‘Cooper Little Wonder’ two-stand shearing plant 
                                                
52 Stibbard, Not a Dream , p. 44; various Pastoral Directories. 
53 Stibbard, Not a Dream , p. 45. Note also Stibbard’s anecdote about the ‘young lady’ from Chapter 1. 
54 Ian Day, Quick Go the Shears: The Life and Times of Henry Salter, Self Published, Kerang, Vic., 
1993, p. 15,  
55 Day, Quick Go the Shears, p. 11 
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driven by a petrol motor. This was mounted on the tray of a converted Model T 
Ford.56 A local retired farmer, Frank Kane, ‘had enough confidence in Henry’s 
industriousness to back him in the venture’.57 Salter recruited another man, who went 
everywhere with him as a working mate. This plant was used until 1939, and in 1936 
he purchased another, operating the two together. Most of his early work was within 
20 or 30 miles of Kerang, and he later expanded into the Balranald district. This was 
an ideal way to survive the Depression, the caveat being that cash-strapped farmers 
could not pay for shearing unless funds were released by stock agents in control of the 
wool cheque. Salter cultivated George O’Connor, an agent based in Swan Hill, for 
inside intelligence on the financial position of grazing clients. In 1939 he switched to 
a four-stand electric plant, powered by a portable diesel engine. As the business 
expanded he employed a rouseabout, and then a cook and a wool-presser. During 
World War II it was very hard to get shearers and Salter advertised in Melbourne, 
although mostly he employed Kerang locals (his own brother-in-law was one of his 
regular shearers). He worked one of the stands himself and some employees stayed 
with him for 10 to 15 years. In districts like Kerang these arrangements were often far 
from the scrutiny of the AWU. Shearers were usually members, but rarely tribal 
unionists. Henry Salter himself was a paid up member most of his life, although he 
ran into serious conflict with the AWU in the 1960s.58 Conditions were often rough 
but it was in Salter’s interest to see that his team was well looked after. He was, after 
all, one of the workers too.
59
  
 
In 1932 the nearby town of Lockington became the base for a similar two-stand plant 
operation. Brothers-in-law Frank Saare and Ron Arnold formed a partnership, and 
like Salter they found this an effective way to survive the Depression. In 1942 they 
too upgraded to a six-stand electric plant. The Saare and Arnold families spent much 
of the year living in a caravan, but owned modest homes in McColl St, Lockington. 
Frank’s son, Kevin Saare was born in 1933 and became a champion shearer in the 
                                                
56 As with many shearers of the twentieth century, Henry Salter was mechanically minded and 
interested in cars. He remembered all the cars he had ever owned. Day, Quick Go the Shears, p. 55. 
57 Day, Quick Go the Shears, p. 23. 
58 See Chapter 8. 
59 For Henry Salter’s contracting business in the 1930s and ‘40s, Day, Quick Go the Shears, pp. 22-7.   
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1950s and ‘60s.
60
 Twenty-six years separated Salter and Kevin Saare, but they were 
both important figures in the shearing industry after World War II. The 
confrontational mateship code which prevailed in Queensland and other pastoral 
regions, including the Western District of Victoria, tended to be more visible. Salter 
and Saare represented a way of life  more readily identified with ‘the pioneer legend’. 
Ward’s legend throws little light on their shearing entrepreneurship. This bore some  
resemblance to MSU values, but the roots of their ethos were found amongst the small 
farms of rural Victoria.61 
 
********** 
Overview 
 
Shearing contractors got started in a variety of ways. By the 1930s as many as 170 
shearing contracting firms were spread across NSW.62 The majority of these were 
located in the wide strip running from north to south through central NSW, including 
the eastern and western ‘slopes’ and the northern and southern tablelands. There were 
relatively few shearing contractors based on the western plains.63 Many were located 
in towns such as Moree, Walgett, Narrabri, Dubbo, Molong Bathurst and Young. A 
large number (about 50) were located on the relatively unpopulated country of the 
north-west (from Bourke and Brewarrina in the west, east to Moree and south to 
Coonamble). This was largely grazing territory, but companies based here were handy 
to the Queensland border. Taking teams of shearers up to Charleville and Longreach 
during the autumn was a way of extending the season. There were about 40 
companies in the central west, conveniently located to take shearing teams north and 
south, as well as west. The 28 firms based in the Riverina could service the flocks in 
Victoria as well as the many stud flocks on stations along the Murrumbidgee.  
 
                                                
60 Margaret O’Brien and Louise Ross, In the Pursuit of Excellence: The Life and Career of Shearing 
Legend Kevin Saare, Lockington and District Living Heritage Complex, Lockington, Victoria, 2002, 
pp. 6-10.   
61 Des Williams, an historian of New Zealand competition shearing, considered it inexplicable that 
neither Salter nor Saare is mentioned in Patsy Adam-Smith’s 300 page The Shearers. 
62 Based on an various issues of Sands Directory for NSW. In 1927 Andrew McInnes thought there 
were about 120. NAA, B1958/10 Box 2. Pastoral Award Transcript 1927.  
63 See above for Charlie Flavel of Broken Hill.  
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Although most shearing contractors were located in wheat-sheep territory, there were 
at least 19 in Sydney in the early 1930s, eight in the suburbs rather than central 
Sydney. Up to a quarter of shearers lived in capital cities. Some of the five pioneers 
from 1910 were still there, although there had been name changes. The most notable 
addition was the Graziers Co-operative Shearing Company owned by the Graziers 
Association of NSW, which became by far Australia’s largest contractor.64  In 1927 
Pugh’s listed 21 shearing contractors scattered around the Queensland pastoral 
districts. Unlike NSW there were few indications that Brisbane was a recruiting centre 
for shearers.65 Well-known names such as the Warrego Sheep Shearing Company 
(Charleville) and Edkins, Moran and Co (Longreach) were included, but it was 
certainly not a complete listing.66    
 
The historical record is more likely to note successful transitions from shearer to 
contractor than failures. The lot of a contractor was far from easy. The usual logistics 
of scheduling shearing runs while dealing with the sometimes unreasonable demands 
of graziers were compounded during runs of bad weather. Shearers’ egos needed to be 
massaged. Shed hands and often the shearers could be an unreliable lot and had to be 
found or replaced if they did not turn up when expected. It was a world in which a bit 
of give and take, a bit of human understanding was required, but also firmness to the 
point of being ruthless. Probably the best known sources of discord were arguments 
over wet sheep, but there were many others. Problems were exacerbated by the 
undercurrents of distrust that poisoned shearers’ views of squatters, and vice versa. 
The contractor’s concern was to minimise these tensions because delays always cost 
money.  
 
The AWU Response 
 
The AWU was antagonistic to contracting. The union had already debated ‘co-
operative’ partnerships in 1908 without being able to decide on a policy, but unlike 
Bean it was apprehensive. Unionists were uncomfortable with the idea that a shearer 
could also be a boss. One ‘solution’ was to ban AWU members from shearing with an 
                                                
64 See Chapter 6, ‘The Graziers’ Co-operative Shearing Company (Grazcos)’.  
65 Even the United Graziers Sheep Shearing Company, was based in Barcaldine.   
66 Pugh’s Almanac and Queensland Directory, 1927, Digital version published by Archive CD Books 
Australia Pty. Ltd. 
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employer who was also shearing. Another approach, completely different but 
tempting to the controlling AWU mindset, was to set a ‘union rate’ for self-employed 
shearer-contractors and perhaps get them included in the award. In the end the 
conference settled for amending its rules to forbid AWU members from having 
anything to do with ‘group shearing’ at all.67 Like ‘carrying machines’ and ‘broad 
gauge combs’ it was bound to be broken.68 The subliminal fear was that if co-
operative partnerships worked unionism had no useful purpose. 
 
Group shearing was a minor matter in the face of the general spread of contracting in 
the decade before the war. At the AWU Annual Convention in January 1911, J. 
McNeill (then representing the Charleville Branch, Queensland) moved a motion 
calling for a plebiscite to consider abolition. Contracting and group shearing, he 
insisted, were ‘a menace to the health and earnings’ of members. References to ‘co-
operation’ were a ‘mockery’. Rather, the contractor was ‘unscrupulous’ and trouble 
invariably arose through him ‘trying to take a point on the men and his greed for 
sweating out extra profits’. Men who voted ‘wet’ were often singled out and not 
offered further sheds, and contractors deliberately operated short handed with respect 
to rouseabouts. ‘The game of the contractor [is] to take only the very fastest men with 
the result that the shed hands [are] run off their legs.’69 ‘Southern states [are] not 
cursed with this system to the same extent as Queensland’, he noted.70 He referred to 
it as ‘sweating’, and a note of nostalgia for the old days crept into the argument. The 
once hated pastoralist was now looked on with some fondness. ‘In cases where the 
pastoralist [looks] after his own shearing there [is] hardly any trouble at all about the 
award.’
71
 
 
Others spoke along the same lines. Jim McLean (also from Charleville) claimed that 
‘outrageous sweating practices [are] allowed, neither the shearer nor the shed hand 
getting a fair deal’. He cited one case in Queensland (near the NSW border) where 30 
                                                
67 The Worker, 12/3/1908, p. 29. 
68 For broad gauge combs see Chapter 10. 
69 The Worker, 8/2/1911, p. 4. 
70 Justice Higgins noted this too in the award hearings later in the year, although in his mind it was not 
a menace. See Chapter 4. 
71 The Worker, 8/2/1911, p. 4. 
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of the ‘fastest shearers in Australia’ had only 18 rouseabouts to pick up the fleeces.
72
 
Ted Grayndler, then secretary of the Victoria-Riverina Branch, said he was sure a 
plebiscite would vote contracting down, and gave an impassioned speech condemning 
the system. ‘Personally, [I have] never had any time for the shearing contractor’, he 
intoned, calling on his own credentials as a former shearer and fighting unionist. Most 
of the trouble the union had to deal with occurred in contract sheds, and even the poor 
machinery manufacturers lost out because contractors skimped on replacement combs 
and cutters to reduce expenses. Moreover, because of their hard nosed attitude the 
men seemed to be cowed into submission. They put up with more petty 
inconveniences than used to be the case with station shearing. He noted a case near 
Longreach where electric light (then quite a luxury) had been installed in a shed to 
facilitate ‘two long runs’ before breakfast. Doing something about the iniquitous 
practice of electric lights in sheds would have to wait for another day, but in the 
meantime he supported the case for a plebiscite, and he sincerely hoped the members 
would make their abhorrence clear.
73
 
 
Jim Laracy argued that as a result of contract shearing men were ending up on the 
‘scrap heap’ by the time they were 35. Hardly anyone over the age of 40 was seen in 
contract sheds. He did not mention that this was probably less because men were 
‘physically wrecked’ than it represented the age group contractors recruited from.74 It 
was suggested that contractors favoured men using broad gauge combs because they 
could enhance their tallies by up to 30 sheep per day.75 The wide comb (as the ‘broad 
gauge comb’ was later known) had not long been invented and there was already an 
AWU rule more or less banning it (although it would be another 15 years until it was 
restricted by the award). They made shed hands into ‘sweated labour’, but there was 
another problem based on the way the arbitration system operated. Contractors were 
endeavouring to make out, unionists asserted, that shearers could make ‘big money’, 
and this would bias the court against increasing shearing rates, and it could even 
                                                
72 A rule of thumb said the same number of shed hand as shearers was required, depending on the speed 
of shearers and other factors. Eventually the award specified minimum shed hand to shearer ratios, 
which contractors and graziers considered unfairly restrictive. The ‘sweated labour’ charge was often 
made, but it was just as important to have the wool cleared promptly and false economy to run a shed 
too light on shed staff.  McLean was probably being disingenuous with this anecdote.   
73 The Worker, 8/2/1911, p. 4. 
74 Most shearer entrepreneurs described in the previous segment were no longer shearing in their 40s. 
75 This is a rare hint that contractors tried to introduce wide combs in these early days. Most evidence 
suggests otherwise. The full history of wide combs is canvassed in Chapter 10. 
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persuade it to put them down. It was said contractors were ‘deliberately swelling’ 
tallies in the facts place before the court. It was also noted (and in this graziers were 
inclined to agree) that sheep were ‘butchered, tommyhawked and hamstrung’ as a 
result of these practices.
76
  
 
Amidst this chorus of condemnation there were some notes of caution. C. Last of 
Bourke questioned whether, the Arbitration Court actually had the power to abolish 
contracting. Tommy White moved that a committee be established to examine the 
matter further, and E.J. Bowman recommended that nothing should be done until the 
committee reported. This was a time honoured tactic of union heavyweights to shelve 
radical propositions.77   
 
At the end of 1911, the union did conduct a plebiscite. They were asked simply: ‘Are 
you against contract shearing?’ It might have been a leading question, but opposition 
to contracting was, on this count, undeniable. Out of 27,397 replies only 3,487 said 
‘no’ – or to put it the other way 87 per cent of shearers had said ‘yes’, they were 
against contract shearing. However, Tommy White, now Secretary General, seemed 
to back away from committing the AWU to a policy of outright opposition in his 
rambling response. 
The plebiscite on the question of contract shearing resulted in an overwhelming majority 
against the system (even in Queensland where it has the greatest hold an 8 to 1 majority was 
given), showing that members, after working years under it object to a system that the 
pastoralists have forced on them. The pastoralists themselves in many cases are finding out it 
is a disadvantage, as they have lost control of their shearing to a large extent where it operates 
and the more it increases the more they are placed at the mercy of the contractors and their 
employers who get the monopoly of the best runs. It will be to the interests of pastoralists to 
co-operate with the AWU in checking it, otherwise they will find the supply of efficient labor 
(sic) getting less each year, and in the end have reason to curse the day they encouraged it in 
the hope that by its aid they would defeat the AWU. Unless the pastoralists will assist in 
checking the evil of a system that cannot ultimately benefit them, but which in fact limits their 
supply of labor (sic) by driving a number of the average men out of the industry, through the 
monopoly of the most profitable sheds being secured by a favored (sic) section, members will 
be justified in refusing to accept employment under contractors till some, at least, of its worst 
features are removed and a squarer deal given by contractors to both employers and 
employees.78 
The line that the pastoralists had forced the system on shearers was only partly true, as 
was the suggestion that they were now beginning to regret it. Whether pastoralists 
                                                
76 The Worker, 8/2/1911, p. 4. These arguments are almost identical to those ventilated during the ‘wide 
comb dispute’ seven decades later! 
77 The Worker, 8/2/1911, p. 4. 
78 The Worker, 30/1/1912, p. 2. 
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would cooperate with the AWU ‘in checking’ contracting was decidedly optimistic, 
and the notion that contractors were increasingly dictating terms to pastoralists and 
shearers alike was flawed. Underneath the rhetoric about an ‘evil’ system, White 
himself was seeking no more that the removal of its ‘worst features’.  
 
Predictably, nothing was done. The leaders understood that it suited most shearers. 
Nonetheless, turning a blind eye gave ammunition to the leadership’s more radical 
critics. In 1916 Jim Prior from Pittsworth challenged W.J. Dunstan, the Queensland 
Secretary’s argument that war and drought had caused declining AWU membership.  
[The] real cause ....., in my opinion, is the contractor, who has a monopoly of sheds and who 
employs none but fast shearers. I have known men that could shear a hundred sheep turned 
down. The men he employs start shearing in January and finish in December, and that is what 
they call getting a big run. You can't blame the men getting all they can, but the system is to 
blame. I have known a large number of shed hands, shearers and cooks who have left the 
pastoral industry because of the contract system. The smaller the shearing plant the greater the 
evil becomes. A small plant of five shearers were shearing near here last year. They shore 
20,000 sheep, and none of those men had a ticket. Abolish the contractor, and our membership 
would be doubled. More shearers, shed hands and cooks would be required. The shed hand 
would then have a chance to learn to shear; now he has none. A plebiscite of members was 
taken a few years ago, and the abolition of the contractor was carried by a large majority, but 
the executive took no action. By not doing so they blundered greatly, in my opinion, and the 
pastoral industry remains in the grip of the middleman and monopolist.79 
Prior’s argument that shearing in small sheds, out of sight out of mind to AWU 
organisers, was reducing the membership, did worry the AWU. However, there was 
very little that could be done about contracting as the cause of it. Remarks 
condemning contracting had a ritualistic air, and were still part of union discourse in 
the 1950s. The AWU concentrated on organising shearers by reaching as many sheds 
as it could, and was remarkably successful in this respect. One reason for this was that 
many shearers did a mixture of sheds, and they were sold union tickets when they 
were in the bigger woolsheds. Moreover, cocky shearers understood the benefits of 
award rates as much as anybody. It was better to quietly condone contracting and put 
up with the abuse of agitators, than to buy a fight with the contracting industry it had 
no hope of winning.  
  
Queensland in the 1920s 
 
The rapid spread of contracting in Queensland before World War I was followed by 
the targeting of Queensland sheds by NSW contractors in the 1920s. By 1924 this was 
                                                
79 The Worker (Brisbane), 17/2/1916, p. 20; For another example, see The Worker, 6/5/1915, p. 19. 
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creating considerable consternation amongst Queensland shearers. Ruthless 
contractors were accused of cramming shearers into cars or onto the trays of lorries 
alongside a shearing plant. Contractors largely replaced squatters as the symbols of 
greed and exploitation: ‘The majority of them sport a new motor car every year, and 
enjoy a seaside residence for the summer months, all wrung from the sweat of the 
pastoral worker.’80 John Durkin, an activist AWU official who was often at 
loggerheads with his superiors in the Brisbane office, spread a rumour that Frank 
Fitch, a manager for the Standard Shearing Company based in Winton, had been 
employed as a ‘special’ during the 1923 police strike in Melbourne. Fitch must have 
threatened legal action because the Worker subsequently printed a retraction.
81
 
  
Sam Brassington from the Charleville office wound up 1924 with a tirade about the 
evils of contracting, which he said was assisting centralisation and draining 
population and wealth from country towns.  
As usual the men recruited by the contractors in the Southern States have returned to their 
homes, after having enjoyed the pick of the shearing. Year after year the number of 
southerners increases, much to the detriment of local workers …… The position is becoming 
acute. 
It was ‘bad enough when local labour was employed’ but things had gotten much 
worse: 
Western towns have declined under its blighting effects, and there has been a steady drift of 
bushmen to the cities during recent years. The contract system has ably assisted centralization 
in the cities.82 
He wanted contracting declared illegal and district labour bureaus established to 
ensure local preference. It could be reinforced by building into the award provision ‘to 
pay fares actually expended’ by shearers from outside the district. The idea was that 
the obligation to pay fares would force employers to prefer local men. The cause was 
taken up by Randolph Bedford, a Labor member of the Queensland parliament, but no 
workable solutions were forthcoming. 
 
There were, in fact, no solutions, or at least none that the AWU could contemplate. 
Queensland’s problem was that its sheep population, although large, was stagnating. 
This had a debilitating effect on the towns of the pastoral belt. Like many of the towns 
                                                
80 The Worker (Brisbane), 30/10/1924, p. 17. 
81 The Worker (Brisbane), 30/10/1924, p. 14. Durkin was sympathetic to radical shearers groups in the 
1920s and ‘30s. See Chapter 7. 
82 The Worker (Brisbane), 16/10/1924, p. 10. 
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in the wheat belts of New South Wales and Victoria there was a significant rural 
labouring population, but with more limited employment opportunities. In 1920 
Queensland came under a more generous State Award which added to the flow of 
‘southerners’.
83
 The result in Queensland towns was a ‘chip on the shoulder’ sense of 
grievance - against graziers, against contractors, and against the world at large.    
 
Woolsheds of the Twentieth Century 
 
Despite widespread unease about contractors, money-making shearers benefited. The 
co-operatives hinted at by Bean were probably too much like socialism to work on a 
large scale. The whole point of contracting was that the farmer or the grazier could 
delegate complex arrangements to a specialist. The fundamentally hierarchical nature 
of shearing organisation could not easily accommodate communal decision making. 
Mateship bound shearers but the distinction between ‘boss’ and ‘worker’ remained.84 
Contract shearing needed an office to keep records, to co-ordinate applications. 
Arrangements had to be fine-tuned when the weather or breakdowns interrupted 
schedules. Shearers sometimes had to be dragged out of pubs. In the early days 
contractors also had to supply machines in many cases. Many bought a truck to 
transport shearers to the sheds. Clearly some capital and entrepreneurial ability was 
required. While a stake could be accumulated from a shearer’s earnings, an element of 
patronage from a wealthy grazier or commercial interests was helpful. Once 
established, many became inter-generational businesses. Despite the chain of 
command, relationships between the new contractors and shearers did not exactly 
replicate the old squatter-shearer divide. Very often shearers made the crucial step 
from employee to employer, and this gave them a ‘hands on’ familiarity with shearing 
culture. This was an important distinction from the older type of contracting business 
where supervisors were frequently wool-classers, or had backgrounds in pastoralism. 
Contractors increasingly considered this to be a disadvantage in handling shearers. 
For example, if the shearers were making a fuss about the machinery it was difficult 
to for a non-shearer to know whether the compliant was genuine. If the boss was an 
                                                
83 The origins of the Queensland Award are canvassed in Chapter 6. 
84 There is depicted in Sunday Too Far Away. The contractor for the shed was recently one of the 
shearing gang. He is in an awkward position when conflict develops between the shearers and the 
grazier, and has to distance himself from them. 
  149 
ex-shearer he could grab the handpiece and shear half a dozen to call their bluff.
85
  
Graziers were sometimes ex-shearers, but demarcation between employer and 
employee continued nonetheless.  
 
Contract shearing was not imposed on shearers by graziers or anyone else. Nor did 
union suspicion stall its advance. There is little evidence that pastoralist organisations 
instructed or otherwise cajoled their members to adopt it. Indeed, in the early days 
some influential graziers discouraged it. As the system expanded the graziers sought 
to corral it by establishing registration schemes, but many contractors survived 
without grazier approval. Grazier concerns that contractors could not discipline 
militant shearers were the mirror image of AWU fears that contracting was a squatter 
conspiracy. Both could not be right. In fact, the balance of power at the woolshed was 
more complex than most people thought. Interaction was not universally hostile. 
Shearers tended to go to the same sheds year after year, and an element of inter-
personal rapport often existed – less so perhaps at bigger sheds. 
                                                
85 SLV MS TMS 557-8, Patsy Adam-Smith interview with Laurie Walsh, 1978,  
  
 
SECTION III 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Arbitration System and its Enemies
Chapter 6: The Return of Instability and the Graziers’ Response 1916-23 
 
Calm before the Storm, 1907 to 1914 
 
Between 1907 and 1914 the shearing industry was encouragingly calm. The 
possibility that contracting was a reason this was not widely considered. The union 
credited arbitration and the 1907 award was heralded as a gigantic achievement. An 
illustration on the front page of The Worker to mark the historic watershed featured 
pastoral bliss with feminised characters quite incongruent with the real outback or 
mateship culture (see Figure 6-1).
1
 The award was updated in 1911 and, despite 
Thomas Waddell’s intemperate outburst, reasonably well accepted on both sides.2 
Justice Powers of the Arbitration Bench praised the union’s moderation and common 
sense in 1913. ‘For many years past disorganisation and conflicts between employers 
and employees in the great pastoral industry by strikes have not taken place.’3 Ted 
Grayndler, who had taken over as General Secretary after Tommy White died 
suddenly in 1912, told the 1913 Annual Conference: 
During the year the award has been firmly administered, and has worked satisfactorily as a 
whole, and only minor troubles, which are inevitable, were reported. The wet sheep trouble 
has been less in evidence, and there has been less friction than in any year of our history.4 
It helped that wool prices were firm and stock numbers rising.5 Uncharacteristically, 
the usually passive New Zealand sheds were reporting strife.6 It was not just union 
propaganda that times were prosperous. A sheep breeder was quoted at the Sydney 
Sheep Show: 
The pastoral industry continues in a flourishing condition. The season is propitious, and there 
is every prospect of a satisfactory lambing and wool yield. The prices for stock are high, and 
the outlook, generally, is very promising.7 
It was too good to last. Some years later the same Justice Powers sang from a 
different song sheet, chastising the AWU’s intemperate reaction to his award of 
1922.8  
                                                
1 The Worker, 23/7/1907, p. 1. 
2 See Chapter 3. 
3 The Worker, 22/4/1913, p. 19. 
4 The Worker, 29/1/1913, p. 3. 
5 The Worker published a table showing wool prices 75 per cent higher in 1907 than they had been in 
1891, more than fully recovered from a 20 per cent drop between 1891 and 1894. The Worker, 
4/7/1907, p. 17; 20/7/1913, p. 1. For wool production, The Worker, 1/10/1913, p. 2. 
6 The Worker, 2/7/1913, p. 1. 
7 The Worker, 9/7/1913, p. 1 
8 Union officials called it an ‘outrage’ and several of them were heavily fined for ‘inciting strikes’. 
SMH, 19/5/1922, p. 11. See below for 1922 strike. 
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Figure 6-1: Worker Front Page July 2007 
 
 
  153 
The AWU was aggressively expanding into other fields such as mining and transport.
9
 
There was now a machine-like efficiency to the network of shed organisers. Officials 
visited all the larger sheds on an annual rotation, and a fair share of the smaller ones. 
They spread union doctrine and ruthlessly signed up members. ‘Shirkers’ who refused 
tickets were berated with lectures on mateship.10 W.G. Spence’s two books were 
published in this period.11 Union rhetoric harped on about ‘the squatters’, how rich 
they were and how badly they treated pastoral workers, but this was largely a habit. 
Shearers shamed or coerced into joining were not necessarily taken in by the ‘great 
union’ mateship myth, but AWU membership had a practical side. The award was 
popular and graziers generally did not dispute it. Moreover, there was a collegiality 
amongst shearers largely independent of the AWU. In a sense, though, it bound them 
to it. 
 
Graziers observed AWU expansion with disquiet, but old-guard tirades from Waddell 
and W.E. Abbott were unrepresentative of shifting opinion. In any case they were 
partly directed at claims for station hands and farm labourers for an award. This did 
disturb graziers and farmers, but unionisation of shearers was grudgingly 
acknowledged as a fait accomplis and perhaps for the best. A resurgent AWU and the 
shift to arbitration perpetuated the need for graziers to be organised. Pastoralists were 
first stirred to organisation in the 1890s when shearing unionism mushroomed. The 
‘pastoralist unions’ were now morphing into the ‘graziers associations’ of the 
twentieth century, as the name change of the NSW body indicated.12 They had to be 
able to present their side of the argument through the Court’s legal rituals of 
presenting evidence and cross-examining witnesses. It was a more civilised way of 
resolving class warfare than setting fire to woolsheds, and secreting ‘scab’ shearers 
past pickets in the dead of night under police escort, but irredeemably adversarial 
nonetheless.
13
 Some of the old ‘squatter versus shearer’ feeling was preserved in 
woolshed culture despite the moderating influence of closer settlement, and also 
contracting. 
                                                
9 Hearn and Knowles, One Big Union, pp. 110-6. 
10 For almost a century The Worker carried the ‘Bushworkers’ Budget’ segment in which organisers 
reported on their rounds of woolsheds. They are a chronicle of what was on their minds, both 
momentous and trivial. Indirectly, the moods of pastoral workers are also represented. 
11 Spence, Australia’s Awakening; W.G. Spence History of the A.W.U, The Worker Trustees, 1911. 
12 See Chapter 2. 
13 Waterhouse, Vision Splendid, pp. 109-11. 
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During World War I a number of factors disturbed the pond. Serious drought returned 
in 1914 and 1915 for the first time since 1902. Massive army enlistments depleted the 
workforce. The cumbersome procedures of the Arbitration Court used ‘the war’ to 
postpone award cases, while living costs were sharply inflated. From December 1916 
(when the 1911 Award should have expired) graziers benefited from a surprisingly 
generous bulk purchase agreement with the British Government. The whole 
Australian clip was to be assessed on the basis of a 15½ pence per lb average. Half the 
profits on resale were to be distributed back to woolgrowers, but graziers were not 
saddled with any prospective losses!  Most of the wool remained in store in Australia 
because of a shipping shortage, but growers received regular cheques based on 
assessed prices.14 On their own, these elements would have been enough to stir 
woolshed conflict, but the politics of the war, especially conscription, also energised 
the labour movement. Shearing sheds in pastoral districts became hot beds of 
discontent - less so in farming regions where local loyalties held sway over class envy 
and patriotism was taken for granted. 
 
Discontent was partly imported. The IWW (also known also as the ‘Wobblies’), had 
notable influences in Australia and New Zealand from about 1907. In Australian 
woolsheds the IWW seized on the militant streak in the bush union ethos with marked 
effect. The AWU no more welcomed this than graziers as it threatened its claim on 
pastoral worker loyalty and its carefully constructed commitment to arbitration. The 
recent MSU challenge from straight talking, no nonsense, money-making contract 
shearers had not conditioned the AWU for a revolt of this type. It had been axiomatic 
that mateship bound the more class conscious, discontented elements to bush 
unionism, as AWU rhetoric implied. In any case, who else had the organisation to 
make their protests effective? The fact that militant condemnation of AWU policies 
sounded eerily similar to past MSU propaganda contributed to the confusion. 
Agitators said that the AWU was more interested in politics and ‘fat salaries’ for 
officials than rank-and-file issues. The difference was that militants wanted ‘direct 
action’ whereas contract shearers had sought harmony and sane dialogue with the 
woolgrowers.15 The IWW was not likely to ambush the AWU with secret deals with 
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the squatters, but it brought organisational rigour to the AWU’s Left-wing. From the 
graziers’ perspective the proposition that arbitration would eliminate ‘shearing 
trouble’ was blown out of the water. However, rather than turn hostile to arbitration 
they became grimly determined to make shearers stick to its rules. This set the scene 
for renewed shearing conflict and a revival of the three-way test of strength that had 
seemed resolved. Graziers confronted a union movement once again split between 
moderate and militant constituents. 
 
Grazier and Farmer Factions 
 
Labour issues contributed to a narrowing of the old rift between squatters and 
selectors, but it did not disappear. Pestering strikes by wheat harvesters steered 
farmers towards the emerging anti-Labor Country Parties and rapprochement with 
their former enemies the wool graziers.16 As Tom Connors has shown, the 
compromise was less than fully consummated. Squatter-selector hatreds over land 
policy eased, but a grazier-farmer feud over price support and stabilisation schemes 
for primary products became the main contested ground in twentieth century rural 
politics. More fundamentally, it evolved out of the protection versus free trade 
differences of the Federation era and conflicting views on government intervention in 
economic affairs. Wheat growers, aligned to the Farmers and Settlers Association, 
were dogmatic supporters of wheat pooling and guaranteed prices. A fanatical faction 
with origins in Victoria, which Connors calls ‘the radical wheat growers’, drove 
farmers to seek government support.  Larger woolgrowers tended to stay in the 
Graziers Association which vetoed all such schemes for wool until the 1970s. 
Woolgrowers were, nonetheless, deeply split according to a grazier-farmer divide. 
Federally, the Australian Woolgrowers and Graziers Council (AWGC) was a creature 
of the graziers associations, vehemently opposed to intervention. The Australian Wool 
and Meat Producers Association (AWMPA) represented farmers who persisted in 
agitating for it. Within the Country Party these profound differences were papered 
over in a semblance of unity. Wool marketing aside, protectionists mostly determined 
policy.17 
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A critical factor keeping grazier-farmer differences in check was antagonism to 
Labor. In the 1890s selector hatred of the squatters had tended to spill over into 
sympathy for bush unionism, a process fuelled by selectors who were also shearers. 
Land taxes, a row in NSW over the threat to block conversion of leasehold into 
freehold, and attempts to unionise farm labour accelerated small farmer 
disillusionment.18 The ‘volunteer army’ of farmers from wheat districts who loaded 
trains and ships and hewed coal during the 1917 general strike viewed unions as 
grossly unpatriotic. In the matrix of sometimes conflicting loyalties to class and 
region shearers were touched by ‘countrymindedness’, even if most voted Labor.19 It 
was not unknown for farmers to vote Labor, or for Labor to hold rural parliamentary 
seats. One factor was the concentration of labourers in mining towns. Broken Hill is 
the outstanding example, and Donald Macdonell held the NSW seat of Cobar. Other 
rural Labor representation was more obviously based on selector support.20 By the 
1920s, however, notwithstanding some ongoing sympathy for underdogs, small 
farmers were often the most trenchant Labor-haters. Paradoxically, graziers were 
more likely to tolerate the AWU as a necessary inconvenience in shearing sheds, 
although this pragmatism did not extend to the Labor Party running the country. J.W. 
Allen, who served as the Graziers’ Association’s full-time General Secretary from 
1915 to 1948, shaped the character of the Association with canny and meticulous 
administration.21 A more nuanced interpretation of the stereotype of ‘ruling class’ 
power exercised by prominent graziers such as Sir Norman Kater and Sir Graham 
Waddell is warranted.22 Attitudes to shearers, the AWU, and the Arbitration Court 
were essentially pragmatic, governed by getting the shearing done without  disruption. 
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Events between 1915 and 1923 were crucial to the graziers’ view. Wrong footed by 
shearing shed unrest during World War I, much as the AWU was, they reconsidered 
strategy and tactics. The realisation that arbitration was not a panacea for industrial 
unrest energised Allen. It was a baptism of fire but he relished the challenge and the 
lessons proved valuable for the rest of his long career.   Graziers resolved to make the 
arbitration system work. They would argue aggressively for their interests in the 
Court. They could not expect to get everything they wanted, but were determined that 
awards would be adhered to. This was preferable to the unpredictability of shed by 
shed negotiation, frequent conflict and periodic violence. On retirement forty years 
later Allen remembered Thomas Waddell’s attack on Higgins in 1911 and the Judge’s 
indignation as a blast from the past. ‘There was a real old rumpus about that!’, he 
laughed.23 He did not always agree with the Court’s decrees either, but cultivated the 
art of being most respectful towards the judges that imposed them.  
 
Shearers and the IWW 
 
The itinerant roots of the IWW in America roughly paralleled those of Australian 
shearers and miners. The rambling nature of the wool industry, its large and highly 
unionised sheds, suited IWW methods of ‘boring from within’. Lacking a strongly 
organised industrial base of their own, militants operated within established unions 
instead of challenging them openly. The MSU had tried to establish a rival 
organisation and this contributed to its failure as the AWU identified its target and 
wore it down. There could be no significant success, however, without a plausible 
message for the grassroots. Rants on ‘speeding-up’ were unlikely to make much 
headway against the competitive instincts of shearers, but the traditional hatred of the 
‘squatter’ did carry genuine promise. It was crucial that AWU organisers in 
Longreach and Bourke had radical leanings and could touch these nerves in shearing 
culture. These minor officials were constantly feuding with union heavyweights in 
Brisbane and Sydney. The IWW made sense to them and they took its message into 
the pastoral regions of Queensland and western-NSW where the bushworker legend 
was most potent. The IWW was hardly noticed in ‘cocky sheds’ in Victoria.24  
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At the 1916 AWU Conference IWW sympathisers were amongst the delegates. A. 
McNaught from the Queensland Branch, who admitted freely that he was an IWW 
member, stood against Spence for President of the union and attracted surprising 
support. Spence, accustomed to being re-elected unopposed, was outpolled in the 
pastoral stronghold of Longreach by 3,063 to 2,645, and voting in the Western Branch 
of NSW was desperately close (2,080 for Spence, 2,042 for McNaught).
25
  Mick 
Kelly, an organiser based in Longreach, and Jack Cullinan from the Western Branch 
were amongst those supporting McNaught’s radical motions. One proposal asked that 
incumbent members of parliament should not be allowed to speak at the conference. 
Another demanded that petitions of members could challenge executive decisions. 
Yet another sought that all rule changes be subject to rank-and-file plebiscite. 
McNaught referred to a ‘star chamber bureaucracy for officials by officials’.26 W. 
McCormack (himself a member of the Queensland parliament, later Premier of the 
State) was dismissive. McNaught’s ideas were ‘catchy’, appealed mainly to ‘belly-
achers’ and mitigated against ‘leadership’.27 Radicals had no hope of success, but a 
pocket of determined dissent clearly existed. 
 
Having survived McNaught’s candidacy, Spence began his presidential address with a 
reference to the war, paying tribute to fallen AWU members who had ‘crossed the 
great border’. They had lost their lives ‘fighting the battle of liberty and justice in the 
interests of the Empire of which Australia [forms] a part’.28 Jingoism risked being out 
of step with rank-and-file sentiment, or even other AWU hard heads. Spence was a 
member of W.M Hughes’ Labor Government. When Labor split over conscription 
later in 1916 he defected with the pro-conscriptionists, in effect becoming a ‘Labor 
rat’. More in sorrow than anger, his colleagues required his resignation from the union 
he had helped found exactly thirty years earlier. Pro-Empire talk was certainly 
anathema to the IWW, and set the scene for their disgust at the rest of his speech 
which was a full-blown attack on its philosophy. ‘Apart from [our] common foe the 
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Pastoralists’ Union, there have been other mysterious forces at work’, he noted. This 
sounded a bit like one of  his past attacks on the defunct MSU, but once into his stride 
Spence displayed impressive familiarity with international socialism. He dismissed it, 
of course, as a ‘shibboleth’ and ‘economic lunacy’. Condemnation of the four or five 
renegades voting for McNaught’s motions was barely disguised.29  
 
Another McNaught proposal for the AWU to abandon arbitration for direct 
negotiation with the employers was vintage IWW dogma, a blatant assault on 
fundamental AWU belief. Such abject heresy was usually curtly ruled out of order, 
but a long and largely measured debate ensued. Perhaps AWU realists sensed unrest 
amongst shearers and felt the arguments for arbitration needed reinforcing. John 
Barnes relived the history of the 1890s recalling that the 1894 strike had almost 
‘knocked [us] out’, the membership declining from 23,000 to a mere 8,000. To 
abandon arbitration would be ‘folly’. Times had changed sufficiently, and he 
maintained that it was ‘easier for [us] to capture the political machine than to allow 
the boss to do it’.30 It was hardly surprising that Barnes held such views. He was a 
Senator of the Commonwealth and Labor was in power federally and in NSW. Before 
the end of the year, however, Labor split over conscription and its loyal remnants 
formed dispirited Oppositions.  
 
Ernie Lane, younger brother of the radical polemicist of the 1890s, William Lane, had 
an insider’s view of the tension within the AWU. 
There was a virile militant minority of delegates at the first Queensland delegate meeting in 
1914 since the amalgamation, who were opposed to the Arbitration system, strenuous 
advocates of industrial immersion on a definite working class basis who viewed with 
misgivings the growing dominance of the politicians.31  
The amalgamation was the absorption of the Amalgamated Workers’ Association 
(AWA) into the AWU. The AWA was a north Queensland bush union of ‘miners, 
sugar workers and labourers’, many of whom were itinerant and this was one source 
of IWW influence.32 Officials in the pastoral region contributed to ‘the growing 
power of the militant section’. Lane specifically nominated Kelly and Cullinan.
33
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Kelly, a fine speaker and capable organiser, always secured a big militant vote for delegate 
meetings and conventions. In debate he could more than hold his own with the AWU ‘big 
guns’ by whom he was regarded as a very dangerous man.34 
Jack Cullinan, Secretary of the Western Branch of NSW, was known for his 
‘pugnacious militancy, unshakable adherence to principle, and hatred of the intrigue 
and trickery of the AWU heads’.
35
 Jack Durkin was another thorn in the side of the 
AWU hierarchy. He was an AWU organiser in 1916, promoted in the 1920s, expelled 
in 1924, and a prominent supporter of the PWIU in the 1930s.36  
 
Five votes (out of 21) for McNaught’s anti-arbitration resolution at the 1916 
Conference showed that the IWW power base was limited, although its popularity in 
the pastoral districts that Kelly, Cullinan and Durkin hailed from was hard to deny. 
The Labor Party’s disintegration over conscription only reinforced the radical 
instinct.37A strong feature of IWW ideology was that parliaments and arbitration 
courts were a waste of time and workers had to engage the enemy at the point of 
production. Given the power that shearers sensed over defenceless squatters with 
sheep mustered - Bean’s ‘undercurrents’ - it was an idea that resonated in hot and 
grimy woolsheds, and in the evenings sitting around squalid shearing quarters far 
from home comforts - debating the war, squatters’ guaranteed prices, the cost of life’s 
essentials, or whatever else cropped up.38  
 
Queensland Strikes, 1916 and 1917 
 
The initial rumblings of protest in Queensland shearing towns in February and March 
of 1916 were barely noticed in the city. W.G. Spence, though, was aware of it and had 
already attacked militants at the January Conference. The AWU arrogantly declared 
that a detailed case for the Arbitration Court was in preparation and shearers should 
patiently wait for the new award. There was talk in the sheds that they had waited 
long enough. In late-March and early-April the restive mood took concrete form.
39
 A 
meeting at Winton on 13 April despatched a telegram to AWU headquarters detailing 
grievances. The leaders dodged a face to face meeting with shearers, suggesting the 
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men go back to work. Emphatically, no financial assistance for a strike would be 
available. Obviously concerned, pastoralists sought a special conference with the 
AWU, which was rejected on more or less the same grounds given to the shearers – 
the Arbitration Court would look after it. Another meeting at Hughenden Hotel 
(‘attended by about 100 men’) was presided over by Alick Short, described in the 
Brisbane Courier as a ‘union delegate’. Not according to the AWU hierarchy!  ‘Short 
has no authority from the AWU to stop men from going to any shed. The union is 
advising men to accept the present award.’40 This was wired to the dissidents by R. 
Bow, District Secretary in Longreach. Bow himself had some sympathy with the men, 
but the prudent course in the meantime was to reiterate official warnings against 
direct action.  
 
A large open air meeting took place at Charleville on the west bank of the Warrego 
River. There was a mood of solidarity, and a taste for action. AWU officials ‘took no 
part’, and ‘later announced that they considered the men ill-advised in their action.’ 
Shortly afterwards Bill Dunstan, Secretary of the Queensland Branch, toured the west 
to explain the AWU’s position.41 The Courier reported that Ted Grayndler, the 
General Secretary based in Sydney, wired all district secretaries to say discussions 
with pastoralists had now occurred and it had been agreed that the ‘AWU will not 
countenance any alteration of the existing rates until the award expires’.42 J.W. Allen, 
as Secretary of the Graziers Federal Council, tried to pressure Grayndler into wiring 
the strikers directly, but Grayndler thought better of it. The last thing he was going to 
do was arm rebels with a telegram they could wave at meetings of rowdy shearers as 
living proof of AWU spinelessness. Gratuitously, he told Allen there was plenty of 
information published in The Worker outlining union policy and he could not be held 
responsible for what individuals chose to do. Surprisingly, Grayndler released the 
correspondence which was not very flattering, but it underlines how urgently he felt 
the need to be seen to be doing something.43  
 
The dispute centred on a demand for 32/6 per hundred, significantly above the 
prevailing award rate of 24/-. Rouseabouts were seeking 50/- per week rather than the 
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award rate of 37/6. According to one report rouseabouts were ‘disgusted’ because, as 
far as they were concerned, shearers were already paid plenty, but this may have been 
misinformation.44 Clearly there was grassroots support for the demands, but who or 
what gave them focus and cohesion? It emerged that Mick Kelly was the key speaker 
at meetings.45 One of Kelly’s speeches was reported in a fair bit of detail. It provided 
a comprehensive history of shearing rates and previous awards. Essentially, Kelly was 
arguing a case similar to the one the AWU would take to the Court. Taking the cost of 
living and other factors into account, shearers were no better off in 1916 than they had 
been in 1891. He spoke strongly against any notion of a breakaway from the AWU 
and claimed that ‘the organisation never stood stronger’. It was not the speech of a 
revolutionary, beyond invoking the spirit of the men from the Broken Hill mine who 
had recently been able to get the Arbitration Court to act more promptly by 
threatening direct action.46 Kelly was a bush unionist frustrated by the leadership’s 
conservatism. This was driving him into the embrace of the IWW, which was at least 
taking him seriously. Courier reports gave no hint of IWW links. Kelly resigned from 
the AWU as the strike crystallised.47 
 
The strike spread quickly. Graziers had sent sheep to the Darling Downs on 
agistment. Indeed there was little trouble getting shearers to work in selector country 
surrounding Toowoomba and Dalby and some western graziers realised they could 
escape their predicament this way.
48
 By the beginning of May there was little shearing 
taking place from Cunnamulla all the way to Cloncurry. There were scattered reports 
of shearing at above award rates but in the main graziers were still trying to stand 
firm. Losses of stock weakened their resolve but it was some time before they realised 
that it was pointless negotiating with the AWU. They were further hampered by 
internal divisions. The Northern and Central branch of the Pastoralists Association 
was not co-ordinating tactics with the South Western branch.  
 
Under constant pressure from Allen, Grayndler tried to end the deadlock. With 
Spence in tow, he travelled by train to Rockhampton to meet representatives of the 
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strikers. Rockhampton was a compromise location to save a day’s travel inland, but 
the AWU leaders may well have been steering clear of Barcaldine and Longreach, 
towns full of idle shearers. Facing a handful of militant spokesmen was preferable to a 
hostile mob. The meeting, attended by 29 representatives from the various districts on 
Thursday 18 May 1916, was held behind closed doors. It went on all day and into the 
night, with reporters waiting outside. All they got was a stony faced statement from 
Spence that there was ‘nothing to report beyond the fact that the position of the union 
had been placed before the men’s representatives’. In fact, Spence and Grayndler had 
been rolled. A committee of three was formed to communicate the men’s decisions to 
the pastoralists. Arrangements were made for an office to be set up in Barcaldine to 
conduct the committee’s affairs. The AWU was to stay out of it.49 
 
Newspapers cottoned on that the dispute was ‘not so much a difference with 
employers as a breakaway from the AWU’.50 Apart from Kelly and the Barcaldine 
committee, no names were mentioned. The graziers now grasped that the AWU was 
not in charge, and things happened more quickly. The parties went through the façade 
of a conference involving the AWU and the Graziers Federal Council with Justice 
Higgins taking the credit for brokering a rate of 27/- per 100 sheep, but this was 
window dressing. At the end of May the Northern and Central branches of the 
Pastoralists’ Association cabled Barcaldine offering a settlement at 27/- per 100 for 
shearing, and 50/- per week for rouseabouts (these were the same figures as the 
Higgins’ ‘compromise’).51 It transpired that the settlement had really been brokered 
by a shearing contractor named Thomas Duffy acting as a neutral intermediary. Duffy 
was able to make all sides aware of the ‘commercial loss and suffering caused to the 
community’ and a formal certificate was drawn up to ‘settle the trouble in an amicable 
manner’. Within a few days the offer was accepted. The South Western branch had 
little alternative but to follow suit and the strike was over.
52
  
 
It was a significant victory for militants, a serious embarrassment for the AWU, and 
for the graziers a very sobering experience. Higgins role was only token. The 
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contribution of Duffy should not be underestimated. It was a sign that commonsense 
could temper IWW radicalism. The clumsiness of the arbitration system rather than 
class hatred created a situation which gave militants traction, although social 
conditions in the towns were also factors. The AWU and the grazier bodies were 
hidebound by arbitration in ways that contractors were not. Contractors got the blame 
for not sticking to the award or for encouraging militants, even when commonsense 
suggested that the award defied market reality and was playing into militants’ hands.  
 
J.W. Allen represented the Federal Council, but the real reason he took a close interest 
was that the NSW shearing was imminent. Militants held a meeting in Bourke some 
time in May and resolved to demand above award payments. Shortly afterwards 
another meeting, this time stacked with AWU loyalists, passed a vote of confidence in 
the AWU and reversed the strike decision. More ominously, a meeting at Boorooma 
station near Walgett on 18 June 1916 voted to strike. By mid-August there had been 
agitation at Narrabri, Gunnedah, Barraba, and as far away as Bourke.
53
 
 
Not long afterwards a fiery meeting was held in Sydney. Who organised it is unclear, 
but the Trades Hall location rather than Macdonell House (AWU headquarters) points 
to the IWW. It had the mark of ‘AWU-Rank-and-File’ gatherings which became a 
thorn in the side of the official AWU in the 1920s.54 The meeting aimed to bind 
shearers into striking if NSW graziers did not pay 30/- a hundred. The AWU had wind 
of it and the meeting was stacked with loyalists including two organisers, Arthur and 
Breen, who knew how meetings worked. The resolution for 30/- was inevitable in the 
circumstances. Even the graziers were resigned to this after Queensland, although 
Allen went through the motions of insisting that shearing be done at award rates. 
Arthur succeeded in moving an amendment to the ‘30/- resolution’, lavishly praising 
the AWU and voting confidence in its leaders. This was too much for those running 
the meeting and the chairman closed it amidst shouting and disarray.55  
 
NSW shearing in 1916 took place without major disturbance, but only because 
graziers recognised that the award was unenforceable. The AWU claim was finally 
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heard and the Higgins Award of 1917 reset shearing rates at 30/- from 28 June 1917.
56
 
This was barely in time for the 1917 shearing season in NSW. Early shearing in 
Queensland was long over and had endured two full seasons without a realistic award. 
Had there not been a strike in 1916 it is doubtful whether the machinery would have 
operated even this quickly. The AWU’s request for patience in early 1916 had been 
thoroughly unconvincing. In his usual pedantic fashion Higgins went into detailed 
argument about how the new award had been calculated, but it was meeting the 
market. Graziers complained but most were already paying 30/- for shearing.57  
 
In 1917 shearing in Queensland was again disrupted for a protracted period between 
July and September, this time by shed hands. Again the hand of the IWW was present. 
Content with their 1916 triumph, shearers were not anxious to support the lowly shed 
hands, but they drifted down to NSW where there was plenty of shearing.58 Unable to 
find shearers anyway, graziers stood firm. A few militants encouraged shed hands to 
dig in.
59
 The result was tragic as they did not have the resources for a long siege. The 
lack of wage circulation told heavily on the local shopkeepers. Train travellers 
described desperate men at Jericho who had walked from Barcaldine. They were 
‘begging for tucker’ and ‘absolutely stony broke’, unable to get work because the 
strike had shut everything down.60 Queensland towns were eerily quiet. Locals had 
gone to the Exhibition in Brisbane while shed hands and a few remaining shearers 
were holed up in camps on the fringes. There were suggestions that secret ballots 
might nullify mateship pressure, but this never occurred. The AWU attempted to 
defuse the situation, approaching the Court to get the 44 hours provision brought into 
the award, but the Court was not interested. Ted Grayndler almost sounded like a 
pastoralist when he blamed the dispute on a ‘few “red raggers”’, and even had the gall 
to suggest that ‘if the pastoralists had stood a little more firm last year, when they 
conceded 44 hours without consulting the AWU, it would have been better for 
them’!61   
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On this occasion woolgrowers were standing firm. The twenty-seventh annual 
meeting of the United Pastoralists and Grazing Farmers Association of Queensland62 
was held during the first week of August, as the strike was getting serious. If the 
President, Arthur Whittingham, had heard of Grayndler’s gratuitous insult he ignored 
it, stating unequivocally that AWU policy should be followed. The backhander to the 
AWU came in his sarcastic rebuke to advocates of arbitration who claimed that it 
would eliminate strikes. ‘As a matter of fact’, he said, ‘industrial legislation seems to 
have had the effect of developing a spirit of revolution against law and order, and of 
setting class against class’.63 The graziers did not blink this time, and desperate 
strikers slowly caved in. By the beginning of September a few sheds were able to 
start, but heavy rain in mid-September again delayed things.64 In any case there were 
few shearers left in the state, and graziers had to wait until the NSW sheds finished 
before they began to straggle north again, to clip the Queensland fleeces. 
 
The tragic fate of the rouseabouts in 1917 notwithstanding, a new militancy was in the 
air. Another meeting of rebels at Trades Hall in Sydney in 1917 discussed tactics for 
the next season. An AWU man managed to get hold of details of the ‘strike 
committee's’ expenditure in NSW in 1916. Nearly £1000 of donations came from 
other unions (including £250 from ‘Broken Hill Unions’). The largest source of 
donations, over £560, came from shearing sheds, and the rest from money collected in 
country towns and from individuals. Most of the money had been collected in 
northern and western NSW, although a significant amount - roughly £150 - had come 
from central-western Queensland.65 These are significant amounts of money, but 
contrary to The Worker's accusatory stance, they hardly suggest that militants were 
rolling in money. Some £240 spent on wages in one or two months suggests an active 
organising effort. Perhaps six or seven full time organisers on a modest wage had 
been operating for a couple of months in NSW. Queensland grazing selectors were 
‘irritated’ that larger pastoralists had given in too easily.66 Key thinkers amongst the 
graziers realised they also needed to beef up their own solidarity. 
 
                                                
62 This was an organisation of smaller growers and farmers, many from the Darling Downs.  
63 Brisbane Courier, 9/8/1917, pp. 8. 
64 Brisbane Courier, 4/9/1917, p. 8; 5/9/1917, p. 8; 6/9/1917, p. 8; 7/9/1917, p. 8; 8/9/1917, p. 6; 
10/9/1917, p. 8; 11/9/1917, p. 7; 12/9/1917, p. 8; 13/9/1917, p. 8; 14/9/1917, p. 6; 17/9/1917, p. 6. 
65 The Worker, 18/1/1917, p. 19. 
66 Ruth Kerr, Freedom of Contract,  p. 51. 
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The Graziers’ Co-operative Shearing Company (Grazcos) 
 
The contractors’ achievement had been to rationalise complex shearing logistics, 
helping to soothe the anxieties of graziers while easing the frustrations of shearers. 
Arbitration was making a reasonable fist of weighing tricky arguments about the 
fairness of pay and conditions. However, the 1916 strike convinced some graziers it 
was not enough.  
Contractors as a body, are a source of weakness rather than strength as the rivalry between 
them is not in the owners interest, so that it is desirable in the future we should secure control 
of the shearing through our own organisation.67 
They felt contractors too easily gave in to militancy. Contractors were bound by their 
agreements with graziers and earned respect (and therefore repeat business) on the 
basis that they could find shearers and control their moods. However, faced with a 
contractor out of his depth, graziers reluctantly agreed to concessions. This was not 
necessarily fair comment, because it was not done lightly, but it is what graziers 
believed. This was the exact opposite of what the AWU thought. In unionist eyes 
contractors were ruthless agents of the grazier class. It was also false, because shearer 
loyalty was an important factor in a contractor’s viability. 
 
NSW graziers decided to form their own cooperative shearing company, which 
opened for business in 1919. Corresponding initiatives occurred in Queensland and 
South Australia, but not Victoria.68 Victorian shearing occurred mostly in October and 
November, later than other regions, and strikes were less problematic. Nonetheless, 
the success of the Graziers’ Co-operative Shearing Company impressed Victorian 
graziers and they lobbied for the company to establish a separate office in Melbourne 
in 1923.
69
 While there is no record of inter-state consultation, the need for grazier 
control of shearing must have been much discussed at the Graziers’ Federal Council.70  
 
The NSW service was offered only to Graziers Association members, who were asked 
to support it by offering their shearing contracts. Members were also leaned on to 
                                                
67 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company Minutes, 1/3/1920. W.F. Jacques at the inaugural Annual General 
Meeting in 1920. 
68These were the United Graziers Shearing Company (UNGRA) in Queensland, and the Stockowners 
Co-operative Shearing Company in South Australia. 
69 Randell, Teamwork, pp. 50-1; ABL, Z278, Shearing Company Minutes, 14/8/1922; 23/10/1922; 
15/1/1923. 
70 There is some discussion of the Queensland initiative in Ruth Kerr, Freedom of Contract, p. 51. 
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stump up capital for shares, although the Executive drew back from making this 
compulsory. The company expected to pay its way but orderly shearing, not profit, 
was its primary purpose. Dividends would be paid out of cash surpluses but shares 
could not be traded. There was to be no question of competing against private 
contractors by quoting prices for contracts – indeed the founders believed that 
competition was the reason for their problems. Stations were to be charged on a ‘cost-
plus’ formula. Costs were calculated strictly on award terms, with a fixed 
management charge added.71 Not by any means was it a text book example of liberal 
capitalism. Grazier class solidarity was countering shearers’ mateship, especially in its 
most virulent form.  
 
The venture vaguely resembled office engagement, at least in spirit, but for both 
commercial and political reasons it was deemed prudent to keep the Graziers 
Association at arms length. Victoria’s labour bureau was explicitly rejected as a 
working model.
72
  Technically, shareholders were individual graziers rather than the 
Graziers’ Association, although the capital structure was later altered to a 
cooperative.73 Communication with the Graziers’ Association was deliberately 
formal, but informal familiarities also governed the relationship. Directors often 
served jointly on both Boards, and meetings in Sydney were often on the same day.  
 
If the motivation was ‘political’ it lacked the cloak and dagger, conspiratorial flavour 
that had dogged the MSU 15 years earlier. One of its objectives was to bolster the 
ranks of the Graziers Association. At the same time the ‘members only’ rule meant 
that it could not displace private contractors, but there was a presumption that by 
disciplined example, it would keep them up to the mark. With Graziers Association 
membership as a captive market it quickly became the dominant shearing company in 
the State, capturing about 10 percent of shearing in NSW within a few seasons.
74
 The 
cutting edge of the expansion of contracting was already shifting to operators located 
in country towns, but the Graziers Company to an extent preserved Sydney’s role as 
the centre of gravity of shearing administration.
75
 
                                                
71 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company Minutes 24/3/1919; 9/2/1920. 
72 ABL, E256/1647, ‘Recollections’, p. 11 
73 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company Minutes, 23/10/1922; 14/10/1924. 
74 ABL Z278. Company Minutes record total sheep shorn per annum 
75 ABL, Z278.  Shearing Company Minutes from 1919 until the 1960s. 
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In its inaugural season the Shearing Company advertised for shearers in the Sydney 
Morning Herald, the Daily Telegraph, and ‘principal country newspapers’, but The 
Worker refused the request for space ‘without comment’.
76
 It made no editorial 
comment on what must have been a widely discussed development. Probably the 
ghost of the MSU frightened the AWU into a defensive reaction, although The 
Brisbane Worker  carried a letter announcing the formation of UNGRA. It was written 
by J.M. Yates – the former Young’s manager last heard of in 1907 giving evidence 
for Federal Shearing.77 He was appointed manager of the Queensland co-operative. 
Yates explained that the ‘aims and policy’ of the company (similar to its NSW cousin) 
were ‘to prevent any misunderstanding among the members of the AWU’, and it was 
dedicated to ‘amicable relations’ with shearers and providing runs of sheds. It was an 
honest statement but few unionists believed it. 
 
At the 1927 award case, the manager R.C. Wilson provided a detailed picture of how 
the Shearing Co-operative functioned. ‘If a man came into a shed and shore one sheep 
his name would be on our cards’, Wilson explained. It enabled the Company to locate 
and look after the fastest and most competent shearers. In 1926 the Company used 
1,706 shearers. Wilson knew where they came from, how often they had shorn with 
the Company, and had a report on each from the overseer. About half of these did 
only one shed with the Company (although Wilson pointed out that they may have 
done sheds before or after with other contractors). Some did as many as seven or 
eight.
78
 Meticulous records fed a union view that secret blacklists were kept, but for 
the most part it was merely sensible management, as much in the interests of shearers 
as the Company.79 It was also, however, a convenient means of identifying militants. 
 
Grazing regions of NSW and Victoria were divided into districts on a colour coded 
map which designated the months of the shearing season. The Company’s shearing 
teams followed the shearing rotation – in July sheds were yellow (the north-west), 
August was blue, ending up in Victoria (coloured brown) in November. Each shed 
had a spot on the map, and indicated the number of shearers it would require. Wilson 
                                                
76 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company Minutes, 24/3/1919. 
77 See Chapter 4. 
78 NAA, B1958/10, Transcript of 1927 Pastoral Award Case, Vol. 1, pp. 283-342. 
79 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company Minutes, 24/3/1925; 7/4/1925. 
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was able to sit in his office in Sydney and receive wires from his overseers about 
progress, estimate when teams would be free for their next assignment, and redeploy 
them from the blue zone into the red or green as they were required.80 It was like a 
military operation, designed to make the best use of shearers when they were 
available. The company aimed to spread sheds as evenly as it could over the five or 
six months of the main shearing season, although grazier preferences meant that there 
was always considerable bunching in August and September. During World War II 
shearing starts were regulated by a government zoning system introduced because of 
the chronic shortage of shearers. R.C. Wilson was appointed to run it, but when the 
war ended graziers returned to their favourite shearing times. 
 
Once the union got used to the idea The Worker frequently carried Grazcos 
advertising and notices, but editorially it was often criticized. Like the AWU itself, 
Grazcos was quickly integrated into the social and cultural networks of rural NSW. 
The possibility of regular sheds and a pathway to eight million sheep meant that, love 
it or hate it, few shearers could afford not to be on the Company books.81  
 
There was a final twist to the 1919 debut which may have explained The Worker’s 
snub. John Young, the pioneer of contract shearing and infamous figure behind the 
MSU, agreed to come out of retirement to get the Company onto an operational 
footing. He was paid a large salary, £1,500 per annum. Once again he was embroiled 
in rosters of sheds and confronting unionists.82 As shearing was getting into full swing 
in August 1919 he sensed the testy moods of shearers. He told the board:  
...judging from my experience during the past month of the state of the labour market, you 
have not formed this company a day too soon. I find the condition of the labour market almost 
in a worse position to-day than it was twenty five years ago when wages were one half.83 
The 1920 season in NSW was seriously disrupted by strikes.84 The season was not 
quite over, but the crisis had been weathered when Young asked the board if he could 
leave his post a few weeks early to catch the boat to England, a customary practice of 
                                                
80 NAA, B1958/10, Transcript of 1927 Pastoral Award Case, Vol. 1, pp. 283-342. 
81 In 1924 the Company established a parallel wool sorting and handling operation which adopted the 
brand name ‘GRAZCOS’. The Company became colloquially known as Grazcos. In 1948 the name 
was formally changed to the Grazcos Shearing Company. It was sold as a going concern to Dalgety & 
Co in 1985. The shearing department was subject to a management buyout and became National 
Shearing Services, based in Dubbo.  At the time of writing the company still exists in this form. 
82 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company Minutes, 24/3/1919; Brisbane Worker, 22/1/1920, p. 16. 
83 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company Minutes, 11/8/1919. 
84 See below. 
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the grazier class in the inter-war period. The board readily agreed and recorded a 
‘very hearty vote of thanks to Mr J.H. Young for his able management of the 
Company since its inception.’85  This understated the profound gratitude these hard 
bitten graziers felt for one of wool’s greatest warriors. 
 
The Queensland Award & Strikes in 1920, 1922  
 
The obvious success of direct action in 1916 did not warrant abandoning arbitration. 
For the time being the 1917 Award was working. However, the Queensland Branch of 
the AWU had been rattled by IWW influence in its western sheds. The industry 
limped through 1918 and 1919, but as John Young’s comments indicated, tension was 
building. Labor swept into office in Queensland in 1915 and new arbitration 
legislation offered a lifeline for the AWU Branch.86 If a State shearing award could be 
secured, Queensland shearers might escape the perceived tyranny of the 
Commonwealth Award.
87
 This was a doubtful proposition legally, because it had to be 
established that disputes were exclusively Queensland affairs. Whatever this  implied 
for Queensland graziers, it was potentially a nightmare for those elsewhere. J. W. 
Allen recoiled in horror at the thought of fighting strikes in northern-NSW if the 
award just over the border was higher. Consequently he was aghast when the UGA, 
panicked by 1916 and 1917, met the judge in chambers and advised him that they had 
no objection to a separate Queensland Award. This eventuated in 1920. ‘Queensland 
rates’ were fixed at 40/- per hundred, considerably more than the Commonwealth 
Award of 30/-. 
 
Predictably, the 1920 NSW shearing was disrupted. The wider labour movement was 
striving to have the 48-hour week abolished in favour of 44-hours.88 The NSW 
Branches of the AWU felt a need to trump the Queensland achievement. Short-
circuiting the pedestrian process of logging a claim via the Court, the union sought a 
                                                
85 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company Minutes, 1/11/1919, 29/11/1919. 
86 For background on the Industrial Arbitration Act of 1916, Barbara Webster, ‘A “Cosy relationship” 
If You Had It: Queensland Labor’s Arbitration System and Union Organising Strategies in 
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87 Tsokhas, ‘Power, Law and Conflict’, p. 227. 
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conference with the graziers to press for 45/- (a healthy premium on the recent 
Queensland award) and a 44-hour week. The shearing season in northern-NSW was 
already beginning. The graziers avoided such conferences if they could, but the union 
was obviously in a strong position. It was quite a gathering, held in Melbourne on 6 
July 1920. Arthur Blakeley and Ted Grayndler attended for the AWU, but also the 
Presidents and Secretaries of the three regional offices directly involved. The Graziers 
Associations of NSW, West Darling, Victoria, and South Australia provided two 
delegates each.89 The 45/- was an ambit claim and a settlement at the ‘Queensland’ 
level of 40/- was achieved. J.W. Allen felt that some resistance should at least be 
demonstrated, and stubbornly refused to follow the other associations’ acceptance of 
the 44-hour week. Having driven a wedge between the graziers, the AWU response 
was public and combative. 
The AWU stands for constitutional methods, but as the rates claimed and awarded in 1917 are 
totally inadequate for 1920, it [is] impossible to expect members to remain satisfied and 
contented to work…. 
A further conference was scheduled for 15 July, but Ted Grayndler made it very plain 
that ‘a complete settlement, so far as NSW at least is concerned, is remote’.90 
   
Allen persisted. The legendary J.H. Young was still in charge of the Shearing 
Company, in only its second season of operation, and stood ready to keep both 
shearers and grazier clients in line. But the pressure was irresistible, and neither 
Allen’s protestations nor the logistical strengths of the Shearing Company could 
persuade wavering woolgrowers to hold the line. The Graziers Association was 
mocked by a series of cartoons and articles in The Worker. One of these showed a 
donkey labelled the ‘Graziers’ Ass of NSW’ (pun obviously intended) crashing head 
first into an impenetrable ‘44-hours’ brick wall. Another showed a map of Australia in 
which there was only one black corner of grazier intransigence. Employment of 
Aborigines by one station inspired Henry Boote to pen a tasteless ‘Blackfellows to the 
Rescue!’ editorial.
91
 The Grazing Company did hold out with some success. Of 54 
sheds and almost 900,000 sheep it handled in 1920, 25 were conducted on a 48-hour 
week. Of the remainder 12 were in ‘44-hour districts’ and 17 were conducted on a 44-
                                                
89 Norman Kater was one of those representing NSW. 
90 The Worker, 8/7/1920, p. 7; 15/7/1920, p. 17. 
91 The Worker, 29/7/1920, p. 3; 5/8/1920, p3; 2/9/1920, p. 3. 
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hour basis ‘at the owner’s request’.
92
 However, this was a fraction of perhaps 20 
million sheep in the contested region, and most contractors conceded the 44-hours 
with grazier compliance. Kosmas Tsokhas concluded that the 1920 strike was another 
union success.
93
 
 
The Shearing Company received letters of appreciation from some clients, but was 
not amused by the reaction of others. The owners of Collaroy station (one of those 
caving in to the union) refused to pay the ½ pence per sheep management charge. The 
Company solicitors were instructed to take whatever legal action was required to 
secure payment and retrieve costs. John Young was as mortified by the outcome as 
J.W. Allen. With the wool market shaky due to the overhang of wartime stocks, Allen 
was determined to steer shearing back to the relative sanity of arbitration. Between 
them they realised that they would have to stiffen the resolve of their members (who 
were also clients) to beat future strikes. Young retired but his successor, Clarence 
Spier, had worked for the Company since the beginning as its ‘labour manager’ and 
was up to the job. He said 1920 had been a ‘strenuous fight’ and devised better 
procedures for the next season. These included closer liaison with local secretaries of 
the Graziers’ Association to schedule shearing starts ‘so that sheds may follow one 
another’ and to reassure waverers. The Company resolved to stick rigidly to award 
conditions, whatever they were. It would prosecute any shearers who refused to shear 
after signing agreements. The Graziers Association agreed that it would refund the 
Company for any additional ‘strike expenses’ incurred in the process of carrying out 
this policy. It had an authoritarian flavour, not unlike the mateship that the AWU 
expected of its members!
94
  
 
The 1921 season was additionally complicated by floods which seriously disturbed 
scheduled starting times in the north-west, and stations became impatient. By the 
beginning of September about half the sheds on the Company’s order book had 
managed to get a start, but many had postponed twice and some three times due to the 
weather. Before the season got underway it was agreed that the 40/- would be 
continued, although well above award rates. However, they would hold out for the 48-
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hour week ‘at as many sheds as possible’.
95
 Eighteen out of 25 sheds were shearing 
48-hours, while there had been a genuine strike at only two. One of the 44-hour sheds 
was Egelabra, the merino stud owned by Norman Kater. No-one suggested that he 
was breaking ranks on fellow graziers, but it is indicative of the difficulties 
involved.96 By December, with only a handful of sheds still to finish, the company 
had shorn 45 sheds at 48-hours and at only 24 was 44-hours conceded. Tighter 
management had led to a better outcome than 1920. In only its third season the 
Company was shearing more than one million sheep. What happened with other 
contractors can only be guessed at but most probably shore 44-hour weeks. Overall, 
Spier was pleased with the outcome. The assistance from local secretaries in the 
difficult ‘Northern part of the State’ had worked well.97 However, it was an 
unsatisfactory position because 40/- - ‘Queensland rates’ – was far in excess of the 
designated Commonwealth Award. Although this had been agreed to in conference, 
the Company depended on an enforceable award as its legal lever. Moreover, the 
signs were that the effort to hold the line on conceding 44-hours was not working. 
 
In 1922 the resolve of the graziers faced a more exacting test. The still fragile wool 
price convinced the Graziers Association to try to resolve the ambiguity over the 
shearing award.98 Perhaps it had left it too long, because although the award was 
theoretically still fixed at the 1917 level of 30/- per 100, shearers had been getting 
‘Queensland rates’ for two full seasons. The graziers went to the Arbitration Court for 
a fresh award and the outcome was the infamous Powers’ Award of 35/- per hundred. 
In AWU mythology this has been represented as a savage cut in shearing rates, and it 
was indeed a sizeable reduction from 40/- to 35/-.
99
 But to Powers legalistic mindset 
40/- was irrelevant: he was adjusting the extant Higgins’ award up to 35/-. Powers 
certainly took into account the uncertainty of the wool market and was convinced that 
restraint was necessary. However, he believed he was setting rates shearers should 
accept.100 For this he was extravagantly condemned in The Worker, and in the public 
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utterances of union leaders. Henry Boote editorialised in The Worker that the 
prospects for a peaceful shearing in 1922 were ‘remote’. John Barnes, in his capacity 
as acting-General Secretary of the union, sought a meeting with the graziers, and 
when this was refused belligerently spoke of the need for a ‘full fighting policy’.
101
 
 
The AWU response was conspicuously more belligerent than its ‘abide by the award’ 
mantra of 1916, but soon learnt that its commitment to arbitration seriously 
compromised its ability to resurrect the old fighting spirit of the 1890s and 1902.  
J.W. Allen was ready, providing a daily commentary to the Sydney Morning Herald 
while the AWU Executive Council was bunkered down in the union’s Melbourne 
office, dithering about what they were actually going to do.102 But in any case the 
1922 strike was doomed to failure after Allen had successfully argued in the 
Arbitration Court for injunctions restraining the AWU or The Worker from inciting 
strike action. The Court imposed heavy fines on Barnes, Blakeley (the AWU 
President) and Boote, warning that imprisonment terms were likely if they continued 
to publicly condemn the judgement or actively promote a strike.103 The leaders hastily 
back-pedalled, distancing themselves from the strike while endeavouring to spread the 
word informally to indignant rank-and-file shearers that they hoped it would succeed. 
It contributed nothing financially and officials steered clear of strike camps and rank-
and-file gatherings. The Worker largely stayed silent. Frenetic attempts to give 
cohesion to the strike by militants failed, despite enthusiasm amongst the rank-and-
file.104 It was perhaps apposite that, as the strike limped to its ambiguous and litigious 
ending, the great bush poet Henry Lawson died in pathetic circumstances. Ignoring 
the irony of the AWU’s compromised position, The Worker reprinted Lawson’s ode 
to bushworker solidarity, ‘I’m too old to rat’.105   
 
Within the union the 1922 strike left a legacy of bitterness and confusion which 
militants continued to exploit. Shearers genuinely wanting to know what the union’s 
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policy was were given mixed messages. Burnt by the fines and threat of 
deregistration, the AWU hierarchy just left the sheds to sort it out for themselves. 
Their unofficial attitude was that they wished shearers well in the fight, but they were 
not going to be seen saying so. This was not as simple for AWU organisers who had 
direct contact. For example, W.H. Atkins was confronted by the shearers at Tyrie 
station, a shed with over 20,000 sheep in the Dubbo region. They had signed on at 
award rates but were worried about being branded scabs. They asked Atkins how they 
stood. Atkins was an honest man and had been at other sheds where men refused to 
shear at the award. Atkins was blunt. Legally the Tyrie shearers were AWU members 
and that meant accepting the award. As far as he was concerned, however, they were 
‘not doing the right thing’. At other sheds men were ‘sticking out’ and Atkins 
considered that ‘those working under the award were scabs’.106 He was bitter at his 
own superiors for putting him in this position, although if J.W. Allen had had hard 
evidence of him saying such things in the sheds he, too, would have been before the 
courts for inciting a strike!
107
 There were many such stories in 1922. 
 
Graziers bore the brunt of strikes in 1916, 1917 and 1920, but by 1922 they had 
devised a strategy. The Shearing Company cajoled graziers to keep their nerve while 
Allen stood ready to apply the full force of arbitration law to make shearers think 
twice about following militant leaders. When militants succeeded in getting strikes 
started in early sheds others tended to follow. The corollary was that if a strike could 
be nipped in the bud, the dominos fell in the graziers’ favour. The Shearing Company 
ruthlessly sacked troublemakers at early sheds and had fresh teams ready. Publicity of 
prosecutions, and the fines imposed on AWU leaders were a public relations 
triumph.108 Strikes gathered momentum when moderates stayed at home after reading 
in the newspapers that shearing was held up. Radicals did their best to persuade 
shearers that they would be ‘scabbing’ if their brothers at other sheds were still ‘out’. 
On the other hand, if the newspapers were full of grazier propaganda that shearing 
was underway, shearers said goodbye to their wives and hurried to the sheds. J.W. 
Allen had managed to establish a formula that he would stick to for the rest of his 
career. It did not prevent major strikes in 1930 or 1945, but these were exceptional 
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years.
109
  The 1922 strike was also a useful test for the Graziers Co-operative 
Shearing Company and it was pleased with its ability to mobilise shearers to work in 
sheds that militants had tried to close down.110 
 
J.W. Allen was equally fearless in dealing with his own recalcitrant members. Meares 
and Pearson, owners of Quantambone station near Brewarrina, decided that it was 
imperative that their 100,000 sheep were shorn before the end of August. Nothing else 
mattered. Accordingly they were prepared to meet the strikers' demands. This 
appalled Allen and he promptly took legal action on the grounds that the station was 
breaching constitutional rules of the Graziers Association. It was rather brave to 
confront one of the biggest stations in the country in such a way, but in any case the 
squatters were too quick for him. They had already tendered their resignation from the 
Association and the court refused to issue the injunction. An exchange of 
correspondence between the Association and the station followed, in which Allen 
attempted a combination of threat and desperate pleading to change their mind. This 
correspondence was published in full in the Sydney Morning Herald – almost 
certainly leaked by Allen to shame the owners. The Graziers’ Association was 
arguing collective responsibility against rugged individualism. Although the militant 
revival in the rank-and-file had lured it into flirting with direct action, this too was the 
AWU’s position. Allen did not refer to Meares and Pearson as ‘scabs’ – only labour 
unions used such un-gentlemanly language. Nevertheless, his condemnation of them, 
also leaked to the press, was brutal enough: 
My executive feel sure that you will realise the odium which would undoubtedly attach to 
your firm if its shed is the first of any consequence to grant the Union demands, as by so 
doing it would gravely prejudice the interests of every grazier in Australia, a position which 
my Executive feel sure you would not willingly bring about.111  
Badly bruised from its mauling in the courts, the AWU must at least have enjoyed the 
spectacle of the squatters airing their dirty linen in public. 
 
Converts to Arbitration 
 
As the years passed, J.W. Allen’s familiarity with the arbitration system matured, and 
neatly counterbalanced the AWU’s messianic belief in its virtues. His career with the 
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graziers spanned the entire period between the 1890s and the 1950s wool boom. The 
interwar period had been tumultuous, book-ended by world wars, both also strike-
prone.112  Interestingly, he looked back on it all as a narrative of order and concord 
rather than violence and chaos: ‘Then when Awards settled the conditions strikes 
faded out. We had occasional troubles but not many.’113 The extreme legalism of the 
Pastoral Award is glaringly apparent from a distance, but the parties caught up in the 
arbitration system became imprisoned by it. By 1948, when Allen carried the case for 
the graziers for the last time, he had an encyclopaedic memory of all the previous 
cases. The first 70 closely-typed foolscap pages of the transcript of that 1948 case – 
the whole document runs to nearly 1500 -  deal only with the preliminaries of 
definition of terms and settling on what needed to be decided. This occupied a full 
morning, and it was not until the Court resumed after lunch that Tom Dougherty 
began to present actual evidence to support the union’s claim. The arguments sounded 
hard edged, but both sides were within long established comfort zones.114   
 
The Graziers Association published pamphlets of advice for its members, and kept its 
solicitors occupied with a steady stream of cases.115 All this was costly, but it was not 
until late in the twentieth century when the pendulum of conservative economic ideas 
began to adopt ‘competition’ as its driving principle, that arbitration was considered 
too bureaucratic. Throughout the 1920s and ‘30s there was wider conservative 
disillusionment with arbitration. If unions retained the right to strike, what use was 
legal conciliation? The Bruce Government’s attempts to curb arbitration in 1926 and 
1929 were motivated by this impulse, but graziers had little enthusiasm for it. Despite 
problems with shearing strikes from time to time they preferred the costs of heavy 
handed regulation to the unfettered market. While the AWU and the Graziers’ 
Association agreed on this, the radical genie let loose by the IWW continued to have 
an influence long after the IWW itself disappeared. 
                                                
112 Kosmas Tsokhas argues that graziers were frustrated by the ineffectiveness of arbitration in 1930, 
but more generally they made good use of it from 1922. He sees it as a vehicle for moderation and 
compromise overall. Tsokhas, ‘Shifting the Burden’, pp. 46-7; ‘Power Law and Conflict’, p. 231. 
Andrew Moore, who deals only with the 1930s takes the more radical view that graziers exploited it to 
crush the workers.  Moore, ‘Pastoral Workers Industrial Union’, p. 67.  
113 ABL, E256/1647, ‘Recollections’ , p. 10. 
114 NAA, 1958/7, Box 33, Vol. 1, pp. 18ff. Pastoral Award Transcript 1948.   
115 See issues of the Graziers Annual, which contained detailed information on shearing regulations, 
award rates, and accommodation requirements. It also published tactical advice for dealing with 
disputes and encouraged graziers to keep precise records as evidence in litigation.  
Chapter 7: Disruptionists and Troublemakers: Depression and War 1925-1945 
 
‘Undercurrents’ 
 
The debacle of the 1922 strike drove the AWU back to arbitration, but it was soon 
obvious that the militant revival was more than a flash in the pan. The vacuum created 
by the demise of the IWW was quickly filled by various communist groups. Mateship 
was easily fashioned into a Marxist narrative of working-class rebellion against 
corrupt capitalism. The dysfunctional economy of the 1930s was kindling for radical 
ideas. AWU ‘labourism’, sullied as it was by factional intrigue, continued to be fair 
game for those in the labour movement charged with a pure revolutionary spirit. 
Shearers’ mateship was prickly in its dealings with outsiders as Charles Bean hinted 
when he wrote of ‘undercurrents’.1 In the confined social climate of the  woolshed 
there was a fine line between a strike-breaker and a strike-maker. W.G. Spence, went 
into some detail about how it operated. 
Shearing sheds employ a varying number of hands, ranging from half-a-dozen to upwards of 
200. Each shed, therefore, can be likened to a factory. Generally it is far from any centre of 
population, and is only used at shearing time, being locked up during the rest of the year. 
Counting each shed as corresponding to a factory, it is safe to say that more strikes have taken 
place in connection with shearing sheep than in all other industries combined. Probably 
10,000 cases since 1886 would be under the number. These lasted from one hour to eight 
weeks. But one hour meant that the Unionists were prepared for a much longer term if 
necessary. 
Sometimes the employer would be merely trying the men, and if they gave in, he profited; but 
if they held out he was not prepared for the risks of delay, so would come to Union terms. Up 
till 1890 there was no collective unity amongst pastoralists except the natural class feeling. 
Each had been so accustomed to having his own way that he took any interference unkindly, 
even though he admitted that the Union demands were reasonable. Some came to terms at 
once, and did well for themselves, as they got the pick of the men, who on their part showed 
their appreciation by more carefully looking after the Union employer’s interests.2 
 
This neatly recognised the scattered and very localised nature of shearing activity. 
Spence shrewdly disguised the inherent power shearers exerted. Pastoralists were 
prepared to ‘come to terms at once’ if the ‘demands were reasonable’. There was an 
advantage in ‘getting the pick of the men’. Shearers were happy to shear provided the 
grazier paid fairly. The grazier was willing to be fair provided the shearer did a good 
job. Spence was describing his ideal union. His own moral compass required 
unionism to be flexible. He could not acknowledge that contractors were already 
                                                
1 See Chapter 5 for Bean’s description. 
2 Spence, Australia’s Awakening, p. 55. 
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performing much the same function. Participants were out to get the best bargain 
without necessarily being implacable enemies consumed by sectional hatred. But this 
depended on an underlying goodwill. Spence begs the question of what might happen 
if the element of mutual respect was absent. He refers to the employer ‘trying the 
men’, implying that the noble bushman, proud unionist though he be and loyal to his 
mates, would never demand anything unreasonable. He does not canvass the 
consequences of any or all of those 10,000 incidents being motivated by caprice or 
malice towards the grazier. Shearers had leverage and it was equally possible for them 
to ‘try the boss’.   
 
An Englishman looking back on his time as a jackaroo in southern Queensland 
provides useful insights into the power of the group, written with wry and penetrating 
humour.3 The year is 1926. It is a large station (22 shearers, and up to 50 people 
overall). The owner is a wealthy old pastoralist with multiple holdings, but he is an 
earthy sort of character, wise to all the tricks. The canny old grazier kept out of the 
woolshed during shearing, delegating direct supervision to inexperienced but reliable 
employees. It was a way of monitoring events without inflaming the pugnacious 
tendency in shearers. Thus a 21-year-old ‘pommie jackaroo’ came to be in charge of 
shearing while the grazier kept his distance in the homestead.   
 
The boss had given firm instructions regarding the need to clamp down on shoddy 
shearing: ‘It takes a sheep twelve months to grow a staple of wool, and those bastards 
one twelfth of a second to cut it in two.’4 Things go smoothly enough for a time: ‘The 
shearers called me arse-licker and pimp behind my back, but were friendly enough 
otherwise.’ Inevitably, a crisis eventuated. The jackaroo noticed one of the men 
‘shearing a sheep for the second time’ - woolshed code for smoothing out unsightly 
‘ridges’ with a second cut. With the boss’s instructions still reverberating, he over-
reacted and told the man he was sacked. The shearer simply ignored him, grabbing 
another sheep. Hysterical protests to the head shearer, the union ‘rep’, only made 
things worse: ‘Serves ya bloody right. Yew can't just walk up and sack a man, mate. 
That's Union business and has to be done through me as the men's Rep.’5 The ‘rep’, 
                                                
3 G. A. W. Smith, Once a Green Jackaroo, Hale, London, 1975, Chapter 15, ‘Annual Shearing’. 
4 Smith, Green Jackaroo, p. 151. 
5 ibid. 
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too, continued shearing. He was not unsympathetic to the young man’s predicament, 
but it would offend the natural order to down tools at the quest of a jumped-up 
jackaroo. When the sheep was shorn the ‘rep’ strolled along the board: ‘Hang it up, 
mate. Too much second cut.’
6
 That was all. The man gathered his gear and left 
without demur. 
 
More ‘undercurrents’ were revealed when an AWU organiser came into the shed. It 
was obvious at once that he was generally despised, but also that the men were a little 
fearful of him. He was there ostensibly to check that conditions were satisfactory, but 
the real reason was to collect union subscriptions. ‘AWU’, as the jackaroo referred to 
him, had a piece of paper and a list of names. After a brief and unconvincing display 
of camaraderie with the ‘rep’, he pointedly walked along the board speaking to each 
shearer individually. If a member had managed to avoid ‘AWU’ last season he would 
be hit for a double amount. That was the union rule. The paper was then handed to the 
young supervisor, with ‘instructions’ for the grazier to make out a cheque payable to 
the AWU for total union fees – it was then up to the boss to deduct individual 
amounts from wage cheques. The organiser imperiously announced he would be 
waiting in the shearers’ quarters. Few things enraged graziers more about AWU 
arrogance. Predictably the old man blew his stack, although he was already resigned 
to signing the cheque. But a smart young station book-keeper sitting around the 
homestead office had a bright idea for a bit of fun. On the back of the cheque he typed 
an endorsement for the organizer and the ‘rep’ to sign. In theory it required the union 
to refund the grazier if shearers refused to accept the deductions! It was only a token 
gesture, as everyone knew. But it succeeded admirably in riling ‘AWU’: ‘We know 
our bloody rights. No smart squatter man’s gonna put it over me.’7 But the ‘rep’ was 
now bored with AWU theatrics. Without further comment he signed the endorsement. 
‘AWU’ continued to curse the squatters and the world in general, but it was only 
display. He snatched the pen and also signed.  
 
The ‘rep’, it turned out, had rather enjoyed this joke at the expense of ‘AWU’. As the 
young jackeroo explained: 
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7 Smith, Green Jackaroo, p. 154. 
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Next day as I passed No. 1 stand, a voice hissed at me to stop. Without hesitating in his work, 
the shearers' rep said: 
"My compliments to your Boss, mate. I didn't think he was such a cagey ol' bastard; and ask 
'im if I can draw me pay when the time comes in one poun' notes ....." 
The machine screamed on its way and the shearer swung his back to me as he commenced the 
Long Blow. He was one of the rare shearers ever to display a sense of humour to an outsider 
like me.8 
Summarising the overall experience, the jackeroo said that it was: 
A simple job - once one had learned the thousand and one rules the shearers have …… and 
had become able to condense them into the Shearer versus The-Rest-of-the-World theme.9 
 
While elements of class underpin these tensions, the relationships are really more 
complex. There is also a large component of theatre or display. The shearers do not 
dislike the young English chap at all, but still talk about him as the ‘arse licker’. Being 
sacked for poor workmanship was accepted, but a pretence of class solidarity had to 
be observed. The AWU is unpopular but they go through the rituals of mateship with 
the organiser. They never actually see the old grazier, but if they did familiarity would 
be minimal. He is not really hated at all, but his allocated part is ‘the squatter man’. 
The ‘rep’ lets it be known that he enjoyed the prank on the AWU. But most of all, the 
shearers create a barrier between themselves and everyone else. It is a sinister form of 
mateship because there are rules – unwritten but powerful – to which they all 
conform. Notwithstanding ambivalence towards the AWU, this also seems to be 
central to the union’s power.   
 
This almost ethnographic picture of a shearing shed at work contains clues to the 
ways disputes developed.10 In this case the ‘rep’ had no intention of disrupting 
shearing. But he had considerable power to do so if four or five other shearers had 
backed him up. The jackeroo was not in control. There are endless examples of such 
disputes in J.W. Allen’s correspondence, and also in the shed reports of AWU 
organisers published in The Worker.11 They could be about a variety of issues – wet 
                                                
8 Smith, Green Jackaroo, p. 155. 
9 Smith, Green Jackaroo, p. 150. 
10 For another insightful account of shearing shed insider/outsider atmospherics in 1927, see Don 
Whitington, Strive to be Fair: An Unfinished Autobiography, Australian University Press, Canberra, 
1977, Chapter 3, ‘Working Outback’, pp. 26-46. Whitington was a Canberra political journalist in the 
1940s and ‘50s. He worked as a rouseabout in the Riverina in the late-1920s, and as a jackaroo for H.R. 
Munro in northern NSW. The latter was elderly grazier who dabbled in the New Guard in the early-
1930s, while Whittington lived on the station.  
11 ABL, Records of the Graziers Association of NSW.  The Board Minutes of the Graziers Co-
operative Shearing Company, are also a valuable source of such material. 
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sheep was a perennial, but daggy sheep, faulty machinery or demands for tins of jam 
were others. Grievances were often genuine, but just as likely to be contrived. 
Outcomes varied widely. Sometimes the boss would talk diplomatically with the 
shearers and persuade them to resume. Sometimes he would back down and reinstate 
the sacked man. Sometimes the union would be called in. If the evidence was right 
charges were laid against the station for ‘wrongful dismissal’. The Graziers Co-
operative Shearing Company had the capacity to turn the tables and prosecute 
shearers. However, it seldom paid a grazier to become petulant – that was always 
remembered. And it seldom paid a shearer to display too much independence of 
outlook – mateship was very unforgiving of mavericks.  
 
The potential always existed for ‘undercurrents’ to be usurped by militant elements. 
The leverage of shearers was most potent in the immediacy of time and place. With a 
shed full of sheep and the weather threatening, squatters were always vulnerable to a 
show of solidarity. However, ‘us versus them’ shed-power was easily exaggerated as 
loyalty had other dimensions. Most attempts at general strikes were quickly defeated 
– 1916 and 1920 were unusual. Militants condemned cocky shearers as ‘scabs’ and 
‘strike-breakers’, but to Victorians who wanted money for their selections it was 
common sense to shear at the rate set by the arbitration court (most drew the line at 
shearing below it). In 1926 the AWU was forty years old and arbitration was an 
article of faith, but rebels muddied the waters during the uncertain 1920s and ‘30s, 
and had a legacy beyond that.  
 
Bushworkers’ Propaganda Group 
 
The Communist newspaper published a Shearers Strike Bulletin in August 1922. This 
introduced a faction called the ‘Bushworkers’ Propaganda Group’ which gave the 
1922 strike coherence. The Group contained ‘some of the militant members of the 
AWU’. It was ‘not opposed to political action’ but objected to ‘the activities of the 
Union making industrial action play second fiddle to the ambitions of secretaries and 
organisers to win seats in Parliament’.12 Probably the same activists were responsible 
for ‘spurious circulars’ in 1920, ‘asking members to endorse an alternative 
                                                
12 Shearers’ Strike Bulletin, Vol. 1, No. 1, 25/8/1922, published with The Communist: Official Organ 
of the Communist Party of Australia, 27/10/1922; see also SMH, 22/5/1922, p. 9. 
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conference’ and criticising the AWU for not demanding ‘Queensland rates’.
13
 Equally 
likely the movement was inspired by the 1916 strike and dissidents in the Longreach 
office of the AWU.14 The meetings at Trades Hall in 1916 and 1917 had the stamp of 
Bushworkers’ Propaganda  events of the 1920s. The strategy of operating as a ginger 
group within the AWU was out of the IWW ‘boring from within’ textbook. Durkin’s 
and Kelly’s actions illustrate some continuity between the strikes of World War I and 
militancy in the 1920s and ‘30s.
15
  
 
The Propaganda Group had its own structure inside the AWU. J.R. Sullivan was 
elected Secretary, and George Bellamy was President. Significantly, Arthur Rae, a 
pioneer of bush unionism in the 1890s, was appointed Treasurer.16  The Group could 
claim ownership of the 1922 strike thanks to the mealy-mouthed efforts of the AWU. 
As a parasite within the AWU through the 1920s, AWU tickets remained the criterion 
for admittance to ‘AWU Rank-and-File’ gatherings, but the main purpose was to 
lambast AWU officials.
17
 Sympathisers such as Durkin helped to arrange meetings 
but as a rule AWU officials were kept in the dark. The Executive issued edicts not to 
attend, but it was hard for the grassroots to tell what was ‘official’ and what was not.18  
 
Shearing shed frustrations were grist to the militants’ mill, but deeper social trends 
must also be taken into account. The war was profoundly disturbing. All people were 
personally affected one way or another through enlistment, bereavement, and 
interpretations of patriotism. Problems of rehabilitating deeply traumatised returned 
soldiers festered behind closed doors. This spilled over into troubling political and 
social divisions, as people queried the direction of society and their place within it. 
The ideological clash of socialism and capitalism loomed as the cause of the next 
global cataclysm. Did the Bolshevik Revolution of 1917 signify hope or catastrophe? 
The politics of class between the wars had a sharpness which later dissipated. 
                                                
13 Harry Knowles, ‘Arthur Rae: A “Napoleon” in Exile’, Labour History, 87, November 2004, p. 112. 
The ‘spurious circulars’ comment is quoted by Knowles from The Worker ‘Bushworkers Budget’ page 
of 14/10/1920. 
14 See Chapter 5 for Sam Brassington’s campaign against shearing contractors. Also Chapter 6. 
15 The Worker (Brisbane), 30/3/1916, p. 15; 6/4/1916, p. 16. Durkin’s dispute with the Brisbane 
Executive is extensively reported but there is no actual evidence of involvement with the Bushworkers’ 
Propaganda Group. The Worker, 9/2/1927, pp. 17-19; 12/10/1927, p. 11; Lane, Dawn to Dusk, p. 152. 
16 See below for Rae’s explusion from the AWU in 1919 . See Chapter 5 for Rae at Eremeran in 1909. 
17 Various names were used: Bushworkers’ Propaganda Group, Rank-and-File Union, Western 
Industrial Association, Law and Liberty Association. The Worker, 6/1/1932, p. 17. 
18 The Worker (Brisbane), 12/3/1925, p. 12; 19/3/1925, p. 11; 20/8/1925, p. 10. 
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Flirtation with communism, which came to seem wrong-headed or naïve in more 
settled times, was not unusual. If there was communism, anti-communism was also 
given oxygen and a conservative over-reaction feared disintegration of social order. 
Many people were unswayed, one way or the other, and Australia always seemed to 
lurch back to the centre after flirting with extremes. Nevertheless, this was seriously 
tested in the 1920s and ‘30s when the hopes of dreamers on the fringes were aroused, 
and at the same time dark fears were activated. It has been referred to as the 
‘meanness of the 1920s’ and ‘a new dimension of fear in the 1930s’19 
 
The Queensland shearing strike coincided with the first anniversary of the Gallipoli 
landing which gave rise to a new legend of Australian nationalism. Has the Sydney 
Morning Herald ever more accurately predicted the future with what it wrote on 25 
April 1916? 
Australia’s great heart is throbbing today as it has never throbbed before. For April 25 – 
‘Anzac Day’ – is a day that will live in our hearts and our history as long as Australia exists. 
And this is the first anniversary of Anzac day.20 
Shearers’ larrikin ways and disrespectful trait drew them to anti-establishment causes, 
though, and a militant tradition was easily reinvented. The IWW was stridently anti-
war and anti-conscription, and it had a following in Queensland shearing sheds. The 
AWU also opposed conscription, yet it is hard to gauge attitudes to the war amongst 
shearers overall. At Edgerol station, at Narrabri, in 1915, shearers refused to continue 
working with a man who had expressed anti-British opinions. He was sacked, 
obviously because the grazier felt pressured by the other shearers, and eventually 
convicted for making a ‘statement likely to cause disaffection amongst the subjects of 
His Majesty the King’. The shearers’ ‘rep’ gave evidence for the prosecution.21 How 
typical this was is impossible to judge, but there were surely many who reflected the 
patriotic jingoism of farming districts. In later years the AWU  shamelessly lauded the 
exploits of pastoral workers at the front.22 Radical politics was more significant in 
coal mines, railway workshops, and the waterfront than shearing sheds, but shearing 
boasted one of the strongest traditions of unionism in Australia. For weeks at a time 
                                                
19, Coleman, ‘New Australian’, pp. 5-6. 
20 SMH, 25/4/1916, p. 5. 
21 The Worker, 16/9/1915, p. 8. 
22 See Chapter 1. 
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men congregated together in small groups. The solidarity of mateship in these 
conditions was particularly potent.23  
This was the world in which ‘Trucker’ Brown, a convert initially of the IWW and 
later a communist, moved with ease. Almost nothing is known about him now, but he 
was well recognised in shearing sheds between the wars.24 A shearer himself, he came 
from Cobar. Brown was first noticed by the AWU when he refused to buy a union 
ticket at Tiltagoona station in the Cobar district in 1920, suggesting the Bushworkers’ 
Propaganda Group was already active.25 By the mid-1920s he was its most prominent 
missionary in shearing sheds. He became a foundation PWIU organiser in the 1930s, 
but fades from view in the late-1930s. Brown was often later remembered in The 
Worker as a ‘disruptionist’, but never again as a participant.26 He combined traditional 
anti-squatter bush unionism with a trenchant international radicalism fanned by the 
controversies of the war. 
  
Cobar was a copper and gold mining centre with a population of over 4,600 in 1911, 
but it declined rather rapidly and in the early-1930s had barely 1,000 people.27 In 
1916 the engine drivers went on strike, frustrated by a wait of more than two years for 
a claim to be heard in the Arbitration Court. This practically closed the town down 
putting 1,500 out of work, while unattended mines began filling with water. Even the 
normally unsympathetic Sydney Morning Herald concluded ‘the result will be 
disastrous unless the dispute is speedily settled’.
28
 Justice Powers of the Arbitration 
Bench was less forgiving. The legality of the strike had yet to be tested but he 
considered the claim was excessive. With the divisive conscription crisis stirring, 
Powers branded it ‘inexcusable, tyrannical and disloyal’. He was not finished, 
condemning strikers as ‘enemies to Australia and the brave men who are fighting to 
defend Australia and the Empire’.29 Such comments could only inflame the battling 
underclass of Cobar and Broken Hill and further alienate the likes of ‘Trucker’ 
Brown. Powers was later the author of the Pastoral Award decision which caused the 
                                                
23 See also wharfies in northern Queensland. Webster, ‘Cosy Relationship’, p. 99.   
24 Neil Byron spelt it ‘Browne’, see Byron, All Among the Wool Boys, p. 10. 
25 The Worker, 7/1/1925, p. 17; The Worker (Brisbane), 20/3/1929, p. 10. 
26 See Chapter 8 for fragments of ‘Trucker’ Brown’s later life. 
27 The copper mine re-opened around 1933. Employment recovered. Wendy Lowenstein, Weevils in the 
Flour: An oral record of the 1930s depression in Australia, Hyland House, Melbourne, 1978, p. 284. 
28 SMH, 7/6/1916, p. 12. 
29 Daily Telegraph, 24/6/1916, p. 8.  
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1922 strike, by which time Brown was active with the Bushworkers’ Propaganda 
Group.30   
 
Arthur Rae described the social climate of the region when he visited Eremeran 
station in 1909.31 He passed through Nymagee, a town neighbouring Cobar. It also 
was once a significant copper mining centre with a population of 2,000, now in 
decline.
32
 
The stoppage for the last eighteen months of the big copper mine which has supported 
Nymagee had brought about an awful deadness of this once lively mining town.33 
Rae was delighted that the town ‘still supports a little radical newspaper, The Peer, 
whose editor, owner and staff – all one man – is gallantly working and waiting for the 
good time coming, and reminded me of the Henry Lawson hero of “The Camberorra 
Star”’. It is unlikely that Rae met ‘Trucker’ Brown on this visit, although they became 
well acquainted in the 1920s. However, it provides a glimpse of the kind of world that 
shaped Brown. The surrounding pastoral country was bleak with extremes of heat and 
cold. Settlement was dominated by a handful of large holdings (including Eremeran 
and The Overflow – made famous by ‘Banjo’ Patterson) and a scattering of grazing 
selectors battling drought.34 The woolsheds, rather like Queensland, had been 
comprehensively colonised by shearing contractors. A letter to The Worker in 1911 
complained that all the sheds between Cobar and Ivanhoe were contract and this was 
cutting out local men.35 Apart from mining and pastoral work there had been 
employment for railway construction but this also was no longer.36 Despondency 
predominated, and in the case of Brown angry frustration. Survival of a militant 
newspaper in such an isolated setting indicates there were others like him. The much 
larger mining centre of Broken Hill further west ensured a population of militant 
shearers. Rae’s reference to Henry Lawson provides a useful clue to the way 
communism and bush folklore could be linked. 
 
                                                
30 See Chapter 6. 
31 See Chapter 4 for his unease about the method of shearer recruitment. 
32 http://www.abc.net.au/rural/telegraph/content/2006/s1720953.htm. For Cobar see Duncan Waterson, 
‘The Northwest’ in Hagan (ed), People and Politics, p. 274. 
33 The Worker, 14/7/1909, p. 4. 
34 Grazing patterns from The Australian Pastoral Directory, 1913. 
35 The Worker, 26/7/1911, p. 2. 
36 Waterson in Hagan (ed), People and Politics, p. 273. 
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Rather more is known about Arthur Rae (1860-1943).
37
 In contrast to most bush union 
pioneers of the 1890s Rae remained unambiguously radical, so much so that he was 
expelled in 1919 and spent the rest of his life as one of the AWU’s ideological 
enemies. Rae’s parliamentary career was rather unusual. He served three single terms 
each separated by an interval of 15 or 16 years. As one of the wave of Labor members 
elected to the NSW Legislative Assembly in 1891 he had not been re-elected in 1894. 
When the Fisher Labor Commonwealth Government gained power in 1910 Rae was 
elected as a Senator. Fisher, having lost office briefly, was swept back to power in 
1914 as World War I was declared, but Rae lost his Senate seat in the same election, 
allegedly because of his outspoken opposition to the war. Finally, largely through his 
association with the Lang splinter faction, Rae re-entered the Senate in 1928 a year 
before Scullin Labor’s landslide in 1929. By then Rae shared little in common with 
mainstream Labor and was a vocal critic of Scullin. He lost the seat in 1935. During 
the late-1890s Rae had briefly held the post of Secretary General of the AWU, and 
during this middle stage of his union career seemed to be developing the conservative 
authoritarianism typical of Macdonell, Grayndler and others.38 Whether he supported 
the union’s shift to arbitration in 1907 is unclear, but by the time the Bushworkers 
Propaganda Group was formed he was vigorously opposed to it. 
 
When Arthur Rae lost his Senate seat in 1914 he was still an AWU folk hero. He 
made a guest appearance at the Annual Convention in 1915, telling them what they 
wanted to hear. ‘I would rather be out of Parliament than out of the AWU’, he 
declared to rousing applause.39 Already, however, he was becoming disillusioned with 
the AWU. His political positions indicated empathy with the IWW, at least, but the 
diminutive Rae seldom acted quietly and there is no evidence he was involved in the 
1916 strike. The Bushworkers’ Propaganda Group was not altogether separate from 
broader ideological struggles within the labour movement and the rise and fall of the 
radical One Big Union movement. This resulted in Rae parting company with the 
Labor mainstream. He baulked at the pledge of loyalty insisted on by the Executive 
Council, and was formally expelled from the AWU in 1919. By 1922 he was 
prominent on the Bushworker Group ‘strike committee’. As radical elder statesman, 
                                                
37 Most of the detail is from Knowles, ‘Arthur Rae’ p. 112. 
38 Merritt, Making of the AWU, p. 279. 
39 The Worker, 25/2/1915, p. 17. 
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he was an ideal President of the PWIU in the 1930s, making good use of the free rail 
pass he held as a Commonwealth Senator. Arthur Rae provides a link between the 
mateship of 1890s bush unionism and the shearing shed communists of the 1930s, as 
do the Longreach AWU organisers of 1916. 
 
Norman Jeffery (1896-1966) was another IWW follower who later became a 
communist. Jeffery was not a shearer, although he may have done shed work from 
time to time. Brown was more successful as a grassroots organiser while Jeffery 
attended to administration and political strategy. He was said to have been involved in 
the ‘Red Flag Riot’ in Brisbane in 1919 and was described many years later by a 
prominent fellow traveller as ‘a colourful activist who never quite graduated out of 
the larrikin IWW school’.40 There is no evidence that either ‘Trucker’ Brown or 
Norman Jeffrey had been involved with the Queensland strike in 1916, but they were 
both prominent during the strike in 1922. 
 
By 1925 the Bushworkers Propaganda Group was operating more or less openly as an 
independent organisation, but retaining the ‘AWU Rank-and-File’ identification. It 
was relatively easy for ‘Trucker’ Brown to enter shearing sheds and call meetings, 
and difficult for the AWU to prevent.41 The helpless tone of Henry Boote’s plea for 
militants to stay in the fold underlined the predicament. 
We need their enthusiastic advocacy of fundamental principles. We need their courage – the 
dynamic force of the faith that they hold with fervid intensity, but they need us. 
THE ALP IS THE ONLY HOPE OF THE MILITANTS, to save them from presenting to the 
world the pathetic and humiliating spectacle of enthusiasm lavishing itself as a delusion, and 
of energy dispersing its strength on barren heroics.42 
More often the AWU aggressively condemned ‘bogus’ gatherings of ‘rank-and-file 
misrepresentatives’.
43
 Undoubtedly this was behind the Executive Council’s 1924 
edict recycling the 1920 loyalty pledge.44 Chaired by Arthur Rae, December annual 
general meetings were held at Trades Hall or sometimes Marx House, but never 
Macdonell House.45 Ted Grayndler called them gatherings of the ‘Christmas 
Communists’. At the 1928 meeting – two years before the formal PWIU schism – the 
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connection to the AWU was already tenuous, although the ‘AWU Rank-and-File’ 
moniker was still used. These conferences were no more ‘democratic’ than AWU 
affairs although they claimed to resurrect ‘the once glorious spirit of the AWU’.46 The 
AWU succeeded in finding some dirt on the Group’s financial affairs. Pastoral 
workers were encouraged not to renew AWU tickets in favour of ‘special tickets’ of 
the ‘Rank-and-File Movement’, on an undertaking that 80 per cent of the money 
would be forwarded to the AWU ‘if the AWU Executive Council granted certain 
demands’. Reportedly, £400 had been deposited in a trust account with the NSW 
Labor Council, but on 13 December 1928 the Council disowned further responsibility  
– only £200 was left so the AWU was never going to get its 80 per cent.
47
 The figures 
are probably accurate enough. At a very rough guess perhaps 1,000 pastoral workers 
had contributed - a tiny hole in the AWU’s vast membership base of over 100,000. 
Nevertheless, the mid-1920s wool boom had already ended, economic security was 
deteriorating rapidly, and the nuisance was becoming a major headache. 
 
The Depression and the PWIU 
 
Early sheds surrounding Moree, Walgett, Coonamble and Brewarrina were fertile 
territory for Propaganda Group agitation. Midkin station near Moree, and Wingadee 
at Coonamble, two of the biggest sheds in Australia, were frequently targeted. 
Shearing was just beginning when Justice Dethridge’s cut in shearing rates was 
announced in July 1930.48 AWU offices were inundated with telegrams of indignation 
and requests for instructions. Several sheds ceased work immediately, assuming that 
such a dastardly move by the Court was completely unacceptable. But the tsars of the 
AWU, while expressing their disgust, were undecided. They concluded, probably with 
good reason, that direct action would be disastrous, and they also apprehended Allen’s 
legal victory the last time they sought to thwart the Court. John Bailey, President of 
the NSW Branch, announced that he was heading to Melbourne where the Executive 
Council would meet. An announcement would be made when everything had been 
weighed up.  
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The AWU approached the Scullin Labor Government to reconstitute the arbitration 
court, and said it was considering a High Court challenge. While the Government was 
keeping quiet, ‘Federal political circles’ (meaning Labor backbenchers, of whom 
Senator Arthur Rae was one) were claiming there was deep unease within the caucus. 
It was suggested that a select committee should investigate removing Dethridge from 
the Bench on the grounds that he was ‘temperamentally unsuited’ to consider 
arbitration cases.
49
 Such was the cancer of instability destroying the Government. 
With militants stirring up woolsheds, and an equally determined mood amongst 
financially stressed graziers to shear at ‘new’ rates, AWU indecision seemed pathetic. 
 
J.W. Allen was again decisive. Summonses were issued to men who had left sheds. 
The cases would soon be heard in Moree and Coonamble. The Labor Daily was 
acting as a mouthpiece for militants and published an article on 3 July headlined, 
‘Sixty Thousand Shearers May Go on Strike’.50 An application was made for an 
injunction to prevent the paper from printing ‘anything by way of encouragement or 
incitement to strike’. Allen fed information to the Sydney Morning Herald, creating an 
impression that the strike was very limited in scope and unlikely to succeed, although 
this was probably true enough. Allen asserted (accurately) that the strike was being 
promoted by ‘professional agitators’, rather than the AWU, but this did not stop him 
from contributing to AWU embarrassment. He mocked it, reminding the public of the 
union’s published policy that shearers should abide by decisions of the arbitration 
court. Cheekily, he assured the press that the AWU would be true to its word.51 
 
When the AWU finally tried to clarify its position it satisfied no-one. The union did 
not support a strike, advising members to work at (reduced) award rates, but in a 
veiled concession to militancy suggested shearers bargain for higher rates if they felt 
they could get them! Given the dreadful unemployment situation caution was realistic. 
However, the unemployment outlook was so bad that it bred a perversely belligerent 
mindset - there was nothing to lose. Desperation and anger fused into a potent mix. 
‘Trucker’ Brown toured the shearing districts stirring up support. Arthur Rae, the 
father figure, said the real enemy was the AWU rather than the graziers! There would 
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be no more standing ovations at the AWU Conference for the aging radical.  
 
The strike in NSW remained confined to the north and west. According to one 
assessment there were about 1000 men in strike camps, but it quickly lost momentum. 
But if sullen strikers could do little about the equally sullen scabs which the Graziers 
Co-operative Shearing Company transported in, grass roots indignation at the pay cut  
remained high. The duplicitous stand of the AWU and the failure of the strike were 
catalysts for the formation of the PWIU out of the Propaganda Group embryo. The 
strike campaign was not taken south to Victoria which was not fertile ground for 
militants. John Durkin’s speech at Wee Waa on 16 August 1930 ended all pretence 
that the strike was run by the AWU. The PWIU took formal shape at Trades Hall in 
December 1930.  
 
J.W. Allen was kept informed by the clandestine services of T.J. Lonsdale. Lonsdale 
was a contemporary of Grayndler as a shearer and AWU official, although he had 
fallen out with the union in 1915, and became a pariah.52 He was a well enough 
known figure in rural Labor circles and mixed freely with shearers, as well as 
unionists he had known. He was able to drop in on Arthur Rae for a chat, and was on 
friendly terms with Jack Durkin, whom he had known since his days in Queensland 
during the war. From around July 1930, when the NSW strike was still in full swing, 
Lonsdale had an arrangement with J.W. Allen to report militant goings-on. Lonsdale 
was getting on in age, it was the Depression, and needed the money which Allen had 
ready in a sealed envelope. But he also seemed to be driven by a grander purpose. An 
old style bush unionist, the AWU had treated him badly, but he wanted moderate 
unionism to survive in the shearing industry. His writings revealed nostalgia for the 
old blade shearing days, and the ‘true spirit’ of bush unionism. While feeding 
information to Allen he supplied the rural press with a barrage of articles under his 
own name, condemning militant unionism. In part these were to generate some 
income, in part to impress Allen, but also to spread his own views. Allen instigated 
the slightly ludicrous practice of filing Lonsdale’s intelligence under ‘Mr. X’. He read 
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16/2/1922, p. 19.  
  193 
the letters carefully, marking key passages with a crayon-type pencil. While some of 
Lonsdale’s breathless revelations had minimal impact, others left a deep impression 
on the wily servant of the graziers. Allen saw the ‘Red’ union as a nest of reckless 
troublemakers, and liaised with his close ally R.C. Wilson of the Graziers’ Shearing 
Company about how to deal with them.53   
 
Following the capitulation in NSW firebrands toured Queensland. The Queensland 
Award had been slashed in November 1930 from 40/- per 100 sheep to 30/-. ‘Trucker’ 
Brown and Arthur Rae, making further use of his rail pass, spent five weeks in central 
Queensland during January and February.
54
 The 1931 season shaped up as a 
showdown between militant unionism and graziers with the AWU again relegated to 
the sidelines. A workers’ meeting at Longreach on 2 January 1931 voted to strike.55 
According to the newspaper report, 40 or 50 strikers piled into six cars when the 
meeting ended and sped out to White Hill station where, the word was, shearing was 
underway. Presumably the purpose of the convoy was to ‘request’ that work stop 
forthwith. Trouble was anticipated because a lone constable was already stationed 
there. There must have been spies at the union meeting because Senior Sergeant 
Maloney and four additional constables arrived at virtually the same time as the mob. 
After a vigorous exchange the situation was diffused and shearing continued.56 
 
Only a few days later shearing was to start at Crossmere station near Blackall with 21 
men. The grazier, with police providing escorts, had a complicated plan to smuggle 
shearers in, but they were ‘intercepted’ by strikers. There was initially some confusion 
in the newspaper reports about whether shearing had started. It transpired that it had, 
but with only six shearers. Whatever form ‘persuasion’ took, it had been partially 
successful. Police allowed militants to address shearers but tried to prevent physical 
contact. Not always could they arrive in time. At Mildura station police had ‘[found] 
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it necessary to produce their revolvers, and one of the strikers [had] his nose badly 
bruised’. Graziers claimed that only a few sheds actually had to call shearing off.57 
 
An ugly situation arose at the Capella railway yards, two miles out of Emerald, at the 
end of January. A ‘special’ train was being used to move about 200 shearers destined 
for sheds in the Clermont district. It was a highly organised manoeuvre, with the rail 
yards being used to prevent agitators approaching passengers. As the train pulled out 
it was met with a ‘fusillade of stones’ which broke several windows. A policeman 
was struck in the face, his nose was broken, and he suffered a serious eye injury. 
Sleepers laid on the track derailed a bogey wheel and the departure was delayed for an 
hour-and-a-half, but the overall plan to get scab shearers through worked. At about 
the same time a nasty assault on shearers working at Noorindoo station, near Surat, 
took place. Few detailed descriptions survive, but episodes such as the following were 
common.58  
Shortly after 5 o’clock yesterday morning, the 12 men who constitute the shearing gang at 
Noorindoo shed, 10 miles from Surat, were roused out of their sleep by an invasion of about 40 
strikers, who had travelled from Surat in seven motor cars. The men swarmed into the hut, and 
in threatening tones ordered the men to pack their swags and “clear out”. Several of the men 
were defiant, and a fierce fight was soon raging, the strikers endeavouring to forcibly eject the 
men from the shed. Although hopelessly outnumbered, the loyalists stood off their assailants 
with their fists, as well as they could, but they were roughly handled by the enraged strikers. 
The floor was soon a mass of struggling figures, and boots were freely used to supplement fists. 
Amid the confusion several shots were fired. A number of the strikers were armed apparently 
with revolvers. Fortunately, the shots went wild, no one being injured by the shooting. In the 
middle of the turmoil two members of the police force from Surat, who had followed the 
strikers, arrived by car. They were powerless to prevent the ejection, which followed, although 
their presence undoubtedly had a restraining effect. Vainly they exhorted the strikers to depart, 
but all attempts at conciliation were useless. The strikers compromised by sending a delegate to 
warn the men in the hut that unless they left immediately, firearms would be resorted to, and 
that, in effect, they would be literally shot off the premises. Deeming resistance hopeless, and 
overawed by the threatening attitude of the strikers, the men immediately packed their swags 
and left the shed.59 
In a ‘jubilant’ mood the strikers subsequently visited two other sheds in the area. In 
both cases ‘the men were either threatened or cajoled into departing, without offering 
any resistance’. Police were present at each of these raids.  
 
Grazier resistance was also efficient. In early January, before the shearing season had 
even begun, a meeting of the Maranoa Graziers’ Association was held at Roma, and 
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the mood was noticeably belligerent. One speaker claimed that ‘shearers at the present 
time [are] able to make considerably more than the man on the land’. Others boasted 
that shearing at award rates could readily be arranged.60 As the dispute persisted 
graziers formed ‘local defence committees’, which conferred with local contractors 
and drew up plans for the recruitment of shearers (mainly from NSW) and discussed 
the logistics of transport and protection. Police were kept informed, and escorts were 
provided. In late January the Courier published photographs of NSW shearers at 
Springsure Railway Station, packing their gear into lorries and cars to be taken in 
convoy to Meteor Downs under police escort. What looks like at least 30 PWIU men 
looked helplessly on, on this occasion, and ‘booed lustily as the strike breakers 
proceeded on their way’.61 There is not much doubt that the AWU actively assisted 
the graziers. Unlike the NSW Branch’s equivocal stance six months earlier, in 1931 
the Queensland Branch issued emphatic public statements advising shearers to return 
to work at award rates.62 The actions of Messrs Clark and Tait, large station owners in 
the Blackall district, show how detailed planning could be.  Graziers held a meeting 
on 20 January without any public statements. Forty-five cars, lorries and utilities from 
as far away as Barcaldine and Tambo were quietly assembled in the railway yards to 
meet a special train carrying 120 shearers and shed hands. Police were on hand but 
‘apart from jeering and hooting the crowd was very orderly’.63 How ‘neutral’ the 
police were is open to interpretation. Kosmas Tsokhas provides a careful analysis of 
the police role during the 1930 NSW strike concluding, ‘even the police were not 
totally pliant tools of the employers’.64  
 
Little is known about who strike-breakers were. The Graziers Co-operative Shearing 
Company brought ‘southerners’ in. In oral histories it is rare for any shearer to openly 
admit to shearing during a strike – some almost protest too much that they did not. 
Intimidation in the towns inhibited Queensland shearers who would otherwise have 
been ready to shear, and the risk of being branded a ‘scab’ on the mateship grapevine 
deterred others. Nevertheless, the AWU’s strong condemnation of the strike was a 
moral justification to defy the ‘bogus disrupters’ for those brave enough.  It is clear 
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that in many cases graziers compromised standards. The employment black hole of 
the Depression ensured a ready supply of men who had little shearing experience, and 
in some cases none at all.  
 
Oral histories by Wendy Lowenstein 40 years later illustrate the dilemmas of 
mateship and survival. ‘Nugget’ Humphries was a shearer scratching rather 
unsuccessfully for opal at Lightening Ridge, living on damper and seriously 
malnourished. He contacted a Brewarrina shearing contractor who gave him a pen 
despite his obviously poor physical state. ‘One thing, there was plenty of good food in 
the sheds’, he said and his health quickly improved.
65
 Humphries took up share 
farming on a bank foreclosure block in the Hillston region, but it was far too small to 
make a go of it. He got hold of ‘a little popping-jenny, a portable shearing machine, 
and a double horse lorry’, and went cocky shearing. Few farmers had any cash 
because banks controlled their cheques and wheat was only ‘one and ninepence’. The 
award was irrelevant. ‘Worst conditions I’ve ever shore under, and the worst pay’. 
Barter was the norm - a bag of wheat to feed a pig or chooks - ‘Take that. The bank 
doesn’t know it’s there’! If a man was a credible shearer it was not necessary to 
endure these indignities and eventually Humphries wrote to the Graziers Shearing 
Company – this must have been 1933 or 1934 – and was sent to Barcaldine Downs, a 
big pastoral company station in Queensland. The bank manager in charge of the 
Hillston selection tried to persuade him to stay – banks were hated by selectors but 
mortgagee eviction was actually a last resort. Someone had to run the properties. 
Humphries, though, had had enough: ‘I’m going where I can get some money! I might 
get fifty pounds for the [shearing] season. I’m making nothing here.’ 
66
 
 
There was no question of anything but award rates with the Graziers’ Company and 
two decent sheds would have earned £50. Humphries stood to make as much as £150 
if he got a run of sheds and, say, 10,000 sheep. He was careful to say that he had not 
scabbed in 1930 or 1931, although it is easy to see how he might have if he thought he 
could get away with it. Others like him certainly did. Cocky shearing for bags of seed 
was technically scabbing, but shearers had a capacity to see small flocks in farming 
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districts as completely separate worlds from grazier sheds.
67
 Sheep had to be shorn 
and shearers were better off than most during the Depression. 
 
Another of Lowenstein’s subjects, Arthur Burgess, had an even sharper nose for 
shearing’s value as a safety net. He had invested £1,400 in a picture theatre at Cobar. 
It was a financial disaster, but he could shear so he decided to try contracting ‘to keep 
the billy boiling’. Apparently a good talker, he borrowed a plant from a farmer at 
Nymagee on the understanding that he would shear his 2,500 sheep before the end of 
the season (it turned out to be 3,000!). He telephoned an acquaintance in Orange, a 
shearer called Fred McIntyre. Between them they managed to secure a shed of 14,000 
at award rates with ‘tucker, tobacco and matches thrown in’. Suddenly they were in a 
league beyond cocky shearing with a portable plant, and there was quite a panic to 
arrange enough shearers, rouseabouts and a cook. The train which brought them 
arrived around midnight, hours late, and somehow they had to be transported to the 
woolshed, and the plant set up in time for the morning. Stores worth £75 were 
somehow secured on a storekeeper’s credit. 
But from then on we’re home on the pigs back. In twelve months from that first shed, we 
shore a hundred and twenty thousand sheep and we never lost one minute from the weather. 
You never heard anything like it. Talk about the angels sitting on your shoulder! And I’ll give 
the cockies here credit, they stuck to the locals. At the end of twelve months I’d cleared the 
picture show up, paid it right off and I’d paid a thousand pound deposit on a talkie plant.68  
Burgess had the misfortune to be badly injured in a road accident shortly afterwards, 
but by 1933 the mine in Cobar had re-opened employing 300 men. Having no further 
need for the complicated life of a shearing contractor, Burgess expanded into talkies, 
built a shop, and ‘never looked back’. 
 
The Later 1930s 
 
Despite the fire and brimstone, PWIU achievements in Queensland in 1931 were 
meagre. In 1932 the mood in early shearing sheds was again edgy. The Graziers’ 
Shearing Company was concerned about the usual trouble spots around Moree, 
Brewarrina and Coonamble. The Pastoral Award was due to be adjusted again on the 
cost-of-living formula, which in the Depression economy would drive them lower in 
nominal terms, not up. R.C. Wilson anticipated ‘an outcry’ but ‘did not expect any 
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serious trouble’. Nor did he think that the PWIU was a spent force.
69
 The whole mood 
was complicated by another award claim in the pipeline, an attempt by the AWU to 
reverse the Dethridge cut of 1930.70 A win in the Court would nullify PWIU criticism. 
The chances were not any better (ultimately it failed) and, with the new season rapidly 
approaching, the timing was awkward.71 Shearers delayed signing on in the hope that 
higher rates would eventuate. Some were simply staying at home because there would 
be no shearing. Wilson received a letter from Norman Jeffery, Secretary of the PWIU 
at the end of May, stating that a ‘mass meeting’ had resolved to strike from 1 July if a 
detailed list of demands were not met. Again, radicals were pre-empting the 
Arbitration Court as well as the AWU, whose position was that shearers should do 
nothing to distract the Court from its important work. Jeffery’s letter had been copied 
to the Graziers Association in any case, but Wilson quickly alerted J.W. Allen. Allen 
was unlikely to be complacent, but Wilson saw fit to ensure his close attention by 
enclosing a copy of the Red Leader full of reports about the threatened action. The 
Shearing Company was sufficiently nervous to open its seasonal offices in Moree and 
Dubbo ‘a little earlier than usual’. Engagement was slow and by the end of June only 
60 per cent of the usual number of men had come forward. More worrying from the 
Company’s point of view was that many of those presenting themselves were only 
‘fair shearers’ rather than the ‘the usual number of good fast shearers’.72  
 
It was the first real sign of a significant problem for the Company in the 1930s. The 
policy of fostering fast shearers with a strong work ethic had paid off but under the 
PWIU influence previously reliable money-makers realised the Company needed 
them more than they needed the Company. Quality shearers were going with private 
contractors who were prepared to pressure graziers to pay above the award. The 
Company fielded complaints that its shearers were too slow and began to lose 
clients.
73
 During World War II, when an acute shearer shortage developed, it got 
worse. Wilson told his Board in 1945 of rumours circulating in New England that the 
Company ‘employed a low type of shearer, and therefore had trouble in its sheds.’ 
Wilson thought it unfounded, and after sending one of his top managers Bill Payne to 
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investigate, the Board decided that ‘some action should be taken to refute these 
rumours’.74 Both the Shearing Company and the AWU tended to be wrong footed by 
delays in Arbitration Court proceedings. Shearers had meaningful bargaining power, 
even during the Depression, and money-makers were seduced by militancy. 
 
The AWU and the Shearing Company adopted remarkably similar strategies to rally 
their supporters. R.C. Wilson addressed the local Boorowa branch of the Graziers 
Association (near Young) on 13 August 1932.75 Likewise AWU meetings were held 
in Walgett and Bourke which, at the urging of AWU officials, passed resolutions 
opposing Jeffery’s strike.
76
 George Buckland, Secretary of the NSW Branch, 
officially advised members throughout 1932 that the union was against a strike and 
they should not be misled by Jeffery’s propaganda.77 In the event shearing began 
without much difficulty in the 1932 season, but Wilson and Allen were well aware 
that there could be future problems. Seasons from 1933 to 1935 were relatively quiet, 
a long spell of wet weather in 1934 being the only complication.
78
 In 1935, AWU 
organisers reported that shearers were again buying AWU tickets.  
 
However, shearing was disrupted in both 1936 and 1937. In April 1936 the Company 
Board was told that ‘shearing is going along alright’ in Queensland, but ‘owing to the 
flies being very bad and everyone wanting to shear at once there had been an acute 
shortage of shearers’. There was an attempt ‘to cause some trouble’ at Barcaldine 
Downs, Wilson said, and he thought ‘it would be advisable in future to have more 
Southern men in the teams as a lot of the trouble seemed to be caused by local men’. 
The situation was managed by addressing the complaints and a major walkout was 
avoided. There were complications in running this shed because Tait, a powerful 
owner who liked to get his own way, asked the company not to use NSW men 
because of local unemployment. He also pressured the Company to be lenient towards 
the local manager Holmes, who had been caught dishonestly booking merchandise to 
the Company. The Board felt there was no alternative but to sack him but Tait asked 
                                                
74 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company minutes, 23/1/1945 
75 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company minutes, 9/8/1932. 
76 The Worker, 24/8/1932, p. 16; 31/8/1932, p. 17; 7/9/1932, p. 17. 
77 The Worker, 24/2/1932, p. 16. The notice was repeated several times. Also 22/6/1932, p. 16; 
29/6/1932, p. 16; 3/8/1932, p. 8. 
78 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company Minutes, 11/12/1934. 
  200 
the Company to wait until Barcaldine Downs was finished. Holmes was well thought 
of and had a knack of controlling unruly shearers.79    
 
When the focus shifted to early NSW sheds the Company faced a co-ordinated strike 
in the Bourke district. The men were ‘determined to make a stand for 37/6 per 100 
(the award was 32/6). The situation was sufficiently threatening for Wilson himself to 
travel to Bourke where he addressed a local Graziers Association meeting. He noted 
that ‘a big number of shearers’ had gathered in Bourke and Brewarrina, and was in no 
doubt that this was a PWIU operation. The men were being organised into gangs who 
would ‘[do] their best to intimidate the men who want to go to work’.
80
 When he got 
back to Sydney he requested an urgent meeting of the Graziers’ Association’s Strike 
Committee. 
 
Shortly after this a classic PWIU kidnapping raid occurred at Charlton station as 
shearers were taking up residence to start shearing. A man named Statton was arrested 
and eventually sentenced to 4 months prison (suspended on payment of a good 
behaviour bond and witness costs). Bob Morgan, president of the PWIU and well 
known to Wilson and Allen, was prosecuted for inciting a strike at Dunumbral. To 
Wilson’s frustration administrative delays held up the case for six or seven weeks by 
which time crucial witnesses had dispersed. However, charges were laid against nine 
men for trespass at Collymongle on the day of the start. Presumably this was another 
intimidation/kidnapping attempt by PWIU fanatics.81 The Company’s efforts had been 
enough to prevent a major strike, but Wilson ‘felt that it was more than likely’ that 
‘the Communists would try and cause trouble again’ in 1937. Wilson also felt that the 
PWIU was seizing every opportunity to harass the AWU, and noted wryly: ‘Due to 
the age and ineptitude of the present AWU leaders the PWIU [is] meeting with some 
success.’
82
 
 
In 1937 a slowly proceeding award case provided another opportunity for militants. 
The Shearing Company adopted its usual precautions in consultation with the 
Graziers Association. Provisioning of a strike committee was organised by F.B. 
                                                
79 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company Minutes, 14/4/1936. 
80 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company Minutes, 23/6/1936. 
81 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company Minutes 21/7/1936. 
82 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company Minutes 1/9/1936. 
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Fleming (conveniently he was Treasurer of the Graziers Association as well as 
Chairman of the Shearing Company). The Melbourne office of the Shearing Company 
was put on stand-by so that Victorian shearers could be mobilised to go into the 
strike-prone early-shearing districts of north and western NSW if they were needed. 
The co-operation of the Graziers Association of Victoria and Riverina was sought and 
agreed to.  Wilson prepared a detailed ‘history of strikes in the shearing industry since 
the War’, reviewing the Company’s experience and the lessons learned. The key was 
‘sending men from unaffected areas in order to make sure of key sheds starting’. He 
expressed misgivings that drawing too heavily on Victoria’s resources would interfere 
with the smooth operation of shearing in the South. This had been canvassed with 
Douglas Boyd of the Victorian Graziers Association who was confident that they 
could ‘work such teams back into the southern sheds when the trouble was over’.83 
 
Once again newspaper reports had an influence on events when the Sydney Morning 
Herald reported that a strike would start on 15 June.
84
 Wilson suspected Norman 
Jeffery was feeding the press misinformation. Another report said that 11 men (out of 
24) had walked off Bangate station, but this was a Company shed and Wilson knew 
that only one shearer had left after the PWIU ‘visit’. He wasted no time advising the 
Herald and it printed a lengthy statement of Wilson’s version of what happened.85 In 
addition to feeding a ‘false statement about this Company’s sheds’, as Wilson put it, 
Norman Jeffery had spoken at least twice on the Labor-owned radio station 2KY. Old 
boy networks were activated to prevent more publication of falsehoods. Sir Fredrick 
Tout, Chairman of the Graziers Association, and Wilson approached Hubert Fairfax, a 
prominent grazier from southern Queensland, coincidentally a board member of John 
Fairfax Ltd., owners of the Herald. Fairfax reassured the Company, in writing, that 
any further articles on shearing strikes would first be referred to the Graziers 
Association. Pressure was applied to the Minister of Broadcasting and Jeffrey’s access 
to 2KY also ceased.  Meanwhile the one shearer who had broken his agreement at 
Bangate was prosecuted in the Walgett District Court. Nothing was being left to 
chance.
86
 Seven shearers, including Ted Irvine, were jailed after a nasty incident at a 
                                                
83 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company Minutes 19/2/1937. 
84 SMH, 16/6/1937, p. 13. 
85 SMH, 17/6/1937, p. 8. 
86 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company Minutes 22/6/1937; 6/7/1937; CPD, Vol. 153, 1937, pp. 493, 696, 
833. The Minister was Robert Menzies. 
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shed near Nyngan.
87
 There was some trouble at Guisley station in July and a third 
team had to be put in to complete the shearing. The incident was a good example of 
how the PWIU could exploit the delicate sensitivities of mateship, but the Company 
also felt that the station manager had unnecessarily antagonised the shearers. It was a 
costly exercise in which the usual careful attention to detail was inadequate.88 The 
1937 shearing season, although not without drama, was the PWIU swan song. 
   
World War II and Communist Infiltration 
 
During World War II these tensions were suppressed to some extent, but they 
certainly did not go away, and late in the war they exploded. As in World War I, bulk 
purchase of wool by the British Government for the allied cause provided a 
comforting platform of wealth. Shearing was a proscribed occupation, but shearers 
still became extremely scarce. The shortage of shearers was a fresh opportunity for 
militants. Most of the ex-PWIU activists returned to the AWU although some were 
later expelled.  As the 1940 shearing season approached rumours circulated that 
militants were planning to strike. R.C. Wilson was asked what he thought. He played 
it down, suggesting that for the past few years ‘the shearers and the graziers have 
worked happily together’, and that all agreed that the best way was to be guided by 
the rates set down by the federal Arbitration Court. However, behind the scenes the 
Company was concerned. It was only two seasons since the PWIU folded and Wilson 
was well aware that its activists had regrouped inside the AWU.89  
 
Lest there be any doubt, he gave the Herald a very comprehensive description of how 
militants operated. They organised meetings of ‘local committees’. These were called 
‘AWU’ meetings, but they were not usually organised by, or under the control of 
AWU officials. As soon as the NSW Branch hierarchy became aware of them, they 
were condemned as ‘bogus’, and members were strongly advised to have nothing to 
do with them.  
Though the PWIU is dead, its leaders are carrying on. Now they are inside the AWU and 
proud of their new respectability, but their technique in creating trouble is exactly the same 
                                                
87 SMH, 7/7/1937, p. 8; The Worker, 23/6/1937, pp 18,19. 
88 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company Minutes, 17/8/1937; 31/8/1937; 28/9/1937; 9/11/1937. 
89 ABL Z278, Shearing Company minutes, 20/2/1940; 23/4/1940; Reference Committee Meeting, 
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way. They are flooding the back country of New South Wales with long yellow pamphlets 
headed ‘The Case for Higher Wages in the Pastoral Industry’.90 
As it turned out, the 1940 season was relatively quiet. The Shearing Company’s well 
rehearsed tactics of isolating militants and prosecuting to deter others continued to 
work. However, there was persistent trouble in the sheds throughout the war. The 
overall level of prices rose by about 25 per cent over the five years of the War, and 
shearing rates were adjusted in fits and starts by roughly the same amount. Kosmas 
Tsokhas has shown, on a limited survey of sheep station accounts, that actual shearing 
wages probably rose by more the 40 per cent. The Shearing Company’s policy of 
sticking to the award meant that it was losing sheds to private contractors, who were 
more willing to acknowledge market realities.91 
 
Despite the AWU’s best efforts to prevent it, there was a significant strike in 1945. 
Early shearing in Queensland was affected, and from April 1945 spread to the 
perennially troublesome sheds of northern-NSW. In 1945 a particularly severe 
drought meant that graziers were anxious to shear. Again the AWU had claims in the 
pipeline for alterations to both the federal and Queensland awards, and as usual 
argued that shearers should wait for the outcome of these cases. The Arbitration Court 
‘upped the ante’ to some extent, by insisting that it would not consider the case at all 
unless all shearing strikes were called off. This hardly deterred the militant-minded, 
who argued that the Arbitration Court was a big part of their problem, and were 
spoiling for direct confrontation. In their eyes it was the disease rather than the 
medicine to cure shearers’ grievances.   
 
While the agitation was at its peak, R.C. Wilson, the General Manager of Grazcos, 
spoke to a group of graziers at Young, NSW. He described how the communists 
operated and outlined what he thought their motives were. This fuelled the 
conservative prejudice of his audience, but had a basis in first hand knowledge.92 The 
first move was to get some kind of stoppage started. Agitators were adept at 
exploiting ambiguities about who they really were, and adopted personas that implied 
they had some sort of status within the AWU. A favourite trick was to circulate 
                                                
90 SMH, 16/5/1940, p. 5. 
91 Tsokhas, ‘Myth of Wartime Harmony’, pp. 218-9, 222. 
92 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company Minutes, 17/4/1945. Wilson called his address ‘The Danger of 
Communism to Australia and the Trouble in the Shearing Industry’. A copy of the speech has not been 
found, but Wilson described militant tactics to the press, SMH 30/4/1945, p. 4.  
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whispers that the AWU hierarchy supported shearers’ demands and was in favour of 
direct action, but could not do so openly as it did not want to be attacked for 
damaging the war effort. By the time the AWU got around to countering these 
calumnies, troublemakers had usually persuaded a nucleus of sheds to strike. The 
tactic then was to keep isolated wildcat stoppages rolling. When a majority in a shed 
voted for a return to work, it was put to them that it would be ‘scabbing’ if other sheds 
were still ‘out’. It would not be fair to your mates to start before other strike 
committees had wired through start-work motions from other sheds. Few shearers 
relished odium of the ‘scab’ label, and the ruse usually worked.93 Another technique, 
which had recently been seen in Queensland, was to require written clearances from 
strike committees before they could work in other sheds. This had created a backlog 
of between two and three million sheep over a matter that was relatively trivial.  
 
The Graziers Co-operative Shearing Company endeavoured to see that its shed 
managers were not put in the position of the hapless ‘pommie jackaroo’. The 
Company usually had the capacity to bring in a fresh team at short notice, avoiding 
the weakness of the lone squatter. Rarely did the incoming team refuse to shear - the 
Guisley case mentioned above being an exception. Secondly, the Company was 
prepared to call the disrupters’ bluff. The risk of  prosecution for breaking an 
agreement was enough to curb the militant instincts of many. Graziers Association 
members were advised to do everything by the book and to keep notes. It all depended 
on the evidence, and J.W. Allen did not waste Association money on cases it could 
not win. The system had to be sensitively managed. It was up to the shed overseer to 
judge whether the grievance was ‘genuine’ or ‘contrived’ – complaints by shearers 
were not always a ‘try on’, and it was in the Company’s long term interests not to 
create grievances unnecessarily. As the AWU had much the same attitude, the 
arbitration system intersected with the reality of the woolshed floor. Both the AWU 
and the Graziers Association, for all their apparent mutual hostility, were committed 
to resolving matters within the arbitration system. Both took victories and defeats in 
their stride. 
 
                                                
93 SMH, 16/4/1940, p. 5. 
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The 1945 strike was an escalation of the industrial friction graziers were accustomed 
to. Recently demobbed soldiers helped the labour supply situation. Shearing was not 
held up for long, and it did not affect the sheep-wheat belt in NSW (which usually 
shore in August and September) or Victoria (a bit later). However, it signified that a 
militant culture survived into in the post-War era. Wilson’s assertions of a communist 
influence were not entirely misplaced, but the mindset of shearers also owed 
something to the ‘bush nomad’ tradition. By now shearers were not ‘nomads’ and for 
the most part were family men. They lived in Moree, Bourke, and other towns of 
north-western NSW and central-western Queensland. Relationships with these rural 
communities were complex – they were part of them, yet they continued to resent 
graziers, who they often still called ‘squatters’. Their manners were coarse, and 
although they could often be influenced by ‘communist agitators’, their bonds with 
the authoritarian, male-chauvinist, old-unionism of those who actually ran the AWU 
were in fact rather strong. 
 
Chapter 8: The Wool Boom and the 1956 Strike 
 
Militants after the War 
 
Economic aspects of the 1950s wool boom have already been canvassed in Chapter 3. 
The AWU saw it as a not-to-be-squandered opportunity to improve the lot of pastoral 
workers. The union was still feeling the sting of its militant critics and needed to 
demonstrate that its tribal mantra of arbitration could deliver results. The PWIU was 
dead but its foot-soldiers had insinuated themselves back inside the AWU during the 
war, and arguably that was worse. Their most recent enterprise of note, the 1945 
strike, was reminder enough of their troublemaking antics. Returned soldiers were 
slow returning to the sheds and country workers were lured into more secure jobs in 
mining and construction. At the woolshed, where graziers, contractors and shearers 
came together, ‘them and us’ attitudes persisted.  
 
Militancy in shearing sheds was a very minor side of a larger picture. In 1947 the 
Labor Party, beleaguered by trouble in coalmining, sensed the looming electoral 
damage for incumbent  Federal and State Governments. The Worker published grave 
warnings about ‘Cuckoos in the Nest of Labor’ and condemned ‘Commo’ 
disrupters’.1  Bill Wilson, Secretary of the NSW Branch, was speaking generally 
about coal mines and the waterfront when he referred to the communist influence in 
unions as ‘the greatest orgy of scabbery ever known in the industrial life of 
Australia’.2 Tom Dougherty, General Secretary from 1944, was even more strident 
when he attacked communists, most of it directed at their infiltration of the wider 
labour movement.3 While none of this had much to do with shearing sheds, both the 
AWU and the Graziers Association were keenly aware that PWIU remnants were still 
very active.  
 
It was now about 30 years since the Bushworkers’ Propaganda Group had surfaced 
and some of its leading lights were no longer around. Arthur Rae died in 1943 – 
radical to the end. Norman Jeffery was still occasionally sighted, and the AWU kept 
                                                
1 The Worker, 26/3/1947, p. 1. 
2 The Worker,  2/4/1947, p. 10. 
3 Radio address, ‘The Menace of Communism’, The Worker, 2/1/1946, p. 6. 
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tabs on him.
4
 In 1939 a letter appeared in The Worker, indicating that he still regarded 
the AWU membership as fertile territory for his activism. Jeffery lived until 1966, but 
apart from a suggestion that he was behind an attempted shearing strike in 1948, his 
involvement in the pastoral industry in the 1950s was minimal.
5
 What became of 
‘Trucker’ Brown is unknown. Edgar Williams, a Queensland AWU stalwart and 
implacable foe, claims that he ended up as a ‘squatter’. Probably this meant no more 
than a small plot of land on which he reared a couple of horses. Neil Byron, a militant 
shearer from the 1930s, who died only in 2005, knew ‘Trucker’ Brown, and 
apparently he talked about him often. Unfortunately little of this ended up in his 
autobiography.
6
  
 
The AWU had a vivid recall of Brown’s nefarious past right back to 1919.  In 1952, 
in yet another denunciation of ‘Red Blacklegs in Shearing Sheds’ and ‘Commo 
Stooges’, The Worker published a highly pejorative account of the Propaganda Group 
and PWIU which was at pains to paint Brown unfavourably. Connections to the 
Communist Party were rehearsed, and the 1930 strike. ‘The PWIU’, it said, ‘played a 
role of unparalleled scabbery, and did all it could to provoke trouble and cause 
disunity’. Agitators were accused of deserting strikers at the most critical stage (‘poor 
deluded dupes’). When the Graziers Association initiated prosecutions, it claimed, the 
AWU ‘was called upon to defend hundreds and hundreds of men, some of whom 
afterwards showed base ingratitude by linking up with the traitorous PWIU and 
attacking the organisation that had befriended them’.7 While the tirade was plainly 
self-serving and wildly exaggerated, this version of history rang true. Regardless, it 
was a sure sign that PWIU influences were still – in the 1950s – worrying the AWU. 
Grazcos, whose shed managers confronted militancy on a regular basis, was not in 
any doubt either, that ‘communists’ were still active in shearing.8 
 
                                                
4 Security authorities probably monitored him also. Moore, ‘Pastoral Workers’ Industrial Union’, p. 64. 
5 The Worker, 11/1/1939, p. 18; 7/4/1948, p. 6.  
6 Cecil Wallace (Edgar) Williams, Yellow  Green and Red, The Worker Newspaper Pty., Brisbane, 
1967, p. 9. Byron, All Among the Wool Boys. The writer acknowledges communications in June 2007 
with Drew Cottle, who knew Byron, for some of these details.  SMH, 21/12/2000, p. 26. 
7 The Worker, 21/5/1952, p. 8. 
8 ABL, Z278, Shearing Company Minutes, 26/11/1946; 1/4/1947; 17/2/1948; 1/7/1952. The Graziers 
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Ted Irvine, Bob Morgan, and Lit Connors had been radicalised in the 1930s.
9
 What 
they called the ‘Progress Committee’ was based in Dubbo. The tactics of these ‘bogus 
disrupters’, as the AWU called them, were much the same as in Bushworker 
Propaganda and  PWIU days, focussed on early-sheds. Midkin (in the Moree district) 
and Wingadee (just north of Coonamble) were still very big sheds in the 1950s.10 One 
aim was to discourage shearers from leaving home by spreading rumours of a strike. 
If shearing towns were awash with men contractors could find shearers prepared to 
start. But if there were mainly ‘hotheads’, as Grazcos called them, group pressure 
against ‘scabbing’ was stronger. If a shed voted not to strike men could still be 
persuaded to wait for other sheds to start. Few shearers wanted to be labelled ‘scabs’. 
Fiery oratory, threats and physical intimidation were all used at different times.  
 
The AWU was forced to show the flag with meetings organised in towns such as 
Moree, Narrabri, and Gunnedah. Bill Wilson’s oratory condemned ‘a few ill advised 
individuals with limited knowledge and small vision’.  One meeting at the Returned 
Servicemen’s Hall in Moree, held on a Saturday at the end of March in 1947, was a 
lively affair. Militants had arrived first and tried to persuade those attending not to let 
Wilson in. According to Wilson this was easily overcome (whether a physical scuffle 
took place, he did not say). Once inside he was able, he said, to quickly dispel the 
spurious logic of the militant case for direct action.          
Probably it was foolish to expect them to do the decent thing, as they were incapable of such a 
course. Members generally had no time for such filthy tactics, and the signs were that in all 
areas throughout the State they would pay more attention to officials and the advice of the 
Union than ever before.11 
Wilson concluded with a pep talk about the coming 1949 election and the need to 
fight to retain the Labor Government. He linked the Liberal Party, the Country Party, 
and the Communist Party with the ‘common objective’ of defeating Labor.12 It had, 
                                                
9 See Chapter 7 for their raids on woolsheds. 
10 The Australian Pastoral Directory, 1954, lists both as properties of the New Zealand and Australian 
Land Company. Midkin stocked 46,974 sheep and 2,276 cattle, and Wingadee 60,906 sheep and 2,352 
cattle. The greater emphasis on cattle compared with the inter-war period is notable, but by 1950s 
standards these were both very large sheep flocks. See also McKenzie, Wingadee, p. 53; ABL, Z278, 
Shearing Company Minutes, 25/6/1946; 28/6/1949. 
11 The Worker, 9/4/1947, p. 10. 
12 This was soap box rhetoric. The communist scare certainly helped Robert Menzies’ Liberal-Country 
Coalition defeat Labor in that 1949 election, and retain office through the entire 1950s and ‘60s. 
Convenient as it was, there is no evidence that Menzies actually colluded with communists in this 
devious way. In the shearing industry Graziers Association and Grazcos saw it as vital to their interests 
that the AWU survived, despite the low opinion of its leaders. See, R.C. Wilson’s dismissive ‘age and 
ineptitude’ remark quoted towards the end of Chapter 7.  
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further, been necessary to expel some of these ‘persons’ from the AWU, because 
letters had been published with ‘false information’, and because of ‘fifth column 
activities’. It was all very cloak and dagger, but Wilson said he was constrained from 
saying more because there was an appeal against the expulsions pending in the 
Courts. This case dragged on for another 20 months and it was not until December 
1948 that Bill Wilson was able to brag that the High Court had upheld the AWU’s 
right to expel the ‘agrarian Commos’.
13
 
 
Skirmishes between the AWU and the ‘Progress Committee’ were first reported in 
1946 and continued well into the 1950s. In January 1947 Dougherty produced a copy 
of a letter from F.A. Nash & Co, a well known shearing contractor based in Sydney, 
in which a shearer was told he needed clearance from the Dubbo ‘Strike Committee’ 
to be employed. This was part of the wash-up after the 1945 strike. As far as 
Dougherty was concerned the idea that rebels demanded money from shearers for 
clearances was brazen in the extreme.
14
 Six years later ‘phony circulars’ were still 
being distributed in the Broken Hill region.15 In 1954 Dougherty told conference that 
resolutions had been submitted ‘purely for the purpose of Communist propaganda’. 
Using whatever pretext he could these were kept off the conference agenda and 
publication in The Worker blocked. This, he said, prevented the union becoming a 
vehicle for communist propaganda in the general press.16  
 
The 40-Hour Week and Scabby Mouth 
  
Just as the source of trouble in the early 1920s had been the 44-hour week, in the late-
1940s it was the 40-hour week. The AWU’s position was that it was in favour of the 
40-hour week, but there was no advantage, either to shearers (paid by piecework) or 
shed hands (paid by the week), unless higher rates of pay were first won in the 
arbitration court. A 40-hour week was no good without 44-hour pay! This was the 
source of bitter acrimony between AWU leaders and the militant fringe.17 While the 
AWU eventually won the 40-hour week at the Arbitration Court, Dougherty was 
                                                
13 The Worker, 8/12/1948, pp. 1, 6, 7. 
14 The Worker, 1/1/1947, p. 3. 
15 The Worker, 22/4/1953, p. 6.    
16 The Worker, 10/2/1954, p.8.  
17 Byron, All Among the Wool Boys, pp.  24-5. 
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forced into adopting a more aggressive stance. The matter became urgent at the 1947 
AWU Conference. The application to the Court had been made in March 1945, so 
impatience was mounting. Dougherty decided to go onto the front foot, and moved 
that the AWU would call a strike if the Court did not grant the 40-hour week. Clarrie 
Fallon wanted an even stronger motion, but Dougherty managed to prevail. Official 
instructions were issued for shearers to sign agreements only on a 40-hour basis. As it 
turned out, the Court delivered, but had it not, direct action was almost inevitable. 
Constant attacks by militants goaded him in this direction, although Dougherty never 
ceased to abuse them. Whether the Court also took this into account is a moot point.18  
 
Shearer anxiety about a disease in sheep known as ‘scabby mouth’ was also exploited. 
Scabby mouth was an unpleasant condition in which sheep developed cancerous 
sores. It had long been known, although it became more prevalent in this period. It 
was widely believed that the infection could infect humans, although the scientific 
evidence was inconclusive despite extensive inquiries. Graziers accepted that it was 
unreasonable to ask shearers to shear infected animals, but often there were only two 
or three in a mob with symptoms. The AWU adopted the stance, which graziers 
accepted, that diseased sheep should be drafted out. This was not entirely from 
goodwill, because if whole mobs were rejected there would be little shearing in some 
districts. The militant view was that the whole mob could not be shorn, primarily to 
maximise inconvenience to the grower. Graziers firmly believed that disputes over 
wet sheep were often contrived, and this was similar. Scabby mouth was a genuine 
problem, but ready made for those intent on mischief.19     
 
Fighting Talk at the Arbitration Court 
 
The Pastoral Award had not been overhauled since 1938 (although there had been 
periodic adjustment of pay rates to keep them broadly in line with retail prices). 
Shearers were restive. The AWU initiated a claim in 1947 but bureaucracy moved 
slowly. Early in 1948 rumours were deliberately spread that the AWU had itself lost 
patience with the Court and was planning a strike. This was right out of the PWIU 
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19 The Worker, 1/1/1947, p. 11; 15/1/1947, p. 11; 31/12/1947, p. 11;  28/1/1948, p. 8; 17/1/1951, p. 9; 
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manual - insinuate unofficial AWU approval to sway moderate attitudes. Bill Wilson 
corrected this falsehood and vilified ‘unofficial strike-mongers’. If members were 
duped they would only succeed in delaying matters even further as the Court refused 
to sit under such threats. It was reminiscent of the corner the union had been painted 
into in 1922. 
 
While condemning ‘communists’ AWU policies subtly shifted leftwards. Dougherty’s 
opening address in the 1948 award case adopted the risky strategy of doing just what 
Bill Wilson had warned members against – using the threat of militant disruption to 
pressure the Court.  He opened with a request for an interim award of an extra 5/3 per 
hundred. Increases were ‘long overdue’. Dougherty was subtly – or perhaps not so 
subtly - reminding the Court of the edgy mood in the outback. He went on in much 
detail about ‘subversive organisations which [have] always attempted to cause 
industrial trouble and industrial strikes when the Union was in Court with a claim to 
improve the wages and conditions of pastoral workers’. 
There [is] such a little coterie operating now in the pastoral industry, and [I] want to make it 
quite clear to the Court that the Union completely [dissociates] itself from any intimations, 
instructions or advice given under the name of the AWU by this Communist cell which [is] 
working in the pastoral areas of the Commonwealth.20 
This bore remarkable resemblance statements that J.W. Allen and R.C. Wilson, the 
Grazcos manager, had made both in public and private. Dougherty read from a 
pamphlet ‘which had been flooding the pastoral areas’. The perpetrators were 
controlled by the Communist Party, the Court was told. They had based themselves at 
Dubbo, and the pamphlet was a report of a ‘Pastoral Workers Conference’ held on 6 
and 7 March 1948. The leaders were six men, four of them known communists, who 
had been expelled from the AWU. The contents were spelled out in detail, including a 
proposal for direct strike action, and collection of money. ‘There never has been a 
pamphlet put out from these people unless there has been a bite at the end of it’, 
Dougherty confided to the Judge. He assumed the money ‘went into the funds of the 
Communist Party’. The postal address on the pamphlet was that of a communist cell 
associated with Norman Jeffery, of 22 Garden Ave, Glebe. Not that anybody present 
really needed reminding, it was explained that Jeffery was the ‘self-styled’ Secretary 
of the Agrarian Section of Communist Party, and formerly Secretary of the PWIU. An 
                                                
20 The Worker, 7/4/1948, p. 6. 
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article titled ‘Shearers Plan State-wide Strike on Wages’ had appeared in a 
Communist newspaper on 17 March 1948. All told, Dougherty was laying it on thick.  
We do not want to be embarrassed by the persons who were attempting to bring about a strike 
and we do not want to create the impression that we were in any way using those persons to 
obtain advantages on behalf of members.21 
Perish the thought, any more than Commissioner Donovan could admit to taking the 
bait. Donovan protested that he knew of no case that had been ‘more expeditiously 
handled’. However, he did agree to listen carefully to Dougherty’s argument for an 
interim award. Dougherty obliged with a lengthy analysis of movements in wool 
prices and indexes of the cost of living, but the important work had been done. He had 
succeeded in using the militant threat to intimidate the Court, and gotten away with it. 
The interim award was duly granted and Dougherty made sure that this was on the 
front page of The Worker with another diatribe about ‘communists’. As the case 
droned on the AWU was having it both ways, using the threat of militants to put 
pressure on the Court, while keeping its own hands clean.
22
  
 
As wool prices accelerated the AWU successfully pressed for higher shearing rates. 
The introduction of a Wool Value Allowance in 1949 was a formula for boosting 
shearing rates whenever wool prices exceeded a benchmark annual average of 39.5 
pence per lb. It added 9 pence per hundred for every extra penny on wool. It seemed a 
modest enough bonus, but it boosted shearing rates £3/15/- per hundred in the 
extraordinary circumstances of 1951. As the wool price started to recede application 
of the formula cut shearing rates anyway but the graziers also began to clamour for 
the formula itself to be watered down, the first application along these lines being 
made in 1952. The union response was to accept the impact of the formula, but to 
argue aggressively for increases in the general rate to compensate. After the 1945 
strike shearing rates were 45/-. Once they passed 100/- (£5) in 1950 it was easier to 
talk in pounds rather than shillings. The Wool Value Allowance drove them to the 
extraordinary level of 174/- (£8/14/-) in 1951. By mid-1952 the formula cut them to 
127/6 (£6/7/6) although the counter claim soon raised them in July to 140/- (or £7) per 
100. Still, history had shown that in any economic circumstance shearers were unruly 
when shearing rates were cut.
 23
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22 The Worker, 7/4/1948, pp. 1,6; 14/4/1948, p. 10. 
23 The Worker, 2/7/1952, p. 1. 
 213 
 
The 1952 award case was unusual because the Court’s entourage travelled out to 
Moree and Coonamble for the convenience of witnesses. Parallel meetings of AWU 
members provided intriguing reactions to whatever was said in the Court. After three 
or four days of hearings at the Moree Courthouse, 98 pastoral workers attended a 
meeting in the Moree Town Hall on the Sunday. There might have been more had 
heavy rain not made it inconvenient to travel.  A reduction in rates – according to the 
Wool Value Allowance formula – had already been announced, effective from 19 
May (the next day). The AWU was making a counter claim, and hoped this would 
restore rates. A motion was passed, noting ‘hostility’ to the reduction, but agreeing to 
continue working under protest until the union’s claim was heard. Dougherty claimed 
that the ‘Red stooges’ had dodged a confrontation with him. Hearings were resumed 
at Coonamble Courthouse on Wednesday 21 May. After the adjournment Dougherty, 
Charlie Oliver (the NSW Secretary) and Harry Delany (the local organiser) faced an 
awkward meeting of members in the local hall. There were 108 at the gathering, 
including ‘a large group representing Warren’, known for its fiery opinions. Under 
Jack Andriski’s chairmanship (just what his sympathies were, is not indicated) there 
was a unanimous resolution not to accept work at reduced rates. Dougherty, Oliver 
and Delany carefully explained the award and AWU policy. Technically, although the 
headline rate for shearing was going down this was because of the link to the wool 
price. It was not, strictly speaking, an award reduction (this nicety had not inhibited 
Dougherty from boasting when they were going up).24 The Moree meeting was lively, 
but toed the official line. At Coonamble they were stroppier.  Questions were asked 
and eventually the desired vote of loyalty and confidence in the AWU was 
forthcoming.25 
  
For the entire period between 1945 (the last major strike) and 1956, buoyant wool 
prices, shortages of shearers, and militant activism were an industrial powder keg. 
The arbitration court and contractors between them struggled to maintain the peace, 
but on the whole managed to do so. Shearers were seen as a surly lot, especially in the 
bigger sheds. As long as the money flowed – which the AWU tried to see that it did – 
                                                
24 When Justice Powers reasoned along these lines in 1922, union leaders did not accept it either. See 
Chapter 6. 
25 The Worker, 28/5/1952, p. 6. 
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a tense peace prevailed. Rates set by the Court were still largely linked to inflation, 
despite the Wool Value Allowance. Market forces were driving wages and shearers 
felt they were in a strong position. Actual payments for shearing were often well 
above award rates.
26
  It was not an environment in which the AWU could easily 
pontificate to its members (as the graziers thought they should) that it was ‘fair’ to 
engineer lower shearing rates. These circumstances festered for several years, and  
eventually precipitated the strike in 1956. 
 
The 1956 Strike
27
 
 
The UGA successfully applied for removal of the so called ‘prosperity bonus’ in 
Queensland, announced in November 1955.28 The AWU, departing from its 
longstanding support for awards, indicated that it would back strikers refusing to 
shear at ‘new’ (lower) rates. Anticipation around the shearing sheds was electric with 
anticipation as the early shearing approached. Tension spread rapidly through NSW as 
speculation mounted that the Commonwealth Arbitration Court would also cut 
Pastoral Award rates. This occurred in February 1956 and the NSW Branch of the 
AWU was equally belligerent in its condemnation of the Court. 
 
Thus began the most significant shearing strike since the 1890s. It lasted for six 
months in NSW and ten months in Queensland, much longer than any shearing strike 
in Australian history. It was a very different to the 1890s, or the rowdy but short-lived 
crises of the 1930s. The AWU tactic of allowing shearing to take place, provided 
shearers were paid according to the ‘old’ (higher) award schedule, made it difficult for 
contractors. Mateship was very effective in policing sheds  and condemning ‘new 
raters’ as ‘scabs’. Roy Ryan ensured that he had a signed guarantee from a contractor 
                                                
26 Tsokhas,  ‘Concessions, Conflicts and Collusion’, pp. 289-304. 
27 It is not possible to give a full account of the strike here. The following sources are valuable. Joy 
Guyatt, ‘The Labor Government and the Queensland Shearers Strike of 1956’, Labour History, 33, 
November 1977, pp. 53-64;  Hearn and Knowles, One Big Union, Ch. 11, ‘The Meaning of Mateship: 
The Shearers Strike and The Split in Queensland’, pp. 237-57; Tsokhas, ‘Concessions, Conflicts and 
Collusion’; Ruth S. Kerr Resolute and Rugged : A History of the Warrego Graziers’ Association, 
Warrego Graziers’ Association (Union of Employers), Charleville (Qld), 1991, ‘The Shearers’ Strike of 
1956’, pp. 37-41; Kerr, Freedom of Contract, Ch. 13, ‘Shearers’ Strike 1956’, pp. 164-72; Byron All 
Among the Wool Boys, ‘The Big Strike of 1956’, pp. 39-52; Fitzgerald, History of Queensland from 
1915, pp. 139-53. To mark the fiftieth anniversary ABC National Radio broadcast a documentary on 
22/9/2006. Transcript downloaded from www.abc.au/rural/telegraph/ in September 2006. 
28 Fitzgerald, History of Queensland from 1915, p. 141. 
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that his work had been paid at the union rate.
29
 Sheep owners, increasingly desperate 
to get the wool off, grudgingly conceded at the woolshed, although the official stance 
of the UGA and the Graziers Association did not bend. Unlike the 1920s and 1930s, 
this was a time of full employment and shearers were able to find work in other 
industries. 
 
The complex machinations of the Labor Party ‘split’ of the 1950s, largely unrelated to 
events in woolsheds, were an additional factor.30 The AWU had been obsessively 
anti-communist since the 1920s. Under Dougherty the union was vehement in its 
condemnation of the ‘reds’, as has been noted. On the face of it the union was a 
natural ally of Catholic zealots infiltrating unions in order to undermine communist 
control. Joe Bukowski of the Queensland Branch had worked closely with  ‘The 
Groups’ from the late-1940s.31 But when the Labor leader H.V. Evatt embarked in 
October 1954 on a spectacular attack on B.A. Santamaria, Dougherty vigorously 
supported him. Santamaria was a shadowy and enigmatic character about whom little 
was known at the time, but much has since been written. A crafty political 
manipulator he was the mastermind behind Catholic anti-communist activism.32 
Dougherty launched a scathing attack on Santamaria in The Worker which left readers 
in no doubt that ‘Groupers’ were now enemies of the AWU.33 Probably he was 
concerned they were becoming too influential in the union movement, and saw them 
as a threat to his own power base.
34
 Dougherty had not gone ‘soft’, but the AWU 
nevertheless veered towards a more militant approach in shearing sheds as a reaction 
to its influence.  
 
Pressure was applied to Bukowski and he rapidly backed away from his thuggish 
activities in support of Groups in Queensland. The Labor Premier Vince Gair was and 
remained in the Santamaria camp. A poisonous mutual hatred between Gair and 
Bukowski destroyed the usual prospect that the dispute over shearing rates could be 
                                                
29 NLA MS 9139, Roy Ryan Papers. Roy Ryan is introduced in Chapter 1. This endorsement is one of 
the few pieces of memorabilia kept with his diaries apart from his shearing tallies. 
30 Hearn and Knowles, One Big Union,  pp. 250-7; Fitzgerald, History of Queensland from 1915, pp. 
139-153. 
31 Fitzgerald, History of Queensland from 1915, p. 140. 
32 Fitzgerald, History of Queensland from 1915, p. 123. 
33 The Worker, 20/10/1954, pp. 1, 11; 1/11/1954, p. 1. 
34 The Worker, 1/12/1954, p. 1. 
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sorted out behind closed doors. Graziers accordingly lost faith in Gair’s capacity to 
resolve the problem.35 
  
The relevance of all this to the 1956 strike was that the AWU was on unusually 
amicable terms with Left-leaning factions of the labour movement. It was able to 
persuade the Brisbane Trades and Labour Council to support ‘black bans’ imposed on 
and wool shorn at ‘new’ rates. This meant that even if graziers managed to get sheep 
shorn by ‘scabs’, getting wool trucked to the ports and loaded for export was almost 
impossible. Downstream assistance from other unions boosted AWU morale and 
increased financial pressure on the graziers.
36
 To graziers it was ‘industrial sabotage’. 
They felt victimised, while hotheads of various persuasions were off the leash. There 
were murky incidents involving the hijacking of trucks carrying ‘black’ wool. 
Accusations of intimidation at woolsheds, and brawls in pubs, were regular 
occurrences.37   
 
Hearn and Knowles see the strike, reinforced as it was by the co-operation of other 
unions, as a form of social progress. The political and industrial power of labour had 
come of age to counter reactionary forces. 
The tables of 1890 had finally turned. In 1956 there would be no triumphant procession of 
graziers, protected by the forces of the state, to the Sydney wharves.38  
In fact it was less clear cut. The Queensland Labor Government, to the everlasting 
disgust of the AWU, declared a state of emergency in October 1956 which pressured 
the union to accept a settlement. The strike was not the only influence, but there was a 
catastrophic split in the Queensland Labor Party and it lost power in 1957 after four 
decades of electoral dominance. Labor did not regain power in the State for another 
25 years. However, the settlement was close enough to pre-strike shearing rates for 
the AWU to claim that it had ‘won’.39 Moreover, the graziers would certainly think 
twice about again trying to get the Court to cut shearing rates. Ruth Kerr argues a 
different case, suggesting any victory was hollow. She quotes the Toowoomba 
Chronicle’s lament of March 1956 that future prosperity depended ‘in the days of 
keen competition on our ability to find some reasonable method of co-operation 
                                                
35 Hearn and Knowles, One Big Union,  p. 255; Fitzgerald, History of Queensland from 1915, p. 140. 
36 Hearn and Knowles, One Big Union,  pp. 248-9. 
37 Byron, All Among the Wool Boys, pp. 44-6. 
38 Hearn and Knowles, One Big Union,  pp. 248-9. 
39 Fitzgerald, History of Queensland from 1915, pp. 143-4, 145-7, 150. 
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between capital and labour’.
40
 This certainly was lost, and is a better clue to the 
strike’s long term legacy. Bitter as it was, it lacked the incendiary nation-changing 
quality that has gripped most understandings of the 1890s strikes. Rather, it 
entrenched the system’s resistance to change. 
 
Adding to the Legend 
 
The 1956 strike passed into AWU legend. The spirit of the times is well represented 
in Sunday Too Far Away. The movie ends with a bar room brawl when Ivy, the 
publican, against her better judgement, refuses to serve beer to scabs. A message rolls: 
THE STRIKE LASTED NINE MONTHS ….. 
BUT IT WASN’T THE MONEY, IT WAS THE INSULT ……’41 
This view of the 10 shilling cut was endorsed in 2006 by Bill Ludwig, President of the 
Queensland Branch but a young shearer in 1956. ‘You would spill it out of your glass 
on Friday night. But it was the principle of the thing, you know.’42 Militants with 
PWIU backgrounds like Neil Byron considered AWU backing for the strike had been 
ambivalent, but this did not stop Tom Dougherty claiming the high moral ground. He 
boasted to the 1957 Annual Conference that the union had ‘scored one of the most 
momentous victories during the seven decades of its existence’.
43
 
 
Mateship culture in its post-1956 form was inherently conservative. It was intensely 
loyal to the AWU and not obviously linked to the militant activism of the 1920s and 
1930s, which it had expressly condemned. However,  the militant unionism of the 
1930s had drawn on the mythology of nineteenth century bush mateship, and there is 
explicit evidence of these links in the participation of Arthur Rae and ‘Trucker’ 
Brown. AWU officials also drew constant parallels with the same history in their own 
propaganda. Accordingly there were common cultural connections between the 1956 
strike and the strikes of the 1930s. This enabled the AWU to link its activism of the 
1890s with 1956. The fact that it had pilloried radicals of the 1930s as disloyal agents 
of the pastoralists was quietly glossed over. 
                                                
40 Kerr, Freedom of Contract, p. 165. 
41 Dingwall, Sunday Too Far Away, p. 119. 
42 ‘Fifty Years Ago’ documentary broadcast by Bush Telegraph program on ABC National Radio, 
22/9/2006. Sound file downloaded  from www.abc.net.au/rural/telegraph/content/2006/s1745191.htm.   
43 The Worker, 23/1/1957, p. 6.  
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A neat example of this is the career of Alf Kain, who was interviewed by Patsy 
Adam-Smith for The Shearers. Kain had grown up in Auguthella (just north of 
Charleville) in the 1920s and by the age of 15 was learning to shear. In 1931 he was 
in the thick of the shearing strike organised by the PWIU, and recalled with 
considerable relish his experiences in the strike camp at the Emerald depot. When the 
strike was over Kain adopted a false name, Green, for a time, fearing contractor black 
listing. These difficulties were quickly overcome and he found sheds, eventually 
settling in as a full time shearer with Bob Wedgewood, one of the better known 
contractors in the central-west.  For the next decade Kain averaged over 30,000 sheep 
per annum. Although militants were still very active he kept his head down, shearing 
for money.44  
 
By 1946 his re-invention was complete as an AWU organiser, and in 1956 was at the 
organisational hub of the strike. This gave rise to another collection of colourful 
‘mateship’ stories for the benefit of Patsy Adam-Smith, which were grafted 
seamlessly onto his earlier biography.45 Kain’s persona of AWU loyalist was further 
illustrated in 1961 at the AWU Conference. Clyde Cameron, who was actively 
engaging with rank-and-file protest in the Broken Hill district, had earned the wrath of 
Tom Dougherty. Edgar Williams, the Queensland Branch Secretary, spearheaded an 
attack on Cameron. Alf Kain now playing the roll of loyal off-sider in the ritualistic 
denigration of Cameron, recalled visiting a shed where Cameron’s supporters were 
vilifying the AWU. After fielding these complaints and, as he put it, ‘outlining [the] 
facts’, a motion of confidence in the General Secretary was carried. The shed 
resolution had not been unanimous, as ‘one or two … refrained from voting’.46 Alf 
Kain, now around 50, was the antithesis of a 1930s radical, a tribal AWU hatchet man 
for Brisbane headquarters. The PWIU shenanigans of 1931 were in the distant past. 
 
It was two decades later, in 1980, when he was interviewed by Patsy Adam-Smith. 
The role he played then was elder citizen of the AWU, an authentic source of 
grassroots experience during the Depression, and one with inside knowledge of the 
                                                
44 SLV, MS TMS 559, 560, 561, Patsy Adam-Smith interview with Alf Kain, 1980. 
45 SLV, MS TMS 559, 560, 561, Patsy Adam-Smith interview with Alf Kain, 1980; Hearn and 
Knowles, One Big Union,  p. 241. 
46 The Worker, 15/2/1961, p. 9. 
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1956 strike. Adam-Smith herself seemed oblivious to the contradictions implied by 
these various roles. Her confusion, though, is understandable, as there is an approving 
voice in the background – probably one of Kain’s younger colleagues in the AWU 
office. Kain is retelling his many yarns about sabotage, intercepting ‘scab trains’, and 
life in the strike camp in 1931. Occasionally he is prompted for extra detail to ensure 
that the picture is sufficiently colourful for the famous novelist. Kain has similar 
anecdotes about 1956, although this implies no disloyalty because it was an official 
strike.47 It is all harmless enough, but it indicates the complexity of the AWU persona. 
The union vehemently rejected extremism while it also made constant use of the 
tradition of bushworker militancy. In the milky glow of hindsight the ‘disruptionism’ 
of the 1930s was recast as mateship half a century later. If a touch of thuggery had 
been required, so be it. This too could be acknowledged by the respectable lady writer 
with a knowing nod and a wink. AWU mythology claimed ownership of events that it 
had done its darnedest to prevent. But it also meant that it spent much of its emotional 
energy living in the past. 
 
Neil Byron is another who bridges pre-war PWIU attitudes and 1956. Byron’s first 
experience of shearing was in 1929 in NSW, and he too experienced the excitement of 
1930s militancy. He knew ‘Trucker’ Brown. Unlike Alf Kain, Byron consciously 
remained on the militant fringes during the war and in the early 1950s, associating 
with Ted Irvine, Lit Connors and Bob Morgan. During the 1956 strike Byron was 
elected into a full time role as the strike co-ordinator in Bourke. He recalled with 
relish many actions of thuggery, including one incident where a truck loaded with 
‘black’ wool from Queensland was hijacked on its way through Bourke. Neil Byron 
considered that AWU support for the 1956 strike was ‘lukewarm’ and its legal 
assistance in his trial over the hijacking episode was grudgingly provided.48    
 
Finally, in a bizarre twist Ted Irvine, who had spent most of his life as a savage critic 
of AWU leaders and had been expelled from the union in 1944, applied for 
readmission in 1960. Rather surprisingly, Charlie Oliver supported his application. 
This was greeted with dismay by other hard heads within the AWU. Oliver replied 
that he knew Irvine’s history better than anyone, and he was not going soft. However, 
                                                
47 SLV, MS TMS 559. 560, 561, Alf Kain interview, Patsy Adam-Smith, 1980. 
48 Byron, All Among the Wool Boys, pp. 10, 39-53;  Hearn and Knowles, One Big Union, pp. 242-3. 
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he believed that Irvine was sincere in his belief in communism, and anyway he could 
do no harm now, as union rules protected the AWU from any engagement in 
‘undesirable activity’. Irvine had joined the AWU as a young man, he said, and was 
angry against the system but misguided, and this led him into the PWIU and the 
Communist Party. Allowing him back into the AWU was a ‘human issue’. He had 
mellowed with age and wanted to die in the union. Delegate Duncan seconded the 
motion, saying that he had known Irvine personally for six years, and been in close 
contact during the strike in 1956. It is hard to imagine how ‘softer’ AWU men could 
possibly be! There is no obvious explanation for Oliver’s rush of charity and 
forgiveness, because it was not his usual style.
49
 Whatever it was, his colleagues did 
not buy into it and the motion to readmit Irvine was resoundingly defeated. The most 
intriguing element of this episode, however, is the sentimental attachment of Irvine 
himself to the AWU and its mateship myth. Possibly he thought 1956 had redeemed 
it, although Neil Byron did not think so.50 
 
Shearing Competitions  
 
Feats of extraordinary speed and endurance in the large sheds of Queensland and 
western-NSW were as much a part of shearing legend as the rise of bush unions. The 
most legendary of all was Jack Howe’s tally of 321 (with blades) in a day at Alice 
Downs, near Blackall, in 1892. Howe’s was not the only remarkable performance. 
Newspapers (including The Worker) reported extraordinary shearing tallies from time 
to time, invariably accompanied by appropriate historical comparisons.51 In 1911 a 
shearing contest in Toowoomba, reportedly for prize money of £600, was organised 
by an entertainment promoter and drew a large crowd.52 Generally, however, 
‘records’ were not created at formally organised contests, but emanated from the 
woolsheds. This tradition continued in the inter-war period, and the associated 
competitive individualism persisted. While mateship prospered in the afterglow of 
1956, the times were also ripe for money-makers and cocky shearers who saw little 
point in quibbling with the graziers. 
 
                                                
49 Marilyn Dodkin, ‘Charlie Oliver: A Political Biography’, MA Thesis, University of Sydney, 1990. 
50 The Worker, 17/2/1960, p. 5. 
51 The Worker, 4/1/1928, p. 20. 
52 The Worker, 22/2/1911, p. 5. 
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The Toowoomba extravaganza of 1911 and the hype surrounding Jack Howe in large 
woolsheds are only loosely connected to modern competitive shearing. Stronger roots 
are traceable to farming rather than pastoral districts. In November 1934 Henry Salter 
won a Shearing Championship staged by the Pyramid Hill Agricultural Society in 
northern Victoria. It cost 5/- to enter and the first prize was £5 (subsidised by a 
prominent grazier). Whether this was ‘the first Shearing Championship ever organised 
in Australia’, is questionable, but evidence of anything earlier is hard to find.
53
 By the 
late 1930s the farming towns of Victoria and the Riverina hosted a circuit of 
competitions. Arranged to liven up the local ‘show day’, they were not inherently 
gladiatorial, although they soon became intensely competitive.
54
 In 1934 Salter was 
just a two-stand contractor from Kerang. He did not think of himself as a gun shearer 
at all, but having been persuaded to enter took it quite seriously.55 As much to his 
surprise as anyone’s, he nudged ahead of the other 13 entrants. Subsequently 
competing in regional shearing competitions around Victoria and the Riverina in the 
late 1930’s, he was consistently successful.  
 
Shearing competitions steadily became more serious and more organised. The first 
shearing contest held at the Royal Melbourne Show took place in 1946 (also won by 
Henry Salter). Newspapers reported that 2,000 people watched the event. Corporate 
sponsorship boosted the prize-money as competitions became a useful advertising 
vehicle in the increasingly complex nexus between agriculture and the merchandising 
of fuel, farm machinery, fertilisers, pesticides and rural finance. Financial support was 
also rendered by grazier interests who recognised an opportunity to modernise the 
status of shearers and to address the shearer shortage.
56
 Their grandfathers had 
conspired long ago to back the MSU, and later formed the Graziers Co-operative 
Shearing Company. This was a different approach to encouraging ‘better types’ into 
shearing.  Ted Irvine was reputed to be a 300-a-day shearer and may well have done 
very well against Henry Salter.57 But communists and fellow travellers were unlikely 
to demean themselves by performing as ‘show ponies’ at the Melbourne Show, for the 
sake of the prize-money the capitalists condescended to dangle.    
                                                
53 Day, Quick Go The Shears, p. 28. 
54 Day, Quick Go The Shears, pp. 29-31. 
55 See Chapter 5 for Salter’s early life and shearing contracting. 
56 Day, Quick Go The Shears, pp. 33-6. 
57 SLV MS TMS 562, 563, Patsy Adam-Smith interview with Jack Nicholes, 1978. 
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The alliance between woolgrowers and commerce seemed likely to arouse the 
suspicions of the AWU. However, the union was initially supportive of a trend which, 
after all, genuinely lifted the status of shearers. On the competition platform they 
seemed to be genuine professionals with conspicuous skill and integrity, a far cry 
from the ruffians of repute, who drank and gambled and cursed. To this degree the 
objectives of the AWU and the graziers almost converged. The AWU did not want the 
Ted Irvines in the industry either. In the early-1950s the Victorian Branch showed 
little indication of disapproval. The Worker publicised main regional competitions and 
reported results.58  
 
The movement towards a national competition was strongly supported by Tom 
Dougherty, largely  as a consequence of a dialogue that developed in The Worker 
following reports of a ‘World Shearing Championship’ in Chicago in the United 
States. It was incomprehensible to Dougherty that anyone but an Australian could 
claim such a title. Momentum built and it seemed likely that an international contest 
would be arranged. It was belatedly suggested that perhaps New Zealanders might 
also be invited. There were awkward problems in defining what sort of sheep should 
be used, and the rules. Not insignificantly, the equipment needed to be specified. The 
Americans rather naively suggested that wide combs all round would be fair, 
obviously unaware how sensitive this was in Australia.59 Perhaps this was the reason 
the anticipated international ‘shear-off’ never took place. However, while the idea 
was still alive it was imperative, national prestige being at stake, that a credible 
mechanism for selecting the best Australian shearers be established. This was  a 
distraction from the AWU’s main concerns of combating militants and award 
applications, but it underpinned union support for the transformation of the annual 
event at the Melbourne Royal Show into an Australian Shearing Championship in 
1953. Henry Salter was the inaugural title holder the runner up was a very youthful 
Kevin Saare. The winner’s medallion was donated by the AWU.60         
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27/11/1957, p. 11. 
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AWU magnanimity did not last. In 1955 the union asserted direct control of shearing 
competitions via the Shearing Competition Federation of Australia (SCFA), a body 
entirely controlled by the Executive Council. All competitions would be subject to 
SCFA supervision. Competitors were compelled to join for a fee of 10/-, and were 
also required to be members of the AWU. The circle of control was closed by writing 
it into AWU rules that participation in unauthorised contests was forbidden. The 
SCFA approved the rules for competitions, emphasising points for quality rather than 
speed. The takeover had apparently been conceived in haste because the list of 
affiliated organisations was not quite ready. This consisted of the many local 
competitions held at Agricultural Shows and presumably some had yet to be ‘notified’ 
of the new arrangements. There was no legal basis for the manoeuvre and there 
appears to have been little consultation with interested parties. The union was able to 
get away with it because AWU membership was effectively an entry permit into the 
shearing workforce. Ostensibly the motivation was to ‘encourage active participation’ 
and to achieve ‘uniformity’ in the rules.
61
 The union, however, was reacting to its 
longstanding primeval fear of influences that blurred its mateship myth. A long 
history of unease about shearers’ individualism was also reflected in its suspicion of 
contracting, ownership of machines, broad gauge combs and cocky shearers. Interwar 
radicals despised them as much as the AWU, and also tugged it in this direction. 
 
Competitions were held on Saturdays and Sundays, but AWU rules and the award 
both prohibited weekend shearing. Should entrants be paid award rates for the sheep 
they shore? If these concerns seem trivial, or perhaps absurd, the AWU mindset was 
constantly on guard against grazier trickery aimed at shearing on the cheap. There was 
method to this as there was genuine grassroots resentment, and in some cases 
hostility, to competitions. A variant of mateship denigrated championship shearers as 
show offs while ‘real’ shed shearers were unheralded. In the backblocks of 
Queensland shearers had little in common with Henry Salter or Kevin Saare. It was 
typical of the AWU that it did not seek to ban competitions but to control them. 
Outright prohibition would have alienated some members. The logic was twisted to 
portray the opportunity to enter competitions as a benefit of AWU membership. 
Critics of AWU control were despised ‘cocky sons’ who could no longer compete 
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because they were not members of the union. Bringing competitions under union 
control was a subterfuge to corral the beast of liberalism. Conference resolutions to 
close down competitions altogether were always defeated. Freer spirits were peeved at 
the dictatorship, but for the time being put up with the odium of AWU control.  
 
Shearer Training 
 
Learning to shear constitutes a lively opening chapter in most shearer biographies. 
Shearing tended to run in families, so sons learnt from their fathers. They also came 
from farming (but less often grazier) families where there were sheep to practice on. 
However, there was a difference between being competent enough to knock out 50 or 
60 a day when the occasion required it on the home farm, and the 120 that was the 
minimum to hold a regular stand with a reputable contractor. ‘Barrowing’ was the 
established way for a young shed hand to get a feel for the handpiece, but the industry 
cried out for a more structured system of instruction, or possibly some form of 
apprenticeship. There was provision in the award for a proportion of stands to be 
allocated to ‘learners’, but it was often given only lip service. Contractors were 
unwilling to waste a stand on a slow shearer if they could get away with it. The AWU, 
conscious that it derived some of its power from the ‘shearer shortage’, was not 
unhappy with a system which made entry difficult.62   
 
By the late-1940s Henry Salter had achieved some renown throughout rural Victoria 
(he was unknown anywhere else). The State Electricity Commission invited him to 
conduct shearing demonstrations with an electric plant throughout the Mallee region 
to promote the new power network. It was handy income for Salter, who was paid £25 
for each event, but he quickly detected the latent demand for shearing instruction.63 
Mallee farmers sent their sons and came along themselves for advice from an 
acknowledged master. Salter approached the Principal of Kerang High School as well 
as the local Agricultural Society. Graziers were co-opted to offer woolsheds and 
supply practice sheep.
64
 By 1950 arrangements were in place for a formal nine-week 
course for which boys were charged £7/10/-. Training schools were eventually held in 
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up to 20 different places around Victoria. In the absence of any subsidy from either 
Government or woolgrowers (or the union), fees were inescapable.65 When he retired 
from teaching in 1970, after 22 years, one report claimed that Salter had instructed 
4,639 young men, of whom ‘over 1,100 still shear regularly’.
66
 Ron Arnold, Salter’s 
rival two-stand plant contractor from Lockington had also won Championships at the 
Royal Melbourne Show on three occasions. He was the uncle of Kevin Saare, and also 
ran shearing classes at the Echuca Technical School from 1949, probably pre-dating 
Salter’s first formal course in Kerang.67   
 
As with competitions, shearing schools made the AWU apprehensive, although 
nothing definite happened until the Executive Council decided in 1966 that ‘it is 
against every principle of this Union for any person to pay any other person or 
organisation to be taught to shear sheep’. The stated concern was that attendees at 
schools should be paid ‘the rate provided in the Awards for learners’.68  In April 1967 
an AWU official upbraided the boys in a class at Sale for ‘breaking union rules’. 
Salter complained that he had never been consulted, and suggested that the AWU 
investigate to see how the classes were run. While AWU organisers privately 
expressed support, Salter was summoned to report to ‘Brahma’ Davis, the Victorian 
Secretary. Their positions were too polarised for any sensible compromise and 
harassment continued. Graziers who supplied sheep were threatened with having their 
properties declared ‘black’ and the 1967 school in Kerang was cancelled.
69
 Salter 
limped on for a year or two, but without AWU approval the schools were becoming 
untenable. By the time he retired (in 1970 he was 63) the union had practically closed 
him down. The plant was purchased by Ross Hann, whose sons had been taught by 
Henry Salter, but after legal threats the operation was closed in 1975. So 
comprehensive was the strangulation that few remembered that the shearing schools 
ever existed.
70
 Salter was still alive in 1987 when he was ‘struck dumb’ by news items 
claiming that ‘Australia’s first Shearing School [is] now being conducted at 
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66 Day, Quick Go The Shears, p. 54. 
67 O’Brien and Ross, Pursuit of Excellence, p. 10. 
68 The quotes are from The Worker, 24/8, 1966, article reproduced in facsimile form in Day, Quick Go 
The Shears,  p. 49. 
69 Kerang New Times, 5/5/1967, article reproduced in facsimile form in Day, Quick Go The Shears, p. 
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Werribee’.
71
 The Victorian shearing schools were a flame which burned for two 
decades until AWU pressure snuffed it out. There had been other attempts to 
formalise shearer training in Australia, notably by Grazcos, but they too withered on 
the vine. 
 
Kevin Saare and Tally-Hi 
 
Shearing schools did not thrive but competitions did. Ron Arnold, had been giving 
Kevin Saare lessons since he was 11 and it was soon obvious that he was a brilliant 
shearer. His father envisaged him going to university, but the shearing plant 
intervened and he began working with the Arnold and Saare team in 1948, when he 
was 15. He made a living working with his father and uncle, but rapidly gained a 
reputation on the expanding competition circuits, often vying with the much older 
Henry Salter for the prize money. Saare exhibited few of the characteristics associated 
with mateship, often shearing alone when he worked as a contractor. From a very 
young age, had been intensely analytical about shearing technique and this was one of 
the reasons for his consistent success in competitions. He shore 327 (with machines) 
at Hopefield station near Pyramid Valley in Victoria in 1957, to become the formal 
holder of Jack Howe’s ‘world record’.72 
 
When, he went to New Zealand in 1961 as a member of the Australian team invited to 
the first Golden Shears Championship, this was a watershed. There was certain 
amount of excitement surrounding the national shearing championships he had 
competed in, but it paled compared to the frenzy that accompanied the Golden Shears. 
Saare came into contact with Godfrey Bowen, the inventor of the ‘Bowen technique’ 
which was said to have revolutionised shed shearing in New Zealand.73 Bowen’s 
methods were not necessarily appropriate for the body-type and wool of Australian 
merinos, so Saare was engaged by the Wool Board to lead an intensive investigation 
                                                
71 Strictly speaking, the Victorian shearing schools of the 1950s were not the first either. The Graziers 
Co-operative Shearing Company had attempted to establish a formal shearing training system in the 
1920s. Almost certainly there were others. 
72 O’Brien and Ross, Pursuit of Excellence,  pp. 8-28. It was not a ‘world record’ at all. This was 
already claimed by Godfrey Bowen of New Zealand for a tally of over 500. Such comparisons were 
virtually meaningless because of different types of sheep, different equipment, and different hours of 
work. 
73 O’Brien and Ross, Pursuit of Excellence, pp. 52-6. 
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into merino shearing. The ‘Tally-Hi’ shearing method was formally launched in 1964 
and teams of instructors, including Saare, toured the nation to give demonstrations. 
Just how influential this was in increasing shearers’ tallies and the quality of shearing 
is impossible to judge accurately, but it was a concerted program conducted over 
several years. Arguably, its impact for shearers who adopted the technique was as 
profound as the influence of wide combs 20 years later.74 
 
As might be expected, there was debate about Tally-Hi within the AWU, but Tom 
Dougherty was reasonably supportive. Inevitably shed shearers were sceptical but 
there were many converts. Mateship culture could also be openly hostile despite the 
qualified support of the AWU. Saare was demonstrating the method in western 
Queensland and sensed the derision of a group of local ‘gun’ shearers. Unwisely 
thinking it would ease the tension, he challenged them to put up their fastest shearer. 
The crowd warmed to the idea and a shearer was pushed forward. The world 
champion easily proved superior but the humiliation of a local was not exactly 
welcome. The crowd insisted on putting up another shearer, who was duly defeated. 
Returning to his motel later in the evening, Saare had to take to his heels to avoid a 
bashing from thugs waiting to ‘teach him a lesson’.
75
 The success of shearing 
competitions, the demand for shearing schools, the development and uptake of Tally-
Hi, and the careers of Henry Salter and Kevin Saare, demonstrated a rich vein of self-
improvement in shearing culture in the 1950s and ‘60s. Equally though, the more 
destructive side of mateship and its insider/outsider codes were impenetrable.  
 
Australian Sheds in the 1960s 
 
The cost-price squeeze and the annoying attitudes of shearers accentuated 
woolgrowers’ sense of victimisation. They scoffed at a campaign, to mention one 
example, to have woolsheds equipped with air-conditioning.76 There was fault on both 
sides. As profits faltered woolsheds were locked in the past. Perhaps it was a little 
mischievous to expect sheds to be air-conditioned, but was it so unreasonable for the 
                                                
74 O’Brien and Ross, Pursuit of Excellence, pp. 57-62. Kevin Saare and his colleagues who developed 
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75 O’Brien and Ross, Pursuit of Excellence, p. 61. 
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accommodation huts? It was a bit rich to have the idea ridiculed out of court when 
workers in city offices and retail shops increasingly enjoyed modern environmental 
comforts. Industrial and construction sites in Sydney had lunch rooms and shower 
facilities that made many shearers quarters appear medieval, despite a hundred years 
of agitation to improve standards. Sterling work had been done agitating for 
accommodation improvements during ‘Big Bill’ Wilson’s time as the Secretary of the 
NSW Branch in the later 1940s. Despite these efforts conditions lagged society at 
large by quite a margin. In 1995, forty years after the 1950s wool boom, a television 
reporter, Janine Perrett, was presenting a piece on a new attempt at co-operation 
between the graziers and the AWU. She stood to camera in a shearing shed, arms 
extended, in a scene not in the least surprising to country folk. But to city people it 
was archaic. ‘Look at this. It hasn’t changed for a hundred years!’77 
 
Militants such as Ted Irvine who were very active in the decade preceding the 1956 
strike, had faded from the scene by the late-1950s. In the absence of radicals 
inflaming the rank-and-file, the AWU thus had an opportunity to reshape its approach 
to the arbitration and grazier organisations, but it did not do so. It is true that between 
1959 and about 1965 there was the constant irritation of Clyde Cameron’s activities in 
the sheds surrounding Broken Hill. Cameron, had been a federal MP since 1949 but 
remained active in AWU affairs, was a constant critic of Tom Dougherty, and a 
stickler for encouraging the union to be forthright in its insistence on accommodation 
standards and prosecuting graziers for breaches of the award. Cameron was a 
dedicated supporter of the ban on wide combs, for example.78 Arguably, however, the 
bigger danger to AWU control of shearing sheds, was the largely unnoticed 
undercurrent of money-making of which the increasingly successful shearing 
competitions and Salter’s shearing schools were visible signs.  Instead, it persisted 
with a strident, if not quite militant, form of advocacy. 
 
The rise of ‘suburban shearing’ made the erosion of conditions self-reinforcing 
because shearers’ huts fell into disuse. Amongst shearers there developed a new social 
division between ‘expedition’ and ‘suburban’ shearing. Those who still travelled to 
                                                
77 Sunday program, “Shearers’ Last Stand”, screened 26/3/1995, Channel 9 TV. Tape in possession of 
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78 Hearn and Knowles, One Big Union,  pp. 263-8. 
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the far away sheds and used accommodation were more fanatical about mateship than 
those who lived at home and travelled 20 or 30 miles every day to whatever woolshed 
they were shearing at. Expedition shearers resented suburban shearers, as well as 
maintaining an undercurrent of disdain for graziers. In the heat and dust of the 
outback these attitudes consolidated. This was not so much militancy, but a rough-
and-ready mateship ethic formed by a group sensing the world passing them by. There 
was an element that still revelled in the excitement of the 1956 strike, and even a few 
who remembered the strikes of 1930 and 1945. Those in the Kevin Saare mould were 
not nostalgic at all. By and large, though, they paid their union fees and kept quiet.  
 
Graziers mostly saw hardcore unionism. This was not altogether fair. In fact, under 
Dougherty’s reign the AWU consulted with industrial officers of the Graziers 
Association to curb disruptive elements. Cameron called it collaboration. For 
example, in the early-1960s the AWGC noticed that shearers were leaving sheds 
early. There was an ‘entirety of contract’ clause allowing employers to withhold 
wages, but the Victorian Branch was challenging contractors in the courts over the 
matter. As often happened, Ted Cole, industrial officer for the graziers, sought 
informal talks with Dougherty to clarify matters if not necessarily to resolve them. To 
Cole’s utter amazement, Dougherty indicated that he completely agreed with the 
graziers’ interpretation, and offered to protect them from gratuitous prosecutions. 
When the Victorian Branch went ahead with a claim against Grazcos, Cole rang 
Dougherty to see if he was as good as his word. Dougherty advised him to stand firm, 
and in a display of the dictatorial arrogance for which AWU leaders were renowned, 
the general Secretary surprised Ted Cole yet again: ‘If it comes to a matter of 
prosecution, the Victorian Branch will refer that to me at head office and you can take 
my assurance, you will never hear any more about it.’79    
 
Given Dougherty’s reputation for Machiavellian intrigue, such high-handed control 
was a mixed blessing. Deals were not always honoured. The union’s central purpose 
was a ruthless pursuit of mass membership. While in the formal sense AWU 
‘preference’ did not apply in NSW, in practice it was almost impossible to shear 
                                                
79 This episode is described in more detail by Tsokhas, ‘The Shearing Labour Process in the 1960s’, p. 
42. The quote is reproduced from Tsokhas, who gives the reference as ABL E266/50, p. 136. 
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without a union ticket.
80
 Graziers in pastoral districts had little concern about this. As 
far as Grazcos was concerned, it made for a more orderly industry if shearers were 
bound by the award. Most farmers accepted as a ‘fact of life’ that shearers needed 
representation in the arbitration court. However, there were also pockets of 
entrenched anti-unionism. In districts where shearing was done by farmers’ sons, it 
was anathema to be coerced into union membership. The strangulation of Salter’s 
quite harmless shearing schools was the kind of AWU action that inflamed these 
passions. It took an episode in one of the most out-of-the way places to bring it to 
national attention.81 
 
In the early 1970s Kangaroo Island was a community of mostly post-World War II 
soldier settlers. Most were comfortably prosperous, but were certainly not ‘wealthy 
squatters’ as AWU propaganda made them out to be. Perched in the colder southern 
ocean, shearing time was November or December and it was unheard of to ‘import’ 
shearers from the mainland. What was called ‘bother with the union’ arose at one of 
the sheds in 1970 when a visiting AWU official, Jim Dunford, failed to persuade two 
shearers to join the AWU. A scuffle developed. Dunford was thrown out and told he 
would be ‘tarred and feathered’ if he returned.
82
 The AWU ‘black banned’ the 
property, preventing all goods from leaving or arriving. After an eight week siege the 
shearers relented and joined the AWU, but obviously under considerable sufferance. 
The community was seething.  
 
By the next season, Dunford was Secretary of the South Australian Branch, and 
seemed intent on making an example of the backwoods cockies. The farce was 
repeated at Brian Woolley’s shed in November 1971. Woolley’s said that he had no 
objection to shearers joining the union, but it was entirely up to them. The AWU 
‘offered’ to send union shearers from the mainland, but to Woolley and the Islanders 
this was outrageous. A ‘black ban’ was imposed on Woolley’s property, but the 
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Kangaroo Islanders had had enough. Community funding enabled Woolley to 
challenge the ban in the South Australian Supreme Court. Legally it hinged on a 
technicality of tort law rather than any rights of union preference. The case dragged 
on to May 1972 and did not provide a clear cut resolution. The Judge instructed the 
parties to attempt an amicable settlement, but this proved impossible and the rift 
deepened. At one stage union ‘black bans’ were imposed on the whole Island because 
of their professed ‘anti-union attitudes’. By now the matter was attracting national 
publicity and in country districts, especially, it fanned the flames of anti-unionism. 
For its part the union showed little sign that it might temper its approach. This is only 
amplified by Clyde Cameron’s gratuitous portrayal of Dunstan as the martyr in the 
affair due to ‘smart-alec lawyers’ engaged by the farmers.83 Dunford justified refusing 
to pay fines on the grounds that ‘there would be more to follow and we would not be 
able to put a ban on anywhere’. He added, ‘I prefer to go to goal rather than pay these 
farmers a penny’.84 The South Australian Labor Government of Don Dunstan 
eventually footed the bill.  
 
The AWU attempt to describe its stance as sticking up for the underdog was a public 
relations disaster. The Kangaroo Island affair exposed the AWU’s bullying style at a 
time when public opinion was becoming less tolerant of unions. Seldom did it get 
much publicity, but obstructive AWU procedure in woolsheds was routinely part of 
rural experience. Jim Clune was a young Western Australian presser in the 1960s used 
to the non-union culture of the wheat belt. He expressed his first experience at a union 
shed thus: 
We had to buy a union ticket. One of the shearers was a very strict unionist; I think he’d come 
from the Eastern States. We had to have a meeting for this and a meeting for that, a vote on 
this and a vote on that. That was an eye-opener, especially coming from cocky sheds.85  
Union rules precluded the ‘give and take’ that rural society felt made woolsheds 
harmonious. If there was a bit of dew the shearers would vote the sheep wet, and you 
could never be sure when they would agree to start. If there were only a handful of 
sheep left at the bell, it was against union rules to put in an extra hour for the sake of 
cutting them out. On the other hand, if there was the slightest fault with the 
machinery, or if the clock in the woolshed was not set correctly, they would hold a 
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‘meeting’ or ring the AWU office for advice. All this was justified on the grounds that 
if standards were not enforced they were on the slippery slope to the ‘bad old days’ of 
squatter exploitation. Mrs. Lorraine Fysh, a grazier from Muttaburra, recalled tense 
dealings with shearers in Queensland in the 1950s. 
I can tell you there was very little love lost between the graziers and the shearers. They 
probably regarded us as arrogant and we certainly regarded them, to a certain extent, as 
troublemakers who were not too keen on work.86 
The post-1956 polarisation was damaging in the long run because the union was slow 
to grasp the significance of changing social norms amid the climate of general 
prosperity that lasted through the 1960s.87 
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SECTION IV 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The Regulated Economy under Siege
Chapter 9: Money-Making Oases: Western Australia and New Zealand 
 
Western Pioneers 
 
In faraway Western Australia sheep numbers did not exceed 10 million until 1950. 
Sheep grazed in selected patches, vast in their own right but covering less than a 
quarter of the territory (see Map 2-1 in Chapter 2). Geographical separation from the 
east generated its own peculiarities. Queensland shearers were an important presence 
in the west early in the twentieth century, but as time wore on habits tended to be 
more home grown. Western Australia bore the mantle of its isolation and different 
history of land settlement.  In the early twentieth century farmers took up blocks east 
of Perth in what became known as ‘the Wheat Belt’ without having to displace 
squatters. As a pastoral and agricultural frontier it lacked the squatter-selector 
polarisation that drove passions in the east. Rural battlers in the west fought the 
elements and the banks as their counterparts in eastern Australia did, but the 
government was an unambiguous ally.1 The pioneer legend was accordingly less 
jumbled with elements which also fitted nomad tradition. Shearers from this social 
environment reflected similar traits. 
 
Two distinct sheep populations could be identified in 1926, when the AWU lodged a 
claim to bring Western Australia under the Federal Pastoral Award for the first time.
2
 
The pastoral region scattered to the north and west of the Great Sandy Desert, miles 
and miles to the north of Perth carried about 2.5 million sheep by World War I.  This 
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grew steadily to about 5 million by the 1930s.
3
 The Wheat Belt was starkly different. 
It carried roughly the same number of sheep – around 3 million in the mid-1920s – 
but these were in small flocks on cropping farms rather than vast acreages. The Wheat 
Belt fanned out from Perth for two or three hundred miles before it got too dry to 
contemplate farming or grazing at all. Its northern edge adjoined the southern 
perimeter the pastoral country. The north did not breed its own white shearers, and 
initially relied on local Aborigines before unionised white bushworkers took over. 
Over time the pastoral zone depended heavily on the farmers of the Wheat Belt or 
their sons. There were some parallels, therefore, to the eastern States where shearers 
came from farming areas into western-NSW and Queensland, but in the west the 
pattern was sharper. 
 
A huge part of the State lay to the south of the Wheat Belt but this did not become 
important in the wool industry until after World War II. The historical complication is 
that by the 1960s it dominated everything else. Earlier endeavours to clear forest in 
the south-west corner for agriculture were disappointing as were attempts to farm 
sandy plains north of Esperance on the far southern coast.4 Eventually, though, 
scientists solved the problems inhibiting agriculture in the region.
5
 Between 1955 and 
1975 sheep numbers in Western Australia trebled to over 30 million. There was a 
chronic shortage of shearers for these rapidly multiplying flocks. In other 
circumstances militant unionism might have emerged. But shearing culture had roots 
in the Wheat Belt where bushworker legend did not fit the remembered facts very 
neatly.         
 
Pastoral North in the 1920s 
 
The first sheep stations on the De Grey River were established in the 1860s, but there 
was little relevant history before 1890.6  There was a smattering of stations in the 
                                                
3 Sutton, Comes the Harvest, p. 6. 
4 Gabbedy, Group Settlement; Alan G. Brunger and John Selwood, ‘Settlement and Land Alienation in 
Western Australia: the Shire of Denmark’, Journal of Historical Geography, Vol. 23, No. 4, 1997, pp. 
478-95. 
5 Bureau of Agricultural Economics, The Economics of Land Development on the Esperance Sand 
Plain Western Australia, Wool Economic Research report No. 17, 1970; Bureau of Agricultural 
Economics, New Land Farms in Western Australia, Wool Economics Research Report No. 26, 1975.  
6 Fyfe, ‘Shearing in the Pastoral Country’, p. 223. 
 236 
Kimberly and around Port Hedland before World War I, and parts further south.
7
 The 
Ashburton, Gascoyne and Murchison River areas developed into a more consistent 
but spread-out grazing zone in the 1920s. The Kimberly stations were spacious, each 
carrying 50 to 100,000 sheep, separated from the rest of the pastoral north by the 
desert which reaches out to the coast between Port Hedland and Broome. ‘The 
Gascoyne’ and ‘the Murchison’ sit between the western edge of the desert and the 
vast arc of coastline from Geraldton to Port Hedland, and flocks were not quite as 
large, mostly between 20 and 40,000 sheep. For example, George Gooch, a leading 
light in the Pastoralists’ and Graziers’ Association (PGA), ran two properties in the 
Gascoyne within a radius of about 100 miles from Carnarvon in 1926, and these were 
reasonably typical. Wandagee covered a huge area of 454,000 acres and carried 
24,000 sheep. Manberry was 211,000 acres for 18,000 sheep. Gooch had taken up 
these leases around 1915.8 Angus Campbell was a grazier on Billabalong station near 
Mullewa in the Murchison. It was 500,000 acres for 30,000 sheep.9  
 
Early station shearing was dominated by Aborigines until machines and unionism 
combined to drive them out.10 A Western Australian Branch of the AWU was first 
formed in 1908. This arose out of a prosecution of shearers for refusing the shear wet 
sheep. Without a union such cases were seldom contested, but L.T. Brown happened 
to meet up with two of the shearers in western-NSW and persuaded them to fight it. 
Local Kimberly solicitors refused to upset pastoralists by representing them, but this 
energised Brown to convene a meeting in Perth. Fifteen attended, and this became the 
nucleus of an AWU Branch. Within a year there were 600 members, a small but 
useful base. The first delegates attended the AWU Conference in 1909.
11
 One of the 
first resolutions from the Western Branch aimed to end ‘the system of indenture of 
blacks to the pastoralists’, but this was not country where white labour was readily 
available. The branch enrolled white cooks whenever it could but ‘in the West 
                                                
7 Carter, Tom (extracts from diaries) No Sundays in the Bush: An English Jackeroo in Western 
Australia 1887-1889, Lothian Publishing Company, Melbourne, 1987. There are a number of 
interesting photographs which probably date from the period around World War I.  
8 NAA B1958/10 Box 2, Pastoral Award Transcript 1926, p. 823. Gooch’s history in the pastoral north 
went back at least to the late-1880s. Tom Carter worked for him on Wangadee in 1888. There is a 
considerable amount of detail of Gooch’s operation and the Carnarvon district in the Carter diaries, 
including an undated photograph of Gooch (at a mature age). Carter, No Sundays, pp. 72-129.     
9 NAA B1958/10 Box 2, Pastoral Award Transcript 1926, p. 903. 
10 Fyfe, ‘Shearing in the Pastoral Country’, p. 225. 
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Chinese [do] nearly all the cooking’, Brown explained.
12
 The problems of running a 
union with Queensland-style discipline were indeed formidable. Communications 
were diabolical. While the 1909 conference was in progress Brown received wires 
from Perth where the office was in turn trying to communicate with shearers in the 
Kimberly about what rates to demand. Shearers on the spot were split, a group of 
them considering it ‘inadvisable’ to demand union rates as pastoralists were making 
arrangements to shear with blacks.
13
 
 
By the end of World War I there were few blacks left in northern woolsheds. This 
came about through a combination of AWU pressure for ‘union rates’ (which in effect 
meant that station owners were no longer willing to employ Aborigines as shearers) 
and the desire to introduce machine shearing which was facilitated by contractors.14 
Perth based contractors had taken total control by about the end of World War I and 
the AWU ensured that unionised white shearers filled the stands. They came from 
Perth, and quite a few from the eastern States, especially Queensland.
15
 Queensland 
shearers in the west were likely to be more interested in unionism and sometimes they 
were disliked, perhaps because of this, but also because they boasted about 
Queensland. Some were veterans of the 1890s and they did inculcate pastoral sheds 
with elements of the bush union ethos. From the 1920s on shearers increasingly came 
from the Wheat Belt.  
 
Remoteness and the extreme difficulty of transport, paradoxically, led to a very 
cohesive, efficient contracting system. The logistics of moving to the early sheds as 
well as from shed to shed were entirely in contractors’ hands rather than individual 
pastoral workers. This could not have been established before motorised transport. 
While parts of the Murchison could be reached on the rail network it was more usual 
to travel by boat to Geraldton, Canarvon, Karratha, Port Hedland or Derby, and 
thence inland on the back of a contractor’s truck. The two biggest operators in the 
1920s were the Pastoral Labour Bureau (PLB) and Synnot and Dunbar.16 They sea-
freighted trucks to Derby for the Kimberly sheds. Once the shearing team was 
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assembled – usually eight shearers and about 20 men altogether -  it stayed together as 
it rumbled southwards. Photographs of a contractor’s truck with up to 20 pastoral 
workers occupying seats mounted on the deck, or alternatively manning a rope to pull 
it through a river are quintessential scenes from the Western Australian runs.
17
 As in 
Queensland the hot dry climate facilitated virtually year round shearing (apart from 
the wet season in the tropical north).  
 
Station shearing persisted in the 1920s on some of the Gascoyne and Murchison 
stations. George Gooch described how this worked in his area. A co-operative rotation 
was worked out with five or six neighbours. They tried to get the same shearers year 
after year and Gooch usually confirmed arrangements months in advance while he 
was in Perth on business.18 The graziers hired trucks to meet the shearers in 
Carnarvon for the run of sheds. In most respects, these private arrangements were 
mimicking what the contractors did. As in eastern Australia there was an outbreak of 
militancy between 1916 and 1923. A major strike in 1916 resembled the Queensland 
strike of the same year. As in Queensland there were signs of IWW involvement – 
and the AWU certainly tried to prevent the strike. Graziers on the Gascoyne and the 
Murchison were unprepared, as were their counterparts in Queensland, and were 
forced to come to terms. There was another strike in 1921, for which the PGA had a 
more effective response. At this time there was no arbitration award in Western 
Australia, and the strike was due to failed conferences between the AWU and the 
graziers, complicated by the activities of militants.19 Almost certainly this was the 
main impetus for the formation of the PLB in 1923. This was a grazier owned co-
operative modelled on the Graziers Co-operative Shearing Company in eastern 
Australia. After it was established the PLB rapidly expanded to cover just over half 
the sheep in the pastoral area, because it was filling another recognised need.20 By 
comparison the Graziers Co-operative Shearing Company never exceeded about 10 
percent of sheep in NSW. PLB sheds tended to be the smaller and more isolated ones, 
                                                
17 Fyfe, ‘Shearing in the Pastoral Country’, p. 224. 
18 NAA B1958/10 Box 2, Pastoral Award Transcript 1926, p. 849. Arranging shearers was not Gooch’s 
only reason to visit Perth from time to time. He would have needed to consult his bank, his 
accountants, his wool broker, and attend meetings of the PGA. Perhaps he had other investments. 
19 Details of these strikes are not widely known. Unpublished research by Glen McLaren has been of 
great assistance. 
20 Harry Doyle’s evidence to the Arbitration Court in 1926 was comprehensive. NAA B1958/10 Box 2, 
Pastoral Award Transcript 1926, pp. 926-76. He also gave evidence in 1927. 
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which private contractors and their gun shearers avoided. Set up as a service for PGA 
members, PLB was not able to refuse these sheds. As a result its shearing teams were 
more often ‘average’ 100-a-day men.21  A cost-plus pricing formula meant that PLB 
was not out of pocket. 
  
Contractors’ expeditions had a touch of the military about their organisation. Shearers 
travelled as a group on the contractor’s truck and according to the contractor’s 
timetable. Synnot and Dunbar rationed beer to two bottles per day. The longstanding 
manager of the PLB, Harry Doyle, was one of the better known and liked characters 
in the northern pastoral zone, but he kept order in the manner of a benign dictator. 
Teams stayed together as they worked their way from the Kimberly to the Murchison. 
The temperature was often unbearably hot during the day (although on the Gascoyne 
and Murchison it could also be fiercely cold at night). Travelling involved long 
journeys on extremely rough roads, but there was a strong sense of purpose and 
camaraderie in these gangs. Mateship was arguably stronger than it was around the 
campfires of eastern bushworker legend, and there was no ‘suburban shearing’ to 
undermine it after World War II. There were barely three million sheep in the whole 
of the northern pastoral zone in the 1920s and these were handled by about a dozen 
shearing contractors, and perhaps 300 shearers. As well as the tight cohesion of the 
travelling groups, shearers often assembled in the pubs of Carnarvon or Port Hedland 
as they were travelling north, or in known ‘shearers’ pubs’ in Perth between 
expeditions.  
 
Despite the hardships, these were probably the most lucrative runs for professional 
shearers in Australia, lasting up to 10 months. The sheep were also good from a 
shearers point of view – less so the graziers – because they were small with light 
fleeces.
22
 Woolsheds had fewer stands for the same number of sheep than in the east, 
where squatters disliked shearing dragging on for months. Noonkanbah in the 
Kimberly was probably the largest shed in the north with 20 stands, but there were 
100,000 sheep to shear – 5,000 per man. It was more usual for woolsheds to only have 
eight stands (for 40-50,000). In the west 4 to 6,000 per man was the rule rather than 
                                                
21 NAA B1958/10 Box 2, Pastoral Award Transcript 1927, p. 1090. 
22 Fyfe, ‘Shearing in the Pastoral Country’, pp. 229-30. 
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the exception. In the east 2,000 per man was considered a good shed.
23
 Gun shearers 
were able to mass impressive tallies, and if shearing rates bore a rough relationship to 
award rates in eastern Australia it was ideal for money-making. Patrick Molloy’s runs 
with contractors Gosden and McGinnity in 1924, and with Doyle’s PLB in 1925, 
illustrate these points.24 Private contractors were fussy about getting top shearers, but 
the PLB provided employment for average shearers provided they were competent. In 
a rhetorical flourish during the 1926 arbitration hearings J.W. Allen pointed out to 
Justice Powers  that shearers were attracted from the east to Western Australia, ‘which 
is regarded by shearers as the Shearers’ Paradise’. This grated with Ted Grayndler 
who quickly interjected, ‘Queensland is the Shearers’ Paradise!’
25
 They were of 
course interpreting the known facts differently. Grayndler was thinking of the 
generous Queensland State Award, which from Allen’s perspective made it a 
nightmare rather than a paradise. Nevertheless, his characterisation was not far wide 
of the mark. It had a lot of inconveniences for a family man, but it was an excellent 
cash generator for wheat cockies during the Depression. It was a life that free spirits 
loved, and an opportunity for younger men to save money for deposits on farms in the 
Wheat Belt.  
 
Shearers of the Wheat Belt 
 
The small sheds of the wheat belt painted a very different picture.
26
 The rail network 
linking it to Perth was comprehensive and its social environment entirely shaped by 
rural towns surrounded by small land holdings. Wheat cropping was the first priority 
of farmers and new settlers focused on clearing enough ground to sow grain. As they 
could afford it they bought a few sheep. Wool provided a little additional income, but 
the main purpose of sheep was to clean up wheat stubble, to occupy land not yet 
sufficiently cleared for cropping, and to fertilise before the plough. Flocks contained 
as few as 200 or 300 sheep. As farmers became more established they expanded the 
wheat acreage, but the flocks also got larger. W.L. Sanderson, representing the PGA 
                                                
23 A shed in Queensland comparable to Noonkanbah was more likely to have 40 stands than 20. 
24 NAA B1958/10 Box 2, Pastoral Award Transcript 1926, pp. 695-703. Molloy’s average daily tally 
over five months in 1925 was about 100, but he shore more than 12,000 sheep. Faster shearers earned 
big money.  
25 NAA B1958/10 Box 2, Pastoral Award Transcript 1926, p. 1215. 
26 Apart from the 1926 Transcript, additional material on Wheat Belt shearing in the 1920s is from 
Munday, Tin Dog. 
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in the 1926 arbitration case, quoted 1925 statistics of 5,812 flocks in the wheat belt 
with between 1,000 and 2,000 sheep. Wheat Belt farmers strongly objected to the 
AWU’s attempt to cite them as respondents in the award claim. The Court agreed to 
hear evidence from an advocate appointed by them to explain their circumstances.
27
  
 
Shearing was often done without hiring shearers at all. Co-operative arrangements 
between neighbours, or the engagement of local labour accounted for virtually all the 
activity. Boys who grew up on farms usually left school when they were 13 or 14 and 
earned wages from the various farming jobs that turned with the seasons, and those 
associated with breaking in new blocks. Land clearing, tank sinking, fencing, wheat 
sowing and harvesting were the staple tasks. Farmers were short of cash, but loans 
from the Agricultural Bank financed much of the development work. One of the 
annual jobs was shearing and most country lads had a go at it. Even flocks of 1,000-
plus were often shorn co-operatively, although more likely to be shorn for wages. 
Sanderson explained it in the following terms. 
A man may be working in the district as an ordinary farm hand, and at shearing time there is a 
certain amount of shearing to be done. And he naturally does that work in order to make more 
money, and then he goes back to his ordinary work. He may be only a week or a fortnight on 
shearing work, but he still gets high rates of pay.28 
Shearing rates in the Wheat Belt bore only a loose parallel to awards (remembering 
that no award applied in the west before 1926), but this did not mean pay was low. In 
spite of the generally cash-strapped status of wheat farmers in the 1920s, the accepted 
rate for shearing was £2 a hundred.29 Accommodation, however, was primitive if it 
existed at all, and sheds were makeshift. On the other hand cockie shearers were well 
fed and ate at the farmer’s table. This was all hand shearing. Machines were non-
existent in the Wheat Belt before the arrival of two-stand plants. It was possible for 
young wheat belt men, including some who had blocks of their own but sought farm 
work for cash income, to be reasonably fully employed in this fashion. 
  
Those attracted to shearing, though, looked to the long contracting runs of the pastoral 
north. Not any shearer could get a stand in these gangs, but contractors were prepared 
                                                
27 NAA B1958/10 Box 2, Pastoral Award Transcript 1926, pp. 76-77. 
28 NAA B1958/10 Box 2, Pastoral Award Transcript 1926, p. 76. 
29 NAA B1958/10 Box 2, Pastoral Award Transcript 1926, p. 37; Munday, Tin Dog, pp. 45-9, 95. The 
Pastoral Award was set at 40/- in 1926 and raised to 41/- in 1927. But since 1923 it had been 38/-. That 
was about when Munday began shearing in the Wheat Belt. How accurate is memory was may be 
questioned but he claimed that £2 a hundred was obtainable in the 1930s after the Award was slashed.  
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to give sons of wheat farmers the benefit of the doubt. It was common to begin as 
rouseabouts, and learn by observation. Don Munday got his first stand on one of 
Frank Lund’s teams in the Murchison in 1925. Munday was 22 and had been shearing 
with blades around Yealering since he was 14, but had never before actually seen 
shearing machines. Lund was fussy about shearers, but this did not bother him.30 
Another option was to invest in a two-stand plant and shear in the Wheat Belt. Two-
man contracting teams with their own plants were common by the late-1920s. It was a 
world with a lot of similarities to Henry Salter’s in Victoria. Like Salter the small 
scale contractors bought electric plants as they became more confident. But the 
Western Australian Wheat Belt was more geographically self-contained than 
agricultural Kerang. While it was possible to venture into the Murchison, in much the 
same way that Salter spread into the more pastoral Riverina, the PLB, Synnot and 
Dunbar, and the other bigger contractors kept a reasonable stranglehold on the 
southern perimeter of their long northern runs. It was often better for a Wheat Belt 
shearer to join one of these gangs rather than contemplate self-employment. 
 
The shearers of the west exhibit interesting similarities and differences from their 
eastern counterparts. Methods and technology of shearing, woolshed custom, and 
group mateship were the same. The presence of Aborigines was a difference as was 
the timing of significant developments. Machine shearing was introduced much later 
and there was no conflict amongst white shearers over it. Machines in the east were, 
initially, expected to undermine militants but there were few militants in the west to 
worry about. They were instrumental in the displacement of Aboriginal shearers 
which the AWU recognised as very convenient, although from the sheep owners’ 
perspective this was secondary to its central purpose of shearing efficiency. There was 
no woolshed conflict on the scale and intensity of the famous 1890s conflagrations. 
Yet eastern history was brought into western sheds by drifters from Queensland, and 
the  AWU successfully put down roots around 1909 largely as a result. There was less 
conflict between contractors and the AWU. Contractors and a small army of gun 
shearers were able to rip through the sheep on long runs while they both raked in the 
money. There was no parallel to the Queensland situation of the 1920s, in which in 
shearers from the ‘south’ meant unemployment for local shearers. In effect, there 
                                                
30 Munday, Tin Dog, p. 61. 
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were no ‘local’ shearers. If anything, mateship reinforced the pioneer ethic as gun 
shearers and contractors bonded on eight month expeditions. In the Wheat Belt, the 
AWU had some presence, but there was not a history of large landowners on which to 
build a stronger sense of class grievance. 
 
Militancy, though, was not completely absent. Significant strikes took place in 1916, 
1921 and 1930, but in between times niggling confrontation of the kind that was 
common in eastern Australia was largely absent.31 This is despite clear signs of class 
distinction between graziers and Wheat Belt shearers. While there were cases where 
inter-personal relationships were perfectly amicable, there is enough comment from 
shearers about the arrogance of pastoralists (as in the east they were invariably 
referred to as ‘squatters’) to suggest that social disparities were keenly felt. A glaring 
example of this was experienced by Don Munday on the Murchison in 1930. Munday 
had a significant farm in partnership with his brother at Hyden, and they were keeping 
it going with cash from the shearing runs.  
The owner, Bert Lukin, was a proper squatter snob. He somehow found out I had a farm and 
came out with one or two snide remarks about cockies.32 
This was no more than verbal jousting until 400 15-month-old-rams were presented 
for shearing.
33
 The union rule was that rams earned double rates but Lukin said they 
were not worth it and he would not pay. The shearers were all farmers, it was the 
Depression and they agreed to shear them at ordinary flock rates, including Munday. 
However, while they were working Lukin could not resist another jibe at the lowly 
wheat cockies. He blurted out that he had heard on the ‘12 o’clock news’ that ‘wheat 
prices have taken another nosedive’ adding, ‘you’ll have to shear a lot of squatters’ 
sheep now to keep your old farm solvent’. Munday admitted that this ‘well and truly 
got on my goat’ and he told Lukin that the deal on the rams was off. The other 
shearers refused to shear them also – a demonstration of mateship - although Munday 
explained that he would hold no grudge if they did. The result was that Lukin had to 
draft off the rams for his station hands to shear with blades after the contractor had 
gone. Munday’s own account rings true. 
                                                
31 Shearing shed tension of the kind related by ‘the green jackaroo’, as described in Chapter 7, was not 
typical of the west.   
32 Munday, Tin Dog, p. 90. 
33 It was due to mismanagement of the tailing muster.  Normally unwanted male lambs would be sold 
long before. These ‘mickeys’ were not fully grown and no more difficult to shear than other sheep. 
Technically, according to the Award, they should be paid double. 
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I suppose I should have kept my mouth shut, and under ordinary circumstances I would have, 
but over the previous three or four days I’d had a gutful of Lukin’s jibes about cockies and 
grabbed the chance to knock him down a peg or two and show him up in front of the whole 
team, including some of his own station hands.34 
Shearers could still be sensitive about this in the 1950s. Harold Christensen had 
grown up on a sheep station in the Murchison in the 1940s. 
When wool did boom, those same people who had been controlled by stock firms became 
wool barons overnight. As well as the price change, their attitude changed. It was amazing. 
They became ‘the chosen race’.35 
These attitudes and the presence of Queenslanders ensured that sheds in the pastoral 
zone were unionised, but their remoteness and the overall cohesion of the contracting 
system meant that it was harder for PWIU methods to penetrate. 
 
The 1930 Strike 
 
There was another prolonged and at times nasty strike in 1930. Don Munday was 
shearing with a contractor in the Murchison at the time. He had anticipated the cut in 
shearing rates, but when it was announced thought it rather severe. However, in his 
mind there was no need to strike over the matter.  
The shearers lost badly, and the price came down to 26/6 a 100. It was a big drop but still 
good money at the time, when there was practically no wages to be had at all.36 
Equally, he was not likely to ‘scab’ and Vic Johnson in the Perth AWU office was 
cabled for advice. They were initially told to ‘carry on’ but some days later it changed 
to ‘all shearers pulling out’. This was June and Munday had been shearing since April 
so he had some cash, although the position at home was grim. He weathered the strike 
by going back to Yealering and saw no contradiction in doing shearing while he was 
there.37 As soon as he heard the strike was over he telegrammed the PLB and got an 
immediate reply that there was a pen waiting. Munday ‘couldn’t get down to Perth 
quickly enough’, where Harry Doyle had booked him onto a plane for the cost of 
£15/10/-  to get him up to the North West Cape, to get started on the backlog caused 
by the strike.
38
 
 
                                                
34 Munday, Tin Dog, Damper, p. 91. 
35 Hobson, Across The Board, p. 49. 
36 Munday, Tin Dog, p. 91. 
37 He seemed confident of getting £2 a hundred although whether farmers were still paying this must be 
doubtful. In any case he did not agonise over whether or not it would be ‘scabbing’.  
38 It is not quite clear from the account whether Munday or the PLB paid the fare, but it was probably 
PLB. In any case it was a substantial amount – almost 1,200 sheep at the reduced shearing award, or 7-
9 days work for a shearer of Munday’s ability.  
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When he landed at Carnarvon, Munday was met by one of the owners and they were 
quickly on first name terms. There was none of the squatter condescension that was 
sometimes experienced. Munday noted this himself, but he soon worked out why 
when he met the other shearers: ‘Christ, what a motley mob lined up on the board 
next morning. All of them were scabs and not one of them went by his right name.’ 
Nonetheless, he was unperturbed by the fact that the station had been shearing during 
the strike and Doyle was replacing the incompetent Depression unemployed with 
genuine shearers as fast as he could. A PWIU man would have declared the station 
‘black’, or at the very least notified the union office. Rather, Munday sniffed at the 
‘bit of a clique’ who resented him ‘butting in on their shed’. He spent the evenings 
with ‘old Harry who was a damned nice chap’. They played cards and drank whisky. 
Munday avoided going into Carnarvon where strikers and scabs were still fighting in 
the pubs. He had no sympathy with ‘the hard-core unionists’ who could not accept 
that the strike was over. Despite his low opinion of the shearers in his own shed, he 
had some sympathy with the ‘poor cows’ the unionists were attacking. They were 
‘dead broke and flat-out to get a job away from the depression-hit city’.  He seemed to 
regard the pastoral zone and the Wheat Belt as mutually exclusive zones. When he 
was in the latter he behaved as a farmer rather than a unionist. But even when he was 
a unionist he was not a grassroots activist. He simply contacted the office for 
guidance. 
 
The strike lasted for two months and was at times very violent. Harry Doyle’s PLB 
did go to a lot of trouble to keep shearing with scabs and this provoked confrontation. 
On one occasion PLB was transporting 35 men to a shed ‘in various cars and trucks’ 
when Doyle got word (how he did not say) that they had been intercepted by strikers 
and given an ultimatum to join the strike camp ‘or be dealt with’. Somehow Doyle 
organised a party of graziers and ‘pastoral workers of the Carnarvon district’ to rescue 
his team from their kidnappers. He also informed the police. The two lots of vigilantes 
clashed at 3am on the road 175 miles out of Carnarvon. Details of the ‘stunt’ are 
sanitised, but Doyle succeeded in rescuing his shearing team.
39
 Strike tactics have the 
mark of the PWIU, but there is no evidence of continuing PWIU activity in Western 
Australia in the later 1930s or during World War II. Wheat Belt shearers like Don 
                                                
39 Doyle’s description of ‘stunts’ are quoted in unpublished research of Glen McLaren. He cites a PLB 
report dated 9/12/1930, p.1, held in the PGA Archives. 
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Munday were not the only influence but were becoming the main force in the pastoral 
districts. In 1956 there was hardly any disruption to shearing at all in Western 
Australia.40  
 
Expansion of Wheat-Sheep Farming   
  
Agricultural development of the sand plains north of Esperance had been tried but 
was unsuccessful. There had been a brief period of prosperity when Esperance was a 
supply centre for the Western Australian gold fields in the 1890s, before the railway 
from Perth to Kalgoorlie was completed in 1897. Jim Carson took up 5,000 acres at 
Grass Patch in 1923 but walked off after 10 months – he was only 22 at the time and 
wrote it off to experience. The Government was putting a railway through to 
Esperance from Kalgoorlie, and neighbouring blocks had all been taken up by land 
speculators, hoping to cash in when the region boomed. None of these blocks were 
ever occupied. Carson was one of those who learned the hard way that the country 
would not support sheep (it was not known at that stage why), and it was poor country 
for wheat.41 The Western Australian Department of Agriculture established the 
Esperance Downs Research Station in 1949, where scientists eventually identified a 
phosphorus deficiency that could be rectified with fertilisers. This led to ambitious 
projects, initiated by the Sate government in 1956 but these also faltered. However, by 
the late 1960s the Esperance sand plains finally delivered the land boom that the 
1920s speculators had gambled on, and the region became a centre of phenomenal 
growth. Table 9-1 gives a sense of the dramatic impact this was having at the local 
level by the mid-1960s. Esperance Shire supported a mere 12,000 sheep in 1947, and 
well over a million by 1968. It was one district prospering with a formula based on 
the enthusiasm of young family farmers judiciously subsidised by the state. 
 
Exponential expansion seriously stretched the supply of shearers. Interpreting Table 
9-2, the most interesting row is the third where the number of medium sized flocks (2 
to 5,000 sheep) expanded from under 1,000 to about 4,000 in two decades. 
Translating this into shearing terms, this was a quadrupling from about three million 
sheep to 14 million in this group. The shearing season in Western Australia was 
                                                
40 Hobson, Across The Board, p. 6. 
41 Carson, Battling Around, p. 35. 
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August to November.42 These farms were largely mixed enterprises, and shearing had 
to fit between wheat harvesting and other priorities. Part-time shearing by farmers 
was one way of addressing the shortage, but obviously they were not available at 
other busy periods.43 It was an opportunity for enterprising contractors who could 
attract shearers prepared to break the rules. 
 
The west’s 11 million sheep in 1950 were dwarfed by the 53 million in NSW and 
approximately 100 million in the eastern states overall. However, it was beginning to 
catch up. The west had one sheep for every in five in NSW; fifty years earlier it had 
only been one in ten. By the 1960s Western Australia was on a remarkable growth 
curve and by the mid-1970s supported over 30 million sheep. NSW, meanwhile, had 
slipped from a peak of 70 million to 55 million (and was still falling). As the wool 
industry overall was increasingly in the grip of the profit squeeze, aggressive state 
assisted agricultural development created quite different results in the west. 
Eventually weak markets and rising costs, as well as land degradation problems, 
                                                
42 Neville Kinnane, “The Impact of Technological Change on Employment in the Shearing Industry in 
Western Australia 1980-90”, October 1980, submission to Senate Inquiry, Inquiry Hansard, pp. 875-6. 
43 EVASI Inquiry Hansard, pp. 843, 959.  
Table 9-1: Selected Output Indicators 
For Esperance Shire, WA 
     
Year 
Ended 
June 
Number of 
Holdings 
Crop Area 
(acres) 
Sheep& 
Lambs 
Shorn 
(thousands) 
Beef Cattle 
(thousands) 
     
1922 na 3 34 na 
1935 na 19 33 na 
1947 52 4 12 0.4 
1952 54 9 24 0.5 
1957 112 14 49 2.5 
1962 273 49 207 14.6 
1966 470 142 667 23.6 
1967 493 166 882 29.9 
1968 508 180 1120 37.8 
Source: Wool Economics Research Report No. 17, January 1970 
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slowed things down but in the twenty years between 1955 and 1975 Western 
Australian sheep numbers trebled. Shearers perfected the money-making habits they 
had learnt on the Wheat Belt, and increasingly discarded the union solidarity that had 
mostly been practiced in the pastoral north. For much of the twentieth century 
Western Australian idiosyncrasies can be seen as interesting but unimportant 
variations. However, as sheep rearing in the west became the mainstay of the wool 
industry’s expansion, western deviance had a bigger impact on the national picture.   
 
 
Shearers of Aotearoa 
 
In 1984 Rollo Arnold argued that, in the 1890s, New Zealand shearers were ‘yeomen’ 
while the Australians were ‘nomads’: the one petit bourgeois and individualistic; the 
other geographically rootless, bonded by mateship, and inclined to collectivism. The 
Pastoralists’ Union, he argues, readily recruited strike breakers in New Zealand in 
1891, while Australian unionists achieved limited success in their goal of forming a 
New Zealand branch.
44
 James Bennett has since countered this interpretation, in part 
drawing on John E. Martin, who has written extensively on nineteenth century New 
Zealand rural labour, including shearers. Bennett’s argument is that swarms of 
radicalised Australians migrated to New Zealand in the early-1900s and introduced 
fresh vigour to shearing unionism, ‘contaminating’ any residual ‘collaborationist’ 
                                                
44 Rollo Arnold, ‘Yeomen and Nomads: New Zealand and the Australasian Shearing Scene 1886-
1896’, New Zealand Journal of History, Vol. 18, No. 2, October 1984, pp 117-142. 
Table 9-2: Number of Flocks by Size in Western Australia 
 1956 1966 1978 
Below 500 3455 2680 1834 
501 to 2000 7201 6953 4324 
2001 to 5000 921 3181 4105 
Above 5000 325 697 1312 
Source: Yearbooks of Western Australia 
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tendencies.
45
 ‘Contamination’ is a jibe at ‘arrogant assertions regarding the superior 
work ethic of New Zealanders’.46 This is part of a larger criticism of a labour 
historiography trapped by national boundaries, and ignoring the strong ‘transnational’ 
element or ‘common front’ energising labour movements on a trans-Tasman basis 
between 1890 and 1940. The broader proposition is not considered here, but Bennett’s 
treatment of shearers is pointing in exactly the wrong direction. Nonetheless, Arnold’s 
approach is one-dimensional and lacks nuance. It is necessary to address this 
controversy to make sense of the clash between mateship and money-making which 
came to a head in Australian shearing sheds towards the end of the twentieth century.  
 
New Zealand had not been affected by the financial hurricanes of the 1890s to the 
same extent as Australia, largely because there was no drought. Sheep stations 
endured severe losses in a snowstorm in 1895, enough to call an inquiry, but it hardly 
matched the despair wrought by Australia’s environmental disaster.47 There had been 
a notable shearing strike at Benmore Station in 1893
48
, but woolshed conflict on the 
scale and intensity of Australia’s did not occur. Legislation enabling industrial 
arbitration was introduced a decade earlier than the Australian acts,  encouraging the 
belief that strikes were an Australian affliction – the genesis of a different legend. In 
the case of shearers, though, this did not necessarily mean they were better treated 
than they were in Australia. In any case the complacency about industrial harmony 
was seriously challenged by the 1912 Waihi mining strike and the spectre of militant 
unionism in 1913. The reforming Liberals who had introduced arbitration and 
encouraged land settlement were at last out of office. Bill Massey, a small farmer 
from South Auckland led a conservative government from 1912 to 1924. Notoriously 
anti-union, his early premiership was characterised by confrontation with militant 
unions. Still, shearers did not actively participate in these upheavals which were 
                                                
45 James Bennett ‘The Contamination of Arcadia? Class, Trans-National Interactions and the 
Construction of Identity, 1890-1913’, New Zealand Journal of History, Vol. 33, No. 1, 1999, pp 20-42. 
James Bennett, ‘Rats and Revolutionaries’: The Labour Movement in Australia and New Zealand 
1890-1940, University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 2004, pp. 24, 29-30, 32-33, 37, 93-94. See also John 
E. Martin, ‘The Struggle for £1: The Emergence of Shearers’ Unions in the 1870s’, New Zealand 
Journal of History, Vol. 24, No. 1, 1970, p. 57. 
46 Bennett, Rats and Revolutionaries, p 37. 
47 Tom Brooking, Lands for the people?: the Highland clearances and the colonization of New 
Zealand: a biography of John McKenzie, University of Otago Press, Dunedin, 1996, p 257. 
48 John Martin, Tatau Tatau – One Big Union Altogether: The Shearers and the Early Years of the New 
Zealand Workers’ Union, New Zealand Workers’ Union, Wellington, 1987, p. 19. 
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driven by militant socialist hostility to the arbitration system.
49
 Ultimately the loyalty 
of shearers to arbitration was betrayed by the Sheepowners’ Association, the reverse 
of what happened in Australia.50  
 
There was also a quieter but more profound revolution in rural New Zealand. In 
Australia closer settlement had a patchwork pattern, but in New Zealand it 
comprehensively transformed rural settlement in the 1890s – again in advance of 
Australia by more than a decade. Wool remained an important output, but agricultural 
prosperity was just as solidly anchored to frozen lamb, and to butter. Largely this was 
because New Zealand had a suitable climate for smaller holdings to be viable, and the 
agricultural economy capitalised on new refrigeration and shipping technologies that 
made it possible to supply the British market with perishable produce. This was also 
true for the closely settled regions of Australia, but pastoral country could not be as 
successfully used to raise fat lambs or dairy cows. New Zealand’s agricultural frontier 
shifted decisively to the North Island during this period. Pakeha acquisition of Maori 
land in the Waikato, King Country and Bay of Plenty was in full swing, vividly 
described by Tom Brooking as ‘bursting up the greatest estate of all’.51 John Martin’s 
Forgotten Worker does not run very far into this period, but he acknowledges 
‘tremendous changes in the rural economy’ as the new century dawned. James Bellich 
calls it the ‘the rise of the farmer backbone’.52  
 
The social environment in which shearers worked was quickly becoming quite 
different to Australia. A 10-stand shed was unusually large and many were four or 
less. It was taking the sting out of any residual militancy and shearing strikes became 
rare events.53 James Bennett’s ‘contamination’ article begins with a quotation from 
the Australian Pastoralist’s Review which lauds New Zealanders as being keen to 
work while Australians are unreliable and work-shy. This is dismissed by Bennett as 
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‘stereotyped’, which is fair comment, yet there are enough resonances of it in what 
others say to suggest that attitudes in shearing sheds were often significantly different. 
What farmers called thrift and moral fibre unionists called weakness and feeble 
subservience. Arthur Brogan, an Australian shearer, wrote from Oamaru in 1908:     
I have been shearing in Canterbury and Otago, and do not find this country as good as it's 
cracked up to be. The rates and conditions of shearing are years behind good old Australia, the 
only country worth living in. The shed hands, having no organisation, are practically at the 
mercy of the boss. Considering the time lost, the price of shearing (16/6) is ridiculous. The 
boss seems to do pretty much as he likes with wet sheep and other matters. Harvesting 
conditions are little better. The men on the mills work the same brutal hours and have 
wretched accommodation in most places.54 
Jim Lambert, a shearers’ cook, made similar complaints from Timaru in 1915. 
Up the Ashburton Gorge two wool rollers refused work on New Years Day, and the boss 
sacked them, and did the wool rolling himself. The shearers went on shearing and said 
nothing! …….What sort of men were they? ……..[The shed hands] are just as bad as the 
shearers, and if a good man or two gets amongst them he is outed. More vigorous union effort 
is required over here.55 
Charley Pike’s letter from Longridge Station in 1902 complained that shearing rates 
were only ‘15/- and found’. He thought a union in New Zealand was badly wanted. 
His words might be seen as an example of ‘Australian attitude’: 
The tucker is the worst imaginable, and the cooking is done by contract. Nearly all the 
shearers at Longridge are Victorians. The owner tried to force them to shear to six o’clock on 
Saturday, but the lads gave him a taste of Australian unionism by refusing. The owner then 
told those who refused to shear that they could leave. Every Australian picked up his shears at 
once and left the board. The boss then climbed down and begged them not to leave him.56  
E.L. Barnes enjoyed New Zealand rather more on an extended trip in 1904 to both 
South and North Islands. Most of the shearers in the South Island were Victorians, but 
most of the North Island was ‘monopolised by the Maoris’.57 Australians were widely 
regarded as troublemakers. Barnes himself was very opposed to the radical element 
within the AWU and had to overcome ingrained prejudice against Australians.
58
  
 
New Zealand Workers Union (NZWU) official, Mick Laracy, an Australian émigré, 
has been described as being a bit of a disappointment to the rank-and-file in 1913 for 
backing off direct action in solidarity with the ‘Red Feds’ but a different interpretation 
has been suggested. Laracy had no confidence at all that if the union took on the 
employers, the rank-and-file would stay the course. Perhaps this was bluff, an attempt 
to save his hide. More likely he knew his shearers pretty well, and understood that 
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many of them did not hate Bill Massey quite as much as dinkum radicalism 
required.59 
 
All this suggests that Australians and New Zealanders did have different views on 
unionism, and perhaps other matters. Of course, the small farming districts of Victoria 
were also notoriously apathetic to unionism, and organisers got stick in many parts of 
NSW. But Victoria was different to New Zealand in that the AWU did exert 
considerable control, and nobody was ever allowed to forget that shearing unionism 
had first taken root there.60 Even E.L. Barnes, a Victorian, was a member, and in fact 
quite happy to be. The union in New Zealand could never build equivalent mythology 
or organisation. Perceptions of difference and actual differences may not be the same. 
But there was certainly talk of different national traits, and perhaps some of it had 
substance.  
 
Nonetheless, it is not possible to read John Martin’s account of the 1893 strike at 
Benmore Station, for example, and continue to believe that there was no conflict 
between the large estates and shearers.61 Shearing trouble in Australia was more 
widespread and certainly more violent, giving some weight to Rollo Arnold, but not 
enough. The Pastoralists’ Union got some of its scabs from New Zealand, but most 
came from Victoria. And as Martin reminds us, it was not unknown in a crisis for 
Canterbury run holders to bring shearers over from Victoria. But by about 1900 it was 
all starting to change. By 1897 shearing unionism in New Zealand had gone strangely 
quiet after feisty beginnings.62 Inward migrations of Australians certainly occurred 
but any radicalising effect is easily overstated.
63
 Still, Australian émigrés dominated 
shearing unionism for the next three decades and it might not have survived at all 
without Mick Laracy, Charles Grayndler (a brother of Ted Grayndler), and Arthur 
Cook. They seemed more honourable unionists than the despots running the AWU, 
yet it continued to be heavy going for them. Partly this was because New Zealand 
farmers were more vehement foes than the AWU’s pastoralist enemies. Small farmers 
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did not take Sundays off, so why should farm labour? Bill Massey’s supporters left 
Australian graziers for dead when it came to union-hating. 
 
But there was also something else in the air. Shearers increasingly came from small 
farmer backgrounds. The trend became dominant in the 1920s and ‘30s. Profiles of 
retired shearers in Shearing Magazine provide valuable insights into the culture.64 
Gangs of three or four moved around the King Country, Wanganui and the Bay of 
Plenty. Shearing on the Canterbury Plains and Southland also changed. They were 
interested in shearing technique and the latest gossip about tallies more than union 
politics. There was a strong ethic of upward mobility and many shearers succeeded in 
becoming farmers themselves. The life should not be excessively romanticised. 
Arguments arose over pay and conditions. Accommodation was often very poor. On 
the other hand meals were likely to be wholesome, often cooked by the farmer’s wife 
and eaten in the farm homestead. Problems and grievances were more likely to be 
addressed face to face, rather than via the union. Membership of the NZWU was 
probably reasonably common, although many seldom saw a representative. 
 
Claude Waite was a typical example. He was born in the Wanganui area in 1911 and 
learnt to shear in 1926, aged 15. He became a full time shearer in 1931, and provides 
interesting details of the tough life working for a contractor based in Marton, running 
six to eight shearers in two gangs. Fred Ackerman seems to have been a pretty stern 
boss, but in Waite’s view fair. Parallels with Harry Doyle, martinet of the Western 
Australian PLB, are worth noting. 
Fred was the head shearer, and whatever he did, everyone else had to do or you weren’t good 
enough to stay with him. Bosses were hard in those days because they knew if you didn’t 
come up to standard, there were plenty to take your place. I’ve seen five or six shearers sitting 
on the landing waiting for someone to get the sack. Fred was loyal to good workers. If you did 
the job you were there forever. If you didn’t he would fix your gear for you, give you a 
warning, but the next time he would kick you out.65 
 
Bill Richards was from this kind of background, growing to maturity on a 400 acre 
hill country farm in the Raglan backblocks. But he had also inherited folklore from 
the Waihi strike. His father (also known as Bill) had been a miner in Ballarat and 
Kalgoorlie in the ‘80s and ‘90s, and in 1903 settled his young and expanding family 
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in Waihi. With his brothers Bill senior worked the mine on contracts and made quite a 
lot of money. Young Bill was born in Waihi in 1907. A contractor rather than a wage 
labourer, his father was not directly involved in the 1912 strike. But he sympathised 
with the grievances of the waged workers, stopped work in solidarity, was branded a 
‘striker’, and forced to leave Waihi during the climax of the affair. Old Bill was not 
politically radical, anything but. Nevertheless, he exhibited underdog solidarity of a 
kind associated with Australian bush unionism.
66
  
 
Bill Richard’s wrote of what happened to the family after it left Waihi:  
It was during this period that their thoughts and ambitions turned to land and farming. Why, I 
do not know, as it was completely foreign to their way of life. As far back as I can trace, I can 
find no reference to any of them having had any experience or knowledge of farming. While 
they were still tunnelling at Western Springs the Government opened up for settlement a large 
block of Crown land at Te Akau. The land was virgin bush. The holdings were surveyed into 
approximately 400 acre blocks to be allocated by ballot. In most cases the farms were very 
isolated, lacking in roads or any other means of access. The only requirement of the 
Government was that the successful applicant pay the first 1½ years’ rent. The main 
requirement of the settler was to have a stout heart. The brothers decided to pool their 
resources and they, together with their womenfolk, put in for a ballot. My mother, Florence 
Mabel Richards, was the successful applicant and drew No. 7 block, Ruakiwi, Te Akau.67 
A knockabout Australian family had flirted around the IWW flame at Waihi, but 
ended up in the New Zealand bush.68 Shearing was an obvious choice for young Bill 
in the 1920s. His world view, though seasoned with a taint of the Australian 
egalitarian spirit, was fundamentally shaped by dour pioneers of the North Island hill 
country. The sheds were more about taming the forest, and producing wool and fat 
lamb for ‘the old country’ than class war. One of Richards’s adventures was a 
shearing trip to Australia in 1930s, described with humour and gusto.69 If he had in 
him an instinct for bush unionism, there is no sign that he had any interest in the 
radical PWIU, then in its hey-day in NSW. Indeed, he makes no mention of it at all, 
although it is hard to believe he could have shorn at Gurley station in the Moree area 
and not been aware of its activities. The shearing gangs Bill Richards was associated 
with in New Zealand were similar to those already described. Parallels can be found 
in the lives of many North Island pakeha shearers from the mid-1920s to the 1950s. 
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This was also the world from which the Bowen Brothers, Godfrey and Ivan, emerged. 
Before they became famous through exploits in shearing competitions in the 1950s, 
the Bowens made a living in the late 1930s and during the war as two-stand plant 
operators in the Hawkes Bay and Bay of Plenty. Accordingly, it is easy to draw 
comparisons with Henry Salter in Kerang, Kevin Saare’s father and uncle, or two-
stand contractors in Western Australia. Of the two, Ivan was widely considered the 
better shearer, but Godfrey was more extrovert. He could talk about shearing even 
better than he could do it. Between them they established world record shearing tallies 
which were huge by Australian norms, achieved of course in very different types of 
sheep. The extraordinary combination of speed and skill developed while they were 
unknown shearing contractors, became known as ‘the Bowen method’. It was entirely 
a result of them trying things out, observing others, and synthesising the results. With 
wool prices booming in the 1950s the New Zealand Wool Board was concerned, as 
was its Australian counterpart, about the supply of shearers. Godfrey Bowen was 
hired on a full-time salary to establish a national shearer training system, and to 
promote better shearing skills. Despite the fact that Bowen was to some extent 
lampooned by common shed shearers, he had an enormous impact on the broader 
image of New Zealand shearers in the 1950s and ‘60s.
70
  
 
New Zealand did not have much history of shearing shed strife after the 1920s. There 
is evidence to the contrary. In 1921 the arbitration court cut shearing rates after a fall 
in wool prices, and in 1928 the NZWU came to an agreement with sheep owners to 
fix rates according to a formula tied to the price of wool. The system then lasted until 
1964. Such a formula could never have worked in Australia. Indeed the bitter strikes 
of 1922 and 1930 were triggered by cuts in shearing rates following wool market 
reverses. AWU attempts to persuade shearers to accept these awards, however 
unpalatable, only enraged the militant element and magnified the abuse thrown at 
officials.71 New Zealand shearing rates were adjusted downwards in the early-1950s 
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without major disruption. Nothing remotely comparable to the 1956 strike occurred, 
although economic conditions and inflationary pressures were much the same.72 
 
The dominance of Maori shearers on the North Island’s East Coast from the 
nineteenth century seems clear, but they were increasingly important, mixing with 
pakeha, in the hill country culture discussed above. Family based shearing gangs 
organised on patriarchal lines, and utilising women and children as shed hands are 
mentioned by John Martin and Witi Ihimaera’s novel Bullibasha has similar 
descriptions.73 Conditions could be very primitive, as this account by the Australian 
Jim Lambert in 1915 suggests. 
There was one big room for sleeping in, without bunks, but with ferns tossed in to doss on. 
You had to burrow in like a rabbit. They were all Maoris, except two of us - Maori women 
rolling and picking up and a Maori woman classing. All sleep in one room, married couples in 
one corner, single girls in another, and single men in another. The boss said he put bunks in, 
but the Maoris pulled them out. He said anything does them, so if we got there we get it 
rough. The tucker was as rough as the place.74 
It was a system that enabled the family to operate as a ready made contract gang, and 
to negotiate directly with stations without dependence on the union. Of course the role 
of the union in establishing benchmark awards was not irrelevant, or unappreciated, 
and Arthur Cook’s organising of Maori shearers must be acknowledged.
75
 However, 
there is also evidence that the Maori regarded the union as another pakeha institution 
to be treated with suspicion. Charles Grayndler described them in 1915 as ‘one of the 
special problems of the Union in New Zealand. In some districts they have enrolled 
splendidly, in others they have proved difficult to approach’ and ‘as to the Maori 
shearer, I found him at times loth to part with his silver for a ticket’.76 In 1925 a union 
organiser visiting the remote East Coast got a civil but cool welcome. The Maori did 
not get the same attention as pakeha members, they suggested, and ‘strongly objected’ 
to paying full price for a union ticket. Why had ‘the head’ not come to see them - the 
general secretary or the president of the union should make an appearance at the start 
of the season.77  For insightful observations on Maori shearers in more recent times, 
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Shearers Motel by the Australian novelist Roger McDonald, contains an account of 
his own experience as the cook for Maori shearers in the early 1990s. A television 
documentary ‘The Kiwi Shed’ made by the ABC is also useful.78 More research is 
desperately needed on Maori shearing but suggestions that they formed part of a 
radical labour front are not promising. 
 
By the 1950s, then, New Zealand shearing culture was noticeably different. A training 
scheme set up during the wool boom under Godfrey Bowen gave shearers national 
status in the export drive. In Australia woolshed disruption culminating in the 1956 
strike perpetuated their ‘agitator’ reputation. The durability and strength of shearing 
unionism in Australia through the twentieth century sits in stark contrast with its 
tepidity and weakness in New Zealand. This was not simply a matter of union 
membership, which in both countries was probably quite high much of the time, but 
of who controlled shearing sheds. Rural social circumstances contributed to this 
difference. James Bennett’s Australia-New Zealand common front of organised 
labour was non-existent, and mateship was much more likely to occur between non-
union shearers. The severe shortage of shearers in Western Australia in the 1960s 
lured New Zealand shearers into the one part of Australia where, despite differences 
in landscape and climate, the Wheat Belt shearing culture was most like their own. 
This created a compelling chemistry which eventually undermined a century of AWU 
domination of Australian woolsheds.   
 
Over time some New Zealanders made Western Australia their permanent base, but 
some migrated backwards and forwards annually. By 1980 they were fully integrated 
into the rural social fabric. The Western Australian Department of Agriculture 
calculated that the state needed a core of about 2000 shearers and estimated that about 
700 regular visitors from New Zealand contributed to the effort required.
79
 The 
Western Australian Government was keen to see that the migrations continued and 
made special arrangements to make it convenient for them to travel, to put in tax 
returns, and to find contractors. Tax was a delicate matter, and farmers found ways to 
pay them in cash without necessarily bothering the Tax Office at all! There was little 
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difficulty about rates of pay – mostly it was above the award. On other matters of 
conditions and regulations that got in the way of money-making they were not so 
particular. It was not unknown for woolshed lights to be on late into the night. 
Sometimes flocks were finished off on a Sunday, to facilitate a clean start on Monday 
morning at the next shed. Kiwis had little inkling that their approach to shearing 
would be regarded as a form of ‘leprosy’ by unionists in Queensland and NSW.80 
After all, what they did more or less followed Wheat Belt practices. Although there 
were over 30 million sheep in Western Australia, there were 150 million in the other 
States, reportedly also in need of shearers. They soon discovered that shearing sheds 
in Longreach and Blackall were very different places from those in which they had 
learned their ways, in Taihape and Heriot. 
  
                                                
80 See Chapter 10 for origin of ‘leprosy’ comment. 
Chapter 10: Mateship’s Last Stand: The Wide Comb Dispute 1970-1990 
 
‘Foreign’ Invasion 
 
Grazcos resented its strike-breaker reputation, but the truth was that it spearheaded 
grazier tactics in all shearing disputes from 1920. In the 1970s many from both sides 
were still telling stories about 1956. The wide comb dispute of the 1980s was the last 
of these dramas in the twentieth century. Grazcos was locked in a love-hate 
relationship with the AWU but they needed each other. No full time shearer could 
afford not to shear Grazcos sheds. Yet the Company was perennially short of shearers, 
testing the patience of shed managers whose job it was to keep shearing on schedule. 
Just as in J.H. Young’s day, graziers yearned for a less irritable brand of shearer.  
 
There had been some recruitment of New Zealand shearers during the 1956 strike but 
it did not influence the course of events.
1
 The wool establishment was aware of 
Godfrey Bowen’s training system, and toyed with replicating something like it in 
Australia. The ‘Tally-Hi’ initiative was the one direct consequence.2 The AWU’s 
lukewarm attitude to training tempted the Australian Wool Board to flirt with radical 
ideas of displacing shearers altogether. Millions were spent investigating robots and 
‘chemical shearing’.3 The New Zealand Wool Board was just as capable of wasting 
money, but had no need for robots. With hindsight Australian graziers were slow to 
realise that the answer lay less in reproducing New Zealand’s training regime than 
hiring its ‘graduates’. Either way, however, AWU hegemony over woolsheds was 
likely to be a serious barrier.  
 
After Federation there was a general dilution of contact between Australia and New 
Zealand on a number of levels.
4
 Trans-Tasman migrations of shearers persisted until 
World War I but waned in the 1920s. Wartime travel restrictions and the adoption of 
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conscription in New Zealand in 1916 triggered the decline.
5
 Still, shearers are 
wanderers and it was not unusual to find New Zealanders in Australian sheds or vice 
versa.6 Indeed, there were examples of more significant contact. An annual migration 
of mainly Western Australians to the New Zealand High Country emerged in the 
1940s. Ironically, given the storm that blew up 25 years later, this was a consequence 
of New Zealand’s attachment to the wide comb. High Country stations carried New 
Zealand’s only remaining merinos, which owners preferred to shear with narrow 
combs. Kiwi shearers avoided going near them and contractors looked to Australia, 
where there were plenty of merino specialists.7 Quips that New Zealanders were ‘too 
useless’ to shear merinos were part of the fun and Australians were warmly 
welcomed. Harold Christensen took his first trip to Central Otago in 1953: ‘The sheep 
farmers were there to meet us; they treated us like kings, an entirely different 
experience to Western Australia.’8 He could not resist comparison with aristocratic 
graziers who ‘only tolerated the shearers because they were an absolute necessity’. 
While regular movement increased in the 1950s, the appearance of New Zealanders in 
Western Australia during the 1960s was the first significant migration in that direction 
for perhaps half a century.9 
 
New Zealanders subsequently drifted into NSW and Queensland, but there was no 
systematic effort to recruit them until the mid-1970s. Major flooding throughout 
western-NSW and Queensland in early-1974 was, inadvertently, a catalyst. 
Newspapers called them the ‘worst floods this century’. Thallon in Southern 
Queensland received 15 inches of rain in 24 hours. Rivers in the upper catchment of 
the Darling rose and a major flood worked its way across western-NSW, bursting 
levees at Brewarrina, Wilcannia and Bourke. Families were evacuated from 
Coonamble, Narrabri and Goodooga. Many homesteads were isolated and stock losses 
were substantial.
10
 Laurie Walsh, a contractor from Broken Hill, recalled 30-40 inches 
of rain which made the surrounding country an ‘inland sea’. He had shearers stranded 
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for almost a month, dropping supplies by helicopter.
11
 While not the main season, one 
of the many problems of besieged graziers was the accumulated shearing backlog. 
With AWU agreement, Fokker Friendships were chartered to bring shearers over from 
New Zealand.
12
 It was a great success and the union later rued cooperating with the 
graziers in their moment of crisis. The Chairman of Grazcos lavishly praised the Kiwi 
shearers. ‘Their performance was particularly good and it was only through the 
attitude of these men that it was possible to get all the sheep shorn.’
13
 
    
Whether or not this was the only factor, it hastened systematic recruitment. In 1976 
Grazcos sent its Victorian Shearing Manager to New Zealand for a five week visit. 
While the purpose was vague, he was to attend the Golden Shears and ‘generally 
study shearing’.14 In the late 1970s Grazcos routinely sent a manager to the Golden 
Shears, New Zealand’s national shearing competition held annually in the Wairarapa 
town of Masterton, to organise whole teams of shearers.15 Word spread 
independently, and in an era of more frequent air services an invasion of the 
Australian outback was underway. 
 
Graziers could not believe their luck. Like the Australians in Central Otago, New 
Zealanders were treated like kings and it escalated into a major issue for the AWU.16 
During 1979 it was openly canvassed that well trained New Zealand shearers might 
bring badly needed innovation. A report outlining their impact in Western Australia 
gave weight to these opinions. Professor Keith Campbell of Sydney University 
suggested, a little idealistically perhaps, that farmers and unions need not be 
‘antagonists’. But he was realistic enough to note that past wounds were ‘deep’. On 
the same occasion Ian McLachlan was less diplomatic. At that stage he was speaking 
as Chairman of the Australian Wool Council. He declared that farmers were 
threatened by the power and size of unions. Another speaker ventilated an issue 
which, hitherto, few outside woolsheds understood or cared about - unofficial use of 
‘3½ inch combs’ was increasing each season. In Western Australia they were already 
doing 80 percent of shearing, it was claimed. Apparently this was one of the 
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innovations, but it was not universally welcomed. This was not a gathering 
sympathetic to the AWU, but Ian Cuttler, Secretary of the Victoria and Riverina 
Branch, felt compelled to put the union view. He was obdurate - ‘wide combs’ were 
‘not on’. There was a whiff of militancy in the audience of woolgrowers. ‘Times have 
changed!’, someone yelled.17 
 
The dispute over wide combs was really about something more fundamental. New 
Zealanders were conspicuously uninterested in union ritual – electing ‘reps’, holding 
‘meetings’, having a ‘vote on this and a vote on that’. ‘Squatter hatred’ was not part of 
their historical baggage.
18
 They had already been marked as efficient and co-operative 
shearing teams. One of the most notorious reputations Kiwis earned concerned ‘wet 
sheep’ voting. New Zealand is a land of, at times, almost incessant rain. There are 
sayings about the weather such as that applied to Mount Taranaki (previously Mount 
Egmont). If you can see the top of the mountain it is going to rain – if you can’t it 
already is raining! It became a standing joke that it was almost impossible to get a 
New Zealander to put in a ‘wet’ vote if conditions were at all marginal. In New 
Zealand shearers spent many hours sitting around waiting for sheep to dry. 
Queensland shearers, Kiwis thought, would ‘vote sheep wet if they were out in a 
heavy due a couple of nights before’.19  Ballots were theoretically secret, but in 
practice everyone knew how votes fell. New Zealanders did not deliberately offend 
mateship codes, but nor did they mind the notoriety of difference. John Mulholland, a 
shearer from Central Otago (actually, a region with an arid climate), enjoyed recalling 
that if there were five Aussies and three Kiwis, voting was always 5:3.20 As the 
invasion progressed it was just as likely to be 3:5, in which case the Aussies had to 
accept decisions of the Kiwi majority.21  
 
The overtone of nationalism was inescapable, but insiders and outsiders were not 
simply defined this way. New Zealanders were not actually the most aggressive 
                                                
17 The Land, 30/10/80, p. 13; 1/3/1979, p. 11;  3/5/1979, p. 14; 31/5/1979, p. 8; R.J. Lightfoot, A.M. 
Ingleton, R.A. Mills, N.M. Marney, & M. A. D’Antuono, Preliminary investigation of shearing merino 
sheep with combs of varying width and design, Western Australian Department of Agriculture, Perth, 
1978. 
18 Shearing, Vol. 1, No. 2, Autumn/Winter 1985, pp. 44, 46. 
19 Shearing, Vol. 16, No 1, March 2000, p15 
20 John Mulholland interview, 2003. 
21 Shearers were not be prosecuted for breaking agreements if ‘in their honest opinion’ sheep were wet.  
 263 
promoters of wide combs in eastern Australia between 1979 and 1981.  Robert White 
was born in 1946 into a small-farming and rural labouring background at Mount 
David near Bathurst and took up shearing in 1969. A knockabout larrikin he married 
young and became a devoted family man. He was a skilled shearer with a highly 
competitive approach to money-making. He discovered the wide comb in Western 
Australia, then set up a contracting business in Mandurama when he returned to NSW 
in the late-1970s. White gathered around him a team of crack shearers and it was an 
open secret that wide combs were used.22 The sense that they were cherry-picking the 
most lucrative sheds, avoiding smaller flocks or ones with difficult sheep, was a factor 
in the vitriol he attracted. There was no question of White’s shearers undercutting 
award rates – high quality shearers were in short supply and there was no need. 
Inevitably, though, they cut corners on rules and regulations if they thought no one 
was watching. Graziers aided and abetted their misdemeanours.23 Western Australians 
were also involved. The Arbitration Commission Bench was taken aback when 
Western Australians were bracketed with New Zealanders as ‘foreigners’ by an AWU 
witness.24 There were in these developments, echoes of John Leahy’s MSU, and the 
shearing at Coombe Martin and Wellshot in 1904, so long ago.25 
 
History of the Wide Comb Ban 
 
Although the wide comb ban was paraded as a symbol of the AWU’s century of 
struggle against the graziers, the history of it was only vaguely understood.26 It had 
existed, or so it was thought, since 1926. In fact, AWU rules had opposed ‘broad 
gauge combs’ (as they were mostly referred to before World War II) since the early 
1900s when they were invented. In 1926 a clause was included in the Federal Pastoral 
Award for the first time, but the union rule was the relevant sanction historically. The 
1926 case was primarily concerned with the ‘double bent tooth’ comb, a quite 
                                                
22 A University of Melbourne scientist was asked to conduct tests, and contractors’ were surveyed. This 
suggests that wide combs were already coming into use. Truelove, ‘Manpower Study’, pp. 107-8. 
23 AIC Wide Comb Case Transcripts 1982, pp. 122-48. White’s evidence was summarised in a 
document held in NAA called ‘Summary of Transcript – Wide Comb Matter’, pp. 4-5. 
24 AIC Wide Comb Case Transcripts 1983, pp. 1775a. 
25 See Chapter 4 for blade shearers’ problems adapting to machines. 
26 Participants seemed unaware of the pre-1926 union ban. The history as it was understood was 
summarised in Julia E. Gibson, Aspects of the Use of Wide Combs in the Australian Wool Industry, 
Farm Management Report No. 16, Department of Agricultural Economics and Business Management, 
University of New England, Armidale,1982, pp. 5-6. 
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different issue which worried graziers, not the AWU. Largely in deference to the 
longstanding AWU rule, a maximum width of 2½ inches was formally incorporated 
into the award but it was merely ratifying established practice and excited little 
argument or discussion. The union’s abhorrence of the wide comb is better accounted 
for, but no more easily explained, by a longer historical process. 
 
The comb and the cutter are detachable items screwed onto the handpiece of the 
shearing machine. The comb is fixed while the cutter (attached to ‘forks’ sometimes 
called ‘chicken feet’) oscillates across its face. Friction between the sharpened edges 
of the teeth cuts the wool. While there have been many refinements of this 
mechanism, the working principle developed in 1888 still survives.27 It is high 
precision equipment and as the edges of the teeth are blunted by constant shearing, 
combs and cutters need to be ground regularly on a rotating emery stone to restore 
their cutting efficiency. When worn out they are replaced. 
 
Knowledge of machines differentiated modern shearers from some of the customs 
passed down from the nineteenth century blade men.28 T.J. Lonsdale remembered his 
days as an AWU organiser in Bourke before the Great War: 
With the changing from blade-shearing to machine-shearing came also a change in the class of 
men; and their outlook was altogether different from the outlook of the ‘Knights of the 
Blade’.29 
He was referring to the ruthless money-making attitude of contract shearing gangs 
which hastened the advance of machine shearing early in the twentieth century.
30
 
However, it was not quite that simple. Blade shearers were also ‘money-makers’. Jack 
Howe, famous for a ‘world record’ with blades at Alice Downs in 1892, was not one 
to look backwards. By 1900 he was ‘doing some good tallies with machines’, and 
later still became a publican and something of a local mover-and-shaker in Blackall.31 
Simultaneously, mateship traditions influenced machine shearing attitudes as the 
militancy of the PWIU and the 1956 strike suggested. Sunday Too Far Away and 
Patsy Adam-Smith’s The Shearers captured these traits of shearing culture rather 
                                                
27 For the history of shearing machinery, A.D. Fraser, This Century of Ours, Dangar, Gedye and 
Malloch, Sydney, 1938, pp. 174-214.  
28 Twentieth century shearers were more mechanically minded than blade shearers. As well as shearing 
machinery they were familiar with farm implements and cars. Day, Quick Go the Shears, pp. 55-6.  
29  Brisbane Courier, 14/7/1923, p. 18. 
30 See Chapter 4 for Lonsdale’s observations. 
31 Fraser, This Century of Ours, p. 198. 
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well. Mateship and money-making were for the most part reasonably compatible, but 
sometimes when the two currents met, it stirred up a rip-tide. The dispute over 
‘carrying machines’ had been an early example. Wide combs divided shearers along 
similar lines.  
 
Pragmatic engineering considerations established the ‘narrow gauge comb’ as the 
Australian norm. Just as electricity power points, spark plugs, electric drills, and a 
host of other mechanical age gadgets have standardised forms, so combs and cutters 
needed to fit the handpieces of any of the three or four manufacturers. Each produced 
a range of models and these multiplied as new versions were developed.
32
 The 
practicalities of cutting efficiency led to shearing combs between 2¼ and 2½ inches 
wide, with 10 teeth evenly spaced to facilitate movement through the wool. Matching 
cutters had three prongs (or teeth). The power of the motors and the human 
capabilities of the shearer governed the options. There were no regulations governing 
the matter, nor any need. In shearing culture, machines and blades divided the old and 
the young in the decade before World War I. The design of machinery parts, though, 
was left entirely to the manufacturers. 
 
Standardisation notwithstanding, ongoing competition for an expanding market left 
plenty of scope for adaptation and improvement. Shearing plants – that is, the motors, 
the overhead gears, and pulleys - were advertised in newspapers read by graziers and 
farmers such as The Pastoral Review or The Land.  Handpieces were more often 
promoted in the union newspaper The Worker. Shearers made the decisions that 
mattered about combs and cutters. There were endless possibilities for bevelling, 
shaping and rearranging the teeth. Advertising always insisted that the latest 
modifications were sure to lead to bigger tallies. The importance of a money-making 
ethic amongst shearers demanded nothing less, while the AWU, publisher of The 
Worker, took no offence. Personal choice governed the combs that were used and it 
was perfectly acceptable for a man who liked the Wolseley to shear alongside a mate 
who used Listers. Nobody thought anything of it. 
 
                                                
32 Fraser, This Century of Ours, pp. 199-200; Godfrey Bowen, Wool Away: The Art and Technique of 
Shearing, Van Nostrend Reinhold Co, New York & Whitcombe and Tombs, Wellington NZ, 1974 
(first published 1955), pp 100-3. 
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The ‘broad gauge comb’ – later called the ‘wide comb’ – appeared in the early 1900s. 
Probably the first version was manufactured by Burgon and Ball, but this is not 
certain. It was an inch wider than the standard comb and had 13 teeth instead of 10. 
The cutters featured four prongs rather than three. The same handpieces were used, 
but adjustments had to be made to the ‘forks’ (the mechanism allowing the cutter to 
oscillate), so that the ‘throw’ (a term used to describe the sideways movement) 
accommodated the full cutting potential of the wider comb. Most shearers were 
capable of carrying out this relatively simple transformation but it took a little time 
and once the change was made there needed to be a good reason to return to the 
narrow comb.
33
  
 
E.L. Barnes refers to them during his account of shearing in New Zealand in 1904. 
Indeed, he goes as far as to suggest that he developed an early version.    
It was at Te-Mata that I designed and used a new type of shearing machine comb and cutter 
for use in large open-woolled sheep, such as those in the north island of N.Z. and other 
countries where sheep are bred for their carcass, rather than for their wool. At this time the 
large open-wooled sheep were being shorn with the same type of machine to which were fitted 
the combs and cutters of the same width as those used on the small close-wooled sheep of 
other parts. It appeared to me that it would be an advantage to use combs and cutters of a 
wider type on the large open-woolled sheep, as the shearing machine could easily cut the extra 
width and so take the wool off the bodies with a fewer number of 'blows'. I had a wider set of 
comb and cutter made and tried it out with great success. Through a patent agent in Hastings, I 
applied for a provisional patent for this improvement, at a cost I could little afford at the time; 
but I did not receive any benefit from it. Some years later a wide comb and cutter, that was a 
success, was put on the market by an American firm, and I am told they are very widely used 
in N.Z. and wherever large open-woolled sheep are shorn and crutched.34 
These comments allude to the early uptake of the wide cutting comb in New Zealand 
and the accepted wisdom it was unsuitable for shearing Australian merinos. They also 
point to the most obvious advantage they offered – faster shearing.  
 
The AWU’s reaction was surprisingly swift and by 1910 the union had a rule: 
No shearer shall use a broad gauge machine unless all other shearers employed in the shed are 
supplied with similar machines.35  
The mateship meaning of this is clear but it also implicitly recognises the practice of 
competing for tallies. It was not ‘fair’ if some shearers got the advantage of the wide 
comb and others did not, although this belies the fact that different designs of narrow 
                                                
33 AIC Wide Comb Case Transcripts 1983, pp. 1447, 1588-1589, 1996. 
34 SLV H17273, Box 125/1, Barnes, Shirtsleeves to Shirtsleeves, p. 305. Fraser, This Century of Ours, 
p. 201, refers to a ‘Barnes handpiece’ which first appeared in Australia in 1899, but this is probably not 
the same inventor.  
35 AWU Rule Book, 1910-11 
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comb also displayed different shearing efficiencies. The rule was not actually an 
outright ban, and was worded to apply in any particular shed rather than sheds in 
general. It did not address, arguably, the greater evil – full teams of wide comb 
shearers roaming the outback at the expense of ordinary shearers. Evidently it was not 
an issue although this is puzzling. This is precisely the time that the legion of MSU 
men were coming back into the AWU and it is surprising that they did not question 
the rule. In 1910 union leaders would have been cautious about antagonising the MSU 
men, but it also had many members who felt threatened by contract shearing, and who 
viewed with alarm any innovation that made the fast men faster. The deep emotional 
commitment to the narrow comb can hardly have been fully formed at this time, yet 
the rule had materialised within a year or two of wide combs first appearing. The 
intention resembles the rule against private handpieces introduced in the late 1890s. 
Despite the received wisdom that wide combs were not much of an advantage in 
merinos, there is a clear recognition of their potential to boost shearing output. This 
view of broad gauge combs was expressed in forceful terms by Jim Laracy at the 
1911 AWU Conference.36 
 
There is evidence that wide gear was available in Australia between 1908 and 1918. 
How universally is conjectural. Advertisements for the ‘Cooper Wide Cut’ appeared 
during 1908. The illustrations clearly reveal it as a 13-tooth model although the width 
is not actually mentioned. This was probably before the union rule, but the 
advertisements do not reappear in 1909, suggesting the comb did not catch on with 
shearers.37 Wide combs appear in the 1913 Australian Catalogue for Dangar, Gedye & 
Co, agents for Lister machines.
38
 AWU organisers encountered wide combs in the 
sheds from time to time. Conomodine shed (a farming property in the Molong district 
with about 6,500 sheep) had five shearers using ‘broad cut forks’ in 1909. The 
organiser was not surprised because ‘it [has] always been regarded as a “scab” shed’. 
Apparently, half-hearted unionists were likely to be wide comb shearers. In 1910 at 
Brindingabba, a shed of about 50,000 sheep in far-western NSW, three shearers were 
caught using broad gauges. They had fitted a special plate to attach them to the 
machine and the ‘rep’, F.H. Peters, objected.  A shed meeting was called and two of 
                                                
36 See Chapter 5. 
37 For example, The Worker, 2/1/1908, p. 7; 9/1/1908, p. 28. 
38 Private correspondence with Jim Donaldson, editor of Blades and Shears, a newsletter for amateur 
collectors of old shearing machinery. 
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the offenders succumbed, no doubt reluctantly, but the third was obstinate. Rule 103 
was still new and there was an argument about its meaning, so Peters wrote to the 
General Secretary for an interpretation.39 They shore on for several days waiting for 
Macdonell’s reply, continuing to argue the point and getting on one another’s nerves. 
The ruling when it arrived was emphatic. Broad gauges must not be used without 
everybody’s agreement.40 
 
The practice of ‘pulling combs’ was a way of getting around the rule. Shearers 
developed methods of bending the teeth of a standard comb. One way was to put the 
comb in a vice and apply a blowtorch to soften the steel for bending with pliers or 
tongs. One shearer explained how he put a horseshoe into the fire until it was red hot. 
He then lodged the outside tooth of the comb in a nail hole for leverage. He tempered 
the teeth with a candle flame before subjecting them to the horseshoe treatment. 
Others were known to carry a piece of blowpipe which was useful as the lever.41  
‘Pulled combs’ seldom replicated factory engineering and graziers considered them a 
danger to the sheep.42 For its part, the union considered them an insult to mateship. 
Shed organisers continued to complain from time to time about the ‘widespread’ 
practice and it was periodically condemned in resolutions sent to AWU conferences. 
The original rule did not define precisely what a broad gauge machine was and in 
1915 the wording was sharpened up, defining it as ‘wider than the standard Wolseley, 
Moffatt, or TUS’.43 This still left room for interpretation, although the whole matter 
never seemed likely to become a major controversy.  
 
Innovation by manufacturers continued to test boundaries. In January 1921 union 
discipline in the Clermont district of Queensland was wearing thin. ‘Almost 
everywhere in this district members are breaking some rule of the union or the 
award’, complained the local organiser. Many were ‘using a certain bent-tooth 
comb’.44 He was referring to a Cooper comb in which the bottom tooth was kinked at 
                                                
39 This was before telephones were widely available to shearers. 
40 The Worker, 5/10/1910, p. 7. 
41 The Worker (Brisbane), 24/1/1924, p10. The ‘horseshoe’ method was still being used in Western 
Australia  in the 1950s. Hobson, Across the Board, p. 172. 
42 Hobson, Across the Board, p. 94. 
43 AWU Rule Book, 1915/16. 
44 The Worker (Brisbane), 3/2/1921, p. 21. 
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the end in order to draw in more wool (see Figure 10-1). This made the comb 
fractionally wider than the ‘standard Wolseley’. But was it a ‘broad gauge comb’? In 
every other respect it was a normal 10-tooth comb. Shearers liked the Cooper and the 
AWU was loath to prevent them using it, and the rule was changed to accommodate 
the ‘Cooper Patented Bent Tooth Comb’. 
The meaning of broad gauge combs shall be any comb exceeding 2½ inches from the outside 
of the top tooth to the outside of the bottom tooth.45  
                                                
45 AWU Rule Book 1921-22. 
Figure 10-1: 'Cooper' Advertisement 1921 
 
 
Source: Queensland Worker, 21/4/1921, p 21 
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For the first time the rule was explicit. It was a line in the sand, and a clue to the 
enduring puzzle of future attitudes to wide combs and union policy regarding them. 
The union did not care what the properties of the teeth were but it would control the 
width of the comb. It had now put a number on it – 2½ inches. This gradually 
assumed sacred status while other features of shearing machinery could be varied 
without attracting any protest whatsoever. The Cooper Engineering Company seemed 
to appreciate the delicacy of the matter. The comb ‘is now within the union width’, 
chirped its advertisement, while dancing around the issue of whether it was faster. 
The potential for superior workmanship and a reduction in ‘nerves and worry’ were 
emphasised. Few shearers would have missed, however, the subliminal message in the 
suggestion that one of the cuts on the long blow might be eliminated.46  
 
Meanwhile the practice of ‘pulling’ combs and the occasional sighting of a wide 
comb continued to be admonished. In 1923, Sam Brassington, another Queensland 
organiser, complained that ‘every brand and breadth of comb [is] used, which [is] 
very unsatisfactory to all concerned’. He related an instance of a man who had been 
shearing ‘150 to 160’, who got a daily tally of 212 after fitting a broad gauge and this 
was ‘altogether unfair to members [of the AWU] in that shed’.
47
 Brassington’s 
suggestion was that the standard size of the comb should be restricted to 2¼ inches, 
which would have outlawed the Cooper with the patented bent tooth. He argued that 
an extra ¼ inch led to unemployment as it took fewer men to shear the same number 
of sheep. This was the crux of the matter. The wide comb rule was partly intended to 
protect rouseabouts because the wool came off faster, forcing them to work harder. 
But it was also intended to ensure a ‘fair’ distribution of sheep (and therefore income) 
amongst shearers. Brassington was one of the loudest voices opposing ‘southerners’ 
in Queensland sheds in the 1920s.48 He was answering to a constituency that had 
already taken root in Queensland, and no doubt elsewhere, which conflated past 
notions of rural grievance with current experiences of disadvantage. For some 
shearing was a mechanism for upward mobility, but there were also those who felt 
entrapment. This was not purely economic, because part of it was the perceived 
                                                
46 The Worker (Brisbane), 21/4/1921, p. 21. 
47 The claimed effect of the broad gauge seems exaggerated. Many years later when authentic 
controlled tests were done, wide combs added 20 to 30 sheep to a shearer’s daily average, not 50 to 60 
as this example implies.  
48 See Chapter 5. 
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condescension of the grazier class and city slickers. Brassington put the union view in 
a form which resonated with IWW-type rhetoric.   
The constitution of the union [aims] at the complete emancipation of all workers, but under 
this speeding-up system how [can we] hope to emancipate [our] workers? To secure [this] end 
the speeding up must go.49  
However, most shearers did not have to be forced to ‘speed up’ by a nasty boss, they 
did it naturally. Yet the term was consistently used year after year at the AWU 
Conference – condemning contracting, advocating the universal tally and other such 
causes. Still, the AWU Conference refused to get very excited about these supposed 
betrayals of mateship. Brassington’s motion failed to get up. In 1924 Jack Durkin, 
who was very much a fellow traveller with Brassington, explained that shed 
committees in his Western District of Queensland had been actively policing the 
matter and fining offenders. But when he brought a motion to the conference floor for 
an increase in fines and more rigorous enforcement of the wide comb rule it lapsed 
without a seconder.
50
 Likewise the abolition of contracting and the introduction of a 
universal tally never got very far. The leaders of the AWU seemed to regard these 
outbursts as a useful means of allowing its Left-wing to let off steam. 
 
Flushed with the success of the ‘bent tooth’, Coopers introduced the ‘Marvel’, 
featuring a ‘double bent tooth’ (see Figure 10-2). This was also popular with shearers, 
but brought graziers into the equation. The ‘Marvel’ had a pinching effect as the wool 
was drawn in to be cut, leading to unevenness or ‘ridging’, especially when used by 
shearers with poor technique. There was also a risk, they contended, that the bent tips 
would cut the skin or sever the teats of lambs. This was denied by the manufacturer, 
and by the AWU when a case was brought to the Arbitration Court in 1926. The 
Court heard a large amount of evidence on these points, by no means all of it 
consistent. The strongest evidence against the comb was provided by R.C. Wilson, 
General Manager of the Graziers’ Co-operative Shearing Company. This carried 
weight with Justice Powers.
51
 In 1927 the AWU attempted to have the clause 
abolished, but Justice Dethridge, like Powers in 1926, was unmoved. 
 
                                                
49 The Worker (Brisbane), 24/1/1924, p. 8. 
50 Durkin has already been introduced in Chapters 6 and 7 as a radical influenced by the IWW and the 
PWIU.  
51 ABL NAA B1958/ 10 Box 2 Pastoral Award Transcript 1927, pp. 299-300. 
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Figure 10.2: The ‘Cooper’ Range of Combs 1924 
 
Graziers were concerned about 
the bend in left hand tooth. It was 
always “in the wool” and shearers 
could not effectively control it. This 
was banned in the 1926 Award. 
The “Marvel” was a modified 10-
tooth comb, not a 13-tooth broad 
gauge comb. 
The graziers did not object to this. 
The longer outside tooth was not 
considered dangerous because it 
was on the shorn/unshorn margin. 
It was mostly “out of the wool” and 
visible to the shearer. 
THIS ADVERTISEMENT (The 
Worker (Brisbane), 28/8/1924, 
p18) CONTAINED NO 
SUGGESTION THAT ANY OF 
THESE COMBS OFFENDED 
THE AWU RULE. 
. 
This comb caused debate in 1921. 
The AWU had modified its broad 
gauge comb rule so that shearers 
could use it. 
The 3-pronged cutter was used 
with all three combs. Broad gauge 
combs used a 4-pronged cutter. 
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Shearers called as witnesses by the AWU were an interesting bunch. As the union was 
opposing the grazier claim, witnesses were ‘freedom of choice’ money-makers. The 
usual diehards of mateship who thought things had to be even to be fair were not 
required. Those chosen duly performed, explaining the great benefits of the Cooper 
‘Marvel’ and downplaying its faults. But in the process these witnesses, of varying 
age and experience as shearers, let slip a few home truths that Jack McNeill, 
conducting the case for the AWU, might have preferred were not aired. With 
surprising frankness several of them volunteered that they pulled the teeth on standard 
combs when the ‘Marvel’ was not available. Pulling combs was explicitly forbidden 
by AWU rules, but they had no shame in admitting to it. The 2½  inch limit was 
coming in without any debate, but this begs a question that the AWU’s own 
witnesses, if pressed, might have revealed views that were embarrassingly politically 
incorrect. L. Benson, for example, told the court that he had never used the double 
bent tooth himself, but this was only because he had other preferences. ‘I bend the 
teeth of [standard] Wolseley combs myself’, he brazenly stated. Slightly nonplussed, 
McNeill asked if this might extend the points ‘beyond the measurement’. Benson 
denied it, but it was not a reply that would have convinced anyone present.52 
 
Most of this evidence contradicted what grazier and contractor witnesses said, and 
Justices Powers and Dethridge both chose to reject it.53 Probably the shearers were a 
bit too cavalier in denying some of the problems that the graziers had raised. For 
example, James McIntosh denied that ‘ridging’ was exacerbated by the combs, 
suggesting that ‘other things’ also caused it ‘such as the headgear and faulty 
duplicates’.
54
 S.B. Turnbull, who was a convert to the ‘Marvel’ having previously 
been ‘prejudiced against it’ was also asked about ridging. ‘No. A man who ridges the 
wool [with] one of those combs will ridge it with any comb.’55 
 
Both men were very experienced shearers and no doubt their opinions were solidly 
based. J.W. Allen himself acknowledged that the double bent tooth was not a serious 
problem in the hands of skilled shearers, but he was asking the court to regulate on the 
                                                
52 ABL NAA B1958/ 10 Box 2. Pastoral Award Transcript 1927, p. 609. 
53 The clause on combs came into the Pastoral Award in 1926 under Powers. In 1927, when the AWU 
applied for it to be removed, Dethridge was presiding. 
54 NAA B1958/ 10 Box 2. Pastoral Award Transcript 1927, p. 450. 
55 NAA B1958/ 10 Box 2.  Pastoral Award Transcript 1927, p. 559. 
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basis that most shearers were not of this calibre. Benson, the same man who had 
virtually boasted about pulling Wolseleys, fell into a trap under crafty cross-
examination by Allen. Had he ever cut off the teats of a ewe with a double bent tooth? 
‘I have taken off a few with it’, the shearer admitted freely, ‘but I have taken a few off 
with the others’.56 It was a good answer, but a bit too candid in the circumstances.  
 
The result of all this byplay was a new clause in the Award. 
The shearer shall not, without the consent of the employer, use any comb wider than the 
standard size of two-and-a-half inches, nor shall he use any double bent teeth comb.57 
‘Without the consent of the employer’ was inserted to accommodate farmers who had 
crossbred sheep rather than merinos. This reflected the New Zealand experience, 
where coarse wool breeds prevailed and wide combs had already practically 
eliminated the standard narrow comb from its woolsheds.  
 
The Court heard no evidence at all on the effect of wide combs on shearing. J.W. 
Allen’s lengthy submission in which the (mostly bad) effects of the double bent tooth 
were analysed with forensic detail, contained but a single reference to the wide comb. 
He merely pointed out that as the union had a rule against it, he assumed it would not 
object.
58
 Justice Powers could say no more:  
As to the first part of the claim [i.e. the standard size of two and a half inches] no objection 
has been made.59 
From there, however, it was more complicated, but Powers more or less adopted the 
script that J.W. Allen and R.C. Wilson had provided. 
As to the second, the union strongly objects to the claim, and many shearers prefer the comb 
referred to. It is speaking generally a new comb, and the employers are almost unanimous in 
their objections to it – many of the objections are serious ones. The comb gathers more wool 
than the ordinary 2½ inch standard comb, and is therefore contrary to the first part of the claim 
agreed to. The weight of the evidence is clearly against the double bent comb, but not against 
the comb bent on one side only, which is useful as a guide.60 
Ted Grayndler for the AWU did not deign to refer to the wide comb at all – not even 
to thank the Court for enshrining one of the union’s longstanding rules. Grayndler 
also argued with some passion in defence of the double bent tooth. Shearers should be 
free as individuals to use whatever gear they wished.61 Again, debate concerned the 
                                                
56 NAA B1958/ 10 Box 2. Pastoral Award Transcript 1927, p. 610. 
57 CAR 1926, p. 468. Emphasis added. 
58 NAA B1958/ 10 Box 2. Pastoral Award Transcript 1926, pp. 1141, 1144. 
59 CAR 1926, p. 469. 
60 CAR 1926, p. 469. 
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double bent tooth and entirely ignored the width of the shearing comb. It was already 
taken for granted that there was little point in wasting time arguing about it. 
 
Thus began the career of the clause in the award. Never before had the Court adopted 
an output restricting measure, or even been asked to. Condemnation of the evils of 
contracting, and the quest for a weekly wage rather than piecework were perennially 
floated at the Conference. Flirtation with the ‘universal tally’ in the 1930s was still 
occasionally revisited in the 1950s. However, the AWU leadership understood that 
these preoccupations of mateship alienated its more conservative agrarian wing, and 
always blocked them before it got anywhere near the Arbitration Court. Except for 
Allen, the wide comb ban would have met the same fate. Possibly this explains 
Grayndler’s graceless acceptance of this gift from the graziers, but if he sensed it 
would cause trouble he gave no hint of it. However, nor was there reason to believe 
that broad gauge combs were a matter of much importance. Only half a century later 
did it blow up as the most poisonous issue dividing shearers since the MSU days. 
 
From time to time further refinements occurred. In 1936 there was a modification to 
assuage fresh grazier concerns about new combs without altering the overall thrust of 
the restriction. As in 1926 and 1927, width was hardly mentioned. The award now 
excluded:  
… any comb having a longer tooth on the lower side or in which the space between the last 
two teeth on the lower side is different from the other spaces in the comb.62 
What this actually meant hardly matters. During the hearings J.W. Allen had asked his 
witnesses to comment on the pros and cons of several different combs and the court 
felt that it was creating reasonably intelligible parameters.63 Grayndler was not at all 
concerned that some shearers might have an advantage over others, arguing that ‘you 
cannot make them equal’, whatever regulations apply.64 More significantly, in 1938 
the prerogative of the employer to allow restricted combs was removed.  
The shearer shall not use any comb wider than 2 ½ inches between the points on the outside 
teeth.65 
The wide comb ban was now absolute, but in 1948 it was made even more emphatic 
by placing the onus on the employer as well as the shearer.  
                                                
62 The Worker, 13/5/1936, p. 17. 
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64 The Worker, 20/5/1936, p. 19. 
65 Gibson, Use of Wide Combs, p. 6. Emphasis added. 
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The shearer shall not use, nor shall the employer permit a shearer to use any comb wider than 
2 ½ inches between the points on the outside teeth.66 
This was insurance against the union’s fear that unscrupulous contractors, perish the 
thought, might still try to coerce shearers into using the forbidden instrument. In the 
meantime, in 1942, the union’s rule was also changed to remove all room for 
discretion. What was now Rule122 simply said: 
No member shall use a broad gauge comb and cutter.67 
No ‘ifs’, not ‘buts’. What could be simpler than that?  
 
It is not clear why these modifications were made. They occurred as the PWIU was 
disintegrating and militant shearers were moving back into the AWU, and then as 
wartime shortages of shearers fuelled woolshed conflict. There was no sign yet that 
the graziers or Grazcos saw wide combs as a way of alleviating shearing problems. 
This was still at least 20 years away. Incidents involving ‘pulled combs’ and wide 
combs continued to be reported but there is no sense that it was an escalating issue. 
Probably, the wide comb rule was now seen as part of a long tradition, and references 
to it in the award and union rules were tidied up. Gradually a quite new idea lodged in 
the minds of militant unionists, that the ban had been one of their most cherished 
victories over the squatters. The truth was that the squatters had given it to them on a 
plate 20 years earlier. For non-militants – the majority - the conventional wisdom that 
wide combs were not effective in merinos held sway. There was thus no forceful 
opposing interpretation. That, too, was two decades away.  
 
In 1961 a revealing debate at the AWU Conference indicated how entrenched 
attitudes had become. Clyde Cameron, at the time Secretary of the South Australian 
Branch, moved that the union seek to have the provision prohibiting ‘bent teeth’ 
deleted. The reason, he said, was that there were combs on the market within the 
allowable width, but which might be technically illegal because of the bent nature of 
the bottom tooth. They were popular with shearers and it was suggested that the 
award be altered to facilitate their use.68 It was an eerie echo of 1921. 
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67 AWU Rule Book 1942/43, p. 40. 
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The delegates discussed Cameron’s motion at some length. Charlie Oliver of NSW 
warned that ‘convention should not fiddle with a provision that had stood the test of 
time and meant so much to the Union’.69 He pointed out that Coopers had been forced 
to withdraw a comb which featured a bent tooth because when tested it was 
‘fractionally over 2½ inches’. This was probably a reference to the problem with the 
Cooper Patented Bent Tooth Comb many years before.70  Despite the slight 
inaccuracy, nothing was ever forgotten by the AWU! The Tasmanian delegate, 
Ramsey, asked Cameron whether he was absolutely sure that the combs in question 
were under the allowed 2½ inches. Cameron was not so easily caught out – he had 
double checked his measurements. ‘Yes, a shade’, was the triumphant reply. That was 
good enough for Ramsey, and he said he was in favour of the motion. Delegates were 
prepared to contemplate a change to the ‘bent tooth’ provisions if shearers wanted it, 
but under no circumstances imaginable could the width rule be tampered with. They 
were all speaking to the converted and saw no need to elaborate. It is possible to scour 
AWU debates and find little that explains why this mattered so much. To the 
uninitiated the emphasis on fractional variations in width might have seemed bizarre. 
Certainly the rule on wide combs was of long standing and the difference between 2½ 
and 3 inches had a meaningful impact on tallies. ‘Pulled combs’ had always been a 
bone of contention amongst shearers and the matter had always been policed. But it 
was a marginal issue at best. Offenders had received little encouragement from 
graziers or contractors over the years. As a union cause it did not have a history of 
bitter struggle against the odds. It does not remotely compare, for example, with the 
long and honourable campaign the AWU waged to get improvements in 
accommodation. Nor did it remotely replicate the angst that had been generated over 
the years about wet sheep. In the end the delegates agreed that the matter was too 
touchy for the conference to settle in open debate and Cameron’s resolution was hived 
off to the Executive Council, and to oblivion. The ‘bent tooth’ rule remained, but 
what really mattered was that the wide comb ban was safe from meddling 
interference. It was manifest that it had become a sacred cow of some significance.71  
 
                                                
69 Emphasis added. 
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As the myth became more powerful in the twenty years after 1945, the circumstances 
which sustained it began to unravel. For most of its existence the rule had few 
formidable enemies. Neither graziers nor money-making shearers seriously 
questioned it. The first sign of a crack in the consensus occurred in 1967 when the 
Graziers Association asked the Court to approve wide combs. This failed, but it was a 
telling sign. New Zealand shearers were beginning to make their mark in Western 
Australia and this eventually ended the truce which had existed for fifty years. 
 
Wide Combs Infiltrate the West 
 
Wide combs were brought to Western Australia by New Zealand shearers. Their use 
exploded in mid-1970s. It is clear that Western Australian shearers adopted them 
willingly. In the eastern states union diehards ensured that pulling combs was not 
widespread. In the west it was common before the New Zealand invasion. Terry 
Harper’s shearing career began in the late-1950s with the contractor Eric Kennedy. 
Everyone shore with pulled combs. If they said they didn’t they’re liars. When Eric Kennedy 
told us the union organiser was coming at about 11 o’clock and to put our straight combs on, I 
wouldn’t. Tommy Reeve, Paddy Tuppin and Hank de Kliver all changed to straight combs 
while the organizer was there. He fined me; he said, ‘You know you’re doing the wrong 
thing’. I told him he knew I’d been shearing with them for years and I wasn’t changing!72 
None of the other shearers referred to were New Zealanders. Tommy Reeve who 
began shearing in the early-1950s was more circumspect, but likewise thought of the 
union in much the same way as a grazier. ‘I’ve never had much trouble with unions. 
Only once for pulled combs.’
73
 ‘Snow’ McMeikan went on his first shearing trip in 
the Western Australian pastoral country, also with Eric Kennedy, in March 1952. 
‘Nearly all the shearers used pulled combs’, he observed and could only remember 
one exception. He had only contempt for ‘the red-hot union men’ from Queensland 
who provoked vicious arguments over pulled combs. 
There was a terrible fight one night between the poor old learner, Stan Blatch, and a 
troublemaker from Queensland; Stan took a nasty beating. It made me feel sick in the stomach 
to see his face. It took a long time to heal.74 
 
New Zealanders soon realised they could get away with wide combs, and before long 
their Western Australian brothers were using them.75 Arguments that wide gear 
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precluded high quality shearing were quickly refuted - or perhaps brushed aside – as 
were assertions of wrist and forearm injuries. Valerie Hobson’s interviewees mention 
wide combs and the New Zealand influence. Most commented favourably, some 
enthusiastically. There are dissenting opinions, and some disapproved of law breaking 
while accepting that wide combs were not inherently bad. Astute observers realised 
that different skills were needed to manipulate wider gear, and only the better shearers 
could develop these quickly. This was relevant to the long-running furphy that they 
were ‘harder to push’. If wide combs had produced roughly the same advantages to all 
shearers they might not have been regarded as quite so evil.  
 
Union objections were not a serious handicap, the only real problem being a supply of 
wide gear. New Zealand shearing equipment was mostly imported from the Sunbeam 
plant in western-Sydney. It was unthinkable for Sunbeam to defy a union ban, and a 
black market in re-imported combs developed.76 One the AWU’s problems was that 
its organisers were too thin on the ground. An organiser in the pastoral country found 
shearers working on a weekend, and was treated with contempt. The accepted union 
procedure was to take names and impose fines, but he decided it was futile, and would 
distance the union even further.
77
  
 
Graziers in the pastoral zone belonged to the PGA, which in the late-1970s had about 
600 members. They were bound by the award, but farmers belonging to the Farmers 
Union of Western Australia were not formal respondents. There were about 7,000 of 
these and they owned most of the sheep in the State, now over 30 million.78 If 
shearers were members of the AWU they had to be paid the award but non-members 
were outside it. Farmers were paying award rates or higher, so for shearers wanting to 
flout the rules it was a massive loophole which accelerated the spread of wide combs 
and drained AWU membership. Too late, when wide combs were already having an 
impact in the east, the AWU tried to ‘clean up’ the west. A ‘Roping In’ claim in the 
Commission aimed to bring  the Farmers Union under the Pastoral Award. The claim 
succeeded – in fact, the farmers did not contest it - but faltered in one vital respect. 
                                                                                                                                       
75 AIC Wide Comb Transcript 1982  p. 452. ‘Summary of Transcript – Wide Comb Matter’, p. 16.  
76  This did not stop the AWU from ‘black banning’ the company in 1982. 
77 ABL, , N117/380, Butcher to Keenan, 20/5/1985; N117/378, General Secretary to Executive 
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Commissioner Barnes concluded that wide combs were so ubiquitous that she 
exempted the whole of Western Australia from the ban, at least for the time being! 
She did direct the parties to confer amongst themselves to see if they could reach a 
satisfactory outcome. All was not lost for the AWU, but it was a serious blow.
79
  
 
Showdown in Eastern Australia 
 
One of the objections to wide combs was that they were not effective in merino wool. 
It was a matter of design because wide combs had been manufactured for New 
Zealand wool.
80
 The teeth were too thick to move easily through finer wool, and there 
were other issues. In the evenings after shearing Robert White spent hours on the 
grinder experimenting with different ways of ‘touching up’ the combs to improve 
their performance. These innovations were ultimately adopted by Sunbeam to mass 
manufacture a merino-type wide comb. By the mid-1980s there were several makes 
producing satisfactory results and much useful advice on shearing methods.
81
 White 
and the New Zealanders always believed in this possibility, whereas unionists – many 
of them very accomplished shearers – flatly denied it.82  At this stage of the affair, 
White was acting ‘outside the law’ – as Charlie Oliver pointed out – and the AWU at 
least could claim the high moral ground.83  
 
In 1980 a NSW grazier observed that a shearer doing 200 a day with wide combs had 
been getting about 150 with narrow gear. He considered the wide comb work ‘a lot 
cleaner’, although he noted that they needed to be ‘used by experienced men’. With 
more wool coming off he was reducing his average cost of shed hands. The AWU was 
equally attached to the status quo. Union rallies in NSW towns drew large crowds. In 
January 1980 Dave Hollis, an AWU stalwart from Western Australia, gave a spirited 
account of the ‘Situation in Western Australia practiced by Scab Shearers including 
New Zealand shearers and assisted by Employers’. The key message was that if wide 
combs were allowed in, it was opening the way for other provisions to be lost. He put 
his concerns on paper for the NSW Branch Secretary in a document titled ‘How The 
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West Was Lost’. New Zealand practices, he said, were a ‘leprosy’ that would spread 
throughout Australia if wide combs were not stopped.84  
 
The Livestock and Grain Producers Association (LGPA) sought modernisation of the 
wide comb clause.85 The matter was handled in a diplomatic, even conciliatory 
manner, insisting that it did not want to impose wide combs against the wishes of the 
AWU. It suggested trials could be conducted with scientific objectivity to settle any 
questions arising. The AWU refused to co-operate so a formal application was lodged 
with the Industrial Commission get legal underpinning for a series of experiments to 
test the efficacy of the wide comb. This coincided with the ‘Roping In’ case, in which 
the union was signalling its desire to reinforce the ban rather than wind it back. 
Woolgrowers still believed there were grounds for optimism, despite union posturing.  
 
Both matters were combined before Commissioner Barnes. A settlement of sorts was 
reached. The application for trials was reserved, basically because the union would 
not concede it, but the union did not get quite what it wanted in Western Australia, as 
noted above. Nothing had been properly resolved but nor were any doors slammed 
shut. Barnes sent them away to confer, and come back to the Commission with 
suggestions. If both matters could be resolved without further Commission 
intervention, so much the better. Barnes must have thought she had done the trick, 
because the Commission heard nothing more for 15 months. Industrial relations 
reformers at the NFF began to focus on the wide comb issue. However, neither the 
NFF nor the Commission quite realised that the AWU would man the barricades over 
wide combs.
86 
 
 
If it was quiet at the Industrial Commission, out in the bush feelings were on the boil. 
A number of union rallies were held and Ernie Ecob became the public face of the 
anti-wide comb cause. He had recently been promoted to NSW Branch Secretary after 
a long career as an AWU organiser at Coonamble. He was steeped in 1956 mateship 
folklore, fumed about squatters, scabs, and ‘Western Australians and New 
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Zealanders’.
87
 Inertia rather than militancy probably best describes the AWU 
Executive Council, but they all reflected the same ingrained prejudice against wide 
combs that the debate in 1961 had revealed. Certainly none of them sensed the wider 
social shifts that the graziers’ new stance reflected, or the risk that they were digging 
themselves in.88  As the NFF interest intensified any realistic possibility of a deal was 
being poisoned, but it was slow to realise it. Accordingly the situation drifted without 
the resolution expected.
89
 The AWU was already set against compromise when 
Houlihan reported to his Executive Committee: 
The Union is as sick of it as we are and if we give them an honourable way out they will 
accept it. This presupposes that we don’t have any major flare-up over wide combs before we 
are able to coax the matter into the Commission for them to direct trials to take place. Credit 
must be given to the LGPA for the way it has managed to keep the issue off boiling point in 
NSW particularly in light of Charlie Oliver’s frequent calls to arms on this issue.90 
Oliver’s private assurances to Houlihan were at odds with his militant rhetoric in a 
speech at Dubbo. ‘You have the law on your side, you have the Trade Union 
Movement, you have never changed, so don’t change now’.91 Dennis McIntosh 
remembers it as an inspiring oration.  Whether the meetings expressed rank-and-file 
opinion or had been stirred up by Ernie Ecob is debateable. There is no doubt, 
however, that Ecob and Oliver were popular figures amongst the AWU faithful.92      
 
The flare-up soon occurred. There had been constant friction when AWU officials 
visited woolsheds at shearing time. If shearers were using wide combs they were 
usually doing so with the full approval of the grazier and AWU intrusions were 
resented. One case was the focus of an ABC ‘Countrywide’ program in May 1981. 
Properties shearing with wide combs had been ‘black banned’ by the AWU and were 
unable to receive vital supplies of stock-feed. Other farmers were helping, a telling 
sign that graziers were in a militant mood. Robert White was often the contractor in 
these skirmishes and was ‘black banned’ after an episode at Rockdale station. He 
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claimed his shearers were not using wide combs but the union claimed he was in 
breach of AWU rules merely by talking about wide combs.93 Despite his leper status 
White was still a union ticket holder. He was summoned to the Executive Council to 
explain himself. Surprisingly he agreed to appear, writing a long letter in advance 
explaining why his activities were in the long run interests of shearers. The AWU was 
convinced he was collaborating with the NFF. He was certainly personally known to 
NFF officials, and they in turn were enraged at the way he was victimised. It was 
becoming clear that the AWU was implacably opposed, even to trials of the wide 
comb and the LGPA returned to the Commission in November 1981 with a claim to 
lift the wide comb ban unconditionally. The gloves were off. The AWU retaliated by 
re-listing its claim to have the wide comb banned in Western Australia. The peace 
settlement Commissioner Barnes had hoped for had evaporated, but it was now 
Commissioner Ian McKenzie’s problem. For the AWU the ban symbolised past 
victories over the squatters. For NFF it represented much of what they detested about 
‘union power’.
94 
In a series of hearings and appeals officials of the NFF and the AWU 
haggled in the Industrial Commission for almost three years – from November 1981 
to July 1984. 
 
1982 Arbitration Case 
 
The initial case ran from November 1981 to the middle of 1982. The evidence was 
tedious, and at times farcical. Both side brought in legions of witnesses, shearers and 
others selected to say what they wanted the Commission to hear. Hour after hour, day 
after day AWU loyalists bemoaned the poor quality of shearing and the extra strain 
imposed on their wrists and forearms. It would be bad for the wool industry. Why 
interfere with something that had been around so long? They said less about what was 
really on their minds – that it was unfair, or a secret plot of the NFF to reduce 
shearing rates – although the notion that it was ‘divisive’ and upsetting the ‘harmony’ 
of the industry did get considerable air play. Witnesses included a sprinkling of 
graziers and contractors who wanted things left as they were. McKenzie received 
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enough correspondence, over an above what he heard in evidence, to convince him 
that opinions were firmly held and that some violence was occurring.  The NFF 
brought in a corresponding stream of witnesses who said exactly the opposite – 
shearers who insisted it made the work easier, and graziers and contractors who 
declared there was no problem with the quality of the shearing provided the 
practitioners knew what they were doing.   
 
Hearings adjourned and the parties had to wait several months for McKenzie to sift 
the evidence. Perhaps he, too, was having trouble understanding what the fuss was 
over. Houlihan told his superiors he was confident the Commission would rule in their 
favour. Eventually it did just that on 10 December 1982. Robert White heard that it 
was imminent and drove all night to be in the court. McKenzie’s judgement was 
lengthy and quoted extensively from the transcripts.95 In his view the extensive use of 
wide combs in Western Australia could not be ignored. Evidence given by equipment 
suppliers was ‘strong and compelling’. The formal change to the clause was not all 
that breathtaking, and amounted to reintroducing the employer prerogative that had 
been removed in 1938. Few employers in 1982, however, would refuse any shearer 
wanting to use wide gear. The effect of it was that the 56 year ban was lifted. The 
union rule of over 70 years still applied, but Robert White and his followers would not 
be taking any notice of that.96  
 
The decision provoked an immediate crisis within the AWU and it issued a belligerent 
statement calling the decision ‘repugnant’ and an appeal was launched. Over two 
months a Full Bench listened to a detailed review of the evidence but, on 23 March 
1983, upheld McKenzie’s decision. The appeal judgement ran to nine pages, and was 
savagely critical of the AWU. The union’s stance was ‘hedged in by conservatism and 
tinged with hysteria’.  The Bench considered that restrictions were ‘calculated to 
smother the development and manufacture of more efficient combs’.97 Finally, it saw 
the union’s complaint in the appeal proceedings that there had been no trials for what 
it was. 
                                                
95 The AWU appeal claimed McKenzie had ignored critical evidence.  
96 CAR Print F1367, pp. 200-201. 
97 CAR Print F2060, p. 7. 
 285 
In light …. of the implacable opposition of the AWU to any such trial and its refusal to attend, 
should they have been conducted, the sincerity of this submission is open to question.98 
 
The 1983 Strike and Aftermath 
 
The Executive Council met in crisis to consider this calculated insult, but it had 
already created a situation it could not control. Telegrams poured into the office 
condemning the Commission. A strike was called, and the dispute was now a test of 
will. 99 Violence underlined bitter feelings between unionists and ‘scabs’. A Land 
photograph showed the battered face of Bill Allen, a 50 year old overseer at 
‘Mutaroo’ in South Australia. McLachlan and Houlihan saw the strike as an 
opportunity to break ‘compulsory unionism’. Grazcos co-ordinated the supply of 
strike-breakers, some of them brought in from New Zealand. Security ‘precautions’ 
were arranged. Neil Ellery, a New Zealander operating in Western Australia, came 
over to do a run of sheds. He made enemies not only of the AWU, but contractors 
who were cut out of sheds. The AWU used spotter planes to identify sheds where 
shearing was taking place. Raids on ‘scab sheds’ were often undisciplined, 
spontaneously decided on during drinking sessions. Woolshed arson occurred. 
Shotguns, iron bars or heavy sticks were used on occasions.  There was claim and 
counter claim as to who was to blame for violence. On balance, though, shearing 
continued.  
 
The Shearing Contractors Association adopted a more neutral stance, mindful that 
when it was all over people would have to work together again.100  The strike was 
looking shaky when the AWU Executive Council met on 5 May 1983. The 
Commonwealth Government was pressing for a settlement. While the meeting was in 
progress a letter from K.J. Crawford, Secretary of the Shearing Contractors’ 
Association, was hand delivered.  The message was brutally frank. Headed “MOST 
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CONFIDENTIAL URGENT”, it went on: ‘hundreds of members ….. are willing to 
defy Union direction and return to work as a mass body.’ This was from friends, not 
NFF propaganda. The letter suggested shearers were now concerned about ‘Hire 
Purchase, Bank Cards, Housing Loans, etc. High interest rates etc.’ It contained a 
garbled but penetrating appraisal of trends in shearing culture: 
At the same time this is 1983, not 1956, in the younger generation of shearers the nostalgia 
does not last as in the past, reason being Suburban shearing. The traditional yarn around the 
fire, to keep the pot simmering, like the fire has gone out.101 
 
The AWU’s legal advisers explained that its position was weak.102 Having stirred up 
rank-and-file passions, it did not have an exit strategy. McKenzie was also sensitive to 
grassroots passions, and reluctant to rely on the Commission’s overarching legal 
power. This was the crutch that enabled the AWU to take the matter back to the 
Commission for another arbitration marathon. At the behest of the new Federal 
Minister for Industrial Relations, Ralph Willis, a conference was held. It was chaired 
by McKenzie, and attended by officials of the Union, the NFF, the LGPA, and the 
Minister’s Department. The six point agreement ending the strike accepted that the 
risk of shearers’ injury might still be an issue, and the Commission agreed to hear 
more evidence. It was emphasised that this was not a ‘re-hearing’ but an opportunity 
to assess aspects not previously considered. The Commissioner was not prepared to 
restore the wide comb ban while arbitration was continuing, but, aware of the 
potential for violence, stipulated that employers were required not to discriminate 
against shearers who might still want to use narrow combs. Correspondingly, wide 
comb shearers should not be intimidated by AWU organisers.103  
 
Hearings for the next phase of the legal battle began in June 1983 and continued until 
April 1984 – another 10 months of remorseless testimony, little of it shedding new 
light. The Shearing Contractors Association had finally decided that change was for 
the best and Ivan Letchford’s testimony had a deep impact on McKenzie.
104
 
Contractors feel the wide comb is a great technological advancement with tremendous 
assistance to all concerned in the industry: the shearers, the grazier, and above all the animal 
itself. These are the considered opinions of the executive committee of the Shearing 
                                                
101 ABL N117/376(b) Crawford to Mitchell, 5/5/1983. 
102 ABL N117/368(b), File note; ABL N117/376(a) Commins & Co. to Mitchell, 28/3/1983. 
103 CAR, 5/6/1984, Print F5655, pp. 3-4. 
104 The copy of the transcript in the AIC archives is marked with red ink and an orange highlighter. It 
makes clear that some testimony particularly influenced McKenzie. 
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Contractors’ Association of Australia, after a discussion at our annual meeting and a survey of 
our members.105 
Letchford added that contractors would always shear to the award and abide by 
arbitration. Commissioner McKenzie handed down his final decision on 5 June 1984.    
I am satisfied that the conclusions reached in my decision of 10 December 1982 were correct 
and to return to the exclusive use of 64mm combs would be against the weight of evidence.  
and:  
I again stress that this industry cannot remain impervious to technological change.106  
 
AWU will to fight was now tempered by fatigue, but it was not quite the end of the 
haggling over combs. In a last ditch stand the AWU argued that there was an 
argument for standardisation, echoing the members’ rule of 1910 that everyone should 
use the same. The NFF strongly opposed it but the Commissioner, uneasy about 
continuing woolshed disturbances, established a committee to investigate.  The wide 
comb dispute as such lost momentum, but the parties continued to bicker. Houlihan 
thought the AWU was internally divided on how to define a standard comb. Shearing 
machine manufacturers were already producing a variety of combs and shearers were 
establishing preferences dictated by individual taste, the type of sheep, and the 
condition of the fleece. Already combs were exceeding 86 mm, but width was only 
one of many parameters. Regulation was no longer practicable. The committee met 
spasmodically in the second half of 1984, but the discussion went round in circles and 
no concrete proposals emerged. The wide comb dispute, per se, had run out of 
oxygen. But it certainly was not the end of vigorous AWU protest against the 
workplace regime the NFF was relentlessly promoting. Opposition transmogrified 
into a campaign against New Zealand shearers that lasted for another decade.107 
 
The Court of the Bush 
 
Meanwhile, in the ‘court in the bush’, a separate battle raged.108 While the first phase 
of hearings was dragging on tension in the regions persisted. Sheep still had to be 
shorn – wide combs at this stage were still illegal, but how long would this be the 
                                                
105 AIC Wide Comb Transcript 1984, p. 2392. 
106 CAR, Print F5655,  pp. 85, 86. 
107 Senate Standing Committee on Rural and Regional Affairs, Employment of Visitors to Australia in 
the Shearing Industry, The Parliament of the Commonwealth of Australia, Canberra, February 1994. 
108 The expression was used by a witness at the Commission. Arbitration Commission, AIC Wide 
Comb Transcript 1983, p. 1899.  
 288 
case? Robert White was the victim of a number of violent attacks, and he bought 
guard dogs and carried firearms. Shearers were in two opposing camps. Ken Prato 
from Ballarat discovered this when he returned to shearing in 1982 after an absence of 
three or four years. The first question anyone asked when he applied for a job was 
‘Wide or Narrow?’ Prato was a very competitive shearer, but was also a stickler for 
unionism with finely judged ideas of solidarity. By no means could he be called a 
‘hot-head’ but he believed shearers should stick up for their rights and firmly believed 
wide combs were a sinister plot to undermine conditions. He remained loyal to the 
narrow comb system. 
 
During the strike and immediately after some of the worst violence occurred. 
Australian Penthouse Magazine published a graphic insider’s account of Ellery’s 
gangs in the Bourke and Brewarrina areas during the early months of 1984. By now 
wide combs were legal. However, at dispersed woolsheds the Commission’s ideal of 
fair play according to the six-point plan was not easily enforced. Both sides accused 
each other of underhand practices. According to the NFF the majority of shearers 
simply accepted the Court’s decision, experimented with wide combs, and found them 
convenient to use. Manufacturers reported that they could not keep up with the 
demand for wide combs. The union countered that suppliers had flooded the market 
with wide combs, effectively denying shearers a choice. Grazcos was accused of not 
employing narrow comb teams. The reality was that an overwhelming majority of 
shearers had already switched to wide comb use, although some may have done so 
reluctantly.109 Contractors who had been sceptics mostly changed their minds.  
 
Ken Prato was one who could not accept the ruling and he remained a narrow comb 
shearer for the 1984 season. He had been working with a contractor who did not 
employ wide comb shearers, so he was able to get sheds. It was, he acknowledged 
years later, ‘partly from fear of change and partly from the ingrained staunch anti-
scabbing philosophy we had always followed’. As the season progressed, ‘stories of 
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the tallies being shorn by quite average shearers began to filter through’. He heard of 
one man, who he knew as ‘someone who had usually snagged along at 120-130 a day 
in quite good sheep’, getting his ‘first 200’. Prato was a highly competitive shearer, 
despite everything, and there was only so much of this he could take. Apart from the 
acknowledged conservatism, his main fear was the often stated one of extra physical 
stress. But he ‘began to rethink’. He resolved to finish off the season, but to have a go 
with wide combs in 1985.  
 
The contractor was finding it harder to get shearers, and seemed relieved when Prato 
broached the subject with him. They mutually agreed -  ‘we have had our heads in the 
sand a bit’. Even so, Prato felt a disquieting guilt on his first day on the board with a 
handpiece fitted with wide gear. ‘That first big wide blow down the belly seemed like 
a swipe with a lawn mower’. It did take time to develop the necessary tricks. He still 
thinks that narrow gear, overall, does a cleaner job, but his own tallies lifted by about 
20 a day. Like Letchford the contractor, Prato was critical of the AWU. The strike 
would have been more effective, many thought, if conducted in the main part of the 
shearing season (July or August).110 This is doubtful. Strikes had been tried in August 
in 1922, 1930 and 1945 and all had been easily broken. Robert White, Neil Ellery and 
Grazcos would have been just as busy in August as they had been in April. No matter, 
it was a widespread view and the AWU suffered mass defections from previously 
loyal members. White and his friends no longer felt the need to bother, and Ellery had 
been a conspicuous anti-unionist from the beginning.111   
 
Resistance to wide combs was driven by deep emotion as much as by reason. Blanche 
D’Alpuget toured western-NSW in 1987 with a photographer to compile a coffee-
table book called ‘The Workers’. Inevitably, it included shearers. Grievances from the 
wide comb dispute were still raw, and she wrote: 
From the outset the AWU leadership treated the wide-comb dispute as an argument about 
values – is it moral? – and not about facts – is it efficient? The narrow comb was made to 
symbolise Truth, Beauty and the True Shearer, the Archetypal Mate. The wide-comb was 
described by AWU officials as ‘immoral and repulsive’. It was Satan’s thing. 112 
The AWU was reacting to, and to some extent stirring up, feelings running though the 
gruff sentimentalists in its ranks. This group romanticised mateship but the most 
                                                
110 Written statement by Ken Prato prepared for Paul Wiliams, 25 April 2003, pp. 1-2. 
111 Business Review Weekly, Vol. 11, No. 20, 26/5/1989, p. 32. 
112 Blanche D’Alpuget and Oliver Strewe, The Workers, Collins Australia, Sydney, 1987, p. 116.  
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obvious manifestation of this was a surly, and sometimes thuggish attitude to 
outsiders. There was a strong sense that the 1956 strike had proved that union strength 
could be asserted if the arbitration court got things ‘wrong’. Over and over again the 
mantra was repeated that concessions to graziers risked an erosion of conditions 
achieved through years of struggle and group solidarity. That wide combs might 
benefit shearers - an increasingly widespread opinion - was rejected out of hand. If the  
graziers wanted the rule changed there was an ulterior motive. The NFF did indeed 
have an ‘agenda’, but it was doing it less than justice to suggest that the primary goal 
was to return shearers’ conditions to the ‘bad old days’.   
 
A year after publication of The Shearers Patsy Adam-Smith, as the extant expert on 
shearing culture, was asked to enlighten mystified urban Australians about the wide 
comb dispute. ‘There is no art, craft or calling so little understood as shearing’ – an air 
of mystery seemed appropriate but she was warming to an exposition of the 
bushworker legend: 
The shearers’ way of life has been with us almost since the coming of the First Fleet. It is a 
true grassroots industry. The shearer is the epitome of the traditional Australian and has had a 
greater effect on our national ethos and history than almost any other character.113 
The rest of the article repeated union propaganda about the evils wide combs 
embodied, and drew a parallel between the present strife and great union battles of the 
past: 
History is repeating itself and if a solution is not found swiftly, the wheel will have turned full 
circle back to the 1890s when the cause of the flashpoint was similar to today’s and the result 
was tragic for a nation with worker pitted against worker, shearer against ‘free labour’ ….., 
[and] farmer against shearer.114 
What was in fact happening was that the last vestiges of the mateship myth were 
being stripped away. It was disintegrating under the weight of changes in the way 
society was ordered. This was not as out of sync with grassroots opinion as Patsy 
Adam-Smith believed and some sections of it were actually driving the revolution.  
 
Conclusion 
 
The narrative of underdogs battling power and privilege is a stock-in-trade of 
Australian nationalism. It has spawned a reverse snobbery denigrating elitism, the 
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‘cultural cringe’, and pretentiousness. Indeed, there is a certain pride in unrefined 
manners and levelling humour. Selected from a much quoted paragraph in the 
opening pages of The Australian Legend, this in part was how Russel Ward 
characterised his ‘typical Australian’.  
He is a ‘hard case’, sceptical about the value of religion and of intellectual and cultural 
pursuits  generally. He believes that Jack is not only as good as his master but, at least in 
principle, probably a good deal better, and so he is a great ‘knocker’ of eminent people unless, 
as in the case of his sporting heroes, they are distinguished by physical prowess. He is a 
fiercely independent person who hates officiousness and authority, especially when these 
qualities are embodied in military officers and policemen.115 
It rings true, both to people who admire Australian society and those who belittle it. 
Possibly its penetrating accuracy explains the enormous success of Ward’s work. He 
finds the legend in convicts, Irish migrants, gold miners, bushrangers and ‘nomad’ 
bushworkers. Ward saw it, too, in nineteenth century shearers, but the type is easily 
recognisable in the twentieth century.116  
 
‘Mateship’ was vague enough and sufficiently adaptable to fit various conceptions of 
Australian culture. Hirst’s ‘Pioneer’ type is associated with settlement rather than 
itinerancy, but had a lot of Ward’s ‘practical man’ who is ‘willing to have a go’117. 
The Anzac legend utilises comparable elements of the egalitarian impulse. Australian 
soldiers were disrespectful towards officers, yet seen as effective fighters; self-reliant 
pioneer selectors resented rich squatters and miserly banks; shearers formed a 
powerful union to get fair conditions from those who would deny them.  
 
In shearing sheds there were class divisions with origins in the different social and 
economic positions of squatters and selectors in the nineteenth century, which 
persisted into the twentieth as they became graziers and farmers. Ward’s legend 
captured elements of this, but so does Hirst’s. Early in the century C.E.W. Bean 
recognised the ‘autocracy’ of the homestead which kept station hands and jackeroos 
subservient, and the ‘republic’ of the woolshed. Squatters, if they were wise, took 
shearers ‘meetings’ seriously. There was a strong countervailing strain of meritocracy 
in the shearing workforce. Bean called it ‘the genius of the Australian character’, but 
others thought genius lay in the attribute which Bean criticised - the collective 
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willingness to stand up to the squatters.
118
 Social evolution roughened the edges of 
these distinctions and evened some of them out.119 
 
Meritocracy did not have to be invented. It was always present. Historians of all 
ideological shades agree that the 1890s Queensland strikes failed because pastoralists 
engaged ‘free labour’ (‘scabs’ to the unionists). Shearers were easily found in the 
agricultural districts of Victoria, Tasmania – and also New Zealand.
120
 While some 
were unemployed and others from cash-poor struggling selections, the Marxist 
interpretation of them as an exploited low wage reserve army is unconvincing. 
Certainly, the MSU shearers of the decade before World War I cannot be 
characterised this way. Nor can Jack Howe and his ilk from the sheds of the 1890s. 
During the twentieth century the mantle of the desperate farmer continued to be seen 
amongst soldier settlers and amid the ruins of the Great Depression. Equally, there is 
evidence of strong upward mobility within the shearing workforce, and of farming 
families which profited from land settlement policies. The biographies of the wheat 
farmer, Arthur Cosh, and the shearing contractor Raymond Stibbard have similar 
elements. Both were from New England. Many shearers came from similar 
backgrounds. They had good relationships with the shearers they employed.
121
  In the 
aftermath of the 1956 strike, competition shearing and innovations such as Tally-Hi 
were symptomatic of a largely unnoticed strengthening of the meritocracy instinct.122  
 
On the other hand, there were pockets of disadvantage which harboured ongoing and 
deep grievances, especially in Queensland and western-NSW. This was manifest in a 
number of ways. Shearers from Longreach and Barcaldine had inherited their culture 
from the strike camps. In the 1920s they resented contract shearers from ‘the south’. 
Much later, they resented wide comb New Zealanders even more.123 The 
Bushworkers’ Propaganda Group and the PWIU were never mass movements, but 
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119 See Chapter 2. 
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sufficiently irritating to both the AWU and the graziers to preoccupy them for almost 
four decades.124 Militants were especially annoying because they claimed some of 
their authenticity from bush union myths which the AWU felt it owned. This lured the 
AWU into a greater degree of belligerence towards graziers and farmers than 
situations warranted. This was especially true, it is argued, of the 1956 strike.125 
 
For a union that had built its considerable influence around the arbitration system, the 
stubborn refusal to accept Commission decisions during the wide comb dispute was 
out of character, although this was also true of 1956. It did so, apparently, because it 
believed there was substantial grassroots opposition to wide combs. Ernie Ecob 
certainly convinced the Executive Council and reports of violence gave credence to 
the view. But violence also alienated unionists from their rural communities, and the 
gruff threatening tone of AWU rhetoric did not play well on television.126 Many union 
members were profoundly uneasy about the implications of wide combs, but very few 
supported a militant approach. Commissioner Ian McKenzie was very cognisant of 
violence out in the woolsheds. He thought the AWU case thoroughly unconvincing, 
but he did not want a decision that was unenforceable. The AWU is a large and 
powerful union operating in many industries, but its heart and soul had been defined 
by its historic shearing roots. From this perspective the wide comb dispute was 
disastrous. Shearers of all shades of opinion deserted it over its handling of the issue. 
Statistics are not available but one union official admitted, ‘There was a lot of 
disillusionment after that dispute. It gave a good excuse to many shearers not to 
continue paying union dues’.127 
 
Unionism had always found money-making uncomfortable and wavered between 
trying to suppress and accommodate it. In the long run, though, individualist ambition 
was actually more influential in shaping the culture of woolsheds than class conflict 
and its fellow traveller the arbitration system. Although in its earliest form contracting 
was linked to pastoralists, the class enemy, shearers immediately took to it, some a 
                                                
124 See Chapter 7. 
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little unwillingly it must be acknowledged. The evolution of country based contractors 
followed closer settlement and farming, but this was also possible because of the pre-
existing individualistic elements within shearing culture. 
 
Similarities between the legends have been noted but differences, and perhaps even 
more, contradictions within them, are just as intriguing. Free of ‘old world’ social 
hierarchies, Australian ideas of democracy differed noticeably from winner-take-all 
American-style freedoms centred on meritocracy. Ted Graynder commented in 1927 
on the brutality of American industrial relations. Probably there were nods of 
agreement from employers as well as his AWU mates.
128
 Nonetheless, opportunity in 
Australia, no less than in America, could not always guarantee that the outcome 
would be ‘fair’. 
                   
The wide comb dispute’s role in the economic transformation of Australia in the 
1980s was minor. Wool was no longer the pivot of the economy. Nevertheless, the 
timing and symbolism were exquisite. ‘Laborism’ had reigned for eight decades and 
the heavy hand of centralised arbitration and protection of employment intensive 
industries defined the practicalities of the Australian ‘fair go’. A Labor Government 
was now setting about its destruction. That the ‘Deakinite’ consensus of the 
Federation era would disintegrate in the late-twentieth century will perhaps become as 
interesting to economic and social historians as the economic, social and 
environmental turmoil of the 1890s which led to its creation. It has, rightly, already 
been categorised as ‘a peaceful revolution’.129  
 
Graziers were amongst the first to re-embark on the laissez faire bandwagon, but 
shearers provide a more interesting insight into the social values which made such a 
revolution possible. Their culture of mateship had elements which were highly 
collective, and others which were intensely individualistic. They had played a major 
part in defining the egalitarian ‘fair go’ in the first place, and staunchly resisted 
attacks on its integrity from 1916 to 1956, and after. There was a rear guard action, of 
course, but when the moment of truth arrived, the money-making individualism which 
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had always been part of their ethos triumphed over mateship. Contract shearing, 
which predated the arrival of arbitration, glided into the new era, as always virtually 
unnoticed. 
 
The union’s failure reflected bigger social forces. The Hawke Labor Government 
swept into office at the very moment that the wide comb matter erupted into open 
conflict.
130
 The new government, with the ex-shearer Mick Young in Cabinet, did not 
want its ‘Economic Summit’ compromised by inconvenient associations with ‘old’ 
unionism. While Hawke’s government maintained a touching faith in arbitration 
through what it called ‘The Accord’, it liberalised financial controls and slashed 
tariffs, accelerating the exit of the old economic order. There is no more poignant 
indicator of the predicament that confronted the AWU in 1983 and 1984. Society had 
moved away from the rigidly regulated economic system which tried to deliver an 
egalitarian outcome. Nonetheless, the mythology of the shearers’ fight for a ‘fair go’ 
from the squatters still resonates in general attitudes to income distribution and social 
justice. The struggle goes on in the hearts and minds of a well-paid consumer society 
where the ‘underdog’ has long triumphed. Yet the shearers themselves had always 
resisted this approach.  
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